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Introduction
State Formation in the Fifteenth Century and the 
Western Eurasian Canvas: Problems and 
Opportunities
Jo Van Steenbergen
1 Whither Eurasian State Formation? Claims, Pitfalls and 
Opportunities*
The concept, practice, institution and appearance of ‘the state’ have been hotly 
debated ever since the emergence of history as a discipline within modern 
scholarship. Over the past century debates over states and statist systems, and 
around issues of their emergence and transformation throughout human his-
tory, have been substantially molded by the visions of towering figures such as 
Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, Max Weber and many others. At the same time, 
they have taken on many different guises along a wide variety of intellectual 
trajectories. Indeed, research on states and their formation and transforma-
tion, already a vast field, continues to expand rapidly. Approaches and con-
cepts have been legion, bringing in more specific if rarely un-problematic ana-
lytical or descriptive forms and types, such as the ‘feudal state’, the ‘patrimonial 
state’, the ‘dynastic state’, the ‘bureaucratic state’ or the ‘(early) modern state’. 
The scholarly bibliography on these forms and types of state in various disci-
plines of the social sciences and humanities is obviously colossal. Any attempt 
to reconstruct these debates in the context of the introduction to this volume 
on state formation in fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asian history therefore 
inevitably risks remaining at the most superficial level. Nevertheless, at this 
point we should probably emphasize two points related to these debates. 
These issues, outlined in the next paragraphs, offer grounds not just for the 
relevance of thinking carefully about state formation in any fifteenth-century 
* This introduction has been finalized within the context of the project ‘The Mamlukisation of 
the Mamluk Sultanate ii: Historiography, Political Order and State Formation in Fifteenth-
Century Egypt and Syria’ (UGent, 2017–21); this project has received funding from the Euro-
pean Research Council (erc) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and inno-
vation program (Consolidator Grant agreement No 681510). Thanks are due to my colleagues 
Jan Dumolyn and Frederik Buylaert for contributing to earlier versions of this introduction 
with most valuable comments and suggestions.
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research context. As this volume will also argue, these two points also combine 
to make a strong case for the importance of pursuing more ‘entangled’ and 
connected historical as well as historiographical trajectories to conduct such 
inquiries.
First of all, for a variety of reasons—some obvious and some less so—the 
adoption and elaboration of different visions, concepts and types of states and 
state formations have arguably been largely dominated by Eurocentrist ap-
proaches. Indeed, certainly in the Enlightenment and Hegelian traditions 
which are at the origin of all modern debates on the ‘state’, Eurocentrism is not 
just a small embarrassing problem that new generations of scholars have to 
correct. Since the development of the humanities and social sciences from the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries onwards, Eurocentrist categories of anal-
ysis and Eurocentrist empirical research programs have been central to all 
theories on the origins of the ‘state’—and indeed of ‘modernity’ itself. The 
‘state’ is doubtless one of the key conceptual pillars of modernity, along with 
‘rationality’, ‘capitalism’, ‘freedom’, ‘division of labor’ and other such master sig-
nifiers. Indeed, descriptions of the past, whether the European idea of the ‘past 
as a foreign country’ or the Orientalist imaginary of the ‘Other’s’ history or lack 
thereof, have always been a way of talking about the present or about unful-
filled futures. In this respect the ‘state’ and its relationship to ‘society’ have al-
ways represented a central stake in the debate.
This presentist or even teleological and Western bias in the classical sociol-
ogy of modernity has now almost universally been recognized. In fact, in re-
cent decades there has been a noticeable increase in interest in the develop-
ment of more specific tools and insights for the study of premodern and 
non-European polities and for gaining a better understanding of premodern 
and non-European ‘statist’ practices, institutions and discourses of power, dis-
tinction, integration, redistribution and order. Nevertheless—and this is the 
second important point for comparative purposes—, understandings of states 
and state systems tend to move at greatly differing speeds in different fields of 
historical research, and these fields themselves often employ extremely diver-
gent epistemological and heuristic parameters. As such, our understandings of 
states and state systems generally continue to lack proper and nuanced aware-
ness of recent research achievements and advances in cognate contexts, 
whether European or non-European. The concept of ‘the state’ is widely used 
in more or less theoretically informed ways across history. However, people 
working in different regional and chronological fields of specialization hardly 
ever understand the notion in similar ways, and the complex dynamics of this 
great divergence are often even less appreciated across such different research 
traditions. Dominant paradigms within these traditions may be influenced by 
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various diverging, or even incompatible, forms of social theory. This can com-
plicate valid comparative research, especially when apparently similar catego-
ries of analysis—including the very notion of the ‘state’ itself—mean different 
things in different research traditions. This is particularly true when these dif-
ferent meanings are not explained explicitly, are only used in extremely fuzzy 
ways, or retain an imported, even exogenous or anachronistic, flavor to them.
This volume wishes to help build bridges between these multivalent con-
ceptions of state formation, making links between different conceptions of 
how Eurasian practices, institutions and discourses of legitimate violence, 
 resource redistribution, social differentiation, political integration and order 
have changed over time and across space. We work on the basis of the sim-
ple proposition that, despite the available, perhaps even conflicting, macro- 
narratives, this intellectual process of more ‘entangled’ trans-regional and 
trans-dynastic writing about history benefits most from starting bottom-up 
and considering relationships between the specific practices and interpreta-
tions of the different socio-cultural formations of the Eurasian zone. Further-
more, we work on the basis of the claim that the particularities and ‘entangle-
ments’ of non-European rulers and elites require much more empirical and 
interpretive research to shift the balance away from Eurocentrist (or other-
centrist) analytical perspectives, and toward more decentered considerations 
of diverse Eurasian trajectories of state formation. Here we actually encounter 
another, arguably even more fundamental, caveat that hampers the building 
of these interpretive bridges in meaningful, stable ways. Within the entire field 
of late medieval Eurasian political history there are huge differences in how 
many research traditions have dealt with the rich and often abundant variety 
of extant source material. Most relevant to consider for this volume and its 
focus on Western Eurasia is the disparity between the topics that have been 
studied (and restudied) on the basis of the relatively abundant sources for late 
medieval and early modern European history and the substantially more mod-
est amount of cases that so far have been the object of any historical  analysis 
for Islamic West-Asian history.1 This disparity means that macro-analytical 
1 To illustrate this point, there still exist no simple narrative biographies for many, if not most, of 
the local and regional rulers and sultans of late medieval and early modern West-Asia. More-
over, most existing biographical studies of the last decades continue to be regarded as having 
a kind of pioneering and referential status, due to the absence of any other serious studies. 
Fifteenth-century cases in point are Babinger’s study of the Ottoman sultan Mehmed ii, 
published in 1959, Darrag’s study of the Egyptian sultan al-Ashraf Barsbay, published in 1961, 
Woods’ monograph on the Aqquyunlu Turkmen polity, first published in 1976 (and repub-
lished in an expanded edition in 1999), Petry’s two monographs on the reigns of the Egyptian 
sultans Qaytbay and Qansawh, published in 1993 and 1994, and Manz’ biography of the 
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approaches in early modern European history have far more solid empirical 
grounds than those of Islamic West-Asian history. In the past there have been 
serious attempts to transcend the specificity and peculiarity of European tra-
jectories and develop more universal models. These certainly include Weber’s 
‘Herrschaftslegitimität’ and related ideal types, Marx’s ‘Mode of Production’ 
and the superstructure or later Marxist reformulations and, more recently, 
Mann’s ‘power networks’ or Bourdieu’s ‘capital étatique’. However, these con-
ceptualizations are all marked not just by a desire to integrate non-European 
experiences in their analyses, but they are also impeded by the fact that any 
understanding of the latter is derived from a rather limited number of studies.2 
Thus, the Eurocentrism mentioned above may also be seen as a function, not of 
some intentional form of orientalism, but of this uneven empirical situation.
2 Whither the Fifteenth Century: Islamic West-Asia’s Trajectories of 
State Formation in Context
This volume aims to promote and enable more balanced and more connected 
interpretations in current understandings of premodern rulers and elites of 
 fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia.3 This vast space, stretching between the 
worlds of the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean and between those of the 
Hindukush and the Sahara (see map 1), is considered here as representing a cen-
tral and interrelated Eurasian political landscape. Furthermore, this West-Asian 
 central-Asian ruler Temür, published in 1999 (Babinger, Mehmed der Eroberer; Darrag, 
L’Égypte sous le règne de Barsbay; Woods, The Aqquyunlu; Petry, Twilight of Majesty; Petry, 
Protectors or Praetorians; Manz, The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane).
2 A good example of this point is Bourdieu’s “From the King’s House to the Reason of State” 
(originally published in French in 1997)—aiming “to pinpoint the logic of the historical pro-
cess which governed the crystallization of this historical reality that is the state”, and “to con-
struct a model of this process”. In this work, for non-European history, Bourdieu limited him-
self to referring to Muzaffar Alam’s The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India: Awadh and the 
Punjab, 1708–1748 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1986), to Robert Mantran’s L’Histoire de l’empire otto-
man (Paris: Fayard, 1989), and to Pierre-Etienne Will’s “Bureaucratie officielle et bureaucratie 
réelle. Sur quelques dilemmes de l’administration impériale à l’époque des Qing”, Études chi-
noises 8/1 (1989): 69–141, which is extremely limited in comparison to the list of more than 
thirty books and articles on late medieval and early modern European history.
3 For the historiographical background, challenges and relationships of comparative, connect-
ed and ‘entangled’ history, see Duindam, “Rulers and Elites in Global History: Introductory 
Observations”, pp. 7–18; Conermann, “The Mamluk Empire”, pp. 22–25 (“Theoretical and 
Methodological Approaches to the study of spaces of interaction”); Werner & Zimmermann, 
“Beyond Comparison”.
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landscape, itself the object of different research traditions, is considered as in 
need of far more detailed and ‘entangled’ approaches, especially for the fif-
teenth century. This introduction therefore does not only wish to make a case 
for the relevance and importance of our choice to focus on ‘the state’ and on 
Islamic West-Asia. In addition, we also wish to account here for this volume’s 
claim that Islamic West-Asian state formation in the fifteenth century repre-
sents a coherent subject of study.
In recent decades, interest in the fifteenth century has been gaining mo-
mentum in at least some generalizing and globalizing approaches to history 
writing. A case in point is the impressive volume ‘l’Histoire du monde au xve 
siècle’, first published in 2009 and directed by Patrick Boucheron, professor of 
the “Histories of Power in Western Europe, 13th–16th centuries” (Histoire des 
pouvoirs en Europe occidentale, xiiie–xvie siècle) at the Collège de France. 
Boucheron and his team framed the fifteenth century as moving from a Eur-
asian to a global scale of integration, “from Tamerlane to Magellan”, and identi-
fied the period not just as the “age of the world’s opening up and accomplish-
ment”, but also as “an aggregation of a rich variety of experiments and 
potentialities”.4 Historiographical traditions continue to develop for at least 
some of these experiments and potentialities albeit in diverse ways. In the 
Western Eurasian context, this high appreciation of the intrinsic value of 
studying the fifteenth century is illustrated by the vitality of late medieval and 
early modern European history writing as well as the relatively intensely stud-
ied field of Syro-Egyptian ‘Mamluk’ history.5 A similar momentum is arguably 
picking up in other fields of Western Eurasian history, such as those defined by 
early Ottoman, Timurid and other fifteenth-century dynasties.6
Despite this momentum within particular research traditions, however, 
most textbooks and general works on West-Asian, Eurasian and world history 
have not yet followed suit. Even more recent comparative works of (political) 
history that try to pursue more globalizing diachronic approaches seem to face 
4 Boucheron, “Introduction. Les boucles du monde: contours du xve siècle”, p. 23 (“Le xve siè-
cle, âge d’ouverture et d’accomplissement du monde? Sans doute, mais qui ménage égale-
ment une somme profuse d’expériences et de devenirs possible”; “De Tamerlan à Magellan? 
Contours du xve siècle”).
5 For more or less comprehensive overviews of these fields of political history, see Watts, The 
Making of Polities; Van Steenbergen, Wing, and D’hulster, “The Mamlukization of the Mam-
luk Sultanate?”.
6 See recent publications such as Binbaş, Intellectual Networks in Timurid Iran; Kastritsis, An 
Early Ottoman History; Asutay-Effenberger and Rehm, Sultan Mehmet ii; and also, for ‘Euro-
pean’ history beyond traditional notions of the Latin Christian West: Nowakowska, Remem-
bering the Jagiellonians.
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a lack of good data, or of easy ways into those data and their interpretations. 
Too often this “age of the world’s opening up and accomplishment” continues 
to be narrowed down to one or more specific (and specifically remembered) 
events such as the “fall” of Constantinople in 1453, the end of the “Hundred 
Years’ War”, the “discovery” of a New World in 1492, or the “re-conquest” of 
Granada. These events tend to be seen as marking some well-defined moment 
of new, early modern beginnings, as though starting from a clean slate. In gen-
eral, such works of history, along with the widely shared historical imagina-
tions that they represent, continue to situate themselves comfortably in the 
stretched world-historical paradigm of a fourteenth-century collapse of the 
Mongol Eurasian order, and of post-Mongol transitions to the (apparently) 
more stable and therefore more interesting appearances of early modern states 
and empires.7 They tend to reduce fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia either 
to a space in which only the Ottoman imperial formation, with its expanding 
European presence, really mattered, or to a preparatory stage for the rise of the 
Islamic world’s so-called ‘Gunpowder Empires’ more in general.8 There thus 
remains a mismatch between these general and generalizing imaginations and 
the diverse historiographical traditions that have developed around particular 
fifteenth-century “experiments and potentialities”. In fact, these traditions are 
increasingly exposing the notion of Asia’s early modern ‘Gunpowder Empires’ 
as a misnomer, which may offer a useful perspective to understand the Otto-
man case, but not those of its early modern peers.9 Surely it is time to raise 
awareness of the many similar pars-pro-toto assumptions that continue to re-
duce appreciations of Islamic West-Asia’s fifteenth-century history to equally 
unhelpful generalizations.
As Boucheron’s summarizing phrase “from Tamerlane to Magellan” implies, 
in many ways a central figure in these “experiments and potentialities” was the 
Central-Asian Turko-Mongol ruler Temür, or Tamerlane in European par-
lance.10 Temür passed away after a brief illness in the Central-Asian town of 
7 See Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony, and the organization along this paradigm of 
Darwin, After Tamerlane. See for instance also Egger’s discussion of fifteenth-century Syro- 
Egyptian political history, reduced to the simple phrase that “[t]he Circassians dominated 
Egypt for the next 135 years, until their defeat at the hands of the Ottomans in 1517”. (Egger, 
A History of the Muslim World to 1750, p. 296).
8 See Burbank and Cooper, Empires in World History; Reinhard, Empires and Encounters. 
This point is also made in Binbaş, Intellectual Networks in Timurid Iran, pp. 290–291.
9 Reinhard, Empires and Encounters, pp. 28–29.
10 See also Darwin, After Tamerlane; and Subrahmanyam, “Connected Histories”, pp. 736–740, 
where he identifies “the reformulation of Eurasian polities in the context of the great 
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Otrar in February 1405, on his way to attack and conquer Ming China. Temür 
died in somewhat anticlimactic circumstances, bedridden rather than on 
horseback, as might have befitted a long life of local, regional and trans-regional 
Eurasian empowerment. Temür had a remarkable career indeed, characterized 
by conquest, plunder and fearsome havoc, but also by accommodation, efflo-
rescence and successful state formation. His accomplishments left a defining 
mark on the diverse social, cultural, economic and political landscapes of 
Central-, South- and West-Asia and of Eastern Europe, like that of few individ-
uals either before or after. Throughout these regions, from Samarkand in Tran-
soxiana to Herat in Khurasan, from Delhi in northern India to Cairo in Egypt, 
and from Muscovy in the North to Hormuz in the South, thanks to Temür’s 
politics of power and conquest, balances of power were recalibrated, social 
groups and communities were reconfigured, connections were reforged, and 
elites were redefined.11 Many new contingencies, setbacks and opportunities 
arose from this remarkable, even revolutionary moment of intense Eurasian 
connectivity at the turn of the fourteenth to fifteenth centuries. In complex 
ways many of these changes fed directly or indirectly into the multiple con-
flicting, overlapping and complementing power relations that, about a century 
later, crystallized into the early-modern Eurasian imperial formations of 
Ottomans, Safavids, Mughals and Uzbeks. How that happened is the story of 
Turko-Mongol rulers and elites, of Muslim political communities, and of vari-
ous interrelated trajectories of post-Temür state formation in fifteenth-century 
Western Eurasia.
 enterprise of Amir Timur Gurgan (d. 1405) […] as the convenient, obviously symbolic, 
point of departure” He offers here a highly nuanced but yet again typical imagination of 
the fifteenth century as a mere beginning of (or transition to) the early modern “age of 
geographical redefinition”, of “a heightening of the long-term structural conflict that re-
sulted in relations between settled agricultural societies on the one hand, and nomadic 
groups […] on the other”, of “changes in political theology”, and of “new or intensified 
forms of hierarchy, domination and separation”.
11 See Manz, The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane. This Timurid factor, and its different Turko-
Mongol legacies, rebooted leadership formations from Cairo to Samarkand and from Ed-
irne to Herat, but not in the Maghreb, al-Andalus or Yemen. This is an important reason 
for not explicitly including these and other complex and fundamentally different Islamic 
political landscapes within discussions in this volume. The Eurasian steppes between the 
Black Sea and the Aral sea, dominated since the thirteenth century by the Muslim leaders 
of the Mongol Golden Horde, represent another very different landscape that is not in-
cluded here, not least because “the Golden Horde was not able to recover from Timur’s 
onslaught […,] [b]y the fifteenth century, only the steppe remained, and even it was 
threatened from the east by a cluster of Mongol-Turkic clans from Siberia […] [and t]he 
breakup of the Golden Horde coincided with the rise of Muscovy”. (Egger, A History of the 
Muslim World to 1750, pp. 384–385).
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The European ‘Far West’12 was not at all similarly affected by the changes 
that were generated by Temür’s Eurasian campaigns. Western Europe very 
much followed its own fifteenth-century dynamics of local and regional politi-
cal change and transformation. In many ways these developments were as dis-
tinct within the wider Eurasian world as their cultural umbrella of Latin Chris-
tianity was from the Turko-Mongol Muslim identities that dominated politics 
in West-Asia. Nevertheless, at the turn of the sixteenth century, in Europe too 
diverse local and regional power relations were crystallizing into a handful of 
early-modern states and empires. Even though the roots of this process stretch 
back way beyond the beginning of the fifteenth century, that era certainly 
also witnessed dynamics of political formation that were highly significant 
at the eve of early modernity. Over time those European dynamics moreover 
became more consistently connected than ever before to what happened in 
Islamic West-Asia. One crucial factor for the growth of this Western Eurasian 
connectivity in the fifteenth century was the continuation and intensification 
of  resource flows across the Mediterranean, not least in the context of the 
booming Indo-Mediterranean spice trade. Another factor was the continued 
westward expansion of the Ottoman Sultanate in the Balkans, in Hungary and 
in the Eastern Mediterranean, which had a substantial impact on European 
political imaginations, worldviews and interests. In fact, the latter fact seems 
to have made the Islamic ‘East’—in whatever ‘othering’ way it was imagined or 
encountered—more present than ever before at the courts and headquarters 
of European princes and statesmen.13
This intensifying political entanglement of various European and West-
Asian elites during the fifteenth century is well illustrated by the famous case of 
the Ottoman prince Jem Sultan (d. 1495). After his defeat in the Ottoman suc-
cession struggle of 1481, Jem sought and found a welcome refuge from the wrath 
of his victorious brother, sultan Bayezid ii (r. 1481–1512), in various places. The 
12 For the notion of a “European Far West”, see Darwin, After Tamerlane, p. 17.
13 This understanding of the upsurge of this particular Eurasian connectivity in the fifteenth 
century builds, on the one hand, upon Abu Lughod’s famous thirteenth-century Afro-
Eurasian economic “world system” and her idea of its unravelling, from the second half of 
the fourteenth century onwards, both as a result of the Black Death pandemic and the 
disintegration of the Mongol empire. On the other hand, it also builds in eclectic ways 
upon, amongst others, Braudel’s notion of a “long sixteenth century”, which for him began 
in the fifteenth century, Darwin’s conception of “the death of Tamerlane [as] a turning 
point in world history” and Reinhard’s assumption that from the turn of the fourteenth to 
fifteenth centuries onwards “there was a gradual increase in the frequency of various in-
teractions within and between cultural areas—a highly plausible thesis though not defi-
nitely provable” (Braudel, La méditerranée; Abu Lughod, Before European Hegemony; Dar-
win, After Tamerlane; Reinhard, Empires and Encounters, esp. p. 8).
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first to welcome him at court was the sultan of Cairo, al-Ashraf Qaytbay (r. 
1468–96). Jem then fled to the Knights Hospitallers in Rhodes, who brought 
him to France. Finally, he ended up in Italy, first with the Pope in Rome, and 
eventually with the King of France, Charles viii (r. 1483–1498), in Naples. 
Throughout his adventures, Jem’s hosts, supporters and enemies in East and 
West appear to have been highly interconnected in that they had similar ways 
of politicizing his symbolic value as a legitimate pretender to the Ottoman 
throne, and hence as a potential threat to Bayezid’s authority and as an effec-
tive check on Ottoman territorial expansionism, especially in Eastern Anatolia, 
Hungary and the Eastern Mediterranean.14 Although this shared understand-
ing and appreciation of Ottoman political culture may have been quite unique 
and exceptional, the point here is that by the 1480s and 1490s a case like Jem’s 
had gained unprecedented importance to quite a few of Europe’s and West-
Asia’s rulers. Jem’s adventures therefore demonstrate that at least some Euro-
pean ruling elites were increasingly being drawn into an expanding political 
space of Western Eurasian dimensions. In the sixteenth century, this gradual 
emergence of a novel space of political interaction culminated in the scramble 
for influence, control and global political order that resulted in many of the 
great powers of the Early Modern East and West. However, the oft-neglected 
early stage of this process of contested global integration is the post-Temür fif-
teenth century, which was marked both by the endless competition for resourc-
es and sovereignty among local and regional rulers and by new sets of players 
who were acquiring new levels of agency and increasing political significance 
on a Western Eurasian platform.
Central to this volume are these complex phenomena of competition and 
empowerment, of power elites and political communities, and of varying 
trajectories of state formation across fifteenth-century Western Eurasia, and 
in particular in the Nile-to-Oxus and Bosporus-to-Indus complex of what 
is defined here as Islamic West-Asia. These phenomena relate to particular 
historical stories of political experimentation and accommodation as well as 
fragmentation and conquest. They also pertain to a wide-ranging legacy of 
historiographical stories which are either inspiring analytically or which hold 
more direct descriptive value. Qualifications like these are of course largely 
valid for any construct of time and space, and one must also acknowledge that 
some conscious interpretive framing is involved in the singling out of histories 
of power and claiming some form of connectivity for them, particularly when 
these histories are as diverse and varied as those of fifteenth-century ce Latin 
Christian Europe and of ninth-century ah Islamic West-Asia. Nevertheless, 
14 Vatin, Sultan Djem; Hattox, “Qaytbay’s Diplomatic Dilemma”.
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among the many paths of political transformation present during this broadly 
defined time and space, some clearly proved more attuned than others to lo-
cal and globalizing circumstances on the threshold of the formation of early 
modern states and empires, in the European ‘Far West’ as much as elsewhere. 
These many winding roads, dead-end streets and expanding routes of history 
are more intertwined than might be expected. Indeed, the stories leading up 
to Temür’s death in Otrar at the beginning of the century after a long career 
of Eurasian conquest, and the developments leading to Jem Sultan’s death in 
Naples nine decades later after being held hostage to the French king, the Pope 
and the Knights Hospitallers can be seen as meaningful instances in ongoing 
processes of political entanglement and competition for resources and sover-
eignty on a Eurasian scale.
However, one must admit that it can also be problematic to connect ‘Tamer-
lane to Magellan’ and Temür’s Chagatai Transoxiana to Jem Sultan’s Renais-
sance Europe in such a straightforward way. This may easily appear as yet 
 another form of the above-mentioned reductionist, over-generalizing or Euro-
centric readings. This is certainly not the approach that this volume wishes to 
promote. As suggested before, we do not regard the history of the fifteenth 
century as a mere prelude to early modernity. In the European ‘Far West’ as 
well as in Islamic West-Asia, many roads were taken, and even more not taken, 
by rulers and elites of all kinds and these did not necessarily progress to early 
modern centralizations. Historically, the trajectories that did not transform 
into early modern political formations—from the Duchy of Burgundy to the 
so-called Mamluk Sultanate of Cairo—are as meaningful as those that did sur-
vive the turn of the fifteenth to the sixteenth centuries. In fact, historians 
should pay attention to the former for many more reasons other than just their 
disappearance. These finite trajectories are equally relevant if only because 
they are not burdened by any teleological impressions of fulfilling imperial 
destinies or of progressing towards Early Modernity.
This volume and its contributions actually originate from a collaborative 
research project on fifteenth-century state formation in the Sultanate of Cairo. 
They have emerged in particular from this project’s concluding conference, 
which promoted a comparative approach to the question of fifteenth-century 
state formation.15 In line with this approach, this volume takes up the specific 
15 ‘The Mamlukisation of the Mamluk Sultanate: Political Traditions and State Formation in 
fifteenth century Egypt and Syria’ (erc Starting Grant, 2009–14, UGent, PI Jo Van Steen-
bergen); International Conference “Whither the Early Modern State? Fifteenth-Century 
State Formation across Eurasia. Connections, Divergences and Comparisons” (Ghent, 
10–12 September 2014) (organizers Jo Van Steenbergen, Malika Dekkiche, Kristof 
D’hulster; participants: Lisa Balabanlilar, Michele Bernardini, Wim Blockmans, Marc 
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challenge to demonstrate that the political organization of the Sultanate in 
fifteenth-century Egypt and Syria around the alleged priority of military slaves 
(mamlūks) is less particular or unique than is so often assumed, and that this 
organization is much better considered as a fully integrated part of the larger 
context of West-Asian appearances and negotiations of political order and so-
cial power. This Sultanate’s state was grounded in century-old West- and Inner 
Asian traditions and practices. Throughout the later medieval period it contin-
ued to pulsate as a formidable regional power from Cairo, one of the late me-
dieval world’s largest and most vibrant urban hubs, home to up to a quarter of 
a million inhabitants and well connected globally via myriads of interlocking 
political, commercial and cultural networks and resource flows. Moreover, in 
the fifteenth century this Sultanate appeared more than ever in the format of 
a non-dynastic state from the practices of a diverse range of military, legal, 
scribal and financial specialists and entrepreneurs, the military, commercial 
and agricultural resources that they managed, the Sunni Islamic value system 
that they nurtured and reproduced, and the structuring stratagems of a long-
standing bureaucratic and ideological apparatus with which they operated. 
According to at least one modern scholar, extensive archival research has sug-
gested that the rise of new social groups and new structures of landholding in 
fifteenth- century Egypt and Syria, along with the larger socio-economic and 
cultural transformations which caused them, were tantamount to paradigm-
shifting changes that would have generated Egypt’s own form of ‘moderniza-
tion’ were it not for the Ottoman conquest of 1517.16 One contribution to the 
above-mentioned ‘Histoire du monde au xve siècle’ indeed even claimed more 
generally for the wider West-Asian landscape that “from Central-Asia to Egypt 
the fifteenth century appears as a moment of modernization of the Islamic 
state, mostly however without being completed or coming too late to avoid the 
attrition of central authority”.17
Boone, Stephan Conermann, Georg Christ, Yasser Daoudi, Malika Dekkiche, Kristof 
D’hulster, Jan Dumolyn, Suraija Faroqhi, Roy Fischel, Antje Flüchter, Albrecht Fuess, Jean-
Philippe Genet, Jane Hathaway, Stephen Humphreys, Dimitri Kastritsis, Metin Kunt, Bea-
trice Manz, Christopher Markiewicz, John Meloy, Coline Mitchell, Stéphane Péquignot, 
Carl Petry, David Robinson, Vasileios Syros, Peer Vries, John Watts, Patrick Wing, André 
Wink, Koby Yosef).
16 Abū Ghāzī, al-Juzur al-tārīkhiyya; see also idem, Tatawwur al-Ḥiyāza al-Zirāʿīya. For a re-
view and constructive critique, see Sabra, “The Rise of a New Class?”.
17 Loiseau, “Le siècle turc”, p. 49: “De l’Asie centrale à l’Égypte, le xve siècle est bien un temps 
de modernisation de l’État islamique, le plus souvent inachevée ou trop tard menée pour 
éviter l’épuisement de l’autorité centrale”.
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These remarkable interpretations of failed Syro-Egyptian or even West-
Asian trajectories of modernization represent a kind of counterfactual and 
negative history that will not be pursued at all in this volume. As suggested 
before, we do not wish to regard the history of the fifteenth century as a mere 
prelude to early modern successes or failures. Nevertheless, readings such as 
these certainly confirm both the relatedness of fifteenth-century Islamic West-
Asia’s different post-Temür leadership configurations and the relevance of ap-
proaching the Cairo Sultanate as another West-Asian trajectory of pre-modern 
state formation. In fact, this volume will claim that adopting this entangled 
and trans-dynastic approach enables new understandings of the complexity of 
the Sultanate’s fifteenth-century formation and enriches the ways in which Ot-
toman as well as other West-Asian trajectories can also be explored. This hope-
fully invites a better-informed integration of this central Eurasian landscape, 
even in any future considerations of fifteenth-century state formation in 
general.
3 Whither This Volume: Bringing Islamic West-Asia’s Trajectories of 
State Formation into Focus
After explaining why and how fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asian state for-
mation makes for a relevant and consistent subject, in this last section this in-
troduction will also account in more detail for this volume’s organization. This 
volume is constructed around extensively contextualized case studies pertain-
ing to the Cairo Sultanate’s as well as to Ottoman and Timurid-Turkmen trajec-
tories of state formation. Undoubtedly various caveats are necessary when 
considering this construction around region-specific case-studies. These con-
cern in particular the massive amount of material and cases that cannot be 
dealt with here, which may lead to new pars-pro-toto arguments. However, this 
caveat should not invalidate the fact that a consciously historicized and con-
textualized focus on high-end political dynamics of state formation in fifteenth- 
century Islamic West-Asia generates insights from which there is still much to 
learn. This is especially due to the fact that, by definition, centralizing power 
formations have always left a substantial mark on both state and non-state his-
torical realities, in political as much as in economic, social and cultural terms. 
The different cases that are presented in this volume certainly attest to that. 
They contribute substantially to current understandings of various trajectories 
of state formation that were pursued, or experienced, by various post-Temür 
power elites in political centers such as Constantinople, Edirne, Cairo, Tabriz, 
Herat and Samarkand. These cases also point to the wider social,  cultural and 
economic impact of those trajectories across and beyond Islamic  West-Asia, 
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and they complement this deepening of various trajectories’ understandings 
with valuable discussions of the diverse and challenging sources on which any 
scholarly engagement with those trajectories is based.
Furthermore, rather than presenting these cases simply in the splendid 
isolation of their specific contexts and academic idioms, this book pursues 
the projection of these cases onto a broad canvas of old, new and compet-
ing paradigms of state formation. This volume actually presents a first-of- its-
kind entangled and trans-dynastic consideration of power, politics and state 
formation across fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia’s diverse but at the same 
time highly interconnected power elites. This is achieved by the joint presen-
tation of different case studies, but above all by offering extensive historical 
and historiographical context for these cases. This takes the form of a general 
historical introduction that offers empirical counter-arguments for any reduc-
tive assumptions, and formulates an interpretative call to overcome tradition-
al dynastic boundaries and consider more carefully different experiences of 
widely shared political realities. This should add to growing insights into the 
artificial nature of the disciplinary (and linguistic) boundaries that continue 
to separate early Ottoman, Timurid-Turkmen and Mamluk historiographies. 
As such, this volume invites historians of West-Asian realities to rethink what 
they know about their subject within the underexplored wider framework of 
Western Eurasian state formation studies. For this reason, we also engage with 
the hotly debated subject of state formation in the late medieval Latin Chris-
tian West of Eurasia. This materializes in a detailed discussion of the theoreti-
cal frameworks that have informed the study of the state in fifteenth-century 
research. This joint reconstruction of highly idiosyncratic European and West-
Asian trajectories of state studies aims to put all the relevant conceptual cards 
on the table, so to speak, in order to enable more balanced, reflexive and de-
centered future interactions between and beyond the different traditions of 
research on Islamic West-Asia. In these ways, this volume wishes to stimulate 
wider audiences and to open up a wider debate over interpretive engage-
ments with specific West-Asian cases and with the specific historical, historio-
graphical and empirical contexts that continue to define these cases’ appear-
ances on the brink of the rise of early modern Western Eurasian states and 
empires.
This volume consists of three complementary parts. The first part con-
sists of two introductory chapters that evoke in critical and entangled ways 
theories, conceptualizations and current understandings of state formation 
in different research traditions that are particularly relevant for fifteenth-
century Islamic West-Asia. The first chapter actually presents a new intro-
ductory interpretation of the entanglement and particularities of the power 
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elites, the institutions and practices, and the transformations that, since the 
days of Temür, left their marks on the rough political landscapes of Islamic 
West-Asia. Emphasizing the segmented nature of Turko-Mongol politics and 
socio- economic organization, this chapter describes ongoing dynamics of ex-
pansion, fragmentation and circulation, and recurrent attempts at Ottoman, 
Turko-‘Mamluk’, Timurid and Turkmen political stabilization and adminis-
trative penetration. It also argues that widely used binaries, such as those of 
‘Turks’ and ‘Tajiks’, ‘elites’ (khāṣṣa) and ‘commoners’ (ʿāmma), or commanders 
and administrators, fed into claims and explanations that contributed to the 
many appearances of social order across West-Asia, amidst highly complex Ot-
toman, Timurid, Turkmen and Syro-Egyptian realities of segmentation, com-
petitive empowerment and state formation.
The second chapter takes this further with a theoretical contextualization 
that reconstructs the modern study of fifteenth-century rulers and states in 
each of the dynastic research traditions of Islamic West-Asia. This is pitched 
against a wider background of state studies that includes discussions of trends 
in the modern historiography of late medieval Europe as well as of the en-
tanglements and particularities of those West-Asian research traditions. In 
general, this chapter offers a more explicit understanding of how research into 
the fifteenth-century state has diverged over the years, not only in reference 
to Latin Christian Europe and Islamic West-Asia in general, but also for many 
of the different dynastic and proto-nationalist constituents of each. It argues 
at the same time that this divergence also harbors within itself many oppor-
tunities for an enriching exchange of ideas, given that searching for shared 
conceptual tools is not just about identifying parallels and connections, but 
rather more about comprehending divergence from a shared model. The chap-
ter ends by suggesting that such a model may well be found in a very  practical 
approach and may be usefully constructed around the recurrent suggestions 
that states do not make history, but history makes states, as and when suc-
cessful social practices of exclusion, integration, reproduction and appro-
priation start appearing, and presenting themselves, pertaining to a coherent 
apparatus of coercion, distinction, differentiation and hegemony, or to the 
central state.
The seven case studies in the subsequent two parts of this volume refer to the 
different political contexts of Islamic West-Asia, with a particular focus on the 
oft-neglected Syro-Egyptian Sultanate of Cairo, and to particular examples of 
just how history (and historiography) makes states. The common thread run-
ning through them all concerns the nature of the relationships between various 
elite groups, institutions and discourses (and their renderings in different sets 
of contemporary sources) on the one hand and rapidly transforming power 
centers in fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia on the other. These processes of 
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inclusion in, structuration of, or confrontation with the disposition of central 
or local power elites may have taken on various forms, depending on where 
and when these centripetal and centrifugal relationships manifested them-
selves. Everywhere, however, these processes revolved around the experimen-
tation with and accommodation of power balances that gave shape to dynamic 
political orders. These orders were real, imagined or both, and always featured 
the distinctive, constitutive characteristic of having explicit links with a legiti-
mate, transcendent form of central political authority, embodied in a particu-
lar ruler (or set of rulers), his (or their) court, and his (or their) representatives. 
Furthermore, these processes of inclusion, structuration and confrontation 
involve social relationships that did not just connect central and local elites, 
but actually constituted different social groups, or entangled networks, as cen-
tral and peripheral elites, in potentially overlapping and conflicting ways. 
These ‘centering’ processes are considered here as representing interlocking 
thematic avenues within the wider field of the study of fifteenth-century West-
Asian, and even Western Eurasian, state formations and transformations that 
enable us to consider and draw together the specific cases presented in this 
volume. More specifically, these processes are represented here as manifesting 
themselves with parallel but distinct ‘centering’ effects among central power 
elites in Cairo, Bursa and Constantinople (Part 2) and among local military, 
cultural and commercial elites in Iran, the Hijaz, Syria and the eastern Medi-
terranean (Part 3).
Part 2 considers the constitution of some of West-Asia’s main centers of 
power in the fifteenth century. It opens with a case study of institutionalization 
from the so-called Mamluk Sultanate of Cairo, in Kristof D’hulster’s ‘The Road 
to the Citadel as a Chain of Opportunity’. In this chapter D’hulster looks into 
the upper end of courtly careers in fifteenth-century Cairo from the perspec-
tive of a bureaucratic cursus honorum, and reconsiders the sequential nature 
of the relationship between the atabakiyya (‘chief military commandership’) 
and the sultanate. By using the format of a critical and reflexive engagement 
with both fifteenth-century and modern historiographies on the subject, he ex-
plains that this institutional relationship was transformed as part of a state for-
mation process that may be usefully identified as ‘Mamlukization’. He suggests 
that such a structuration of what constituted the Sultanate’s center and also 
its path dependencies deserve to be taken more into account in any historical 
interpretation. Chapter 4, by Albrecht Fuess, is entitled ‘The Syro-Egyptian Sul-
tanate in Transformation, 1496–1498’. Here, Fuess engages with a very similar 
problematic of accession to the sultanate in Cairo. He describes how by the 
end of the fifteenth century al-Nasir Muhammad b. Qaytbay (r. 1496–8) was 
attempting to reverse this process of ‘Mamlukization’ and he demonstrates 
how this sultan, as a royal son and heir, tried to reconnect with older, dynastic 
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traditions rather than the bureaucratic ones in order to bolster his claims to 
central authority and to counter the ambitions of veteran mamlūk grandees 
from his deceased father’s entourage. Fuess also details how this particular 
moment of experimentation and accommodation was shaped by a cultural 
as well as a social program of substantial central reform, provoking harsh re-
actions, as can even be detected in the era’s historiographical record. The ex-
periment ultimately failed when this program’s dynastic cornerstone of family 
rule proved too fickle. Chapter 5 by Dimitri Kastritsis, entitled ‘Interpreting 
Early Ottoman Narratives of State Centralization’, delves deeper into the social 
tensions that were evoked by processes of institutionalization and central-
ization, moving the focus to the early fifteenth-century context of Ottoman 
restoration and empowerment. Kastritsis engages in substantial historio-
graphical detail with the case of the Çandarlı family, whose various members 
appeared as key agents of the expansion and organization of Ottoman power 
between the mid-fourteenth and mid-fifteenth centuries. At the same time, 
these figures appeared in contemporary and later narratives as corrupters of 
that centralizing power. The chapter presents a strong argument for consid-
ering the construction of these narratives not simply in a traditional context 
of reactions to post-1453 state centralization from increasingly marginalized 
peripheral elites, but in the post-Temür context of early fifteenth-century Ot-
toman fragmentation, competition between different Ottoman power centers 
and their opposing political discourses of Ottoman state formation and its tra-
jectory, and the messy re-centering of Ottoman power around Mehmed i (r. 
1412–21) and his entourage.
Part 3 discusses the constitution and accommodation of various local elites 
at the peripheries of fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia’s power centers. It 
opens with Beatrice Manz’ ‘Iranian Elites under the Timurids’. This chapter 
presents a revisionist discussion of the long history of Iranian landed elites, 
and explores their multivalent participation in local and regional politics in 
Timurid times. The chapter also calls for a more critical reading of the cen-
tering narratives of the available sources and their neglect or mere partial 
representation of non-central elites. Above all, Manz demonstrates here how 
beyond the Timurid courts and urban centers different processes of  inclusion, 
structuration and confrontation were at work. This happened in centralizing 
and decentralizing ways that varied depending on time, place, actors and 
stakes, but always involved Iranian local elite families in far more active and 
connected ways and in far more meaningful military capacities than is gener-
ally assumed. Chapter 7, by John Meloy, is entitled ‘the Judges of Mecca and 
Mamluk Hegemony’, and it takes a similar long durée perspective to better 
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understand the changing relationships between local religious elites in the 
 Hijaz and the Sultanate’s court in Cairo. The particular processes of inclusion, 
structuration and confrontation at work here again reveal how they are multi-
directional and multivalent ones, involving centering strategies and agencies 
as much as the pursuance of local interests and connections. Meloy argues 
that Cairo’s penetration and integration of Hijazi politics through the appoint-
ment of local judges over time represented a type of Mamlukization that was 
shaped by ideological as well as by coercive and bureaucratic strategies. He 
shows how this had constitutive effects on all participants. These may be  better 
understood through the concept of ‘legibility’: the Sultanate’s state acquiring 
the ability to understand, or ‘read’ the social landscape of the Hijaz in ways 
that allowed it to participate, co-opt local elites, and contribute to shaping 
that landscape. Chapter 8, by Patrick Wing, entitled ‘The Syrian Commercial 
Elite and Mamluk State-Building in the Fifteenth Century’ shifts the focus to 
similar processes of experimentation, accommodation and co-optation at play 
amongst the newly emerging commercial elites in fifteenth-century Damascus. 
This chapter uses the case of the Banu Muzalliq family of merchants to explain 
how Cairo established new forms of control over the changing socio-economic 
landscapes of fifteenth-century Syria. Wing explains in particular how here too 
different processes of inclusion, structuration and confrontation were at work 
with varying effects on the constitution of the Sultanate’s center and its rela-
tionships with local elites in Syria. The chapter also argues that those changing 
relationships of commercial, political and bureaucratic agencies need to be 
interpreted against a de-centered, entangled and regional canvas, allowing us 
to see these multiple ties as cosmopolitan and part of networks that connected 
Tabriz to Cairo and Venice to Mecca, rather than as merely Cairo-centric. The 
final chapter, by Georg Christ, entitled ‘Cortesia, Zemechia and Venetian Fiscal-
ity in Fifteenth-century Alexandria’, continues this cosmopolitan and commer-
cial perspective by engaging in more detail with that Venetian connection, and 
its effect on the constitution of the Sultanate’s center. Christ moves the dis-
cussion back to Egypt, and moreover brings in a different set of sources from 
Venetian archives. These offer highly complementary new insights into those 
same processes of inclusion, structuration and confrontation that constituted 
the Sultanate’s peripheries, its center in Cairo, and its wider, regional connec-
tions. The chapter reconstructs in detail how the locally negotiated solution of 
a customs conflict in Alexandria in 1419 between the Sultan’s agents and the 
Venetian community was unsuccessfully contested by the latter at the Sultan’s 
court in Cairo. This chapter also considers this case against the wider back-
drop of Venetian commercial involvement in the Sultanate’s political economy 
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from the thirteenth century onwards, and within an interpretive framework 
of hybrid relations that are constructed creatively and locally and at the same 
time bound by trans-local arrangements. Christ concludes that Venice was in-
tegrated in multiple, complex and highly illustrative ways in the Sultanate’s 
constellation of power, with constitutive effects for both Cairo’s court and Al-
exandria’s diverse elites.
To conclude, through these seven specimens of specific West-Asian studies 
in Parts 2 and 3 and their detailed empirical and theoretical contextualiza-
tions and interpretations in Part 1, this volume offers new and arguably bet-
ter tools—including survey chapters, interpretive frameworks and illustrative 
cases—for building the aforementioned bridges, for a more meaningful in-
tegration of Islamic West-Asia’s rulers and elites in the writing of fifteenth-
century Eurasian histories. At the very least, it is hoped that this volume 
will contribute to creating new opportunities for future research to develop 
more informed, more connected and more valid comparative reflections on 
the meanings and potentials that emerge from these and many other micro- 
studies into various manifestations of fifteenth-century West-Asian, and Eur-
asian, state formation.
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Chapter 1
From Temür to Selim: Trajectories of Turko-Mongol 
State Formation in Islamic West-Asia’s Long 
Fifteenth Century
Jo Van Steenbergen
This chapter presents both a general overview and trans-dynastic interpreta-
tion of the power elites of fifteenth century Islamic West-Asia, their institutions 
and practices, and the many transformations that marked their trajectories 
across the rough political landscape of the time.1 As far as that overview is con-
cerned, the chapter retraces the general contours of these many crisscrossing 
trajectories of trans-regional, regional and local empowerment that distin-
guished the landscape from Nile to Oxus and from Bosporus to Indus between 
the end of the fourteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth centuries ce 
(or  the end of the eighth and the beginning of the tenth centuries ah). In a 
rather traditional fashion, the chapter focuses in particular on describing spe-
cific trajectories of trans-regional empowerment. These appeared in the for-
mat of dynastic and non-dynastic hegemonic constellations of power elites 
that engaged in competing politics of conquest, integration, reproduction and 
exploitation, or of war-making and state-making, on a trans-regional or even 
West-Asian scale. The chapter will of course also have to consider other trajec-
tories of empowerment as equally meaningful components of fifteenth- century 
Islamic West-Asia’s political history, even when they did not necessarily  involve 
or relate to any identifiable processes of state-making. The latter trajectories 
range from those on the more local level of non-complex social groups related 
to a town, village, urban neighborhood, tribal pasture or small-scale communi-
ty to regional ones, operating within more complex composites of social groups, 
1 This chapter has been finalized within the context of the project ‘The Mamlukisation of the 
Mamluk Sultanate ii: Historiography, Political Order and State Formation in Fifteenth- 
Century Egypt and Syria’ (UGent, 2017–21); this project has received funding from the Euro-
pean Research Council (erc) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and in-
novation program (Consolidator Grant agreement No 681510). My sincere thanks go to Evrim 
Binbaş, Frederik Buylaert, Kenneth Goudie, Zacharie Mochtari de Pierrepont and Patrick 
Wing for reading and commenting upon earlier versions of this chapter. Needless to say, 
I take sole responsibility for the interpretations presented here as well as for any remaining 
inaccuracies.
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especially in particular geographic and ecological units of West-Asia’s diverse 
landscape. For mostly practical reasons, the consideration of these local and 
regional trajectories will mainly be organized around their multivalent inter-
sections with those dominant trans-regional trajectories of the Ottomans in 
and beyond Islamic West-Asia’s Northwest, of various Timurid and Turkmen 
dynasts in its North and East, and of the sultans of Cairo in the Southwest. In 
these ways this chapter aims both to make fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia’s 
political history in general more accessible and intelligible to wider audiences 
and to contextualize this volume’s specific case studies, all of which relate to 
the remarkable processes of expansion and centralization that marked those 
trans-regional trajectories.
This chapter also invites specialists of the histories of these different trajecto-
ries to rethink their understanding within the wider frameworks of West-Asian 
connectivity and state formation. To this end, it adopts an entangled and the-
matic approach to these histories. This means that this chapter crosses the 
boundaries that tend to continue to divide West-Asia’s history into separate, 
dynastically-organized research traditions in particular amongst Ottomanists, 
Mamlukologists and Timurid-Turkmen specialists. The chapter aims to inte-
grate those dynastic boundaries more explicitly into its explanations and inter-
pretations, seeing these as markings of variations on deeply interconnected 
trans-dynastic phenomena and as common sources of meaningful distinction 
in particular historical and historiographical contexts. In order to do so, this 
chapter reconstructs those phenomena and contexts into meaningful descrip-
tive and interpretive units. The choice of units is informed by current (especially 
minimalist and practice-oriented) theoretical understandings of premodern 
states, of how they become, and what they do (and not do), as detailed in the 
following chapter.2 The first part of the current chapter consists of introductory 
2 For the sake of clarity, it is already relevant to refer here to Charles Tilly’s historicizing defini-
tions of what states are and what they do. These will be explained (and problematized) in 
more detail in the next chapter. However, it is a deliberate choice to allow these definitions to 
substantially inspire the focus and organization of this chapter. Tilly sees states as “coercion-
wielding organizations that are distinct from households and kinship groups and exercise 
clear priority in some respects over all other organizations within substantial territories” 
(Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, p. 1). Elsewhere he outlines what he thinks these 
organizations did in the following minimalist terms: “Under the general heading of organized 
violence, the agents of states characteristically carry on four different activities: 1. War mak-
ing: Eliminating or neutralizing their own rivals outside the territories in which they have 
clear and continuous priority as wielders of force; 2. State making: Eliminating or neutraliz-
ing their rivals inside those territories; 3. Protection: Eliminating or neutralizing the enemies 
of their clients; 4. Extraction: Acquiring the means of carrying out the first three activities—
war making, state making, and protection”. (Tilly, “War Making and State Making”, p. 181). See 
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explanations that describe the main political players and playgrounds in Is-
lamic West-Asia, while the second part takes an interpretive approach to dis-
cuss the rules and stakes of these games of power. This approach builds upon a 
general scholarly consensus concerning basic facts and figures, and as the next 
chapter engages in much detail with the current state of relevant Ottoman, 
Timurid-Turkmen and Syro-Egyptian political history research, literature ref-
erences here are kept to a minimum, used only to support, illustrate or explain 
certain interpretations. This approach continues in the third part of the chap-
ter, moving towards a more critical consideration of the historical dynamics 
that help to better understand the remarkable interplay of socio-political con-
tinuities and changes in Islamic West-Asia’s political history. These continu-
ities and changes appear as specific fifteenth-century convergences of phe-
nomena that are all similarly related to processes of state formation and 
therefore invite to be considered from trans-regional and trans-dynastic per-
spectives. They include the contingency of centralizing longevity, the integra-
tion of distant power elites through multivalent processes of bureaucratic 
growth, the particularity of outsiders’ coercive integration as a strategy of elite 
renewal, and simultaneously the reproduction of central elites in highly com-
petitive ways. In the discussion of these different phenomena, occasional ref-
erence is also made to the different chapters in Parts 2 and 3, and to how their 
case studies make for highly illustrative examples. An epilogue finally consid-
ers the nature and formation of fifteenth-century socio-political boundaries 
and how these relate to specific formulations of an ideal, discursive framework 
of social order and political sovereignty.
1 Situating Agents and Agencies of State Formation in Fifteenth-
Century West-Asia
The late fourteenth century reign of the Central-Asian ruler Temür (r.  1370–1405) 
was a kind of matrix moment for the histories of Islamic West-Asia’s main 
 fifteenth-century polities and political elites. Temür, also known as Tīmūr in 
 Arabic and Persian, or as Tamerlane in European languages, certainly had a 
 remarkable career. Remembered especially for his feats of conquest, plunder 
and fearsome havoc on a Eurasian scale, Temür also stands out for the unique 
level of personal empowerment, cultural efflorescence and successful state 
formation that he achieved in the Mongol, Turkish and Muslim contexts of 
also Chapter Two in this volume, especially “Introduction: Defining the ‘state’ between Max 
Weber, ʿAbd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun and Charles Tilly”.
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both the Chagatai nomadic polity of Central-Asia and the ancient urban cen-
ters and cultures of Transoxiana, Khurasan and Iran. Across Islamic West-Asia, 
Temür’s successes stimulated the consolidation of hybrid leaderships, political 
identities and charismatic hegemonies that often combined Turkmen, Turk-
ish, Kurdish, Arabo-Persian and Mongol facets. In fact, his personal politics of 
conquest enabled not just the rise to power of his family and entourage as a 
new trans-regional elite in Islamic West-Asia, but also led to the new or re-
newed empowerment of various local and regional elites, particularly those of 
a Turkmen nomadic background. In this way Temür’s political action con-
firmed and boosted the so-called “eastward reflux” of Turko-Mongol leader-
ships, following the thirteenth-century wave of westward expansion from 
Mongol Inner Asia.3
This important moment in West-Asia’s history indeed brought to power an 
entirely new, mostly peripatetic trans-regional power elite in Transoxiana, 
Khurasan and Iran (see map 2). This new elite was composed of two different 
groups. On the one hand there were Temür’s many descendants who grew into 
a new dynasty of Turko-Mongol royal status known as the Timurids. On the 
other hand, there were the military leaders of Temür’s armies, who stemmed 
from various Turko-Mongol Chagatai origins. Tried, tested and bred in the per-
sonal entourage of Temür, these princes and commanders continued to domi-
nate these eastern regions’ politics for many decades after Temür’s death, and 
in varying constellations and associations that included also their own descen-
dants. In Transoxiana and Khurasan this highly dynamic Timurid domination 
even lasted up to the turn of the fifteenth to sixteenth centuries (see map 4).
Beyond these core areas of Timurid leadership, Temür’s conquest politics 
of undermining or annihilating the authorities of regional and trans-regional 
rivals created political opportunities for various local power elites, including 
tribal leaderships and messianic movements, especially in the regions stretch-
ing from Iraq and Azerbaijan to Anatolia (see map 1). Throughout most of 
the century, these regions, with their ideal winter and summer pastures, their 
3 See Loiseau, “Le siècle turc”, p. 36, who takes this notion of a reflux from Woods, The Aqquyun-
lu, p. 3, who, in turn, explains that he took it from the pioneering studies of Minorsky and 
Sümer: “Amplifying the earlier view of Minorsky, Sümer notes the eastward reflux from Ana-
tolia of the Mongol Oirot, Jalayir, and Süldüz after 1335/736 in addition to the three Turkmen 
‘waves’ composed of the Qaraquyunlu, the Aqquyunlu, and the Safavid Qizilbash that swept 
out of Anatolia over Iran in the fifteenth/ninth and sixteenth/tenth centuries”. (see Anony-
mous. Tadhkirat al-mulūk: a manual of Ṣafavid administration (ca. 1137/1725), V.F. Minorsky, 
ed. and trans. (e.j.w. Gibb memorial series vol. 16) [London: Luzac, 1943], appendices, p. 188; 
Faruk Sümer, Oguzlar (Türkmenler), tarihleri, boy teşkilâtı, destanları (Ankara: Üniversitesi 
Basımevi, 1967), pp. 143–153).
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fertile river basins, and their multiple commercial networks of towns and 
routes, remained a politically unstable and poly-centric area, characterized 
not only by intense mobility but also high fluidity. They may therefore be con-
sidered one of fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia’s main frontier zones; an 
area where “one could move from place to place, allegiance to allegiance, and 
identity to identity with an ease and acceptability hard to even imagine in 
more settled societies”.4 In fact, connecting West-Asia’s centers of somewhat 
more stable political, commercial and cultural activities (especially—but not 
exclusively—the urban centers of Bursa, Edirne and Constantinople in the 
Northwest; Aleppo, Damascus and Cairo in the Southwest; Tabriz in the North; 
and Herat and Samarkand in the East) those towns and routes of Iraq, Diyar 
Bakr, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Anatolia, and the diverse local elites that con-
trolled them, remained a trans-regional bone of contention, and thus were a 
genuine frontier zone, marking the borderlands between remote but ambi-
tious  trans-regional leaderships, such as that of the Timurid Shah Rukh 
(r.  1409–47) in the East, of the Ottoman sultans Murad (r. 1421–51), Mehmed 
(r. 1451–81) and Bayezid (r. 1481–1512) in the Northwest, and of the Sultanate of 
Cairo and its many mamlūk rulers, including the sultans Barsbay (r. 1422–38), 
Jaqmaq (r.  1438–53), Qaytbay (r. 1468–96) and Qansawh (r. 1501–16), in the 
Southwest.
First subdued by Temür’s passage through Anatolia and Syria in the opening 
years of the fifteenth century and then all but annihilated by subsequent years 
of territorial fragmentation and internecine warfare, the Ottoman and Syro-
Egyptian polities only re-emerged as strong trans-regional power centers from 
about the mid-1410s onwards (see map 2). In the process, as will be detailed 
below, newly composed politico-military elites rose to power in both Sultan-
ates, and both had in common their origins of enslavement (mostly in the Bal-
kans and in the Caucasus respectively), socialization in royal military and 
court service, and acculturation to particular Turkic-Muslim political identi-
ties. In many ways, these power elites thus became more alike than would be 
suggested by their organization around the century-old Ottoman dynasty in 
the Northwest and the even older Sultanate of Cairo in the Southwest. In the 
course of the fifteenth century a scramble for West-Asian control and influ-
ence regularly pitted these elites and their sultanic rulers against each other. 
Initially this conflict mostly happened indirectly, through local and regional 
4 Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, pp. 140–141; here he is speaking of Western Anatolia, but the 
definition works equally well for this frontier zone in the fifteenth century. For an illustration 
of frontier conditions in this zone in the 1420s and 1430s, see Adriaenssen and Van Steenber-
gen, “Mamluk Authorities and Anatolian Realities”.
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intermediaries, but increasingly it was also direct, through diplomatic ex-
change and military confrontation. To some extent, the campaigns of the Otto-
man sultan Selim (r. 1512–20) in Azerbaijan in 1514 and his conquests of Syria in 
1516, and then of Egypt in 1517, also fit into this complex pattern of ongoing re-
gional competition for sovereignty, influence and control in that enormous 
frontier zone of fifteenth-century trans-regional politics. At the very least, 
these campaigns and conquests of the early sixteenth century radically 
changed the stakes that had dominated the previous century, forcing many 
elites and activities in the frontier zone of Armenia, Diyar Bakr and eastern 
Anatolia to become more firmly integrated into an exclusively Ottoman frame-
work of sovereignty, endeavoring to push political boundaries out- and east-
wards, and allowing them to be reframed more simply along an ancient East-
West politico -military axis.
Before that re-orientation of the political landscape of West-Asia, however, 
this gigantic poly-centric zone—connecting in myriad ways Egypt, Northwest 
Anatolia, and Khurasan and Transoxiana—operated very much as a labora-
tory  of fifteenth-century political (and cultural) experimentation. This in-
volved  various local and regional elites and their shifting loyalties as much 
as the more remote and continuously contested trans-regional leaderships of 
Timurids, Ottomans, Turkmen and ‘Turks’ (as the Syro-Egyptian Sultanate’s 
politico-military elites were identified by their contemporaries).5 In the his-
torical regions of Southern and Eastern Anatolia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Diyar 
Bakr and Iraq in particular, various old and new movements, networks, com-
munities and chieftainships benefitted, with varying degrees of success and 
sovereignty, from the renewed local political opportunities created by both 
5 In remarkable contrast European and modern historiography generally all refer to members 
of this Syro-Egyptian power elite as Mamluks (as a result of the mamlūk, or military slave 
status of the majority of them) rather than ‘Turks’. However, this is an external label that 
poses many interpretive challenges for significant but as yet largely unacknowledged reasons 
(see Ayalon, “Baḥrī Mamlūks, Burjī Mamlūks”; Yosef, “Dawlat al-Atrāk or Dawlat al-Mamālīk?”; 
Van Steenbergen, “Nomen est Omen”; Van Steenbergen, “Mamlukisation between social theo-
ry and social practice”). In the first part of this volume we will therefore use this traditional 
Mamluk label when referring to the field of ‘Mamluk’ studies only, and not when referring to 
this Sultanate and its elites. When referring to the latter we draw on an interesting analogy 
(and synchronism) with standard references to the North-Indian Delhi Sultanate or Sultan-
ate of Delhi (1206–1526) and its different ruling dynasties, including of mamlūk and Turkish 
origins. We will therefore mostly use the signifiers ‘Cairo Sultanate’ or ‘Sultanate of Cairo’ and 
‘Syro-Egyptian elite’ in this volume’s first two chapters (see e.g. Peter Jackson, The Delhi Sul-
tanate. A political and military history [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003]; Iqtidar 
Husain Siddiqi, Composite Culture under the Sultanate of Delhi. Revised and Enlarged Edition 
[Delhi: Primus Books, 2016]).
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Temür’s campaigns and subsequent contested trans-regional leaderships. 
Within this fluid, permeable and poly-centric zone many participated in the 
endless negotiations of local balances of socio-economic, political and cultur-
al interests with violence, charismatic leadership, millenarianist ideas and dip-
lomatic pragmatism.6 Throughout the century, however, some leaderships 
emerged as more successful, more powerful and more regionally reputed than 
others in a wide range of different local contexts.
In this way, the Karamanid dynasty was first subdued by the Ottomans but 
then restored to their fourteenth-century regional primacy by Temür, and 
eventually claimed priority from the ancient Anatolian capital of Konya 
throughout much of the South-central Anatolian mountain lands and plains. 
Especially during the long and expansionist rule of Ibrahim Beg Karamanoglu 
(r. ca. 1423–64), the Karamanid leadership vied variously and in alternating 
ways with other Anatolian chiefs as well as with the Ottoman and ‘Turkish’ 
sultans for local and regional sovereignty. The Karamanids had two main com-
petitors among these Anatolian leaderships: the Ramadanids who sought to 
impose some form of regional authority and control over the Cilician coastal 
plains from the towns of Tarsus and Adana, and the Dulkadirid lineage, simi-
larly claiming priority on the Anti-Taurus plateau from their seats of power in 
the towns of Elbistan and Maraş (Kahramanmaraş) (see maps 2 and 3). From 
the late 1460s onwards, external pressures on these so-called ‘Turkmen’ dynas-
ties in South-central Anatolia increased at a varying but unrelenting pace to 
the extent that they were all eventually subdued by, or fully integrated into the 
trans-regional claims to power and sovereignty that were emanating ever more 
intensely from Ottoman Constantinople in particular, as well as from Cairo 
(see map 4).
In the regions of Diyar Bakr, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Iraq competition for 
local and regional priority and assets was dominated by two other Turkmen 
tribal groupings (see map 2). These groups seem to have maintained a higher 
level of transhumant activity than their Dulkadirid, Ramadanid and Karama-
nid peers. The chiefs of the Qara Qoyunlu (the Clan of the Black Sheep) were 
among the few fourteenth-century regional leaderships that managed to sur-
vive Temür’s onslaught and they eventually even regained priority status in 
and beyond their former east-Anatolian territories. This was above all thanks 
to their charismatic Qara Qoyunlu chief Qara Yusuf (d. 1420), whose military 
6 See e.g. Binbaş, “Did the Hurufis Mint Coins?”, p. 139, which refers briefly to various “intel-
lectual movements which acquired a political character and minted coins in the late medi-
eval period”, as well as to “other cases in which the boundaries between tribal-cum-local 
elites and religious-intellectual networks are blurred or cannot be drawn accurately”.
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successes from 1406 onwards established his sovereignty over all of these re-
gions, effectively forming a block within this enormous zone between the Cau-
casus and the Persian Gulf which hindered the territorial ambitions and inter-
ests of the Timurid Shah Rukh in Herat in particular. Qara Yusuf’s son and 
successor Iskandar (d. 1438) was confronted with the consequences of this 
growing tension, in the form of substantial pressures from Shah Rukh and his 
armies as well as from various local groups acting as allies to the Timurids or 
others. These pressures eventually all proved ineffective, and Iskandar’s son 
Jahan Shah (r. 1439–67) managed to consolidate his predecessors’ achieve-
ments, even stepping into the Timurid void after Shah Rukh’s death and estab-
lishing his own sovereignty over many formerly Timurid lands in Iran. Jahan 
Shah achieved this from the Qara Qoyunlu center in Tabriz, eventually evolv-
ing into an awe-inspiring trans-regional ruler in his own right over most of 
central West-Asia (see map 3).
In 1467, when Jahan Shah was captured in battle and executed, the story of 
Qara Qoyunlu trans-regional leadership in Eastern Anatolia, Armenia, Azer-
baijan, Iraq and Iran proved to be short-lived. However, more consolidated 
Turkmen rule in these regions continued along very similar lines, when Uzun 
Hasan (r. 1457–78), leader of the Aq Qoyunlu (the Clan of the White Sheep), 
seized the opportunity to step into Jahan Shah’s footsteps. This led to the ac-
commodation, absorption or integration of Qara Qoyunlu (and formerly 
Timurid) relationships, balances, and achievements into an adapted trans- 
regional order, now dominated by the Qara Qoyunlu’s longstanding Anatolian 
rivals of the Aq Qoyunlu. It also meant that the Aq Qoyunlu tribal group and its 
leaders finally extended their influence beyond the mere control of the trade 
routes and the transhumant network of Diyar Bakr and Southern Armenia (see 
maps 2 and 3). This zone until then had defined their area of operation, com-
petition and relationships since the days of the alliance between Temür and 
one of the Aq Qoyunlu’s most charismatic early chiefs, Uzun Hasan’s grandfa-
ther ʿUthman Beg Qara Yuluk (d. 1435). Uzun Hasan and his immediate succes-
sors now took Tabriz in Azerbaijan as their seat of power and they maintained 
for more than three decades at least some level of sovereignty over the highly 
diverse chain of lands, people and resource flows that connected the Cauca-
sian mountain lands, the Iraqi lowlands and the Iranian plateau (see map 4). In 
that enormous frontier zone of fifteenth-century trans-regional politics these 
territories thus increasingly became a more or less coherent political space 
that was organized around Turkmen leadership in Tabriz. In the Southwest, 
the expansion of this new political coherence was curbed by Syria’s ancient 
dominance from Cairo. In the Northwest its reach was limited by an equally 
increasingly coherent Ottoman sovereignty and Anatolian dominance, sealed 
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by the Ottoman victory over Uzun Hasan at the Battle of Bashkent in eastern 
Anatolia in 1473. In the East, the reach of Turkmen transregional authority con-
tinued to be checked by Timurid princes claiming leadership from the main 
urban centers of Khurasan and Transoxiana.
2 Situating Practices and Institutions of State Formation in Fifteenth 
Century West-Asia
In some ways these competing leaderships of fifteenth-century Islamic West-
Asia, from Ottoman, Syro-Egyptian and Timurid sultans to various Turkmen 
leaders and rulers, all have similar profiles, marked by the marginality of 
their social origins, the martial nature of their socio-political identities and 
the ‘Turkishness’ of their linguistic and cultural idiom. Given the common 
setting of their political action amidst Islamic West-Asia’s settled Arabo-Per-
sian environments, the historical profiles of these sultans, leaders and rulers 
are all also marked by the same experimental creativity and hybrid mix of 
memories, practices and institutions that they and their entourages used to 
explain and reproduce the messy and often violent political realities that 
emerged from these marginal, martial and Turkish contexts. Across Islamic 
West-Asia, these diverse fifteenth-century realities of leadership and their ex-
planations all remained deeply rooted in longstanding interconnected imagi-
nations and traditions of trans-regional political action. This type of political 
connectivity is often labeled as the Turko-Mongol factor of fifteenth-century 
Islamic West-Asia. This is a shorthand for capturing the combined features of 
nomadic (or semi-nomadic) roots and Perso-Islamic, Turko-Saljuq and Mon-
gol-Chinggisid precedent that determined in multivalent structuring ways 
these realities and explanations of political action across fifteenth-century 
Islamic West-Asia.
The second part of this chapter will provide an overview of those Turko-
Mongol features that are central to understanding fifteenth-century Islamic 
West-Asia’s history and the politics of its leaderships. These involve particular 
practices and institutions of socio-political reproduction and transformation, 
of socio-economic accumulation and redistribution, and of political organiza-
tion and state formation. These main practices and institutions of Turko- 
Mongol politics are discussed here only in a general way. As announced above, 
the purpose here is to frame these features from trans-dynastic perspectives 
and informed by state formation studies. As such an approach is not very com-
mon within the field of fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asian history, it has to 
be stressed that the occasionally more unorthodox interpretations that are 
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
Van Steenbergen36
<UN>
also presented here are above all intended to stimulate further discussion and 
exploration.
2.1 Turko-Mongol Socio-political Praxis
The presence and impact of the Turko-Mongol factor as outlined above have 
been generally regarded as being most visible through the widespread ancient 
appanage and tanistry practices that continued to regulate the distribution 
and reproduction of power, status and resources within elite lineages and po-
litical communities. These practices operated in diverse and multivalent ways 
between Cairo, Constantinople, Tabriz and Herat, and they continued to rein-
vigorate centrifugal tendencies and to obfuscate or even obstruct the pathways 
towards political stabilization and centralization, albeit with varying levels of 
success. Appanage and its cognate tanistry refer to the fact that the Turko-
Mongol mindset considered entitlement to privileges and social distinction, as 
well as succession to status, wealth, power and authority, as collective elitist 
arrangements. At the same time, these arrangements were nowhere organized 
in any straightforward hierarchies of individual rights, priorities and obliga-
tions. Rather, they always had to be acquired in highly competitive social cir-
cumstances, and agnatic kinship and seniority were only one asset among 
many here, alongside highly individualized qualities such as ambition, charis-
ma, political acumen, coercive prowess and even longevity. Political participa-
tion in this context of regular dynastic fragmentation and violent succession to 
leadership was not just a matter of birth or choice, but also of social survival 
and necessity, and power elites were left with no choice but to partake actively 
and continuously in political action. As a result, this politicization of all social 
relationships continued to favor the individual expertise and personal clout of 
successful military entrepreneurs among the members of those elites. “[Tanis-
try] politicized society, and it personalized monarchy”, as one of the pioneers 
of the study of Inner Asian and Turko-Mongol politics, Joseph Fletcher, put it.7
7 Fletcher, “Turco-Mongolian Monarchic Tradition in the Ottoman Empire”, p. 240. See also 
Woods, The Aqquyunlu, pp. 19–23 (following Dickson, “Uzbek Dynastic Theory in the Six-
teenth Century”) for a more nuanced (if limiting) consideration of the tensions between so-
called corporatism and dynasticism that together constitute tanistry as it is conceptualized 
here. Whereas in the Ottoman context, as Fletcher argues, this practice gave rise to the well-
known (and eventually codified) royal succession tradition of fratricide, its dividing presence 
in and impact on Timurid and Turkmen dispensations is also well known. (See also Binbaş, 
“Condominial Sovereignty and Condominial Messianism” for an interesting corrective about 
shared notions of rule in certain Timurid contexts). This phenomenon is perhaps most tell-
ingly illustrated by the ways in which the Qara Qoyunlu ruler Jahan Shah stepped into the 
footsteps of the Timurid Shah Rukh or how the Aq Qoyunlu ruler Uzun Hasan stepped into 
those of Jahan Shah. For examples and discussions from the Cairo Sultanate in the Southwest, 
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In this context of Turko-Mongol political praxis, success was highly person-
al, and leaders such as Temür, Murad, Jaqmaq, Uzun Hasan and their peers and 
descendants had to constantly fight for their survival. Political order and stabil-
ity were a widely shared responsibility as well as a highly volatile symbolic con-
struction, which faced continuous pressures, both from within and from with-
out. In fact, as will be detailed below, the Ottoman Sultanate in the Northwest, 
its ‘Turkish’ counterpart in the Syro-Egyptian Southwest, the Timurids in 
Khurasan and Transoxiana and somewhat belatedly also the Turkmen in Azer-
baijan and Iran managed to check the returning centrifugal consequences of 
these practices and pressures, even though in most cases only in contingent 
ways and to a certain extent. The process of state formation in these cases fea-
tured the gradual appearance of a coherent central political apparatus and of 
the concomitant idea that there was one autonomous ‘Turkish’, Ottoman, 
Timurid or eventually even Turkmen hegemonic political order. This process 
favored, in diverse ways, centripetal strategies that limited any effects of the 
elite fragmentations that were plaguing tanistric moments of succession in 
Cairo, in Edirne and Constantinople, in Tabriz, and in Herat and Samarkand. 
This never happened in any similarly stabilizing ways for other leaderships 
with trans-regional ambitions in fifteenth-century West-Asia, and the evapora-
tion of Timurid authorities in Anatolia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iraq and West-
Iran and the successive territorial expansions of the Qara and Aq Qoyunlu be-
tween the 1450s and 1470s had as much to do with these internal reproductive 
weaknesses as with the military successes of charismatic leaders like Jahan 
Shah and Uzun Hasan.
Most important for a proper understanding of the impact of Turko-Mongol 
socio-political praxis, perhaps, is the fact that, even under the latter Timurid 
and Turkmen umbrellas of unstable trans-regional leaderships, rapid political 
transformation had no more effect on the political practices and identities of 
most local and regional power elites in Eastern Anatolia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Iraq and most of Iran than it did on their counterparts in the more stable po-
litical contexts of Ottoman Anatolia, ‘Turkish’ Syro-Egypt, or Timurid Khurasan 
and Transoxiana. Loyalties and allegiances shifted and sovereignties and re-
gional priorities were constantly renegotiated, while political spaces and fields 
of power were incessantly redefined as a consequence of tanistric competi-
tion. In all of these regions, however, local and regional groups of political ac-
tors and their stakes and assets were far more enduring, changing primarily as 
a consequence of the many realities of social, cultural and physical mobility. 
see Adriaenssen and Van Steenbergen, “Mamluk Authorities and Anatolian Realities”; Van 
Steenbergen, “Caught between Heredity and Merit”.
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This relative social stability moreover not only concerned those who propa-
gated rural or urban violence in ever changing political constellations, but it 
also characterized many other elite groups and individuals who wielded some 
form of leverage and political clout. All of this meant that across Islamic West-
Asia, Turko-Mongol leaderships never fully achieved any monopoly of power 
as their political relationships tended to be crisscrossed, checked or even un-
dermined not just by appanage and tanistry practices, but also by the assets, 
strategies, and tools of those who had other skills to tap into local and regional 
flows of cultural, political and economic resources. Beatrice Manz, in her study 
of the reign of the Timurid ruler Shah Rukh, described as follows the effect of 
this atomistic and highly volatile situation on the political landscape within 
which the Timurids operated:
The towns from which the Timurids ruled their dominions were like an 
archipelago within a sea of semi-independent regions, over which con-
trol was a matter of luck, alliance and an occasional punitive expedition.8
As illustrated by the different case studies of local and regional elites in Part 3 
of this volume, this powerful archipelago metaphor is not just a very good ap-
proximation of the situation in West-Asia’s Timurid East. On the ground, in 
and out of the limelight of trans-regional political power, all kinds of constella-
tions of scholars, merchants, bureaucrats and local rural and urban leaders 
participated actively and often equally successfully in the translation and ac-
commodation to local and regional realities of trans-regional claims to power 
and primacy. As will be detailed below, the social, cultural and financial entre-
preneurship of these groups alongside their knowhow and access to all kinds 
of resources made them equally important, powerful and impactful both for 
the highly personalized and tanistric successes of all kinds of Turko-Mongol 
leaderships in West-Asia’s more peripheral zones as well as for (or against) the 
more coherent processes of central state formation in the Ottoman Northwest, 
the ‘Turkish’ Southwest, the Turkmen North and the Timurid East of Islamic 
West-Asia. As it played out in fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia, Turko- 
Mongol socio-political praxis was therefore not just highly personalized, 
 tanistric and violent. It also displayed a strong tendency towards fluidity and 
 poly-centrism. All these Turko-Mongol qualifications therefore invite one to 
consider West-Asian power as a relational and circulating historical phenom-
enon that connected and disconnected local, regional and trans-regional so-
cial realities in myriad centrifugal and centripetal ways. The growing visibility 
8 Manz, Power, Politics and Religion, p. 2.
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of the latter integrative tendencies in some parts of West-Asia should never 
obfuscate the continued workings of the former decentralizing and poly-cen-
tric forces in the peripheries as well as in the centers of the Ottoman, Syro-
Egyptian, Turkmen and Timurid trajectories of state formation.
2.2 Turko-Mongol Political Economies
These diverse local, regional and trans-regional elites were actually connected 
through access to Islamic West-Asia’s many resources in more defining and 
structuring ways than they were through Turko-Mongol socio-political praxis. 
It is therefore also appropriate to give some consideration here to this, and to 
the diverse but related sets of tributary, fiscal and proprietor relationships and 
of redistributive arrangements that distinguished fifteenth-century Islamic 
West-Asia’s political economies. These have to be understood against the back-
ground of a brief contemplation of the region’s wider symbiotic nomadic, agri-
cultural and commercial economies.
The recurrent tendency in Turko-Mongol politics towards “internecine war-
fare” did “minimal damage to a nomadic economy”, as explained Joseph Fletch-
er. “[T]o an agricultural economy, on the other hand”, Fletcher continued, “it 
was destructive, sometimes disastrous”.9 For many centuries, West-Asia’s di-
verse, rich and longstanding agricultural economies had been forced to ac-
commodate the many changes wrought, in more and less destructive ways, by 
the influx of Inner-Asian nomads and their tanistric politics. In the fifteenth 
century, that accommodation continued, due both to the pressures of the 
Turko-Mongol reflux from West to East and the impact of more particular 
socio -economic phenomena, not least the mid-fourteenth-century Black 
Death pandemic and similar, more restricted, epidemic cycles of pestilence, 
plague and depopulation. Throughout Islamic West-Asia, a transhumant no-
madic economy, controlled by Arab, Kurdish, Turkmen and many other tribal 
leaderships, had thus come to occupy a much more prominent space, and 
these groups often functionally shared the diverse rural landscapes of the re-
gion with agricultural ventures of a reduced and mostly relatively modest local 
scale. This created a particular trans-regional economic context that, though 
fundamentally different from any earlier trans-regional situation, proved resil-
ient enough to the political realities of endless warfare to maintain a reason-
able level of sufficiency.
An important factor here also was undoubtedly the fact that these symbi-
otic nomadic and agricultural economies were supported by the fifteenth-cen-
tury mercantile networks that increasingly strengthened connections amongst 
9 Fletcher, “Turco-Mongolian Monarchic Tradition in the Ottoman Empire”, p. 242.
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and beyond West-Asia’s many long-standing and densely populated urban cen-
ters and towns. This booming business of the circulation of local, regional and 
trans-regional merchants and commodities (including luxury goods such as 
spices and also slaves and furs) had also very successfully adapted to accom-
modate the recurrent political insecurities of the time, operating along 
rhythms of exchange and along flows of resources that managed to produce in 
many ways their own commercial realities.10 On a local level, these realities 
were undoubtedly also volatile, affected by ecological and demographic uncer-
tainties and intersected by all kinds of competing interests that could be 
equally political and economic. Across the board, however, the era’s political 
and economic volatilities did not necessarily mirror each other thanks to the 
resilience of local economic communities as well as their capacity to adapt. 
Many of these communities also empowered themselves by acting as links in 
the intensifying chains of West-Asian routes and towns that connected the 
Mediterranean, Inner Asian and Indian Ocean trade zones. Islamic West-Asia’s 
fifteenth-century cultural efflorescence and its reputation as an age of cultural 
innovation and creativity, and of trans-regional networks of defining scholar-
ship and knowledge practices, are very much testimony to the ways in which 
these changing socio-economic realities had somehow managed to accommo-
date the potentially destructive effects of Turko-Mongol political praxis.
Turko-Mongol political praxis in this post-Temür age, however, had also 
been shaped in many ways by those same socio-economic changes. The afore-
mentioned appanage and tanistry practices of dynastic fragmentation and vio-
lent succession to leadership were not static normative devices that structured 
political action in unchanging or uniform destructive ways. They rather repre-
sented deep-rooted traditions that were constantly being re-invented and re-
imagined according to the necessities of time and space, thus offering many 
potential solutions to all kinds of challenges. This was also true of the chal-
lenges posed by the new political and socio-economic realities of the fifteenth 
century, and of the great variety of more or less successful solutions pursued 
across Islamic West-Asia by the new, or renewed, elites of the post-Temür era. 
This pragmatic interplay between leadership challenges and solutions played 
out most directly on the local level, when political and socio-economic reali-
ties intertwined and Turko-Mongol elites everywhere tried again to tap into 
10 Apellániz Ruiz de Galarreta, Pouvoir et finance en Méditerranée pré-moderne; Inalcik, “Bur-
sa and the Commerce of the Levant”; Inalcik, “Ḥarīr. ii—The Ottoman Empire”; for wider 
commercial (and related political) connections east- and westward, see also Vallet, 
L’Arabie marchande; Meloy, Imperial Power and Maritime Trade; Coulon, Barcelone et le 
grand commerce d’Orient.
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the region’s changing flows of resources and accelerating rhythms of exchange. 
The intense and highly interconnected cultural and intellectual life of fifteenth- 
century Islamic West-Asia was very much an outcome of these pragmatic poli-
tics of local revenue extraction, thriving as it had before on the patronage of 
these elites, on the political needs of their competing leaderships, and on the 
many opportunities for others beyond the direct control of these particular 
elites. Cultural and intellectual innovation were stimulated by regional compe-
tition, by the ubiquitous scramble for social distinction and political legitima-
tion, and by the fertile hybridization of Arabo- and Perso-Islamic, Turkic and 
Turko-Mongol lore, and these developments found a welcome partner in the 
West-Asian empowerment of the relatively small groups of highly mobile 
West-Asian power elites of the post-Temür era. Rather than being undermined 
by the era’s continuous outbursts of rivalry and violence, the cultural efflores-
cence of the fifteenth century in many ways was sustained by the constant 
opportunities generated by these endless renegotiations of local, regional and 
trans-regional balances of interest.11
Across fifteenth century West-Asia, Turko-Mongol elites attempted in many 
different ways to tap into the region’s flows of resources and rhythms of ex-
change. Even though fiscal institutional precedents created a semblance of 
uniformity, these attempts were determined by local circumstances as much as 
by trans-local ambitions or centralizing initiatives. The most defining factor in 
all this, so it appears, was actually the changing contingency of a political cen-
ter’s distance from, and level of control over the economic assets in a locality. 
Territories and periods marred by political competition, warfare and cam-
paigns of conquest and redress were hit most forcefully by the potentially de-
structive economic effects of Turko-Mongol politics. In such contexts, harvests, 
livestock, commodities or other resources were invariably looted, and then 
distributed as booty among campaigners and their followers along ad hoc hier-
archies of military investment and political interest. After Temür’s endless 
campaigning, and throughout the fifteenth century, West-Asia’s regions that 
continued to be most regularly plagued by these coercive politics of resource 
extraction were the politically unstable poly-centric zone of Iraq, Diyar Bakr, 
Azerbaijan, Armenia and Eastern Anatolia and their winter and summer pas-
tures, fertile river basins and multiple commercial networks of towns and 
routes.
11 The Russian historian Vasilij Vladimirovič Bartol’d (1869–1930) already made this point 
regarding Timurid history; in due course it was framed with the label of a Timurid “renais-
sance”, see Barthold, Ulugh-beg; Binbaş, Intellectual Networks in Timurid Iran, pp. 4–5.
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In many cases, however, mitigating arrangements between local and cam-
paigning leaderships followed, or forestalled, such economically and politi-
cally disruptive moments. Often, precious gifts were exchanged and tributes in 
cash and kind were pledged to confirm such arrangements, generating alterna-
tive, more controlled mechanisms to provide a return on the investments re-
quired for military campaigning. Depending on the circumstances, and also on 
the extent to which promises could be enforced, such ad hoc settlements be-
tween local and central elites could transform into more structural arrange-
ments, including varieties of what essentially were tax farming engagements. 
Indeed, throughout the fifteenth century, these fluid arrangements arguably 
shaped the majority of economic relationships between local and central elites 
across Islamic West-Asia, appearing from Egypt over Western Anatolia to Tran-
soxiana as the means best suited to balance the continuities of local actors and 
practices against the volatilities of Turko-Mongol politics and socio-economic 
changes. Such arrangements required minimal investments from central elites 
and helped maintain some level of authority over more peripheral social or 
territorial spaces. At the same time, these practices integrated Arab, Turkmen, 
Kurdish or other urban, rural and tribal elites into the authority structures of a 
political center by giving them a stake in the maintenance of political and eco-
nomic order. As suggested above, the nature and extent of those stakes, along-
side the level of integration of local and regional elites, and even the identity of 
that political center remained the object of fierce competition, negotiation 
and transformation throughout the century and across the continent.
More direct and unilateral fiscal systems of resource flow tended to comple-
ment, marginalize or even displace tax farming and tributary arrangements 
in areas that were more stable politically such as Ottoman Anatolia, ‘Turkish’ 
Syro- Egypt or Timurid Khurasan and Transoxiana, as well as in the proximity 
and catchment area of powerful leaders, such as Jahan Shah and Uzun Hasan. 
In each of these West-Asian power centers, broadly similar invasive rural and 
urban tax regimes were in operation, inspired by longstanding local and region-
al fiscal traditions, and leading to greater integration of taxpayers, beneficiaries 
and financial administrators into centralizing economic and political orders. In 
all regions these more direct tax regimes derived from a combination of ancient 
Islamic taxes, most importantly the land tax—or kharaj—and the poll tax—or 
jizya—together with a range of customs duties and related, mostly urban, taxes 
and forced payments that were not similarly sanctified by Muslim scripture. For 
many centuries, especially the kharaj’s tithe payments in cash and kind had 
provided a steady flow of income for the region’s elites, and this did not radi-
cally alter in the fifteenth century. At the same time, however, the period’s 
socio-economic changes certainly also affected the flow of those traditional 
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resources, increasing the importance of other types of income, not least 
through these elites’ fiscal and other forms of participation in West-Asia’s, and 
Eurasia’s, commercial economies.12
The redistribution of these fiscal and related resources among political 
elites in West-Asia was everywhere similarly organized as a regionally inter-
connected and dynamic practice of land tenure and remuneration rooted in a 
mixture of precedents. Most of the economic assets and activities in Islamic 
West-Asia that were somehow subject to more direct tax regimes were con-
nected to lands and rights that legally (at least in theory) belonged to the ruler, 
in his capacity as the personification of the sovereign political order, or the 
state. This proprietorship was then parceled out in fiscal concessions and fiscal 
exemptions to his household, to his courtiers and military leaders, and to other 
relevant beneficiaries in return for their loyalties and services. In the Anatolian 
context the main type of grant in this practice of controlled, but devolved, 
royal remuneration and fiscal administration was known in Ottoman Turkish 
as a timar, and its holders, the timariot, were all cavalrymen (sipahi) with vary-
ing ranks, status and responsibilities. In ‘Turkish’ Syro-Egypt the Arabic noun 
iqtaʿ was used to refer to a concession in the arrangements that organized and 
regulated the distribution of tax income to the Sultanate’s various military 
commanders (amīrs) and their bands of horsemen. In Timurid and Turkmen 
lands similar arrangements prevailed among the entourages of rulers, but 
there these fiscal, administrative and proprietorship grants were referred to as 
soyurghal, or also as tiyul or ulka. The various forms, names and arrangements 
which this prebendal practice took in fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asian 
courts were all rooted in shared local customs and traditions that often origi-
nated in the tenth-century history of the region. These forms, names and ar-
rangements also overlapped everywhere in more or less explicit ways with the 
Turko-Mongol appanage practice of shared but segmented authority. Invari-
ably, they confirmed military leaders of Turko-Mongol background in their 
role as receivers and beneficiaries in West-Asia’s fiscal resource flows, as active 
partners and stakeholders in the region’s economies, and as managers of their 
own socio-political, military and economic resources or estates, even during 
moments of accelerating central state formation. All over Islamic West-Asia 
this prebendal practice finally appeared as the normative way of organizing 
the political economy around successful trans-regional leaders and power 
12 This point is especially made in Apellániz Ruiz de Galarreta, Pouvoir et finance en Méditer-
ranée pré-moderne; for a strong argument supporting the idea of very active early Otto-
man participation in the Mediterranean commercial economy, see Fleet, European and 
Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman Empire.
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elites. Bound to be expanded and pushed to the contested social and territorial 
frontiers of these leaders’ effective reach, however, this practice never entirely 
gave way to feudal hierarchies of benefit and service, but rather continuously 
intersected and competed with other arrangements such as centralizing fiscal 
regulations and local tax farming and tributary solutions, alongside alternative 
land tenure provisions, especially those for religious endowments (waqf).13
In order to understand fifteenth-century Turko-Mongol political econo-
mies, it is also extremely relevant to consider in more detail the intersections 
between this multifarious prebendal practice, the latter construction of Mus-
lim religious endowments and centralizing regulations which appeared in 
some of the politically more stabilized parts of West-Asia. The land tenure sys-
tem of fifteenth-century Egypt in particular has been demonstrated to have 
undergone a remarkable transformation, generally identified as waqf-ization. 
This notion of waqf-ization stands for the legal process by which the status of 
taxable land was changed to that of waqf-land, by incorporating the land and 
the income that it generates into the semi-closed, religiously sanctified and 
tax-exempted socio-economic circuit of a religious endowment (waqf). Insti-
tutions for religious practice and education, their salaried staff and students 
and  related forms of expenditure were very often part of this specific socio- 
economic circuit. At the same time, in fifteenth-century Syro-Egypt, such cir-
cuit similarly often included amongst its main beneficiaries specific household 
and family members and the descendants of the private person who created 
the waqf and donated its main assets. For the latter reason in particular, the 
process of waqf-ization has also been likened to a process of de-centralization 
and privatization. Many, if not most, of the Sultanate’s courtiers and political 
leaders, very often also including sultans themselves, pursued all kinds of legal 
and financial strategies to subvert the centralized system of land tenure and 
fiscal redistribution. They alienated state lands traditionally parceled out as 
iqtaʿ and acquired full control over their assets by assigning them to their reli-
gious endowments, and thus to the long-term benefit of particular religious 
institutions and, most importantly, of their family and household. As such, 
waqf-ization was an effective strategy for enabling the Syro-Egyptian Sultan-
ate’s elite families in particular to anticipate, contain and very often also over-
come, at least in socio-economic terms, the volatilities of Turko-Mongol poli-
tics and the many political changes that affected the Sultanate in the fifteenth 
century.14
13 See Inalcik, “Autonomous Enclaves in Islamic States”.
14 Amīn, Al-Awqāf wa-l-Hayā al-Ijtimāʿīya; Petry, “Fractionalized Estates in a Centralized Re-
gime”; Abu Ghazi, Tatawwur al-Ḥiyāza; Sabra, “The Rise of a New Class?”.
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
45From Temür to Selim
<UN>
At the same time, however, recent research has begun to make clear that 
this is not just a question of decentralization or of socio-economic privatiza-
tion and survival. It is also a story of a substantial political transformation in 
the fifteenth-century Sultanate. This was due to the fact that, over time, control 
over some of the largest and most profitable waqf-estates in the Syro-Egyptian 
realm was actually transferred back to the central state, in particular to an in-
creasingly clearly defined small number of the highest court offices. Positions 
such as those of the ‘chief commander of the armies’ (atabak al-ʿasakir), ‘se-
nior head guard’ (raʾs nawba kabir), and ‘grand chamberlain’ (hajib hujjab) 
came to be directly associated with the financial management of major waqfs. 
In ways that warrant further research, these major waqfs had often been en-
dowed by previous sultans and they were linked to the upkeep of Cairo’s main 
religious infrastructures, such as the Mansuri hospital, the Ashrafi religious 
complexes inside and outside the city walls, or the Muʾayyadi congregational 
mosque next to the Southern gate. This meant that any military leaders who 
occupied these powerful offices at Cairo’s court also automatically acquired 
control over these important estates and their resources. These leaders were 
then given the opportunity to transfer to their own households the substantial 
surplus generated by these waqf-lands in Egypt and Syria. They thereby moved 
from the administration of one set of waqf-estates to another as they made 
their careers at court and accumulated ever more resources. In the meantime, 
most of these leaders also used the riches they assembled in this way to set 
up  their own religious endowments, continuing the afore-mentioned waqf- 
ization process and working to the socio-economic benefit of their own house-
holds and families.15 In many ways, therefore, the accelerating transformation 
of Egypt’s land tenure system through waqf-ization and the paradoxical re- 
integration of waqf-estates in the state apparatus were related factors. They 
both contributed to, but were also partly generated by, the formation in Cairo 
of a small but particular set of state actors. As will be discussed in more detail 
below, these figures all rose from very humble origins, distinguished them-
selves through many years of military and court service, and eventually man-
aged to accumulate substantial political and economic resources in the pro-
cess. Different sets of these particular state actors, and their huge personalized 
resources, continued to influence successions and the political stability within 
the Sultanate throughout the fifteenth century. A handful of these men, in-
cluding figures such as Jaqmaq (r. 1438–53), Inal (r. 1453–61), Khushqadam 
(r. 1461–7), Qaytbay (r. 1468–96) and Qansawh (r. 1501–16), even managed to 
15 Igarashi, Land Tenure and Mamluk Waqfs, esp. pp. 29–32, 42–45; Van Steenbergen & Ter-
monia, “State Formation, Military Entrepreneurship, and Waqfisation”.
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rise to the highest court office of sultan after long careers of service and of re-
source accumulation.
Elsewhere in Islamic West-Asia, the waqf institution also continued to play 
an important role in structuring socio-economic and political relationships. In 
the Ottoman and Timurid territories, as well as in the more fluid zone of East-
ern Anatolia, Armenia, Diyar Bakr, Iraq, Azerbaijan and Iran, this infrastruc-
ture similarly enabled the structural patronage, cultural promotion and politi-
cal integration of wide varieties of particular religio-cultural communities and 
their leaders, followers and practices. In these parts of Islamic West-Asia, the 
waqf institution also provided for a legal and socio-economic mechanism to 
protect elite families, households and other social groups against the vicissi-
tudes of Turko-Mongol politics. However, only some of these endowments 
were integrated or linked with the political apparatus of these regions’ rulers. 
As semi-closed local or regional circuits of agricultural, manufactural and 
commercial estates and assets, of expenditure for specific religious and com-
munal purposes, of sovereign provisions prescribed by Islamic scripture and 
the law, as well as of rural and urban expertise, the majority of waqf endow-
ments in Islamic West-Asia actually operated as an alternative, unusually sta-
ble, set of socio-economic arrangements for various elite groups to participate 
in the endless negotiations of local and regional relationships and balances of 
power. The semi-closed, sovereign and communal character of the waqf insti-
tution actually made it into a very powerful centrifugal instrument in the 
hands of power elites. It facilitated the intersection of centripetal ambitions 
and relationships emanating from Bursa, Edirne and Istanbul, from Tabriz, 
Herat, and Samarkand, and even from Cairo and Damascus with other equal-
ly  powerful, institutionalized relationships, which had substantial socio- 
economic, cultural as well as political impact on a local or regional level. As 
explained above, in fifteenth-century Cairo this centrifugal dynamic was 
somehow complemented by a more constructive participation of waqf endow-
ments in the state formation process. In the East, Timurid rulers and their en-
tourages started pursuing a parallel re-integration and more centripetal opera-
tionalization of the waqf (vaqf in Persian) institution within the politics of the 
central court.16 In Anatolia, however, the Ottoman state pursued a different 
policy, changing the legal status of rural properties and endowments (vakıf in 
Ottoman Turkish), or even seizing them. This happened to increasing numbers 
16 Subtelny, Timurids in Transition, esp. Chapter Five: “Piety and Pragmatism: the Role of the 
Islamic Endowment” (pp. 148–191); McChesney, Waqf in Central Asia, esp. Chapters Two 
(‘The Origins of the ʿAlid Shrine at Balkh’) and Three (‘Waqf in its Political Setting’) 
(pp. 21–70).
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of rural properties and endowments belonging to groups and families in vari-
ous parts of Western, Central and eventually even Eastern Anatolia. This forced 
expansion of the Anatolian land tenure system under direct Ottoman control 
was actually part and parcel of the process of centralization that followed sul-
tan Mehmed’s (r. 1451–81) conquest of Constantinople in 1453. Many local Ana-
tolian elites’ privately-owned and waqf lands were transferred to become Otto-
man state lands (miri). They thus ended up as property of the Ottoman sultan 
in his capacity as the personification of the Ottoman political order and were 
parceled out as timars to the sultan’s cavalry elites, the sipahi, or these lands 
were at least tied to a requirement of some form of military service from its 
original proprietors. In the process of the formation of the Ottoman state in 
the fifteenth century, therefore, it were the radical annihilation of the waqf in-
stitution’s atomistic and even centrifugal dynamic as well as the maximization 
of the timar system as a function of the expansion of the dynasty’s military 
apparatus that were the main targets of the central Ottoman court’s socio- 
economic policy.17
2.3 Turko-Mongol Political Apparatuses
These diverse redistributive arrangements in the political economies of Islam-
ic West-Asia were all also interrelated as far as the administrative and authority 
structures that appeared to organize them are concerned. At this point it is 
therefore necessary also to briefly outline the organizational appearances of 
Turko-Mongol political power in fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia and to 
consider their differing levels of complexity and penetration in and beyond 
the main centers of Ottoman, Syro-Egyptian, Turkmen and Timurid power, 
and also to explore how they transformed throughout the century.
As suggested above, these organizational arrangements all operated along 
devolved and even atomistic modes of power and control that remind us of the 
appanage practices of Turko-Mongol politics. These arrangements and their 
varying degrees of political integration often also coalesced with those prac-
tices and provided them with a more structured, institutionalized, appearance. 
Most of the princes, courtiers, military commanders, cavalrymen and other 
urban, rural and tribal leaders and elite communities of fifteenth century Is-
lamic West-Asia were all very much left to their own devices with regards to 
organizing access management for the resources they controlled or which had 
been assigned to them. Even holders of a timar, an iqtaʿ and a soyurghal had to 
attend to their own economic and military needs and responsibilities, and they 
17 İnalcık, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 126–131; Inalcik, “Au-
tonomous Enclaves in Islamic States”, pp. 118, 124.
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mostly did so in organizational formats that appeared like down-scaled ver-
sions of trans-regional rulers’ courts and administrations.
This segmentation of how fiscal relationships were organized in fifteenth-
century Islamic West-Asia, even in the vicinities of strong rulers and expanding 
states, is another function of the personalized nature of Turko-Mongol politics. 
The remaining instability and volatility of political realities across the region 
regularly cut across processes of more intense trans-local political integration 
and subordination of elites, even in the more stabilizing political orders of the 
Ottoman Northwest, the ‘Turkish’ Southwest, the Turkmen North and the 
Timurid East. In the latter statist contexts especially, leaders continued to pur-
sue a more coherent administrative level of integration and central control 
through the enforcement of particular regulations, such as the temporary and 
non-hereditary allocation of prebendal grants, the assignment of territorially 
dispersed prebendal lands, the rapid transfer of grant holders between estates, 
or alternative remunerations from central repositories. However, centrifugal 
tendencies to subvert these regulations remained equally strong, as in the 
waqf-ization process, as well as more generally in the atomistic and diverse 
practical organization of the management of grants, tax farms, tributes, en-
dowments and estates. For this reason, the costs of enforcing these regulations 
for central authorities often proved extremely high. As a result, rulers and elites 
throughout fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia continued to favor a diversity 
of ad hoc and middle-ground solutions serving a variety of local and central-
izing needs and interests, even in the increasingly stable contexts of the Syro-
Egyptian and Ottoman Sultanates.18
Overall during this period, these devolved, segmented and negotiated ways 
of organizing fiscal relationships were actually part and parcel of the rather 
light and messy wider arrangements that accompanied the political fortunes 
of the region’s Turko-Mongol rulers, dynasties and power elites. Just like redis-
tributive practices, these organizational arrangements throughout the region 
were rooted in various hazy combinations of longstanding bureaucratic prec-
edents, local managerial requirements and particular types of expertise and 
opportunity. Basically, every man of status and every leader high or low had to 
find his own solutions to the challenges of collecting and paying his dues, of 
communicating with sovereigns, peers and subordinates, and of safeguarding 
his patrimony. Across the region, solutions to these challenges were largely 
18 Inalcik, “Autonomous Enclaves in Islamic States”; Inalcik’s attempt to create a better sense 
of the meanings and roles of “Temlîks, Soyurghals, Yurdluḳ-Ocaḳlıks, Mâlikâne-Muḳāṭaʿas 
and Awqāf” certainly leaves the reader with this impression of diversity and ad hoc 
solutions.
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determined by local circumstances, as well as by regional and historical condi-
tions, and, above all, by the sliding scale of a man’s power. Here, both person-
alized politics and volatile political realities defined the level of complexity of 
organizational challenges and their solutions as well as, importantly, the com-
position, size and fate of the administrative and military staff supporting a 
leader in his duties.
Everywhere, relationships of power, whatever their level of complexity and 
authority, coalesced around basic organizational units of groups of people 
bound together through multivalent sets of personalized ties. As in preceding 
centuries, these bonds ranged from various kinship arrangements to mutual 
loyalties acquired through social action. As far as the diverse Turko-Mongol 
leaderships of fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia are concerned, there was a 
range of more or less structured formats in which these organizational units of 
people and social ties could appear, depending on a man’s power. Peripatetic 
warbands of military leaders and their associates and personal retainers were 
one, often more short-lived, format that continued to make its mostly violent 
appearance in particular in Islamic West-Asia’s frontier zones and peripheries. 
Urbanized households of sultans, princes, courtiers and their personal body-
guards, women, children, servants and administrators were another, heavily 
structured format, occupying the other extreme on this continuum of core re-
lationships of power.19 In the devolved, segmented and negotiated realities of 
fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia, most relational power constellations wa-
vered in dynamic ways between these two extremes of social complexity. As 
suggested above, only a handful of these constellations attained and main-
tained a high level of organizational complexity, transforming with varying 
levels of success into the region’s central courts in Cairo, Constantinople, Ta-
briz, Herat and Samarkand.
Throughout Islamic West-Asia, scribes (Ar. katib, pl. kuttab) of various prov-
enance and expertise were hired to perform duties of tax collection, of house-
hold and military expenditure, and of letter writing in Arabic and Persian (and, 
increasingly, Turkish) for these diverse power constellations. Whenever, and 
wherever, the scale of a patron’s power required it, specialization and diversifi-
cation generated, or regenerated, more complex administrations. This process 
involved the structuration of larger sets of scribes and their different tasks fol-
lowing the ancient bureaucratic unit of the diwan and along hierarchies topped 
by traditional positions such as that of the vizier (Ar. wazir) or its Persian or 
Turko-Mongol equivalents. Similar processes affected the military entourages 
19 Crossley, “Military Patronage and Hodgson’s Genealogy of State Centralization in Early 
Modern Eurasia”, pp. 105–108.
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of West-Asia’s rulers and leaders, with each patron having in their service fight-
ers of various provenance and expertise ranging from tribal levies over merce-
naries to military slaves and freedmen, and from horsemen to footmen. The 
occasional expansion of these fighters’ ranks also led these services to special-
ize, diversify and subscribe to structural military precedents, including that of 
hierarchies of commanders known as amirs (in Arabic and Persian) or begs (in 
Turkish). In the course of the fifteenth century, as will be detailed below, this 
process of growing organizational complexity marked the history of Ottoman, 
‘Turkish’ and Timurid leaderships and their courts in Western Anatolia, Egypt 
and Eastern Iran. It also happened to a certain extent in the entourages of oth-
er powerful leaders in the more unstable and peripheral frontier zone that con-
nected Eastern Anatolia, Iraq and Azerbaijan.
In Egypt, as elsewhere in West-Asia, this process of bureaucratic specializa-
tion and diversification had actually been ongoing with ups and downs for sev-
eral centuries. Following long-standing regional traditions of Arabic writing on 
epistolary and accountancy practices, this process’ trajectory during the fif-
teenth century, in the service of the ‘Turkish’ Sultanate, was captured and re-
produced in a handful of very detailed and informative literary texts. Describ-
ing the rules and regulations of the Sultanate’s court and power apparatus, 
these books were written by scribes as manuals and as instruments both of the 
Sultanate’s bureaucratic practice and of that practice’s structural coherence 
across time and space. In these literary repositories of fifteenth-century proto-
col and epistolary modelling the Sultanate’s apparatus actually appears as far 
from light. Indeed, these texts rather portray a powerful and coherent bureau-
cratic structure set up to penetrate and organize local power relationships as 
efficiently as possible. This impressive contemporary appearance has substan-
tially informed many modern imaginations about the Sultanate, painting a 
picture of a highly rationalized bureaucratic state, organized and performed 
along a neatly devised triple hierarchy of ‘the men of the sword, the men of the 
pen and the men of the turbans’. In modern scholarship, these contemporary 
categories are generally referred to as the ‘military-executive’, the ‘financial-
secretarial’, and the ‘judiciary office holders’ of ‘the Mamluk government’.20 
Furthermore, in modern Ottoman studies there is an equally widespread tradi-
tion to understand the Ottoman Sultanate in the later fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries as a similarly intrusive bureaucratic state. This mainly followed from 
the fact that from the early sixteenth century onwards, this state began to leave 
an impressive paper trail not just in comparable manuals and administrative 
20 Popper, Egypt and Syria under the Circassian Sultans, pp. 90–110.
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repositories, but also in uniquely preserved archival records. In fact, variations 
of this bureaucratic type of state appeared for a long time as a norm in modern 
scholarship that could be used to understand, evaluate and compare political 
organizations across fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia, especially in Egypt 
and West Anatolia and to some extent also in Timurid Khurasan, as more or 
less successful prequels of the region’s early modern empires.
As will be detailed in the next chapter, since the early 1990s some scholars 
are also pointing to the pitfalls of teleology and anachronism in argumenta-
tions such as these, and alternative interpretations of the actual nature and 
meaning of bureaucratic practice and of bureaucratization in a context of 
Turko-Mongol politics are gradually being formulated. Considering the vio-
lent, volatile and personalized nature of those politics across the region, in-
cluding in fifteenth-century Egypt, current scholarship is now certainly also 
contemplating the possibility that administrative texts and political realities 
could be two very different things. Indeed, the former texts may well have been 
one of the tools available to scribes and to their patrons to pursue more stable 
participation in, and control over, the fluidity of the latter realities in the face 
of continuous challenges. This approach tallies not just much better with what 
is known about fifteenth-century Turko-Mongol politics, but also with data 
from many other contemporary sources which points to the often incoherent 
and ad hoc nature of bureaucratic practice and also hints at the rather more 
limited success of central bureaucracy’s penetration of local communities 
across fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia. As suggested by the competitive 
nature of Turko-Mongol organizational arrangements, the structural integra-
tion of elites in centralizing sets of relationships was frequently contested, and 
the integration of diverse local and regional administrative practices and ac-
tors in centralizing claims to authority remained a haphazard enterprise. Wher-
ever in Islamic West-Asia the scale of a leadership’s power enabled administra-
tive and military specialization and diversification, physical and political 
distance nonetheless continued to define, and confine, the extent of a locality’s 
bureaucratic penetration by the center and its organizational arrangements. 
Just as with the politics of fiscal administration, the administration of central 
authority in this wider sense also continuously intersected and competed with 
all kinds of local, alternative or rival authority arrangements. The combination 
of a need for costly investments of people and resources to face these challeng-
es, alongside the infrastructural limitations of surveillance and  communication, 
and also the volatility of Turko-Mongol politics and the recurrent recalibration 
of central powers in fifteenth-century West-Asia, all meant that substantial dis-
tances continued to separate political actors. All this reflects above all a 
 historical reality of socio-political segmentation and of local continuity and 
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 empowerment that was not easy to integrate into, let alone control with cen-
tralizing bureaucratic arrangements, ambitions and apparatuses.
In fact, as suggested by Manz’ archipelago metaphor above, West-Asia’s inte-
gration into the orbits of its main political centers in the fifteenth century re-
mained a contested and diverse reality which often involved the ad hoc action 
of military agents and local representatives. Irrespective of West-Asia’s diverse 
ecological systems, administrative penetration and integration were therefore 
primarily limited to the main urban centers and towns and their hinterlands 
and to the upholding of interrelated, but also locally accommodated, urban 
systems of taxation and justice. This urban prioritization can be seen most 
forcefully in the concentration of military and administrative representatives 
and agents of central courts, as governors, commanders, judges, scribes and tax 
collectors, in many of the urban centers and towns of Egypt, Syria, Anatolia, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Iran, Khurasan and Transoxiana. As explained be-
fore, this presence had a mixed impact on local relationships of power, de-
pending on distances and loyalties, on central investments of expensive re-
sources, and on all kinds of different local complexities. Wherever any urban 
penetration was achieved, however, the core business of any political appara-
tus was to focus on tapping into local resource flows via fiscal and other ar-
rangements, the maintenance of social order to assure the steady flow of those 
resources, and at best also some local performance of the central court’s claims 
to sovereignty and political order.
Any assessment of the nature of this central penetration of local relation-
ships of power is complicated by not just the structuring bias of Arabic, Persian, 
and Turkish administrative textbooks, but also the general paucity of docu-
mentary and non-urban sources for the political history of fifteenth- century 
Islamic West-Asia. Towards the end of the fifteenth century, however, another 
important set of bureaucratic texts emerged in Aq Qoyunlu and Ottoman con-
texts. These texts confirm in many ways this rather narrow bureaucratic focus 
on local urban systems of taxation and justice as outlined above. The sources in 
question are the interrelated Law Books (Kanun Name) of Uzun Ḥasan and of 
the Ottoman sultan Bayezid.21 As Ottomanist Rhoads Murphey explains for the 
latter case, these and a related handful of surviving documents and texts con-
firm indeed that
it was from the narrow base of the more closely regulated urban space 
and urban markets that the Ottomans launched their first and most effec-
tive efforts aimed at modifying undesired market tendencies such as 
21 Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650, pp. 244–251; Woods, The Aq Qoyunlu, pp. 108–109.
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hoarding and price speculation, and at creating the basis for a fair bal-
ance between mercantile profit and affordability for average urban 
consumers.22
These Law Books integrated various local customary arrangements, comple-
menting more general doctrinal regulations and legal advice formulated by 
specialists of religious law who tended to operate within alternative authority 
frameworks. As such, these Law Books announced comprehensive regulatory 
codification projects of later Ottoman sultans, but certainly did not mirror 
them. They actually pursued a more active central participation in particular 
local social, commercial and fiscal arrangements and solutions by proscribing 
and regulating the agency of the ruler’s own local agents and representatives. 
The production of these specimens of royal codification towards the end of 
the fifteenth century are therefore above all rare extant functions of the 
growth, specialization and diversification of the entourages of Uzun Hasan 
and Bayezid as these were trying to organize the expanding horizons of these 
rulers’ power.
In this way these Law Books actually only represent one particular moment 
in the formation and empowerment of such entourages and political appara-
tuses. Similarly formalized communication between courts and their agents 
in the form of decrees, orders, diplomas, missives, letters and reports—most 
of which have not been preserved—were integral to bureaucratic expansion 
throughout fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia, performing political authority 
as much as negotiating it. Other equally important aspects of this growth and 
expansion included all kinds of regulatory efforts, including the maintenance 
of social order and the ensuring of justice, related both to fifteenth-century 
West-Asian rulers’ symbolic apparatus as well as the daily performance of their 
claims to sovereignty and resources and therefore often recorded in contempo-
rary narrative texts of history. Modern scholarship has even made the convinc-
ing case regarding the Syro-Egyptian Sultanate that the ruler and his bureau-
cratic agents managed to appropriate legal and judicial authorities traditionally 
only invested in more autonomous specialists of religious law.23 This remark-
able expansion of the authority of the sultan of Cairo and of his bureaucratic 
apparatus appears not to have been achieved by any other ruler in fifteenth- 
century Islamic West-Asia. Nevertheless, many certainly also deployed, or 
22 Murphey, “The Ottoman Economy in the early imperial age”, pp. 28–30, esp. 28.
23 Rapoport, “Royal Justice and Religious Law”.
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pursued, similar strategies of growth, penetration and judicial empowerment 
in their own, more or less successful, ways.24
3 Situating Trajectories of State Formation in Islamic West-Asia
In the wide range of predominantly urban bureaucratic practices, fifteenth-
century leaders and their agents generally seem to have prioritized concerns 
for power and control over any expectations about the performance of govern-
ment and of specific administrative tasks.25 This prioritization involved first 
and foremost the power, control and level of local or regional participation of 
the leader or ruler in whose service an administrative and military apparatus 
operated. However, in many, if not all, cases it also involved the power and 
control that could be acquired by the bureaucrats themselves, and that could 
be wielded by scribes, by military commanders and by all kinds of other agents 
in the leader’s service. Closeness and direct service to the ruler in varieties of 
advisory, financial, military, diplomatic, ceremonial or other capacities were 
certainly one strategic means by which an agent could acquire power and con-
trol, indeed this was a very important tool amidst the returning realities of 
Turko-Mongol personalized politics. But in certain political contexts, these ca-
pacities could also be transformed into power and control in other, more au-
tonomous, and therefore also more structural ways. Whenever the scale of a 
leadership’s political reach in fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia enabled bu-
reaucratic specialization and diversification, this also generated a lengthening 
of the virtual chains of authority and agency between a ruler and the increas-
ing numbers of agents performing his rule. From these agents’ perspective, 
with greater complexity thus also came a relative depersonalization of the ties 
that bound them to their ruler. This was accompanied by the transformation of 
the ruler from a mere powerful person into a more abstract idea and represen-
tation of correct political order. This form of state formation therefore brought 
24 See Burak, “The Second Formation of Islamic Law”, for a wider, comparative consider-
ation of the relationship between Turko-Mongol dynasts and Islamic law in the late me-
dieval and early modern period, suggesting that “different dynasties’ adopting a particular 
Islamic school of law as their official state school […] [represented] active attempts by the 
ruling dynasty to regulate the school’s structures, authorities, and doctrines” (p. 580) and 
that at least in the Ottoman case this process of expansion of dynastic authority began in 
the early fifteenth century and is especially notable from the sixteenth century onwards.
25 Miura, “Administrative Networks in the Mamluk Period”; see also Chapter Two in this vol-
ume, especially “Introduction: Defining the ‘state’ between Max Weber, ʿAbd al- Rahman 
Ibn Khaldun, and Charles Tilly”.
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greater autonomy for those along the chain who were trained, skilled and ex-
perienced in the maintenance, reproduction and expansion of that order, re-
sulting in a remarkably symbiotic interaction between an agent’s own empow-
erment and that of the leadership he served.26
As suggested before, this classic state formation process of the mutual em-
powerment of a bureaucratic apparatus and of a centralizing political order 
topped by a particular leadership emerged especially in fifteenth-century Is-
lamic West-Asia in the Ottoman Northwest, the ‘Turkish’ Southwest, the 
Timurid East and eventually also the Turkmen North. In each of these particu-
lar leadership contexts it did so only in qualified and circumscribed ways, as 
trans-regionally competing (and hence also co-constitutive) phenomena that 
were predominantly urban-centered realities and that were continuously chal-
lenged, intersected and renegotiated. Furthermore, the different leaderships of 
the more peripheral frontier zone in between these stabilizing political spaces 
also experienced an overlapping variety of more and less parallel moments of 
symbiotic empowerment. In all regions, military successes and expansions led 
by Turko-Mongol leaderships certainly generated some form of bureaucratic 
growth, diversification, specialization and state formation. In many cases, 
however, the same kinds of ongoing military action could also easily thwart 
this process of central or regional consolidation, and cause its regular regres-
sion to more personalized and contested relationships of power.
Having considered the general contours of fifteenth-century Islamic West-
Asia’s politics, its power elites and its Turko-Mongol practices and institutions, 
let us now turn to a more specific interpretation of these patterns of state for-
mation and transformation, in particular of the dynamics that appear to have 
defined these patterns throughout this long century in the Ottoman, Syro-
Egyptian and Timurid-Turkmen contexts. The main historical dynamics that 
will be discussed here reflect convergences of key features of West-Asian state 
formation that distinguish the fifteenth century while at the same time mark-
ing its trans-dynastic entanglement. These include the contingency of central-
izing longevity, the integration of distant power elites through multivalent pro-
cesses of bureaucratic growth, the specificity of elite renewal by outsiders to 
West-Asian political realities, and the reproduction of central bureaucratic 
elites in highly competitive as well as parallel and continuous ways.
3.1 The Politics of Longevity
In the Ottoman, ‘Turkish’ and Timurid-Turkmen contexts, one of the main fac-
tors that tended to check the fragmentation of power constellations so typical 
26 Van Steenbergen, Wing & D’hulster, “The Mamlukization of the Mamluk Sultanate?”.
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of Turko-Mongol politics was the contingency of an easily forgotten phenom-
enon that will be named ‘centralizing longevity’ here. Fully in line with the 
nature of Turko-Mongol politics, it actually was a personalized type of central-
izing longevity that seems to have generated almost paradoxically more deper-
sonalized processes of bureaucratic diversification, specialization and state 
formation in most of fifteenth-century West-Asia’s political centers. This type 
concerned the longevity of personal rule, when a ruler’s military and political 
successes were long-lasting, over time generating the appearance of his reign 
as pertaining to a natural order of things. This longevity of personal rule cre-
ated a charismatic political authority that somehow transcended and con-
tained recurrent warfare and fragmentation while at the same time stimulat-
ing bureaucratic growth and state formation. Between 1421 and 1512 the 
Ottoman Sultanate was led by just three powerful rulers, who each reigned 
successively for some thirty years: Murad (r. 1421–44, 1446–51), his son Mehmed 
(r. 1444–46, 1451–81) and his grandson Bayezid (r. 1481–1512). This remarkable 
continuity of leadership was certainly one of several factors that facilitated a 
more or less persistent symbiotic interaction between these rulers’ empower-
ment and that of new groups from their expanding, diversifying and special-
izing entourages. There occurred similar continuities and processes of symbi-
otic interaction, gradual empowerment and bureaucratic growth in Timurid 
contexts, especially during the long reigns of Shah Rukh (r. 1409/1416–47) 
and  then of Sultan-Abu Saʿid (r. 1451/1459–69) and Sultan-Husayn Bayqara 
(r.  1469–1506) in the East. To certain extents, these multivalent phenomena of 
Turko-Mongol state formation eventually also accompanied various other 
Turkmen experiences of long, successful and expanding personal rule, such as 
with the Qara Qoyunlu ruler Jahan Shah (r. 1439–67), with his Aq Qoyunlu suc-
cessor Uzun Ḥasan (r. 1457–78) or with the Karamanid Ibrahim Beg (r. ca. 1423–
64). The fifteenth century in Islamic West Asia was thus certainly an era marked 
by both a remarkable set of long reigns and a variety of processes of state for-
mation at the same time. Unlike in the Ottoman case, however, Turkmen, 
Karamanid and even Timurid forms of state formation in West-Asia’s frontier 
zone never entirely managed to contain the detrimental effects of Turko-Mon-
gol politics. The persistence of bureaucratic staff and practices certainly en-
sured some forms of stability, continuity and state formation in the face of the 
violent dynastic transitions from Shah Rukh to Sultan-Abu Saʿid and then Sul-
tan-Husayn or to Jahan Shah and then Uzun Hasan in Iran and Azerbaijan, and 
from Karamanid to Ottoman sovereignty in Southern Anatolia. Nevertheless, 
such transitions after the disappearance of strong leaders were also always 
marked by the radical fragmentation, subordination or even annihilation of 
Timurid, Turkmen or Karamanid political authorities and power elites.
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In contrast, this never happened in any similarly destructive ways within the 
Ottoman dynasty or for the Syro-Egyptian Sultanate in the fifteenth century, at 
least not after the first years of the century. Following Temür’s violent passages, 
these years had in both cases indeed been marked by a similarly radical loss of 
political authority, central control and coherence. In Cairo a kind of centrip-
etal institutional force actually enabled the containment and then, throughout 
the fifteenth century, the stabilization and structuration of this recurrent cen-
trifugal dynamic in the format of the Sultanate’s own successful trajectory of 
state formation. In the course of their long careers of military service, resource 
building (including through waqf-ization) and political leadership, the afore-
mentioned successive sets of fifteenth-century state actors in Cairo decided 
successions to the sultanate and could even themselves rise to that position. As 
such they were both the products and the performers of that trajectory of con-
tinued bureaucratic growth, centripetal empowerment and political structura-
tion, as Kristof D’hulster also suggests in Chapter 3 of this volume. At the same 
time the Sultanate’s political elites, including these actors, continued to face 
regular and violent fragmentation in the context of succession struggles and 
other variants of Turko-Mongol internecine warfare. Unlike what happened 
among their Timurid or Turkmen peers, however, between 1412 and 1517 this 
never had any similarly destabilizing effects in the Sultanate on its territorial 
or socio-political coherence. This remarkable situation of bureaucratic growth 
and state formation in the face of endemic political violence and conflict in 
many ways was both a result and also a contributing factor of a kind of institu-
tional inertia. This inertia was above all informed by the institutional longev-
ity of the Sultanate in Cairo, which was unique, at least for fifteenth-century 
West-Asia. The Sultanate in Cairo originated with the Muslim championships 
of Saladin in the later twelfth and of a handful of mamlūk sultans in the thir-
teenth centuries and, as a site of trans-regional power, arguably even with their 
predecessors in Cairo since the tenth century. It was this institutional longevity 
and subsequent inertia that stimulated, irrespective of any divergent realities, 
the reproduction of the coherent, timeless and natural appearance of the Sul-
tanate’s political order in the aforementioned administrative texts as well as in 
all kinds of other contemporary imaginations and performances.
Nowhere else in post-Temür Islamic West-Asia were there any similarly 
longstanding and awe-inspiring continuities in Muslim sites, institutions, val-
ues and resources of power that could be claimed to complement and consoli-
date recurrent moments of personal centralizing longevity and its structuring 
effects on relationships of power. Nevertheless, all the fifteenth century’s 
Turko-Mongol leaderships regularly, and successfully, appealed to ideas of in-
stitutional continuity with local or regional Turko-Mongol, Perso-Islamic and 
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other precedents. However, in the Ottoman case only the returning instability 
of Turko-Mongol political practices was also contained by another form of 
institutional longevity, contributing to a specifically Ottoman trajectory of 
state formation. This trajectory arguably only really took off when, after the 
conquest of Constantinople in 1453, another powerful type of centripetal in-
stitutional inertia started contributing to the effects of many years of success-
ful Ottoman leadership. For sultan Mehmed and his successors, the ancient 
imperial metropolis of Constantinople, with its wide-ranging appeal to politi-
cal, cultural and socio-economic imaginations on an incomparable Eurasian 
scale, soon proved a structuring site of power that rivaled Cairo’s role, both as 
a stabilizing centripetal factor within the Sultanate and a valuable regional 
metropolis at the pinnacle of Islamic West-Asia’s hierarchies of power. Otto-
man political authority continued to face ongoing disruptive political chal-
lenges, such as the threat posed between 1481 and 1495 by sultan Bayezid’s 
brother, the refugee contestant for the throne Jem Sultan, or the struggle for 
succession between Bayezid’s sons Korkud, Ahmed and Selim between 1511 
and 1512. Yet during all this time, the Ottoman political order and its expand-
ing number of agents, proved more than capable of securing the appearance 
of coherent political continuity and of avoiding the fate of Timurids, Karama-
nids or of many other Turkmen dynasties.
3.2 The Politics of Distant Integration
Whether cut short by the disruptive realities of Turko-Mongol politics or suf-
ficiently embedded through different types of longevity to survive any such 
disruptions, there were various trajectories of state formation that made a 
marked contribution to the political landscape of fifteenth-century Islamic 
West-Asia. Above all, these trajectories with their differing institutional quali-
ties and quantities brought various levels of political autonomy to those in-
volved in the region’s complex chains of authority and agency, including to all 
kinds of non Turko-Mongol and non-military elites. In many areas of West-
Asia, state formation thus offered a channel to integrate, in more than merely 
coercive ways, extant local political, administrative and military elites and elite 
arrangements into the expanding order of a successful center of Turko-Mongol 
power. It is all too easy to forget this phenomenon of the distant, occasionally 
resource-intensive and violent, and mutually-empowering integration of local 
leaderships into the bureaucratic apparatus of fifteenth-century West-Asia’s 
more successful political orders. These different local elites and the politics of 
their political integration are equally important aspects of the trajectories of 
state formation in fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia. It is therefore relevant 
to consider them here in some more detail too.
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As mentioned before the process of political structuration through bureau-
cratic growth engaged various urban elites in particular within expanding 
power relations of a centripetal and simultaneously locally accommodated 
nature. From Cairo and Alexandria in Egypt and Gaza, Jerusalem, Damascus, 
Homs, Hama, Tripoli and Aleppo in Syria, and from Bursa, Iznik, Sinop, Konya, 
Ankara, Amasya, Sivas, Kayseri and Amid in Anatolia and Tabriz, Mosul, Bagh-
dad and Basra in Azerbaijan and Iraq, to Isfahan, Yazd, Shiraz, Kerman, Herat, 
Samarkand and Bukhara in the regions of Iran, Khurasan and Transoxiana, 
West-Asia’s diverse and fragmented urban realities were not only dominated 
by interrelated and competing local and regional social formations and their 
overlapping varieties of kinship, communal identity and professional special-
ization. The arenas of intense social interaction which gave birth to these and 
many more urban centers and towns in West-Asia’s ancient urban networks 
were also shaped by more or less successful attempts at urban participation 
through bureaucratic expansion and integration by various, often competing, 
Turko-Mongol power centers.27 Again, the urban penetration of these centers 
in this manner was extremely diverse and multivalent across time and space, 
defined by physical and social distances as well as by sliding scales of Turko-
Mongol power and success. Moreover, even where that penetration was most 
successful, not all urban groups were necessarily touched by it in the same way, 
and not all local urban elites, including Coptic accountants in Egypt, adminis-
trative experts from various sectarian communities in Syria, Anatolia and Iraq, 
or Persianate scribes and scholars across West-Asia, were necessarily similarly 
transformed into bureaucratic agents of a political center’s interests. However, 
as also suggested by Patrick Wing’s and Georg Christ’s case studies of different 
merchant families and communities in Part 3 of this volume, many local actors 
went through an integrative process such as that of state formation and there-
by became more deeply involved in the era’s expanding political orders. Some 
certainly also became active shareholders in those political orders, as uphold-
ers of longstanding specialist solutions at the same time as being local or even 
regional political leaders.
Parallel to these urban technocrats and notables, Islamic West-Asia’s rural 
and tribal elites were also in one or another way affected by the fifteenth 
century’s trajectories of state formation. Actually, along the many, constantly 
changing, fringes of the century’s intricate political orders many figures, in-
cluding all kinds of Arab, Turkmen and other tribal leaderships and marsher 
27 Lantschner, “Fragmented Cities in the Later Middle Ages”.
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lords, chose to be integrated into the bureaucratic apparatus of a political cen-
ter in order to both contribute to the idea of the trans-regional expansion of 
that center’s political order and to generate local distinctions through the so-
cial power of trans-local titles, paraphernalia and connections. Military service 
in particular continued to generate power in all trajectories of state formation, 
but the wider the distance separating these local military agents from the ex-
panding political center, the more symbolic any obligations related to that ser-
vice were, and the more local and centrifugal their power was. The atomistic, 
segmented and fickle realities of power relationships across fifteenth-century 
West-Asia, and the urban bias present in the more successful trajectories of 
state formation meant that such political distances with (semi-)nomadic lead-
erships in particular remained substantial. As a result, local instrumental-
izations of any form of integration into the bureaucratic growth of regional 
 centers—including also various arrangements that favored new leaderships, 
or new parties within extant leaderships—often prevailed over any more cen-
tripetal dynamic and over any form of bureaucratic penetration. Across the 
board such penetration was at times still considered necessary, particularly in 
ad hoc contexts of disputes over taxation and tribute, in the face of safety is-
sues concerning the circulation of goods and people, and when there were 
changes to the perceived balance of trans-regional powers. In these cases, pen-
etration mostly happened in the format of diplomatic exchanges and punitive 
expeditions which aimed to restore the local appreciation of a center’s coer-
cive power and to recalibrate its troubled relations with local elites. However, 
these exchanges and expeditions always represented occasional, temporary 
and expensive investments of financial and human resources in the intensifi-
cation of particular sets of political relationships, and as such these missions 
and expeditions into West-Asia’s diverse rural and nomadic areas always re-
mained hazardous enterprises, at best generating only uneven and transient 
outcomes. Sometimes they even contributed to the empowerment of new lo-
cal groups and individuals, and often carried within them the seeds of subse-
quent expeditions. Throughout the century and the region, they never gave 
way easily to more systematic reductions of political distances or to wider 
structural forms of integration in the state apparatus.28
28 For examples of this phenomenon, see Wing, “Submission, Defiance, and the Rules of 
Politics”; Garcin, “Note sur les rapports entre bédouins et fallahs”. On these atomistic and 
also distant power relationships across fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia, see further-
more the (very different) local examples engaged with in Binbaş, “Did the Hurufis Mint 
Coins?” (for the Anatolian region of Erzincan) and in Walker, “The ‘Disappearing’ Villages 
of Late Medieval Jordan” (for the Transjordanian region in Southern Syria).
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This type of distant, occasionally resource-intensive and violent, and mutu-
ally empowering integration of local leaderships into the bureaucratic appara-
tus of fifteenth-century West-Asia’s more successful political orders was deci-
sive for political relationships above all in the poly-centric zone that stretched 
from Azerbaijan and Iraq to Anatolia. It marked the unsteady political rela-
tionships that connected many petty lords and rulers in this more peripheral 
zone to the competing trans-regional trajectories of Ottoman, ‘Turkish’ and 
Timurid state formation. As John Meloy reminds us in his contribution to Part 
3 of this volume, this was also true for the elites of the Hijaz on the Arabian 
peninsula, controlling the sacred centers of Mecca and Medina both in the 
name of the Sultan of Cairo and as powerful but contested patrons of local 
communities.29 In the second half of the fifteenth century, the Timurid disap-
pearance in Western Iran and the trans-regional empowerment of Jahan Shah 
Qara Qoyunlu and then Uzun Ḥasan Aq Qoyunlu, obviously re-oriented many 
relationships. Nevertheless, Eastern Anatolia in particular remained a genuine 
frontier zone, where trans-regional authorities were disputed, where political 
distances appeared as substantial, and where ambitions to stabilize or even 
structure political relationships continued to be resource-intensive and haz-
ardous enterprises. Important moments here include the decisive victory of 
the Ottoman sultan Mehmed over Uzun Ḥasan in 1473 at the battle of Bashkent 
in the Anatolian East and the Ottoman conquest of the Karamanid capital of 
Konya in the South in 1468. These would prove key moments for the particular 
transformation towards a more structural Ottoman penetration of Anatolian 
power relationships.30 Nevertheless, Karamanids, their local tribal supporters, 
Aq Qoyunlu followers and many other Anatolian groups continued to chal-
lenge and subvert that penetration after the end of the fifteenth century, as did 
competitors for trans-regional authority from Cairo and Tabriz. In fact, the 
hugely expensive and mostly ineffective military confrontations between 1485 
and 1491 in Southern Anatolia between the troops of Mehmed’s successor 
Bayezid and those of the Sultan of Cairo, Qaytbay, were very much an illustra-
tion, a product and a confirmation of those Anatolian frontier conditions.31 In 
many ways, therefore, throughout the fifteenth century the disputed politics of 
local state formation and distant integration persisted in Southern and Eastern 
Anatolia, as they did in the regions of Iraq, Iran and Azerbaijan, at least until 
the beginning of Turkmen trans-regional empowerment with Jahan Shah Qara 
Qoyunlu.
29 See also Meloy, Imperial Power and Maritime Trade.
30 Yıldız, “Razing Gevele and Fortifying Konya”.
31 Har-El, Struggle for domination in the Middle East.
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Closer to West-Asia’s main centers of political power, especially in non- 
urban contexts the political distances from local leaderships often equally re-
mained substantial. This could be due to geographical circumstances hinder-
ing easy access to a nearby region or to the Turko-Mongol practice of regular 
political fragmentation obstructing stable relationships with local power elites, 
amongst other possible more local variables. In all of these contexts of wider 
social distance, various forms of these particular politics of distant integration 
also persevered in Western Anatolia, in Syria and Egypt, in Azerbaijan and in 
Eastern Iran and Transoxiana, despite the more successful trajectories of state 
formation in operation in and beyond those regions. Arab and Turkmen Bed-
ouin, Anatolian tribal and rural associations, Iranian mountain dwellers and 
many more groups participated actively in local and, occasionally, regional 
politics. Across Islamic West-Asia, and across these different social formations, 
these politically relevant groups and people also included trans-local commu-
nities of scholars, mystics and their followers in largely unprecedented ways, 
with people often rallying around charismatic religious leaders and driven by 
heterodox and occultist ideas and apocalyptic fervor.32 The actions of these 
groups had great political relevance on the local or even regional scale, and 
throughout the fifteenth century they therefore often informed central reports 
that either marked these groups as brigands and outlaws, as loyal state agents, 
or as both. These groups’ political actions often indeed countered or subverted 
state formation trajectories, causing endless conflicts and disputes. Alterna-
tively, such conflicts were equally often instigated by the different expectations 
and opportunities raised by the fiction of any attempts at these groups’ distant 
integration into such trajectories. Besides such efforts, mainly in the form of 
diplomatic exchanges, at mutually beneficial integration into the military and 
administrative apparatus, central powers mostly resorted to costly punitive ex-
peditions as their main mechanism for resolving these recurrent tensions with 
Bedouin and other nomadic and rural interests, or dealing with subversive 
32 Binbaş, Intellectual Networks in Timurid Iran. Binbaş actually argues that substantial dia-
chronic change defined the space for political participation for networks of intellectuals, 
scholars and men of religion in the course of the fifteenth century, suggesting on the one 
hand that the state formation processes in the Ottoman Northwest and Timurid East of 
West-Asia in particular integrated such loosely defined networks more effectively from 
the mid-century onwards. On the other hand Binbaş believes that those same processes 
simultaneously empowered more complexly organized networks of Sufi masters and fol-
lowers as active partners and agents and eventually as rivals, with the Safawiyya Sufi 
brotherhood and their Eastern-Anatolian Turkmen supporters transforming into the Sa-
favid imperial polity.
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ideas and claims. Even in the more directly administered environments of the 
Ottoman Northwest, the ‘Turkish’ Southwest, the Turkmen North and the 
Timurid East, most attempts at more structural integration and control still 
quickly proved too resource-intensive to maintain for any states in formation 
during this time. It was only in the Ottoman North that this mutually constitu-
tive wavering between an accommodated and a violent integration of local, 
centrifugal power relationships sometimes acquired a more structured out-
look. This phenomenon was apparent in the practice of moving certain, sub-
versive, Anatolian populations and social groups to new regions, especially 
across the Bosporus. There, as local outsiders, their fortunes were more inti-
mately linked to that of the trajectory of the Ottoman state in their new roles 
as economic and military agents of that state. This Ottoman practice of collec-
tive resettlement (sürgün), achieved through a combination of violent coer-
cion and the award of economic privileges, manifested itself most famously 
between 1468 and 1473 in the repopulation of the new capital of Constantino-
ple with people from the South-Anatolian Karamanid lands. A powerful tool in 
the particular trajectory of Ottoman state formation, however, in the fifteenth 
century it remained simply an ad hoc solution to particular problems of dis-
tant integration just like any other that was available to the Ottoman sultans, 
and to their West-Asian peers.
3.3 The Politics of Central Elite Renewal: mamluks, kul, and Turks
Islamic West-Asia’s multivalent trajectories of Turko-Mongol state formation 
generated multiple new opportunities not only for the empowerment of an-
cient or distant local groups and elites. These trajectories also interacted along 
mutually defining pathways with all kinds of other social formations of more 
recent stock and specialization, similarly complementing or even joining the 
ranks of the Turko-Mongol leaderships of the post-Temür era at the very cores 
of its political centers. The complete integration of political, military and even 
social outsiders as new power elites was nothing new in the histories of Is-
lamic West-Asia. However, as will become clear below, in the fifteenth century 
this happened with a variety, range and to an extent which were quite unprec-
edented, and therefore deserving of separate discussion, if only for the way 
they further illustrate the particular trajectories of Islamic West-Asian state 
formation.
In the final quarter of the fourteenth century, Temür’s enterprise sought to 
use a politics of endless conquest to create a new trans-regional West-Asian 
power elite composed of his family and of his comrades-in-arms, most of whom 
stemmed from minor leaderships in the Chagatai nomadic conglomerate of 
Central Asia. This radical social transformation thus generated the nucleus of 
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the fifteenth century’s Timurid leaderships.33 Temür was continuing long-
standing practices accompanying the establishment of new Turko-Mongol 
leaderships, and his achievement in replacing more traditional, structured 
power relationships with entirely new, personalized ones was, as explained 
before, regularly repeated across West-Asia as part of Turko-Mongol tanistry 
and appanage practices. In Timurid and Turkmen contexts, however, these 
regular shifts never entirely repeated Temür’s exploit of the creation of a radi-
cally new central elite at the turn of the fourteenth to fifteenth centuries. The 
East’s political centers of Tabriz, Shiraz, Herat and Samarkand continued to be 
dominated by Temür’s military elite of Turko-Mongol powerholders as well as 
their Turkmen peers of more traditional leadership origins. This happened 
above all in an uneasy, mutually restrictive interaction with the particular tra-
jectories of state formation that developed around long-reigning successful 
rulers such as Shah Rukh, Sultan-Abu Saʿid, Jahan Shah, Uzun Hasan, and 
Sultan- Husayn. Regularly partaking in the expanding political and military ap-
paratuses around these rulers and their courts, these military elites were col-
lectively identified as one exclusive political community of ‘Turks’, even though 
their ranks remained divided by violent competition and internecine warfare, 
and by political action undermining and disrupting as much as supporting 
those trajectories of state formation. There were regular endeavors to intro-
duce fuller integration or even the marginalization of these centrifugal ‘Turk-
ish’ military elites but these attempts at strengthening particular central state 
formation trajectories were never entirely successful in disciplining the era’s 
Turko-Mongol tide of devolved authority and recurrent fragmentation. As a 
result, from Temür’s time onwards, Timurid, Turkmen and Turko-Mongol mili-
tary leaders, families and lineages continued to hold on to their access to au-
thority, power and income across these regions, pursuing interests that never 
easily aligned with those of their sovereigns, and continuously negotiating bal-
ances of power that everywhere checked the political autonomy of these ‘Turk-
ish’ amirs as well as of Timurid and Turkmen rulers and princes.
In the contexts of the Ottoman and ‘Turkish’ Sultanates, on the contrary, 
feats similar to Temür’s creation of a new elite appeared in more systematic 
ways than ever before, and can arguably even be seen as important functions 
of these Sultanates’ particular trajectories of state formation. The historical 
trajectory that, in modern scholarship, tends to be most intimately connected 
with this notion of a socio-political reproduction through the repeated re- 
creation of Turko-Mongol elites is that of the Sultanate of Cairo in Egypt and 
Syria, today also known for this reason as the Mamluk Sultanate. For centuries 
the personal armies and warbands of rulers and leaders in Egypt and Syria had 
33 Manz, The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane.
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been constructed around the skills and capacities of hardened horsemen. 
Most of these horsemen were brought to the region in unfree (mamluk) condi-
tions via commercially vibrant commodity chains especially from Inner Asia’s 
steppes and the Caucasus, to be subsequently prepared for military and politi-
cal service in their new master’s entourage. Throughout this long period, but 
especially since the mid-thirteenth century, many individuals originating as 
mamluks managed to acquire local or regional power and leadership, building 
up their own armies of mamluks, and occasionally even attaining the sultan-
ate. As mentioned before, in the post-Temür fifteenth century amirs and sul-
tans with diverse mamluk origins emerged more consistently than ever before 
as actors and agents of the Sultanate’s state. Collectively identified in contem-
porary communication as both Circassians (Jarakisa) and Turks (Atrak) at the 
same time, almost all of these sultans and amirs had been among the tens of 
thousands of mamluks who, throughout the century, were sold in Egypt, re-
educated as Sunni Muslims, trained as Turko-Mongol horsemen, accustomed 
to speaking Qipchaq Turkic, and accommodated to Turkic patterns of martial 
behavior. New groups of these Turkified Circassians regularly rejuvenated the 
ranks of a sultan’s personal troops in particular, to strengthen his military ca-
pacities, to counterbalance those of his mamluk military commanders, the 
amirs, and to expand the pool of military experts available for him to rely on 
and to favor in return with rank, status and income. The Sultanate’s political 
elites of ‘Turkish’ amirs therefore all shared similar individual histories of 
mostly (non-Turkish and non-Muslim) Caucasian origins, juvenile enslave-
ment and transfer, long years of royal military and court service and of resource 
building, and endless competition for status and income with regular batches 
of new royal favorites of similar backgrounds. In fact, in this process of highly 
competitive social reproduction amidst the expansion of the sultan’s bureau-
cratic apparatus and the lengthening of its chains of authority and command, 
not just particular sets of mamluk amirs-courtiers, but also groups of the sul-
tan’s mamluk rank-and-file in Cairo appear to have acquired more political au-
tonomy than ever before. In any case, the unruly behavior in Cairo’s urban 
spaces of the more recent royal imports (julban) among them is a well-known, 
even notorious, problem of the Sultanate’s fifteenth-century history. Through 
a combination of coercive action and anticipation of immediate material re-
wards, they were often a deciding factor in successions to the sultanate as 
well as the extent to which the reigns of sultans in this century were marked 
by the presence or absence of central stability and prosperity.34 In general, 
however, all of these developments aligned the identities, interests and con-
flicts of sultans, amirs and their personal entourages of family, followers and 
34 Levanoni, “Rank-and-File Mamluks versus amirs”.
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mamluks, in intimately centripetal ways with the political order that had given 
them their new lives of power, precedence and opportunity.
Unlike in previous centuries in Syro-Egypt, and unlike elsewhere in Islamic 
West-Asia, that political order of the fifteenth-century Sultanate of Cairo ac-
quired a highly meritocratic, socially transcendent and increasingly ideational 
flavor. The reason for this is that, amidst the realities of Turko-Mongol tanistric 
politics, recurring attempts to again make it a dynastic order like in preceding 
centuries never succeeded. This is also illustrated in the short-lived case of 
 al-Nasir Muhammad (r. 1496–98), son and successor of al-Ashraf Qaytbay 
(r. 1468–96), presented in Albrecht Fuess’ discussion of this sultan’s dynastic 
endeavors in Chapter 4 of this volume. In contrast, the expanding bureaucratic 
apparatus, the military and political experts who manned this apparatus, and 
the flows of human and financial resources that supported them, endured, 
even if only in tense and conflict-ridden ways. A remarkable factor that illus-
trates this non-dynastic trajectory of Syro-Egyptian state formation through 
the fifteenth century concerns the transformation of the position of sultan 
 itself into a bureaucratic prize to be won, and lost, by the highest bidder. 
Such a qualification needs to be weighed against the achievements, longevi-
ty  and  subsequent empowering royalty of sultans such as al-Ashraf Barsbay 
(r.   1422–38), al-Zahir Jaqmaq (r. 1438–53), al-Ashraf Qaytbay (r. 1468–96) and 
Qanṣawh (r. 1501–16). However, as mentioned before, in most cases, including 
those of the latter four sultans, the embattled accessions to the sultanate tend-
ed to crown long careers of military and court service and of resource accumu-
lation in the royal shadows of peers. Apparently, it took a long time to acquire 
the main political and financial competences necessary for gathering (and 
keeping) the support of royal mamluks and amirs-courtiers. Many sultans in 
the fifteenth century had enjoyed long default careers in the state apparatus 
meaning that most of them only managed to accede to the sultanate at a fairly 
advanced age. Whereas Barsbay, in 1422, had been in his forties, his successor 
Jaqmaq was in his sixties when he succeeded to the throne in 1438. Al-Ashraf 
Inal (r. 1453–61), like his two predecessors, was originally a talented horseman 
and Circassian mamluk brought to Egypt from the Caucasus in the 1390s. When 
he succeeded Jaqmaq, he was 73 and for him, this succession brought to a 
 glorious close his long and eventful career of leadership as a military com-
mander, as a governor in various Syrian towns and cities, and as an entrepreneur- 
courtier in Cairo. Similar stories of humble origins, service and empowerment 
have survived about most of Inal’s successors, belonging to new, younger gen-
erations of mamluk state actors. Al-Zahir Khushqadam (r. 1461–7) and Qaytbay 
were in their fifties when they became sultan, and just like the unsuccessful 
septuagenarian al-Zahir Yalbay (r. 1467) and his equally unfortunate successor 
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al-Zahir Timurbugha (r. 1467–68) they all had been brought to Egypt and Turki-
fied in the 1420s and 1430s before embarking upon long and conflict-ridden 
careers of military, administrative and court leadership. Finally, in the 1490s a 
third generation of veteran military bureaucrats graduated into competent 
candidates for sultanic office, all originating as new mamluks in Egypt in the 
1450s and 1460s, and including Qansawh, who was in his sixties when he as-
cended the throne in 1501 and who infamously died of a stroke in 1516 on a 
battlefield in Northern Syria, appalled by the victorious onslaught of the Otto-
man sultan Selim.35
The absence of dynastic reproduction, and the regular competitive but co-
herent self-renewal of the Turko-Circassian political community more gener-
ally, seem unique for the ‘Turkish’ Sultanate’s trajectory of state formation in 
fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia. Nevertheless, the contemporaneous Otto-
man Sultanate, which was obviously entirely constructed around the success-
ful reproduction of the Ottoman dynasty, also experimented intensely with 
centripetal strategies of elite renewal that had a lot in common with those of 
the Southern Sultanate’s. Here too, complete outsiders were transformed into 
central state actors through a system of total re-socialization and centralizing 
entanglement. In fact, upon closer inspection even the Ottoman dynasty itself 
was a product, and a telling illustration, of this gradual construction of a new, 
specifically Ottoman, political community. The sultans Murad (r. 1421–44, 
1446–51), Mehmed (r. 1444–46, 1451–81) and Bayezid (r. 1481–1512) were all born 
from unfree women, selected and brought to the Ottoman court as royal con-
cubines for the sole purpose of the royal lineage’s successful reproduction. 
Only sultan Selim (r. 1512–20) was an exception to this rule, as the product of a 
marriage between Bayezid and the daughter of the Dulkadirid ruler of Elbistan 
in Southeast Anatolia. The latter, however, only represented an acute late- 
fifteenth-century moment in the Sultanate’s politics of distant integration, 
whereas the former cases were all part of a complementary, expanding prac-
tice of internal renewal and total integration. This was gradually generating a 
novel elite, even within the Ottoman royal household, gathering various sets of 
state actors whose competences and fortunes were intimately connected with 
the maintenance of the Ottoman dynastic order, and with the expansion of the 
apparatus that performed this order.
As Dimitri Kastritsis explains in great detail in Chapter 5, when he writes 
about the doomed fate of the Çandarlı family of traditional Ottoman bureau-
crats, this integrative reproduction of the Sultanate’s political community 
35 Levanoni, “The Sultan’s Laqab”, esp. p. 82.
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through substantial renewal was anything but a straightforward and uncon-
tested process. Like in the case of the Sultanate of Cairo the performance of 
this elite reproduction through the military and political prioritization of un-
free dynastic agents (kapikulari) of varying expertise, gender and outsider ori-
gins was rooted in longstanding local and regional customs. Basically, the Otto-
man solution to the perennial problem of the continuous need for loyal 
manpower appeared above all in the format of the so-called ‘new army’ 
(yeniçeri), a personal bodyguard entirely made up of trained footmen selected 
from the ranks of the sultan’s unfree servants (kul). The precise historical tra-
jectory of this Janissary corps, of similar central regiments of loyal and sea-
soned fighters, and of the kapikulari more in general, are forever lost in the 
mists of hindsight narratives explaining the origins and nature of Ottoman suc-
cess.36 Whereas these phenomena had emerged and settled in already before 
the Sultanate’s near destruction in the wake of Temür’s victory in 1402, they 
only really started appearing as a dominant practice of Ottoman elite renewal 
in the mid-century reign of Mehmed ii. At that time, they became more than 
ever a function of, and a contributing factor to, the Ottoman trajectory of state 
formation and of the expansion, specialization and symbiotic empowerment 
of the dynasty and its agents alike.
By the mid-fifteenth century at the latest, the Janissary corps of unfree foot-
men and similar central military regiments, all directly rewarded for their ser-
vice by their master, the sultan, were not just providing regularly renewed Ot-
toman manpower. As kul whose destiny was directly dependent upon that of 
their master’s, the sultan, they also balanced the power and interests of the 
Sultanate’s traditional elites in important, centripetal ways. These included a 
wide range of military commanders, mostly belonging to ancient Turkish and 
Anatolian families of cavalrymen (sipahi) and spread all across the core Otto-
man territories, as timar-holders with their own troops of horsemen, along 
separate hierarchies of power, status and resources. The substantial expansion 
of the Janissary corps under Mehmed, who managed to double its size to about 
10,000 members by the 1470s, thus both represented and enabled a decisive shift 
in this traditional balance of military power to the sultan’s benefit. As part of 
the Ottoman trajectory of state formation, however, this expansion also went 
hand in hand with the growth of the Janissaries’ own political autonomy at the 
center of the Ottoman political order. With its ranks continuously being replen-
ished from the kul and with its size steadily maintained at mid-century level, 
the Janissary corps acquired a reputation not just for causing havoc and turmoil 
at moments of political instability, but also for thus becoming a powerful actor 
36 Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, pp. 112–113.
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at such moments, and one whose actions and choices left many marks on the 
Ottoman political order, without ever challenging that order. In the context of 
the tanistric succession struggles of the 1440s, the 1480s, and above all the 
1500s, Janissary violence and anticipation of rewards proved a factor to be reck-
oned with, and their actions eventually even decided the accession of Selim 
(r. 1512–20) to the top of the Sultanate’s political order.37
The kul’s transformative role in the expansion and empowerment of the Ot-
toman state apparatus in the fifteenth century also played out at other, more 
individual, levels of elite participation and reproduction. In fact, the gradual 
diversification and specialization of the bureaucratic apparatus were also rep-
licated within the burgeoning ranks of the sultan’s unfree servants. Many of 
these kul came to be selected and trained for non-military duties, entering the 
service of the sultan’s household and its expanding administration. In due 
course, particularly starting from the mid-century reign of Mehmed, several of 
these courtier-bureaucrats with kul origins even succeeded in becoming mem-
bers of the sultan’s leading advisory council, the imperial divan, or in obtaining 
the post of grand vizier, chairing the divan and acting as the most powerful 
Ottoman bureaucrat after the sultan. This remarkable wider employment and 
empowerment of individual kul at the sultan’s court again provided for impor-
tant centripetal checks and balances on the power and expertise of traditional 
Ottoman elites. This peculiar aspect of Ottoman bureaucratic growth and state 
formation gradually, often violently, and mostly haphazardly pushed these an-
cient Turkish and Anatolian families (including that of the Çandarlı) away 
from the center of Ottoman power. The Ottoman trajectory of state formation 
therefore eventually manifested itself in, and was indeed pursued by, the emer-
gence of a very different, very Ottoman, political leadership. Consisting in in-
creasingly exclusive ways of royal unfree or freed servants, this new political 
elite came to be dominated by regularly rejuvenated sets of military, adminis-
trative and court experts. These people were specifically selected and trained 
for the single purpose of service to a more and more abstract idea of Ottoman 
political order, and rose in the ranks of the expanding apparatus to positions of 
Ottoman authority and power through a combination of bureaucratic compe-
tence, royal favor and the elimination of competitors.
The expanding membership of the kapikulari thus gradually moved their 
field of action from serving in the sultan’s personal entourage to having a sig-
nificant impact within, and upon, the military, administrative and political ap-
paratus of the Ottoman political order. This new Ottoman leadership of kul 
bureaucrats saw its ranks regularly replenished from particular sources of 
37 Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650, p. 258.
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manpower that continued to ensure that all kul began their military or admin-
istrative careers more or less as newcomers to that political order. Many of the 
unfree who were selected to enter the sultan’s palace for further specialist 
training and education did so as prisoners of war, captured during the endless 
military campaigns, especially against non-Muslim adversaries. Some also 
continued to enter via the commodity chains and specialist markets that con-
nected the many corners of Islamic West-Asia in general with the wider world 
and that provided most of the power elites between Constantinople, Cairo and 
Samarkand with high-quality household and other staff. War and commerce 
were, however, expensive, resource-intensive and hazardous enterprises, and 
were not an easy way to provide for a steady supply of manpower to meet any 
growing demands. Unlike the ‘Turkish’ Sultanate in the Southwest the Otto-
man leaderships managed to overcome this predicament and to complement 
the common but rather vulnerable dependence on production centers and 
commodity chains beyond a political center’s direct reach and control. They 
turned to new, more internal, resources for elite renewal, and thus established 
more structured flows of manpower. In fact, in the Ottoman context this hap-
pened by tweaking—first on ad hoc bases but increasingly also along more 
regulated lines—particular tax farming and tributary arrangements with non-
Muslim communities in a practical direction that could meet the continuous 
Ottoman need for manpower. These more specific arrangements became 
known as the Ottoman practice of ‘collection’ (devşirme). They entailed that 
from every forty households in Christian communities in regions such as Alba-
nia, Bulgaria, Serbia or Anatolia, one boy aged between 8 and 18 years was to be 
hand-picked as part of the payment of the Ottoman levy imposed on these 
communities and sent to the sultan’s agents in Bursa, Edirne or Constantino-
ple for allocation to the Janissary corps. If the boy was endowed with excep-
tional qualities he was sent to the palace and given several years’ training for 
military or palace service, until he would be recruited to fill a vacancy in the 
corps or at the palace and start a career of bureaucratic service and, poten-
tially, leadership in the expanding military, administrative or political appara-
tus of the Ottoman political order.
Whatever the violent, commercial or tributary arrangements that trans-
formed these kul into unfree servants of the Ottoman sultan, they all obviously 
were entering the Ottoman household and, increasingly even becoming mem-
bers of the Ottoman political community from backgrounds which were ex-
tremely diverse ethnically, socio-economically and culturally. Just like the 
Turkified mamluks in the Syro-Egyptian Sultanate, the aim of the preparation 
of these newcomers for Ottoman service was first and foremost to transform 
them into a more uniform community of loyal Muslim subjects of their master, 
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
71From Temür to Selim
<UN>
the sultan. Albanians, Greeks and many others who were thus integrated into 
the center of power were all forced to convert to Islam. They had to learn to 
communicate in the Ottoman variant of the Turkic language, to conform to 
Ottoman Turkish values and rules of behavior, and to nurture social bonds 
with peers and with other Ottoman agents. In general, the idea was to make 
them ‘Turkified’ and allow them to become full partners and stakeholders in 
the dynasty’s own, regularly replenished, elite social formation of the new ‘Ot-
tomans’ (Osmanli). Metin Kunt summarizes as follows the early modern out-
come of this process of the genesis of an entirely new Turko-Ottoman political 
community and identity:
By the mid-sixteenth century the Ottoman military-administrative elite 
was made up of these new Turkish-speaking Muslim officers who called 
themselves not Turkish but ‘Roman’ or ‘Ottoman’; it was in this sense that 
Ottoman writers could comment that the ‘Ottomans’ took the best quali-
ties of many nations and blended them to a new, superior race […]. The 
Ottoman dynasty, too, was as much a product of this new blend as their 
servitors. From the beginnings of the family of Osman, the beys made 
marriage alliances with neighbouring Byzantine or Serbian princesses. 
Later the sultans chose not to continue such marriages but sired their 
sons and daughters with harem favourites of various ethnic backgrounds 
brought up in the palace. The language of the dynasty as well as of the 
polity remained Turkish, but not, strictly speaking, as a mother tongue.38
Half a century earlier, at the turn of the fifteenth century, the boundaries of the 
Ottoman political community were not yet so exclusively delineated by the 
kapikulari and their distinctive Turko-Ottoman identity. Nevertheless, as ex-
plained above, they certainly formed an increasingly formidable factor among 
the Sultanate’s central power elites, as they and their expertise, action and re-
lationships infiltrated, monopolized and reproduced the expanding tentacles 
of the Ottoman political order in (and beyond) the Northwestern corner of 
West-Asia. In this capacity they displayed many obvious parallels and connec-
tions with the contemporaneous hegemony of the Turko-Circassian commu-
nity of mamluk bureaucrat-leaders in the Syro-Egyptian Sultanate. Even the 
social reproduction of these fifteenth-century mamluk bureaucrat-leaders and 
of their kul peers and contemporaries was largely bound by similar practices 
and conventions. The increasingly distinctive kapikulari status at this time re-
mained the exclusive domain of kul of non-Muslim origins who owed their 
38 Kunt, “Ottomans and Safavids”, pp. 197–199 (quote p. 199).
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new lives, identities and careers entirely to their master, the sultan. For this 
reason, until at least the 1510s the many members of the Janissary corps were 
even prohibited from marrying and producing offspring. As the chains of au-
thority and command were lengthening in the course of the Sultanate’s pro-
cess of state formation, selection for, access to, and management of the kapiku-
lari was also increasingly administered and controlled by kul bureaucrats 
rather than by the sultan himself or any other courtier of more traditional 
stock. There was thus a growing, self-fulfilling bias at the Ottoman center in 
relation to the expanding ranks, expertise and relationships of the kul, even 
regarding the management of their own renewal. This meant that bureaucratic 
power amassed by an Ottoman military or court leader was increasingly only 
transmitted on the basis of bureaucratic competence, favor and patronage, 
and success in the endless competition with peers and others, and not on the 
basis of kinship or lineage.
Several of the long careers in Turkifying palace service, bureaucratic special-
ization and, eventually, Ottoman leadership and authority during the long 
reigns of sultans Mehmed and Bayezid represent a strong illustration of, and 
defining factor in, the Ottoman trajectory of state formation and of the mutual 
empowerment of the kapikulari and of their master, the sultan. These careers 
also demonstrate how the politics whereby the central elite was reproduced by 
substantial renewal from within the Sultanate’s territorial boundaries enabled 
different kinds of remarkable continuity that intersected in successful ways 
with the politics of Ottoman integration. Out of the fifteen different individu-
als who occupied the court’s leading position of grand vizier between the 1450s 
and the 1510s only three belonged to traditional Turkish families. All the other 
grand viziers in this period had Christian backgrounds, just like many other 
viziers, lower officials and commanders. They entered the Ottoman political 
order and embarked upon new, Ottoman, careers of authority and power as 
hand-picked devşirme levies mostly collected from rural communities in the 
Balkans or as prisoners-of-war captured in the ongoing confrontations with 
(former) Byzantine and Balkan elites. These various coercive arrangements 
thus simultaneously allowed some of the experts, expertise and relationships 
of power of its former Christian adversaries to be directly integrated into the 
center of Ottoman power. This was one distinctive outcome of the unique situ-
ation of the Ottoman Sultanate’s substantial expansion into the Christian Bal-
kans, and this remarkable phenomenon again empowered both the Sultan, 
providing him with a particular group of new loyal servants, and these new kul, 
including many of former Byzanto-Balkan noble stock who were now convert-
ed to Islam and Turkified. At the turn of the fifteenth to sixteenth centuries 
many of the latter became leading members of the increasingly powerful 
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Turko-Ottoman political community and of the political order to which that 
community owed its very existence.39 Very symbolically, and tellingly, they 
even had in their ranks at least two nephews of the last Byzantine emperor. 
Captured as young boys during the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 
1453, they were only known by their Muslim names and Turko-Ottoman titles 
as Mesih Pasha (d. 1501) and Has Murad Pasha (d. 1473). These boys eventually 
came to hold major positions of military and palace leadership, including the 
governorship of the Balkans (beylerbey of Rumeli) and the grand vizierate dur-
ing the reigns of sultans Mehmed and Bayezid. They both seem to have done so 
without ever losing at least some appreciation for their imperial Byzantine ori-
gins.40 Inspired by these and many similar cases from the latter half of the fif-
teenth century Karen Barkey, paraphrasing Heath Lowry, concludes with good 
reason that “after 1453, the Ottoman palace was packed with ‘Byzantine and 
Balkan aristocrats turned Vezirs’”.41
3.4 The Politics of Central Elite Reproduction: Scholars, Scribes and 
Tajiks
This remarkable transformation-cum-integration of the Ottoman Sultanate’s 
political community through an ever more internalized and automated pro-
cess of renewal was quite unique for fifteenth-century West-Asia. This singu-
larity manifested itself especially in this process’ successful marginalization of 
traditional Turkish and Anatolian elites and their more centrifugal interests, 
and also in the way it converged various local experts, expertise and relation-
ships of power in the sultan’s expanding household, palace and political order. 
Elsewhere, reproduction of power and status among central elites happened in 
more diverse and multivalent ways, which require a separate discussion.
In the Sultanate of Cairo, the regular renewal of military-bureaucratic elites 
certainly paralleled that of the ‘Ottomans’ as a self-sustaining and centripetal 
practice. In the Sultanate’s case this determined the marginalization of dynas-
tic trends even more, including in relation to access to the very top of its politi-
cal order. At the same time, however, the Sultanate followed an entirely differ-
ent path from that of the remarkable convergence of the Ottoman state 
formation trajectory in the kapikulari. In the latter Ottoman case the tradition-
al bureaucratic distinctions between ‘the men of the swords’, ‘the men of the 
39 Lowry, The Early Ottoman state, pp. 115–130 (“Chapter Seven: The Last Phase of Ottoman 
Syncretism—the subsumption of members of the Byzanto-Balkan aristocracy into the 
Ottoman ruling elite”).
40 Lowry, “A Note on three Palaiologon princes as members of the Ottoman ruling elite”.
41 Barkey, Empire of Difference, p. 80; Lowry, The early Ottoman State, p. 118.
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pen’ and ‘the men of the turbans’ certainly continued to inform the organiza-
tion of the expanding state apparatus. However, the boundaries of the first two 
categories appeared as increasingly fluid in terms of people and relationships 
of power, especially in the wake of the expanding involvement and diversifica-
tion of the Ottoman sultan’s kul. In the Sultanate of Cairo, however, a more 
complex politics of central elite reproduction appears to have existed. This 
complemented, in equally centripetal ways, the construction of a Turko- 
Circassian political community. Unlike in the Ottoman case, in Cairo and else-
where in the Sultanate those traditional boundaries of specialization and re-
production were constructed along alternative lines of functional and social 
distinction. There, mamluks generally—but not exclusively—held titles, posi-
tions, privileges and responsibilities of the first, military category while a mix 
of experts particularly with local Syro-Egyptian origins continued to manipu-
late the mechanisms of central taxation, remuneration, communication and 
justice that are traditionally ascribed to the second and third categories.
In fact, in fifteenth-century Cairo several of the latter experts became ex-
tremely wealthy bureaucratic leaders in their own right, controlling the court’s 
flows of resources, its symbolic apparatus and related sets of court relation-
ships in highly empowering ways. Most of these non-military competitors for 
power at the top of the Sultanate’s political order actually came from a mere 
handful of families of administrators and scholars of (formerly) Christian or 
Muslim, and Syrian or Egyptian origins. After many years of engagement in lo-
cal low-profile scholarship and scribal service, different members of these 
families had only entered Cairo’s court and its expanding bureaucratic appara-
tus in the 1410s and 1420s, as a function of their employment in the pre- sultanic, 
amiral households of the sultans al-Muʾayyad Shaykh (r. 1412–21) and al-Ashraf 
Barsbay (r. 1422–38). Men (and women) from the most successful of these new 
bureaucratic elite families, such as the Banu al-Barizi from Ḥama, the Banu 
Muzhir from Damascus, and the Egyptian Coptic converts of the Banu Katib 
Jakam, continued to appear at court until the end of the Sultanate a century 
later. There, they would partake in the performance of its administrative, reli-
gious and sometimes even military apparatus, currying royal favor, gathering 
enormous wealth, and pursuing all kinds of relationships of power and exper-
tise, including through royal, amiral and other highly political marriages. Dy-
nastic tendencies therefore certainly determined the transmission of office 
and power within many of these families. Examples here include the Banu 
Katib Jakam, whose members held the top post of the supervision of the royal 
fisc (nazr al-khass) continuously between 1425 and 1458 and that of the army 
bureau (nazr al-jaysh) between 1466 and 1496, or the formerly Coptic Banu 
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l-Jiʿan family, whose members were associated with the supervision of the trea-
sury (nazr al-khizana) for about a century until 1501.42
Nevertheless, despite this apparent trend towards dynastic reproduction, a 
more centralizing practice of competitive renewal simultaneously imposed it-
self. This practice was defined by factors of competence, favor, resources and 
their opposites, rather than simply by any rights or privileges of kinship or lin-
eage. Such qualities and competences were obviously rooted in particular, ad-
ministrative skills and successes, which created opportunities and opened 
many doors, and which were certainly easier to possess or acquire for these 
and many similar families’ offspring than for any outsider. At the same time, 
however, just as with the Turko-Circassian community of royal mamluks and 
amirs, the acquisition of authority and leadership in the expanding state ap-
paratus was a different matter from bureaucratic service. That acquisition in-
stead had more to do with more generic qualities of entrepreneurship, charis-
ma, distinction, brokerage and wealth. The ongoing growth of the Sultanate’s 
apparatus therefore continuously created new opportunities for ambitious in- 
and outsiders, as well as providing all kinds of new arenas of fierce competi-
tion along the Sultanate’s lengthening chains of authority and agency. As a 
 result, at the pinnacle of the Sultanate’s fifteenth century political order, some-
times not just families, but also individuals of lesser and diverse professional 
and social origins—such as the infamous Abu l-Khayr al-Naḥḥas (‘the Copper-
smith’) (1412–59)—occasionally emerged as new bureaucratic leaders. When 
this happened, it was often much to the dismay and horror of their competi-
tors of more traditional stock, and with important mitigating effects on the 
reproduction of power for any more consolidated group of administrators at 
court.43
Even among scholars and scribes, therefore, hierarchies of central leader-
ship were not easily reproduced, but rather continuously challenged and re-
newed in often conflict-ridden ways. Participation and advancement in these 
hierarchies depended on bureaucratic skills and precedents, but it was even 
more contingent on an individual’s political and financial competences which 
they required for gathering (and keeping) the support of subordinates, peers 
and sovereigns. As a result, like the careers of sultans and amirs, those of some 
of the most prominent non-military leaders and courtiers of the Sultanate’s 
42 Martel-Thoumian, Les civils et l’administration dans l’état militaire mamlūk (ixe/xve 
siècle).
43 Mortel, “The Decline of Mamlūk Civil Bureaucracy in the Fifteenth Century”; Elbendary, 
Crowds and Sultans.
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fifteenth century history were also marked by many years of service and of 
 accumulating political and financial resources—relationships, wealth and 
power. We might think of figures such as Jamal al-Din Yusuf b. Katib Jakam 
(1416–58), supervisor of the royal fisc (nazir al-khass) for five successive sultans 
(1437–58), Yahya al-Ashqar (d. 1469), major-domo (ustadar) for most of the 
period between 1440 and 1467, and Abu Bakr b. Muzhir (1428–88), the court’s 
confidential secretary (katib al-sirr) at the head of the royal chancery from 1463 
until his death in 1488. At the same time, however, in the absence of any real 
dynastic practices, the political opportunities and autonomy thus acquired by 
these and many more central bureaucrat-scholars and -scribes in the fifteenth-
century Syro-Egyptian Sultanate remained highly conditional and volatile. 
Above all, they remained intimately connected to the bureaucratic roles that 
they managed to play, to the political and financial resources that those roles 
enabled them to tap into, and even to the conflicts over those roles and re-
sources in which they continuously had to engage. Their career paths of ser-
vice and leadership therefore continued to be tied up in centripetal ways with 
the maintenance and reproduction of the political order to which they mostly 
owed those careers. This was true even when on an individual or collective 
basis they were bound to prioritize their own rather than that order’s empow-
erment.44 The powerful leadership of many of these local bureaucrats, and the 
regular competitive renewal of their ranks, therefore remained an illustration, 
and function, of the Sultanate’s particular, mutually empowering, trajectory of 
state formation, just like that was also true for its Turko-Circassian political 
community of amirs and sultans.
As mentioned above, unlike their Turko-Circassian and Turko-Ottoman 
counterparts the Timurid and Turkmen politico-military communities in the 
North and East remained much more fragmented and determined by the tanis-
tric political and economic interests of ‘Turkish’ military leaders, families and 
lineages. These mostly owed their continued regional empowerment to Te-
mür’s construction of a new elite at the turn of the fourteenth century, and to 
its largely successful dynastic reproduction throughout the fifteenth century. 
At the same time, however, the highly contested trajectories of state formation 
that marked the reigns of Shah Rukh, Abu Saʿid, Jahan Shah, Uzun Hasan and 
Sultan Husayn did not just continue to have to engage in mutually restrictive 
ways with these ‘Turkish’ elites and the reproduction of their mainly centrifu-
gal interests. These trajectories certainly also interacted closely with the repro-
duction of particular Persian scribal and scholarly elites and their practices 
and skills, both benefiting from this reproductive process and stimulating it in 
44 Miura, “Administrative Networks in the Mamluk Period”.
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centripetal and political ways that remind one of the experiences of their peers 
in the Sultanate of Cairo. These elites were collectively identified as ‘Tajiks’ and 
employed as expert administrators managing the assets and interests of both 
‘Turkish’ amirs and Timurid-Turkmen rulers across the region. Throughout the 
fifteenth century several individual members of these elites emerged from ad-
ministrative service in these rulers’ households and palaces to bureaucratic 
leadership in their political orders. They were deeply involved, in mutually em-
powering ways, in the expansion, maintenance and reproduction of those or-
ders, refining and controlling most of their mechanisms of central taxation, 
remuneration, communication and justice. In the process, these administra-
tors accumulated substantial political and financial resources alongside rela-
tionships, wealth and power, from which their own families, friends and fol-
lowers equally benefited.
As Beatrice Manz also explains in detail in her chapter on the political in-
volvement of Iranian landed elites in Part 3 of this volume, quite a few such ‘Ta-
jik’ leaders of Perso-Iranian origins thus became formidable political leaders in 
their own right, occasionally even engaging in military leadership and warfare 
with their own, personal troops. In these ways they managed to counter in sig-
nificant and effective centripetal ways ‘Turkish’ competitors for central power 
and ‘Turkish’ challengers of that power and its political order. Among the most 
remarkable and powerful of these non-military leaders at the Timurid and 
Turkmen courts were undoubtedly Ghiyath al-Din Pir-Ahmad Khwafi (d. 1453), 
head of Shah Rukh’s finance office between 1417 and 1447 who later served at the 
courts of various other Timurid princes, and his son Majd al-Din Muhammad 
Khwafi, chief accountant at Sultan-Husayn’s court since its first installation in 
Herat in 1469, who was chief agent of the court’s centralizing trajectory of bu-
reaucratic expansion and specialization. Eventually, in 1494, after many years of 
competition and confrontations with the court’s ‘Turkish’ memberships, Majd 
al-Din Muhammad was tortured, deprived of his allegedly fabulous wealth, 
and murdered.45 These two careers, spanning almost a century of Timurid rul-
ership in West-Asia’s East, represent a remarkable, personalized connection be-
tween these two distinct moments of Timurid state formation during the first 
half and final quarter of the fifteenth century respectively. In fact, connections 
such as these are anything but exceptional for political careers in the Timurid 
and Turkmen North and East, where the imperfect integration of ‘Turkish’ com-
manders and the balancing empowerment of ‘Tajik’ administrative experts rep-
resented practical realities that connected individuals, groups and institutions 
across all kinds of regularly shifting boundaries of loyalty,  service and political 
45 Subtelny, Timurids in Transition, pp. 79–99.
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order.46 The careers of Pir-Ahmad and his son Muhammad at various Timurid 
courts are therefore a powerful illustration of how in Islamic West-Asia’s North 
and East state formation also appeared as one, regularly reproduced, process 
of political transformation, albeit along its own, distinctive trajectory of sym-
biosis and confrontation between fifteenth- century ‘Turkish’ and ‘Tajik’ politi-
cal communities, and of the latter’s reproduction and empowerment across 
Timurid and Turkmen (and occasionally also Ottoman) leaderships.
4 Epilogue: The Trajectories of Fifteenth-Century Boundaries and 
Ideals
It is well known that of these many distinct trajectories of Turko-Mongol state 
formation in Islamic West-Asia, the Ottoman was the only one that continued 
more or less unaltered, indeed in increasingly coherent ways, into the sixteenth 
century. Key factors in this process undoubtedly included military and admin-
istrative expansion, personal and institutional longevity, internalized elite 
 renewal and the reproduction of the Ottoman Sultanate as an increasingly 
 autonomous, integrative and empowering bureaucratic order. But another de-
fining factor was certainly also the strength and tenacity of the era’s other tra-
jectories of state formation in the Southwest, North and East of West-Asia. For 
the Cairo Sultanate this manifested itself from the late 1510s onwards in the 
rapid local integration of Syro-Egyptian elites and practices into this Ottoman 
process, in the continuation of much of the Sultanate’s political apparatus, 
now adapted to Ottoman political realities, and in the substantial recalibration 
of the latter realities to equally accommodate the definitive shift of the Otto-
man political order towards the very center of the Muslim and Eurasian worlds. 
The latter shift, however, was a function not just of Ottoman expansion and ap-
propriation of the Cairo Sultanate’s apparatus and elites, but also of the particu-
lar continuation of the more ambiguous Timurid-Turkmen state formation 
route in Islamic West-Asia’s East, in Uzbek Transoxiana and Mughal Northern 
India as well as in Safavid Iran. Making its appearance on the West-Asian stage 
at the turn of the new century, Shah Ismaʿil’s (r. 1501–24) Safavid authority was 
personally, practically and institutionally in many ways one of the main heirs to 
this Timurid-Turkmen trajectory. At the same time, when that authority ac-
quired a more coherent appearance in the course of the sixteenth century, this 
contributed to the emergence of new East-West frontiers that were also strongly 
46 Woods, The Aqquyunlu, pp. 106–110.
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tied to the formation of the political, social and cultural order of the Safavids’ 
early modern Ottoman counterpart.
That early modern Ottoman social order was actually described by Malcolm 
Yapp as “compartmentalized”, and as
a block of flats in which the inhabitants only met in the corridors […] 
[and in which] each compartment had its hierarchy and the leaders of 
those hierarchies transacted much business together […] [I]t was the 
people who bridged the compartments, qāḍīs and notables, who made 
the system work.47
This view certainly reminds one of above-mentioned statements about the 
segmented nature of Turko-Mongol politics and socio-economic organization 
in fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia. However, although the block of flats, 
with clearly defined compartments, corridors and inhabitants with clearly de-
fined roles is attractive, it is not the most apt metaphor here, given the ongoing 
dynamics of expansion, fragmentation and circulation, recurrent attempts at 
political stabilization and administrative penetration, and, more generally, dif-
ferent trajectories of Turko-Mongol state formation. Even in the Ottoman 
North-West those dynamics, attempts and trajectories remained insufficiently 
fixed, structured or coherent to justify thinking of them in terms of clearly de-
fined and delineated blocks, flats, compartments, corridors and roles. Never-
theless, some social phenomena in the foregoing survey may certainly be un-
derstood as multivalent compartments, autonomous corridor trafficking and 
multiple roles and hierarchies, even if they did appear only in very temporary, 
localized, premature or ad hoc formats, and in conditions of continuous nego-
tiation, accommodation, contestation and experimentation. The metaphor 
therefore may still have some value, as it makes clear how old and new com-
partments continued to take shape and interact amidst the fluidity, volatility 
and incongruence of fifteenth-century West-Asian social order At this time the 
skeleton of certain blocks of flats even became visible, although their construc-
tion remained very much creative work in progress, and although the more 
coherent early modern appearances of some of that work were all but prede-
termined. Above all, this imperfect yet insightful metaphor certainly helps one 
to remain aware of the impact of Turko-Mongol trajectories of state formation 
on these constructions of social order, not least also reminding us of the limits 
of that impact. Driven by coercive power and integrative ambitions these 
trajectories generated a productive centrality for rulers, elites and political 
47 Yapp, The Making of the Modern Near East, pp. 9–10.
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communities in those skeletons. At the same time, these trajectories emerged 
almost incidentally, and with differing rates of success, from multivalent ac-
tions that were above all about creating new compartments, about expanding, 
reorganizing and repositioning them, and about pursuing priority in the con-
stantly changing corridors of compartmental relationships, rather than at-
tempting to construct an entire block, monopolizing it and making “the system 
work”.
Yapp also suggested that due to the “compartmentalized nature” of early 
modern Ottoman social order, “the Muslim ideal of a stable society, based on 
justice and composed of the four classical pillars—bureaucrats, soldiers, mer-
chants and artisans, and peasants—bore little relation to […] reality […]”.48 
Considering the differences between the “compartmentalized nature” of the 
early modern Ottoman order and that of fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia, 
the latter fifteenth-century reality was even farther removed from that ancient 
ideal of one stable and just society. Nevertheless, the ideal was also very pres-
ent across that reality’s unstable political landscape, perhaps even more ac-
tively than generally tends to be acknowledged. It informed widespread ideas 
about good rulership and legitimate socio-political order.49 It permeated the 
aforementioned multiple pursuits to organize relationships of coercion and 
power along the labels of ‘the men of the sword, the men of the pen and the 
men of the turbans’ and through legislation and legal action. It finally also 
guided many dichotomous explanations of the era’s fluid and volatile roles 
and hierarchies, such as the binaries of ‘Turks’ and ‘Tajiks’, ‘Persians’ and ‘Ar-
abs’, ‘elites’ (khassa) and ‘commoners’ (ʿamma), tax payers and tax recipients, 
commanders and administrators, or Muslims and Christians. These and many 
similar ideas, labels, actions, binaries and explanations contributed to the 
many appearances of social order across West-Asia, amidst those complex re-
alities of segmentation, fragmentation and competitive empowerment. Above 
all, they operated everywhere as highly fluid specimens of socio-cultural 
boundaries that were constantly crossed, challenged and reconfigured. In fact, 
the formulation of such boundaries with the aid of these and related ideas and 
explanations continued to represent important stakes in the endless negotia-
tion, accommodation, contestation and experimentation from which both 
compartments and corridors emerged, stimulating communication across 
such compartmentalization and contributing to the appearance of larger skel-
etons and contours of order.
48 Yapp, The Making of the Modern Near East, p. 9.
49 Darling, A History of Social Justice and Political Power in the Middle East, esp. pp. 113–118 
(‘Post-Mongol Polities (1335–1506)’).
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These fluid socio-cultural boundaries, and these ideas and ideals more in 
general, were always also highly political, constructing, and constructed by, all 
kinds of relationships of power across Islamic West-Asia. As such they were 
always also part of the ideologies of Turko-Mongol rule in fifteenth-century 
West-Asia, and of wider apparatuses of political communication and perfor-
mance. Despite their importance for fifteenth-century West-Asia’s diverse tra-
jectories of state formation, these symbolic apparatuses have not been dealt 
with separately in this chapter. This is partly because that would go beyond 
the more socio-politically oriented focus of the current volume, but also be-
cause much pioneering work still remains to be done in this highly complex 
and intellectually sophisticated, but traditionally downgraded and even oft-
neglected, domain.50 Today these ideologies and discourses of power, and the 
highly intricate trans-regional webs of meaning-making and knowledge prac-
tices to which they pertain, are arguably even less well-known, studied and 
understood, in the more general entangled context of fifteenth-century Turko-
Mongol state formation in particular, than Islamic West-Asia’s power elites, its 
institutions and practices, and its socio-political transformations. Recent years 
have certainly seen a growing acknowledgement of the need for research into 
this field. Scholars are beginning to realize the potential value in investigating 
the nature and wide-ranging impact of the often very novel sets of ideas and 
ideals of legitimate rule and kingship that came to dominate West-Asian dis-
courses of power with and after Temür. There is also a growing acknowledge-
ment of the riches of this subject, and of the experimental creativity and the 
shared mix of memories, symbolic practices and cultural systems by which 
Turko-Mongol leaderships, Arabo-Persian courtiers and Muslim intellectuals 
of wide-ranging expertise and mobility engaged in legitimizing, explaining 
and disciplining the eclectic, violent and volatile political realities of the era. 
Models of leadership in West-Asia in the fifteenth century operationalized 
eclectic imaginations of social justice, divine favor, dynastic precedence, ideal 
rule, royal wisdom, millenarian sovereignty, charismatic sanctity and their like. 
50 See especially Watt, Islamic Political Thought and Crone, Medieval Islamic Political 
Thought. Despite the comprehensiveness suggested by these titles, these two authors gen-
erally prefer to neglect any detailed discussion of the later medieval period, due to their 
focus on the imamate. This was a religio-legal concept of Islamic sovereignty that ap-
peared in the fifteenth century with substantially altered meanings that are difficult to 
comprehend from Watt’s and Crone’s strictly Arabo-Islamic genealogical perspective. See 
also Antony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought (who tellingly decided to enti-
tle his brief survey of important fifteenth-century thinkers such as Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad 
Davānī and Faẓl Allāh Khunjī-Iṣfahānī “The Decline of Classical Islamic Political Thought” 
[pp. 183–188]).
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These highly creative symbolic apparatuses enabled very intense connections 
between the different courts of the era and their communicative systems, and 
also with their Perso-Islamic, Turko-Saljuq and Mongol-Chinggisid anteced-
ents as well as with the ways their imperial successors made their impressive 
appearances on the early-modern Eurasian stage.51 It remains a daunting task 
to untangle the genealogies, the communications and performances, and the 
functions and agents of these eclectic imaginations, which are to be situated 
within the fields of theology, philosophy, mysticism, occultism, mathematics, 
historiography and various other premodern Eurasian knowledge traditions. 
At the same time, pursuing this is highly desirable, not least because as dem-
onstrated above almost all of the, mostly narrative, extant sources for those 
trajectories of fifteenth-century state formation are in many ways products, 
and constituents, of those symbolic apparatuses. Even though it is a task that 
cannot be addressed in the current context, this certainly remains a highly rel-
evant and very promising one that calls for further, preferably collaborative, 
initiatives along similar lines of West-Asian, and for that matter Eurasian, en-
tangled research.
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Chapter 2
Studying Rulers and States across Fifteenth-
Century Western Eurasia
Jan Dumolyn and Jo Van Steenbergen
In this second chapter we seek to embed the preceding chapter as well as the 
other contributions to this volume within various interpretative traditions of 
state formation studies in order to determine a heuristic ground for better un-
derstanding the parallels, connections and divergences of fifteenth-century 
‘statist’ appearances in the historiography of Islamic West-Asia, and of Western 
Eurasia more generally.1 The main questions at stake are as follows: how have 
researchers operationalized concepts of ‘the state’, of its formation and of its 
transformation within the various historiographical traditions; what conscious 
or unconscious presuppositions and assumptions have driven this operation-
alization; and how has social theory been applied in this process in various 
ways. This discussion of some of the major conceptual debates on ‘the state’ in 
the study of fifteenth-century Western Eurasia will be pursued in a pragmatic 
way. It will be oriented towards identifying and explaining some of the most 
widely or most explicitly used models of state formation within different re-
search traditions. The rationale here complements that of the first, empirical 
chapter in aiming to make fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia’s political his-
tory more accessible and intelligible to wider audiences while also inviting 
specialists of these different traditions to rethink what they know about their 
subjects within wider or unexplored frameworks.
More generally, pursuing these questions and purposes in this chapter en-
ables us to further contextualize the different contributions to this volume’s 
Parts 2 and 3. We aim to make them more intelligible, in entangled and reflex-
ive ways, as representatives of wider research traditions that continue to be 
1 This chapter has been finalized within the context of the project ‘The Mamlukisation of the 
Mamluk Sultanate ii: Historiography, Political Order and State Formation in Fifteenth- 
Century Egypt and Syria’ (UGent, 2017–21); this project has received funding from the Euro-
pean Research Council (erc) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and 
 innovation program (Consolidator Grant agreement No 681510).
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dominated by what will be identified here as legalistic readings of ‘the state’. 
Moreover, this chapter also wishes to take stock of the various possibilities for 
genuine comparative research, across and beyond these traditions of Islamic 
West-Asian political history writing. Given the almost complete lack of any 
general ‘historical sociology’ of premodern state formation in Islamic West-
Asia along with the relative paucity of theorizations of explicitly non-Western 
premodern state formation more generally, this chapter also wishes to enrich 
these fields of study with more precise analytical perspectives.2 This includes 
foregrounding conceptual tools that may enhance the comparative potential 
on the Eurasian canvas of empirical historical research such as that which is 
presented in this volume.
After a general introduction presenting some of the main issues at stake in 
the long history of the theoretical study of the premodern state, the second 
part of this chapter briefly discusses the main trends in the substantial existing 
literature on state formation for late medieval and early modern Europe. The 
longer third part of the chapter then presents an in-depth survey of the differ-
ent interpretative frameworks that have informed, and continue to inform, the 
study of rulers and states across fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia. This part 
focuses in particular on how (early) Ottomanists, Turkmen and Timurid spe-
cialists, and Mamlukologists have thought about “the state” in their diverse yet 
interconnected research traditions. The chapter ends with some final observa-
tions and suggestions about the comparative value of extant models and ana-
lytical tools to study state formation.
2 For Islamic West-Asia, only a handful of theorizations in more specific studies come close to 
contributing to a historical sociology of ‘the state’ (often, however, without really engaging 
with each other’s ideas). See Paul, Lokale und imperiale Herrschaft; Paul, “Violence and State-
Building in the Islamic East”; Paul, “The State and the Military—a Nomadic Perspective”; 
Lindholm, “Part iii State and Society: Prophets, Caliphs, Sultans, and Tyrants”, in idem, The 
Islamic Middle East; Di Cosmo, “State Formation and Periodization in Inner Asian History”; 
Crone, “The Tribe and the State”; Donner, “The Formation of the Islamic State”; Lapidus, 
“Tribes and State Formation”; Mottahedeh, Loyalty and Leadership; Clifford, State Formation 
and the structure of politics; Abou-El-Haj, Formation of the modern state; Barkey, Empire of 
Difference. See below for a detailed assessment of the contributions by Marshall Hodgson, Ira 
Lapidus and Michael Chamberlain to this theorization. Furthermore, worth mentioning here 
are also the following attempts to at least marginalize dominant European models, “avoiding 
Eurocentrism and presentism” (Kiser & Levi, “Interpreting”, p. 557), in comparative engage-
ments with (aspects of) premodern state formation: Monson & Scheidel, Fiscal Regimes; 
Bang & Scheidel, Oxford Handbook of the State in the Ancient Near East; Morris & Scheidel, 
Dynamics of Ancient Empires.
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1 Introduction: Defining ‘the state’ between Max Weber, ʿAbd al-
Rahman Ibn Khaldun and Charles Tilly
1.1 Defining What States ‘are’
In a recent comprehensive survey article on modern scholarship’s diverse en-
gagements with the study of the premodern state classicist Walter Scheidel 
noted how there are being used two distinct types of definition of what ‘the 
state’ is, and how it can or should be studied. On the one hand, Scheidel ex-
plains, there are those who formulate exclusive definitions that prioritize mod-
ern Western statist experiences. On the other hand, there are those who pur-
sue inclusive definitions that are in favor of universal heuristic applicability 
across time and space.3 According to Scheidel, this analytical dichotomy is 
“emblematic of a more general rift between legalistic and political science ap-
proaches … [and] approaches of history, anthropology, and sociology”.4 As we 
will argue below, this division has also characterized historiographical visions 
of the state and of its agency in late medieval Europe and fifteenth-century Is-
lamic West-Asia. In fact, the exclusive determinism of ‘the modern state’ has 
for a long time had a substantial impact on these visions, and on their widely-
shared organization around state/society binaries in particular. Especially in 
the study of fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia this impact continues to leave 
many traces until today.
At the same time, from a comparative analytical perspective, it is also clear 
that across the board, the diverse definitions of ‘the state’ in modern scholar-
ship all share a rootedness in Max Weber’s ideal type, with its emphasis on 
the combination of coercion, differentiation, a ruling apparatus and legitimate 
order:
A ‘ruling organization’ (Herrschaftsverband) shall be called a ‘political or-
ganization’ (politischer Verband) if and insofar as its existence and the 
effectiveness of its order (die Geltung seiner Ordnungen) within a speci-
fiable geographical area are continuously safeguarded by the application 
and the threat of physical coercion (physischen Zwangs) on the part of 
the administrative staff (seitens des Verwaltungsstabes). A continuously 
operating compulsory political organization (ein politischer Anstaltsbe-
trieb) shall be called a state (Staat) if and insofar as its administrative 
staff successfully claims the monopoly of legitimate physical coercion 
3 Scheidel, “Studying the State”, p. 8.
4 Scheidel, “Studying the State”, p. 8.
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(das Monopol legitimen physischen Zwanges) in the implementation of 
its order (die Durchführung der Ordnungen).5
The diverse definitions in modern (Western) scholarship actually share not just 
Weberian roots, but also what Scheidel identifies as “a number of key features”. 
Reviewing seminal contributions to state formation debates by leading histo-
rians and sociologists such as Michael Mann, John Haldon and Charles Tilly,6 
Scheidel concludes that all of the most widely accepted definitions point at 
the usefulness of identifying a power constellation as a ‘state’ if in one way or 
another it combines these three factors: “centralized institutions that impose 
rules, and back them up by force, over a territorially circumscribed population; 
a distinction between the rulers and the ruled; and an element of autonomy, 
stability, and differentiation”.7
To this triad of centralized coercive institutions, socio-political distinction 
and stabilizing political differentiation a fourth factor is very often added refer-
ring back to Weber’s insistence on the centrality of successful claims to order 
and legitimacy. Especially in the study of premodern or early states, this addi-
tional factor has also increasingly been acknowledged as an equally constitu-
tive key feature for any definition of the ‘state’. This concerns the symbolic 
means that underscore the reality of the other three factors and that bind rul-
ers and ruled into the shared imagination of an integrated, even natural, politi-
cal whole. Byzantinist John Haldon and political scientist Jack Goldstone, in 
their own neo-Marxist exploration of a statist definition, stress the importance 
of this factor of “ideological integration”, which in their view often appears in 
the format of “the ‘ritual penetration’ of a society as represented by specific 
5 This is Walter Scheidel’s translation of Max Weber’s definition (the italics are Weber’s), ex-
plaining that “the conventionally quoted English translation in Weber 1978, 55 is imprecise” 
(Scheidel, “Studying the State”, p. 5). Weber’s German terminology has been added here to 
Scheidel’s translation to underscore the value of his translation, and to convey the subtleties 
of Weber’s definition (from Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, p. 29). This translation is re-
peated, as a “very precise” one, in Hall, “Varieties of State Experience”, p. 61.
6 Mann: “The state is a differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying centrality, in 
the sense that political relations radiate outward to cover a territorially demarcated area, 
over which it claims a monopoly of binding and permanent rule-making, backed up by phys-
ical violence” (Mann, Sources of Social Power, 1: 37); Haldon: “the state represents a set of in-
stitutions and personnel, concentrated spatially at a single point, and exerting authority over 
a territorially distinct area” (Haldon, The State, pp. 32–33); Tilly: “Let us define states as coercion- 
wielding organizations that are distinct from households and kinship groups and exercise 
clear priority in some respects over all other organizations within substantial territories” 
(Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, p. 1).
7 Scheidell, “Studying the State”, p. 7.
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sets of social practices that express the legitimacy and belief system underpin-
ning elite and central authority and that generally express and reinforce the 
structure of social relations of production”. Haldon and Goldstone explain that 
ideological integration and ritual penetration actually allow states to survive 
even when those key features of centralization, distinction or differentiation 
are under pressure.8 Many years before Haldon and Goldstone, Joseph Strayer, 
one of the pioneers of European state formation studies, had made this point 
even more forcefully when he explained that “a state exists chiefly in the hearts 
and minds of its people; if they do not believe it is there, no logical exercise will 
bring it to life”.9 The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, in one of the most 
compelling contributions to theories of the state and its formation, formulates 
similar insights, famously explaining and formulating the addition of this sym-
bolic feature of ideological integration, ritual penetration and collective imagi-
nation as an explicit elaboration of the traditional Weberian definition.
I would say, using a variation around Max Weber’s famous formula, that 
the state is an X (to be determined) which successfully claims the mo-
nopoly of the legitimate use of physical and symbolic violence over a de-
finitive territory and over the totality of the corresponding population. If 
the state is able to exert symbolic violence, it is because it incarnates it-
self simultaneously in objectivity, in the form of specific organizational 
structures and mechanisms, and in subjectivity in the form of mental 
structures and categories of perception and thought. By realizing itself in 
social structures and in the mental structures adapted to them, the insti-
tuted institution makes us forget that it issues out of a long series of acts 
of institution (in the active sense) and hence has all the appearances of 
the natural.10
Following Bourdieu, it indeed seems important for any definition of the state 
to also acknowledge that states are the incarnation of a mutually  constitutive 
8 Goldstone and Haldon, “Ancient States, Empires, and Exploitation”, pp. 10–15, esp. 13.
9 Strayer, Medieval Origins, p. 5.
10 Bourdieu, “Rethinking the State”, pp. 3–4 (italics from the original) (see also Bourdieu, On 
the State, p. 4). In this context of symbolic violence and “ritual politics” as key features of 
statist definitions we should also refer to the contributions to this debate made by the 
neo-Marxist Antonio Gramsci, especially in the format of his thinking with the notion of 
‘hegemony’ (Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks; Bates, “Gramsci and the Theo-
ry of Hegemony”), and by the anthropologist Clifford Geertz, especially in his Negara: the 
theatre state in nineteenth-century Bali, where he (in)famously argued that “power served 
pomp, not pomp power” (p. 13).
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combination of a hegemonic discourse and of an apparatus of coercion, dis-
tinction and differentiation. As such, states display a tendency to appear as 
natural or even meta-historical forms of political organization, which is how-
ever no more than a function of their existential claims to legitimacy and to 
any self-defined form of statehood. Rather than merely being as they thus ap-
pear, states are always in the process of becoming, in an endless “series of acts 
of institution”. “[S]tates are never ‘formed’ once and for all”, as George Stein-
metz explains in his exploration of the study of the state-culture nexus. “It 
is more fruitful to view state-formation as the ongoing process of structural 
change and not as a one-time event”.11 In any definition or attempt at analy-
sis, therefore, what matters most is this process of a state’s endless formation, 
and transformation, as that incarnation of a mutually constitutive combina-
tion of a hegemonic discourse and of an apparatus of coercion, distinction and 
differentiation.
1.2 Defining How States ‘become’
For Bourdieu, and for many like him, this endless act of state formation hap-
pens simultaneously in the “objectivity” of social structures and in the “subjec-
tivity” of mental structures. Often, this is thought to happen in a dialectic inter-
action between power structures, or between varying combinations of such 
structures and all kinds of non-state phenomena.12 In many cases more spe-
cific moments in this process of formation are identified and defined, mostly 
as heuristic tools for analytical purposes rather than as actual stages in any te-
leological trajectory. In this respect, Goldstone and Haldon speak of a “line 
from local state to supra-local state to empire (and back again)”.13 More specifi-
cally, they explain how
At one extreme of socio-political organization, the term “state” can re-
fer to a relatively short-lived grouping of tribal or clan communities 
united under a warlord or chieftain who is endowed with both symbolic 
and military authority—in anthropological terms, a “Big-man” confed-
eracy. […] At the other extreme we find more or less territorially unified 
political entities, with an organizational “center” (which may be peripa-
tetic) from which a ruler or ruling group exercises political authority and 
that maintains its existence successfully over several generations; a key 
11 Steinmetz, “Introduction”, p. 9.
12 See e.g. Mann’s notion of a ‘dialectics of empire’ generating “a long-term developmental 
tendency” (Mann, Sources of Social Power, 1:161).
13 Goldstone & Haldon, “Ancient States, Empires, and Exploitation”, p. 6.
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element in the formation and degree of permanence of such formations 
is that the authority of the ruler or ruling group is recognized as both 
legitimate and exclusive.14
In Goldstone and Haldon’s very wide-ranging historical model, state formation 
between these extremes is not simply a contingent function of dialectic inter-
action between power structures, but “a longer-term evolutionary process in 
which social habits and institutions and state organizations respond to chang-
ing conditions through […] ‘competitive selection’ of practices”.15 In this evolu-
tionary process towards social transcendence and autonomy and towards a 
high degree of political integration and permanence, Goldstone and Haldon 
describe how “the potential for state formations to reproduce themselves” ap-
pears as a central feature.16 In this respect, they reformulate Bourdieu’s idea of 
“the instituted institution” in historically and materially more concrete terms, 
which arguably represent some of the main heuristic parameters that are cur-
rently used in historical state formation studies:
The state becomes a specialized and dominant set of institutions, which 
may even undertake the creation ab initio of its own administrative per-
sonnel and that can survive only by maintaining control over the appro-
priation and distribution of surplus wealth that this specialized person-
nel administers.17
Goldstone and Haldon’s analytical model of an evolutionary process shift-
ing back and forth between two extremes appears here perhaps most clear-
ly as deeply rooted in a Marxist interpretation of modes of production.18 At 
the same time, they also explicitly acknowledge their indebtedness to other 
 traditions. These included the ideas formulated by the fourteenth century 
North-African scholar ʿAbd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406),19 who famous-
ly described the process of social formation from a nomadic chieftaincy to a 
14 Goldstone & Haldon, “Ancient States, Empires, and Exploitation”, pp. 5–6.
15 Goldstone & Haldon, “Ancient States, Empires, and Exploitation”, p. 7. This argument fol-
lows Runciman, Treatise.
16 Goldstone & Haldon, “Ancient States, Empires, and Exploitation”, p. 8.
17 Goldstone & Haldon, “Ancient States, Empires, and Exploitation”, p. 8. This mainly follows 
Mann, Sources of Social Power, volume i (see also below).
18 For a brief critique of neo-Marxist notions of state formation, see Steinmetz, “Introduc-
tion”, pp. 14–15 (focusing in particular on “Gramsci’s writings on hegemony” and “Ander-
son’s historical studies of antiquity, feudalism, and absolutism”).
19 Goldstone & Haldon, “Ancient States, Empires, and Exploitation”, p. 7.
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bureaucratic-administrative power constellation as a highly competitive itera-
tive one, determined chiefly by social identities and relationships, economic 
structures, urbanization and cultural production and consumption. For Ibn 
Khaldun, nomadic formations are most powerful in social terms, but economi-
cally they remain relatively weak; their inevitable military empowerment is 
therefore bound to target economic empowerment as well, both of which ma-
terialize best in urban contexts of defense, accumulation, differentiation and 
distinction. However, the impact of the latter processes, including on social 
power, is transformative for the ruling constellation of the ‘state’ (al-dawla). 
Over time this ‘state’ becomes entirely dependent on new administrative per-
sonnel for its maintenance of control and authority, and at the same time is 
bound to collapse under the pressure of a new nomadic formation and its fresh 
social power.20
This tradition of imagining the endless act of state formation in a naturally 
occurring iterative succession of different forms of political organization actu-
ally has its equivalents in Mediterranean antiquity. It appears most explicitly 
in Book 6 of The Histories by the second century bce Greek historian and poli-
tician Polybius of Megalopolis (ca. 200–118 bce). Polybius explains how there 
are three forms of political organization (politeias)—kingship (basileias), aris-
tocracy and democracy—and how time and again each of these three forms 
degenerates into its lesser equivalent—tyranny, oligarchy and mob-rule 
(okhlokratia)—, just as a living organism experiences birth, rise, decay and 
death. For Polybius the latter natural experience of life also marks the succes-
sion of these forms, with mob-rule eventually giving way to the chaos out of 
which a new strongman will rise as monarch, and the cycle of political organi-
zation (politeiōn anakyklosis) restarts.21 Ibn Khaldun’s and Polybius’ thinking 
about state formation appears as very different, also demonstrating how they 
operated and embedded their theories in very different political contexts and 
concepts—fourteenth-century ce nomadic power and Islamic urban efflores-
cence in North-Africa and West-Asia for the former, Greek integration into the 
freshly won Roman domination of the second-century bce Mediterranean 
world for the latter. On a more abstract level Ibn Khaldun’s and Polybius’ mod-
ellings nevertheless also have many features in common, from their iterative 
logics and firm beliefs in the degenerating nature of power to their assump-
tions about the naturally increasing complexity of political organization and 
20 Ibn Khaldūn, Muqaddima; Martinez-Gros, Ibn Khaldûn.
21 Polybius, The Histories, Volume iii, book vi (ii. On the Forms of States), pp. 294/5–318/9; 
Polybius. The Histories, p. xix.
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their conceptions of that organization’s active, even reproductive, integration 
of ever more stakeholders.22
Another seminal tradition to which Goldstone and Haldon explicitly refer as 
a source of inspiration—“Weber’s concept”—brings us back to the opening 
paragraphs of this chapter’s introduction, to the Weberian tradition.23 It is well 
known that Weber identified “three pure types of legitimate authority” (drei rein-
er Typen legitimer Herrschaft), which in many ways also remind us of Polybius’, 
and for that matter Ibn Khaldun’s, modellings. In line with Weber’s aforemen-
tioned definition of a state as “a political organization [that] […] successfully 
claims the monopoly of legitimate physical coercion in the implementation of 
its order”, these three analytical types differ along the fundamentally different 
rational, traditional or charismatic “grounds” (Charakters) on which they suc-
cessfully make those claims, famously giving way to “legal authority” (legale 
Herrschaft), to “traditional authority” (traditionale Herrschaft) or to “charis-
matic authority” (charismatische Herrschaft) respectively. Weber usefully sum-
marizes the socio-cultural essence of each of these three types as follows:
In the case of legal authority, obedience is owed to the legally established 
impersonal order (der legal gesatzten sachlichen unpersönlichen Ord-
nung). It extends to the persons exercising the authority of office under it 
(durch sie bestimmten Vorgesetzten) by virtue of the formal legality of 
their commands and only within the scope of authority of the office 
(kraft formaler Legalität seiner Anordnungen und in deren Umkreis). In the 
case of traditional authority, obedience is owed to the person of the chief 
who occupies the traditionally sanctioned position of authority and who 
is (within its sphere) bound by tradition (der Person des durch Tradition 
berufenen und an die Tradition [in deren Bereich] gebundenen Herrn). But 
here the obligation of obedience is a matter of personal loyalty within the 
area of accustomed obligations (kraft Pietät im Umkreis des Gewohnten). 
In the case of charismatic authority, it is the charismatically qualified 
leader (dem charismatisch qualifizierten Führer) as such who is obeyed by 
virtue of personal trust in his revelation, his heroism or his exemplary 
qualities so far as they fall within the scope of the individual’s belief in his 
charisma (im Umkreis der Geltung des Glaubens an dieses sein Charisma).24
22 See also Duindam, “Dynasty and Elites”, pp. 2–3.
23 Goldstone & Haldon, “Ancient States, Empires, and Exploitation”, p. 7.
24 Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, p. 124; translation from Weber, Economy and Society, 
p. 216.
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Weber basically conceptualizes political transformation as a process of ra-
tionalization from personal to impersonal forms of political organization, to-
wards the ideal type of legal authority “and its typical expression in  bureaucracy” 
(seinen spezifischen Typus in der ‘Bürokratie’), and away from the charismatic 
and traditional types, the latter “typically represented by patriarchalism” (im 
‘Patriarchalismus’ typisch repräsentiert).25 In premodern times, however, the 
charismatic and, especially, the traditional types always remained predomi-
nant for Weber, especially in patriarchalism’s more complex manifestation in 
patrimonialism (Patrimonialismus), representing an expansion and semi-bu-
reaucratization of the ruler’s personal power, and at the same time “a decen-
tralization of the household […] [which] leads inevitably to an attenuation of 
full patriarchal power (führt unvermeidlich zu einer inneren Abschwächung der 
vollen Hausgewalt)”.26 As will also transpire from the survey below, this typol-
ogy of charismatic, traditional and legal power has arguably been as influential 
in modern, especially historical, studies of that endless act of state formation, 
as Weber’s aforementioned definition of the state has been. A case in point, 
especially for West-Asian historiography, is Karl Wittfogel’s much debated and 
largely outdated model of ‘oriental despotism’. In its alleged historical manifes-
tation in the format of Asian ‘hydraulic empires’ this highly influential model-
ling was obviously informed by Marx’s historical materialism and his concep-
tualization of an ‘Asiatic mode of production’.27 In its imagination of the 
organization of discretionary personal power, however, it was rather more akin 
to the “extreme case” (im Höchtsmaß der Herrengewalt) of bureaucratic patri-
monialism that Weber identified as ‘sultanism’ (Sultanismus).28
In speaking of ‘sultanism’ as an “extreme case” and identifying it as the out-
come of a “transition” (Unterschied) that is “continuous” (fließend) and moves 
from tradition to discretion, Weber’s conceptualization of political transforma-
tion appears more complex (and Eurocentric) than any uniform and one- 
directional process of rationalization accounts for.29 In fact, his understanding 
25 Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, p. 612; translation from Weber, Economy and Society, 
p. 954.
26 Weber Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, p. 682; translation from Weber, Economy and Society, 
p. 1010.
27 Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism; see also Curtis, Orientalism and Islam, pp. 217–257.
28 See Weber Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, pp. 133–134; Weber, Economy and Society, pp. 231–232. 
Weber also explicitly referred to “Oriental sultanism” and to “the Near East [as] … the clas-
sic location of ‘sultanism’” (p. 1020). The assumptions that inform these ‘orientalisms’ 
have by now been seriously problematized and falsified (see e.g. Curtis, Orientalism and 
Islam, esp. ‘Chapter 9. Max Weber: patrimonialism as a political type’, pp. 258–298).
29 Weber, Economy and Society, p. 231; also p. 232 (Weber Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, p. 134): 
“Where domination is primarily traditional, even though it is exercised by virtue of the 
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
Dumolyn and Van Steenbergen98
<UN>
of this relationship between patriarchal/patrimonial and sultanistic authority 
arguably displays surprising parallels with Ibn Khaldun’s and, especially, Poly-
bius’ assumptions about the degenerating nature of (traditional) power. For 
Weber, indeed, premodern state formation must be analyzed against the patri-
monial background of “the continuous struggle of the central power with the 
various centrifugal local powers”, an endless oscillation between the central-
izing and decentralizing tendencies that are identified as patrimonialism’s 
“specific problem”. In fact, in many ways this incorporates another iterative 
logic of political organizations waxing and waning between ad hoc and more 
complex power constellations (at least until, for Weber, modern rationalism 
enabled Europe to escape from that logic).30
More generally, iterative models such as those of Ibn Khaldun, Polybius, 
and—at least for non-European political organization—Weber, and evolu-
tionary models of state formation, which inform approaches such as Wittfo-
gel’s or for that matter of modern legalistic and political sciences, both seem 
to be ideal types at the extremities of a rich continuum of interpretations of 
that endless historical act of a state’s formation. Most of these interpretations, 
however, including that of Goldstone and Haldon and more generally also that 
of Weber himself, situate themselves somewhere in between these evolution-
ary and iterative variables, trying both to avoid the pitfalls of determinism 
and also to allow for entropy. From a generalizing perspective, therefore, it ap-
pears more relevant to accept the reality of this analytical continuum in state 
formation studies than to identify where exactly on that continuum these and 
many more conceptualizations are to be situated. In fact, the most interesting 
general insight may well be that the variables that tend to be operationalized 
in this respect by most, if not all, relevant studies continue to relate directly 
to the shared essence of Ibn Khaldun’s and Polybius’ aforementioned concep-
tions and assumptions about the entropically increasing complexity of po-
litical organization and its active, even reproductive, integration of ever more 
stakeholders.
ruler’s personal autonomy, it will be called patrimonial authority; where it indeed oper-
ates primarily on the basis of discretion (freier traditionsungebundener Willkür), it will be 
called sultanism (sultanistische [Herrschaft]). The transition is definitely continuous (Der 
Unterschied is durchaus fließend). Both forms of domination are distinguished from ele-
mentary patriarchalism by the presence of a personal staff”.
30 Weber Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, p. 712; translation from Weber, Economy and Society, 
p. 1055. On this cyclical logic, see also Mann, Sources of Social Power, 1:172. For a critique on 
Weber’s belief that only Europe manages to escape from this logic of traditionalism via its 
particular manifestation in the format of feudalism and its subsequent process of Euro-
pean urbanization, see Steinmetz, “Introduction”, pp. 15–16: ‘Weber and the Relegation of 
Culture to Non-Western and Premodern Sites’.
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1.3 Defining What States ‘do’
Another insight that follows from this generalizing perspective is that the 
state—as the integrative-cum-entropic process of the formation and transfor-
mation of an apparatus of coercion, distinction and differentiation in a mutu-
ally constituent combination with a hegemonic discourse—is, and always has 
been, experienced as a dominant mode of organization in history. “It appears 
that from very small beginnings some five thousand or more years ago”, Scheidel 
remarks, “the state soon became the demographically dominant type of hu-
man political organization”.31 As a result, studies of the state have also always 
revolved around, and been inspired by, questions about states’ actual roles in, 
and impact on, history. Alongside questions about the state’s definition and 
formation, another big issue at stake in studies of the premodern state has thus 
been: What does the state actually do? Governing society, or social groups, 
communities and formations, seems the most obvious and most widely con-
templated answer here. Even so, the empirical reality of the minimalist nature 
of government in premodern contexts often tends to add important caveats to 
this kind of answer. Sociologist Anthony Giddens importantly remarks in this 
respect that
[i]t is misleading to describe the forms of rule typically found in non-
modern states as ‘government’, if ‘government’ means a concern of the 
state with the regularized administration of the overall territory claimed 
as its own. Traditional states did not ‘govern’ in this sense. Their ‘polities’ 
were mainly limited to the governance of conflicts within the dominant 
classes, and within the main urban centres.32
For most of human history, states simply did not have, aspire to, or consider ac-
quiring, the power, resources and instruments to discipline a ‘society’ in the 
maximalist ways that the modern notion of ‘government’ suggests.33 At least, 
studies of the state have never stopped to grapple with the measure—whether 
minimalist or rather more maximalist—of this state-society relationship. An 
important voice in this debate undoubtedly is that of sociologist and historian 
Charles Tilly, whose contribution to state formation studies of late medieval and 
early modern Europe has been crucial (see below). For Tilly, states engage pri-
marily in war-making against external enemies, in state-making by integrating 
31 Scheidel, “Studying the State”, p. 14.
32 Giddens, Nation-State, p. 57 (italics by Giddens); also referred to in Scheidel, “Studying the 
State”, pp. 16–17.
33 On this specific point, see also Mann, “Autonomous Power of the State”; Ando & Richard-
son, Ancient States and infrastructural power.
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or excluding internal competitors, in protecting their main supporters and allies 
against enemies or competitors, and in extracting resources from subject popu-
lations to enable war-making, state-making and protection.34 This focus on 
practices of exclusion, integration, reproduction and appropriation, however, at 
the same time implies that there are also many things that pre-modern states did 
not do. Many, if not most, voices in the field would certainly agree with the impli-
cation that Bourdieu’s aforementioned claim that the state exerts “violence over 
a definitive territory and over the totality of the corresponding population” 
seems too maximalist (and perhaps also too modern) a definition.35 Weber, 
again, appears to have been more nuanced in his understanding of this state-
society relationship. As Scheidel explains, this is a nuance that easily tends to be 
forgotten, making Weber even more useful for studies of the premodern state 
than is generally acknowledged:
It is worth noting […] that Weber speaks essentially of a claim to legiti-
mate force in the enforcement of state rules, and does not envision an ef-
fective monopoly on physical coercion per se. In this regard, his approach 
fits the situation of early states with their diffused coercive capabilities 
better than is sometimes realized.36
Among the multiple imaginations of the nature and impact of these “diffused 
coercive capabilities” Tilly’s interlocking practices of exclusion, integration, 
reproduction and appropriation certainly stand out as referential, and are rep-
resented at least partly in most studies of what premodern states do. At the 
same time, quite a few scholars wish to go several steps further with the mini-
malism implied, questioning in varying degrees the very reality of the state-
society relation. One important voice in this debate was certainly social an-
thropologist Ernest Gellner. Gellner actually preferred to think of pre-modern 
state-society relations in terms of social segmentation, with a horizontally ori-
ented elite constituting the state, and extracting taxes from and maintaining 
34 Tilly, “War Making and State Making”, p. 181; Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, 
p. 96; also referred to in Scheidel, “Studying the State”, p. 20. For Tilly, each activity gener-
ated its own agents and agencies, from armies over policing executives and courts to fiscal 
institutions.
35 Bourdieu, “Rethinking the State”, p. 3. See also Loyal, Bourdieu’s Theory of the State, 
pp. 111–121 (‘How Penetrating is State Thought?’, in Chapter 7: An Assessment of  Bourdieu’s 
Theory of the State).
36 Scheidel, “Studying the State”, p. 5. Weber literally speaks of the legitimate use of coercion 
“in the implementation of its order (die Durchführung der Ordnungen)” (Weber, Wirtschaft 
und Gesellschaft, p. 29).
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peace (and segregation) between otherwise largely disconnected social units 
of local communities.37 Other modern scholars tend to push the analytical bal-
ance in favor of what Gellner identified as communities, strictly avoiding over-
structuralist or top-down approaches and incorporating into their thinking 
varying notions of the state’s social constructedness. Following Michel Fou-
cault’s insistence on the ubiquitous, ‘capillary’ and productive nature of power, 
Middle-East historian Tim Mitchell questions the very notion of the state as a 
social actor, and suggests that any kind of state/non-state interaction should 
not be taken “as the starting point of the analysis, but as an uncertain outcome 
of the historical process”.38 For Mitchell, the state should be understood as “a 
structural effect” of that process, which although “appearing as an apparatus 
that stands apart from the rest of the social world” in actual fact should be 
studied as the product of diverse social practices and arrangements that, im-
portantly, also “produce the apparent separateness of the state and create ef-
fects of agency and partial autonomy, with concrete consequences”.39 In this 
conception, coercion, distinction, differentiation and hegemony do not neces-
sarily constitute any coherent apparatus of power, but rather a diverse and 
contingent set of social relations, which simultaneously create an effect of 
their own appearance as a coherent apparatus.40 In other words, states do not 
make history, but history makes states, as and when successful social practices 
of exclusion, integration, reproduction and appropriation start to appear and 
present themselves as a coherent apparatus of coercion, distinction, differen-
tiation and hegemony.
37 Gellner, Nations, pp. 8–18; also referred to in Scheidel, “Studying the State”, p. 16.
38 Mitchell, Rule of Experts, p. 74.
39 Mitchell, “Limits of the State”, pp. 90–91 (“Conceived in this way, the state is no longer to 
be taken as essentially an actor, with the coherence, agency, and subjectivity this term 
presumes. We should not ask ‘Who is the state?’, or ‘Who dictates its policies?’ Such ques-
tions presume what their answers pretend to prove: that some political subject, some 
who, preexists and determines those multiple arrangements we call the state. The ar-
rangements that produce the apparent separateness of the state create the abstract effect 
of agency, with concrete consequences. Yet such agency will always be contingent upon 
the production of difference—upon those practices that create the apparent boundary 
between state and society. These arrangements may be so effective, however, as to make 
things appear the reverse of this. The state comes to seem a subjective starting point, as 
an actor that intervenes in society”.); also in Mitchell, “Society, Economy and the State 
Effect”, p. 84.
40 Mitchell, “Limits of the State”, pp. 93–94; Mitchell (and Foucault) admittedly focus pri-
marily on the modern state; for an argument in favor of this approach to also understand-
ing other, premodern statist appearances, see Van Steenbergen, “‘Mamlukisation’ be-
tween social theory and social practice”, pp. 26–27.
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In rethinking the state in this bottom-up manner, Mitchell actually takes 
direct issue with another, even more minimalist, trend in state studies. “The 
importance of the state as a common ideological and cultural construct”, 
Mitchell argues,
should be grounds not for dismissing the phenomenon in favor of some 
supposedly more neutral and accurate concept (such as political system), 
but for taking it seriously. Politics, after all, is a process built out of such 
shared constructs.41
This ‘cultural’ turn in state studies has indeed also given way to an analytical 
trend that involved even more radical questionings of the usefulness of the 
state as a heuristic concept to understand the social realities and impact of 
power. Seminal contributions to this include a posthumously published pa-
per by historical sociologist Philip Abrams about “the difficulty of studying 
the state”, given what he described as “the secret of the non-existence of the 
state”.42 Perhaps one even more significant contribution is a survey about the 
uses and abuses of the state concept in European medieval studies by medi-
eval historian Rees Davies who concluded that “the state has been given far 
too privileged a role in the analyses of power in earlier societies”.43 This critical 
line of minimalist, if not nihilist, thought was informed by a growing unease 
with the dominant evolutionary paradigm of the medieval origins of European 
modern states (see below). It also displayed many belated echoes of similar 
debates that have been raging in the political sciences since the mid-twentieth 
century.44 This approach found its most explicit medievalist representative in 
a survey history of later medieval European politics first published in 2009 by 
John Watts, an historian of late medieval England (see also below). Watts even 
argued that “it is not necessary to frame—one might almost say burden—the 
structural history of politics with the notion of the state”.45 As a result, Watts 
41 Mitchell, “Limits of the State”, p. 81.
42 Abrams, “Difficulty of Studying the State”, p. 77. (“The state is, then, in every sense of the 
term a triumph of concealment. It conceals the real history and relations of subjection 
behind an a-historical mask of legitimating illusion: contrives to deny the existence of 
connections and conflicts which would if recognised be incompatible with the claimed 
autonomy and integration of the state. The real official secret, however, is the secret of the 
non-existence of the state”.).
43 Davies, “The Medieval State”, p. 289.
44 See Mitchell, “Limits of the State”, pp. 77–89 for a sketch and appraisal of this debate, in-
cluding of Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back in”.
45 Watts, Making of Polities, p. 35.
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decided not to speak of the state at all, but to adopt “a more open-ended per-
spective on the changing political structures of the period”.46
This dismissive attitude, however, is certainly not the dominant position in 
state formation studies at large. Echoing Mitchell’s above-mentioned criticism, 
John Haldon was perhaps one of those who warned most forcefully against 
throwing out the baby with the bath water when pushing a minimalist ap-
proach to these extreme ends.
It is important to stress that the state does have an identity as a field of 
action, as a role-constituting site of power and practices which can be 
independent, under certain preconditions, of the economic and political 
interests of those who dominate it.47
As in the case of Middle East historian Timothy Mitchell, Haldon entered this 
debate from a rather different background, not as a specialist of Western Eu-
rope but as a Byzantinist. In his thinking about the state as a tool in premod-
ern historical research he was concerned with a far more theoretical “Marxist 
approach to the State”. Haldon asked questions on a Eurasian scale about “a 
historical materialist approach to the state, state elites, the relative or absolute 
autonomy of state structures and practices, and the role of the economic in 
Marxist historical interpretation”.48 From his Eurasian and comparative per-
spectives Haldon actually recasted these debates between minimalists and 
maximalists in interestingly processual terms. Ascribing to the aforementioned 
notion of state formation as an endless process, he stressed “that state forma-
tions differ qualitatively in the degree of their ‘stateness’”, forbearing any com-
parisons between their historical manifestations across time and space that 
do not take into account the specifics of “very different structural contexts”.49 
Any study of states and of their impact on human history should therefore 
internalize the assumption that all statist manifestations are specific and can 
46 Watts, Making of Polities, p. 35. For Watts “political structures” are “the frames and forms 
and patterns in which politics took place; frames, forms and patterns which conditioned 
those politics, and which also … had some role to play in causing, as well as explaining, 
political action”. (p. 35). This position was recently re-iterated in perhaps a more nuanced 
and open way in De Weerdt, Holmes & Watts, “Politics, c. 1000–1500”, p. 262. (“Today’s 
historians of medieval politics are more likely to be concerned with process rather than 
with trajectory and outcomes, and while, as we shall see, this by no means forecloses 
considerations of ‘the state’, political history does not have to be framed by that particular 
problematic”.).
47 Haldon, The State, p. 33; referred to in Scheidel, “Studying the State”, p. 22.
48 Haldon, The State, p. 32.
49 Haldon, The State, p. 33.
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only be considered as contextually defined exceptions of any one analytical 
model that may be employed. Rather than trying to reduce that specificity and 
exceptionality to, prioritize their features within, or exclude them from a stat-
ist ideal, what should matter most in comparative, and, for that matter, non-
comparative historical research is to use that ideal to acknowledge for, and 
to decipher, specificity and exceptionality.50 Scheidel believes that it is Tilly’s 
“model of state formation driven by interstate and class conflict”, through the 
interplay of war-making and state-making, that “holds promise for the study of 
any historical period, even as we must avoid the transfer of specifically Euro-
pean features to other environments”.51 The latter critical distance may well be 
achieved by identifying where and how Tilly’s model resonates with or may be 
further refined by the thinking of others, including Max Weber, Ibn Khaldun 
and Polybius.
2 Studying State Formation in Late Medieval Europe
Empirical studies on ‘the state’ in the Middle Ages—even if we limit ourselves 
for now to those dealing with Western Europe—are so numerous and diverse 
that it would be impossible to offer more than an outline of some general his-
toriographical trends which are relevant to the present discussion. Until World 
War i, state formation was not an issue that would have been explicitly formu-
lated by most traditional western medievalists. As will be detailed below, with 
the notable exception of theoretical discussions on the applicability of the 
modern concept of ‘the state’ on medieval society within German legal history, 
the concepts of ‘state formation’ or ‘state-building’ only really became popular 
in mainstream medieval historiography during the mid-1970s and 1980s when 
historical sociologists working in the Weberian and Marxist traditions had put 
it on the agenda more explicitly.
Territorialstaaten was an expression which German medievalists already 
used sometimes at the end of the nineteenth century, but otherwise the term 
‘state’ was primarily used in the specific case of the ‘Papal state’ or in discus-
sions of ‘Church and state’ inspired by contemporary conflicts.52 Some preco-
cious explicit examples of the use of the term ‘state formation’ include, for 
50 This necessary focus on the specific and on the apparently exceptional “to establish the 
distinctiveness [Eigenart]” of historical phenomena was also formulated and emphasized 
as part of any truly meaningful comparative approach by Weber (Weber, Economy and 
Society, p. xxxvii).
51 Scheidel, “Studying the State”, p. 38.
52 For instance in the English translation of Ranke’s work: von Ranke, History of the Popes.
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instance, Vaughan’s 1962 work on the Burgundian Duke Philip the Bold, and a 
remarkable earlier 1909 article by the Belgian medieval historian Henri Pirenne 
on ‘the formation’ of the Burgundian state.53 As we will see below, Pirenne’s 
powerful and systematic approach ensured that state building would become 
a central concept in Burgundian history. This approach rivaled the historiogra-
phy of the two most centralized medieval Kingdoms France and England, and 
to a lesser degree the Iberian monarchies, leaving the decentralized Holy Ro-
man Empire or the city-states of Italy mostly at the fringe of the debate (or else 
being studied in terms of why state formation before the nineteenth century 
had failed in these regions). Pirenne apologized to the traditionally empiricist 
readers of his time that “state is a modern term”, but also affirmed that it was 
not an arbitrary notion but rather one “based on historic fact”.
At the origin of Pirenne’s observations was the German legal idea of the re-
centralization of public authority, which had been fragmented as a result of 
feudalism, into a modern Staatsgewalt. Before that time medievalists had most-
ly discussed questions of the growth of state power or public authority just in 
passing when dealing with the personalities and policies of princes. By the end 
of the nineteenth century the problem was being posed in more explicit terms. 
Von Below already consciously used the expression ‘state’ for the Empire as a 
whole. He was clearly inspired by Hegel’s teleological philosophy in which the 
development of the state was a necessary objective to guarantee the wellbeing 
of a people.54 In 1904, the French legal historian Jacques Flach, for instance, 
also considered the efforts of the Capetian kings to reestablish royal power 
over a France torn apart by feudal anarchy to be a “renaissance of the state”.55 
For his part, Heinrich Mitteis, the most influential legal historian of the first 
half of the twentieth century, used the notion of the Personenverbandsstaat for 
the central Middle Ages, defining it as a state based upon the association of 
persons rather than a modern state with bureaucratic institutions.56 The main 
concern for medievalists became identifying a state which was ‘impersonal’ in 
the sense that it was detached from the person of the prince. This implied that 
the rule of the state was supported by a theoretical construct based not only 
upon principles of law and governance but also by an apparatus of govern-
ment offices whose actual institutional functioning was not solely controlled 
by the prince’s arbitrary decisions. In an intellectual climate dominated by 
53 Vaughan, Philip the bold; Pirenne, “The Formation and Constitution of the Burgundian 
State”.
54 Von Below, Der deutsche Staat des Mittelalters.
55 Flach, Les origines de l’ancienne France. Vol. 3.
56 Mitteis, Lehnrecht und Staatsgewalt; idem, Der Staat des hohen Mittelalters.
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thinkers like Hegel and Ranke, the idealist and hermeneutic trend within Ger-
man historiography inevitably considered the state foremost as an idea, an ab-
stract legal notion, or in more practical terms, as an administrative and politi-
cal entity apart from the person of the prince.57
It was this incipient usage of the term which, in 1909, inspired Pirenne, a 
more materialistically oriented historian who mostly focused upon socio- 
economic processes. Pirenne also spoke of ‘states’ in the Middle Ages, although 
he emphasized that the Burgundian state was larger than the separate princi-
palities in the Holy Roman Empire thus denoted. Pirenne’s focus traditionally 
remained on dynastic politics but he also systematically considered the posi-
tions of the cities and the nobility within this process, as well as the relationship 
between “political centralization” and “social and economic changes”, the evo-
lution of central institutions and the creation of a standing army by the dukes. 
In short, he developed a surprisingly modern and sociological approach for a 
historian of those days.58 Similarly, building mostly on German scholarship, in 
1936 Sir Frederick Powicke also made a critical assessment of “the problems the 
word ‘state’ suggests when it is applied to medieval society”. A careful empiricist, 
taking into account a variety of types of medieval documents, he opted to speak 
of a state as the condition in which a ruling power had firmly established its 
authority over other powerful groups in a given territory, but his analysis lacked 
any systematics and would continue to set the tone in British medieval history 
with its longtime fear for any kind of sociological generalizations apart from the 
national parliamentary mythology present in Whig History.59
In the meantime, another line of theory on the modern state and its forma-
tion came not from legal and institutional history but from philosophy and the 
new discipline of sociology. Hegel’s Beamtenstaat and his praise for the admin-
istrative class of Prussia had laid the foundations for the concepts of the state 
upheld by both Marx and Weber. However, of these two great sociologists only 
the latter would have a real impact on medieval history before World War ii. As 
suggested above, for European history at least Weber’s focus was on the au-
tonomy of the administrative and legal institutions from the political sphere of 
decision making, on processes of rationalization and bureaucratization and on 
the monopoly of legitimate force to effectively exercise domination in a regular 
manner within a given territory. To some degree a co-thinker of Weber while 
also departing from his viewpoints on many matters, the Prussian Otto Hintze 
was one of the first historians to analyze state formation as a process which had 
57 See Post, “Law and Politics in the Middle Ages”.
58 Pirenne, “The Formation and Constitution of the Burgundian State”.
59 Powicke, “Reflections on the Medieval State”.
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to be systematically tackled with clear conceptual tools. In his “constitutional 
and administrative history” (or to cite the better German term ‘Verfassungs- 
und Verwaltungsgeschichte’), he focused on the relations between specific 
types of states (he considered these historical forms to be “real types” based on 
concrete historical observation as opposed to Weber’s “ideal types”) with spe-
cific forces in society. He for instance distinguished between “sovereign states” 
developing from more centralized forms of feudalism and “commercial states” 
supported by bourgeois capitalism.60
The points of view of both Weber and Hintze, however, were soon strongly 
criticized by another influential medieval historian, the Nazi-party member 
Otto Brunner. Brunner opposed analyzing medieval lordship in such modern 
terms influenced by liberal constitutionalism and also criticized the Hegelian 
opposition between state and society that Weber and Hintze had maintained. 
For Brunner medieval notions of lordship as well as community had to be ana-
lyzed in their own terms, focusing on the legal expressions used at the time. In 
the tradition of Otto von Gierke’s Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht which posited 
that collective associations were at the basis of medieval society, Brunner 
stressed the interaction between the notion of Herrschaft, based on the per-
sonal ties between rulers and subjects and other Persönenverbande on the one 
hand, and the Genossenschaft principle on the other.61 The concept of legiti-
mate rule or Herrschaft and hence the ideological representations of state 
power and their interactions with theology were first systematically studied by 
two other German far right historians: Percy Schramm and Ernst Kantorowicz. 
Schramm studied the symbols of the medieval state, thus focusing on the 
Hegelian idea of the state rather than on its material support. Kantorowicz ar-
gued that the fourteenth-century state assumed some of the sacred power of 
the Church.62
During the 1940s and 1950s, the term state was still rarely used by medieval 
historians, but during the 1960s this began to change for good with some con-
ceptual discussions and with notable works such as the one by the Spanish 
early modern historian José Antonio Maravall. Maravall studied the later medi-
eval origins of an early modern state in elaborate detail from the point of view 
of developing ‘modern’ mentalities in Spain and the cultural control of the 
absolutist monarchs on the nobility.63 Of more lasting importance, however, 
were the contributions by the American medievalists Joseph Strayer and 
60 Hintze, Staat und Verfassung.
61 Brunner, Land und Herrschaft; von Gierke, Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht.
62 Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies; Schramm, Herrschaftszeichnen und Staatssymbolik.
63 Maravall, Estado moderno y mentalidad social.
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Gaines Post. For the aforementioned Strayer, the comparative analysis of gov-
ernment institutions should be the key method used to discover a growth of 
state power between the twelfth and the seventeenth centuries. Strayer’s focus 
was legal, administrative and financial, and used an explicit top-down perspec-
tive. In Strayer’s view the early modern state had developed from medieval em-
bryonic state structures originating in the twelfth century into more efficient 
government institutions with appointed and permanent office-holders replac-
ing the prevailing feudal and hereditary fragmentation of power amongst the 
hands of noble lineages. A second crucial development was the creation and 
strengthening of royal courts of law. As these institutional developments also 
permitted better control of revenues, a third crucial factor in state formations 
was the centralization of taxation, an element which Charles Tilly picked up 
on somewhat later. The logical conclusion for historians was to see Philip the 
Fair’s reign in France around the turn of the fourteenth century as a breaking 
point. The prince, supported by his centralizing legists, had already been con-
sidered as the archetype of the medieval state-builder before Strayer’s work. 
According to Strayer, in the later Middle Ages, however, crisis and war would 
temporarily suspend this process of state-building through institutional cen-
tralization.64 In the meantime, Strayer’s close colleague Gaines Post held on to 
a legal conception of a state, defining it in terms of public law and medieval 
‘political theory’, or in other words in terms of the legal, theological and moral 
principles of governance upheld by contemporary authors.65 In this sense his 
approach was complementary to Strayer’s but also remained rooted in the tra-
ditions of German historiography. And in fact, this research tradition of look-
ing for ‘ideas of the state’ in learned theological and legal treatises and dealing 
with the reception of Roman Law that had started in the nineteenth century 
still continues today.66 The influence notably of the legal historical tradition 
and the work of Hintze and Brunner in Germany and that of Strayer and 
Guenée in the US and France is still present in more traditional empirical stud-
ies dealing with some aspects of state formation.
The next impetus in the debate came indeed from France, and notably from 
the work of Bernard Guenée, who saw in later medieval state formation a dual-
ity and a dialogue between the person of the ruler and the communities of the 
realm represented by the estates.67 The combined influence of the older legal-
historical tradition and Strayer and Guenée’s emphasis on the role of state 
64 Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State; idem, The Reign of Philip the Fair.
65 Post, Studies in Medieval Legal Thought.
66 See e.g. Canning, “Ideas of the State”.
67 Guenée, L’Occident aux xivè et xvè siècles.
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elites led to a renewed focus on the role of the legists and other officers of the 
state. That role could only be studied systematically by making use of proso-
pography, the collective biography of the elites which had also been applied, 
for instance, in Roman history, and this is still a prominent way of tackling the 
question of state formation, also of non-Western societies. The concept of po-
litical society which Guenée introduced led to an emphasis on representative 
institutions and their delegates as both counterweights and collaborators of 
the state building process, again through a combination of institutional and 
prosopographical approaches. This school of thought was continued by schol-
ars such as Blockmans, Genet and Bulst and gave rise to a fruitful series of stud-
ies during the 1980s and 1990s.68
However, it was the influence of the new wave of historical sociology that, 
independently from the medievalist traditions, with a clear focus on modern 
history and starting with Barrington Moore and Theda Skocpol in the 1950s, 
would become decisive for these new trends in medieval history.69 The key 
figure in this respect was the aforementioned Charles Tilly. Tilly saw state-
building first of all as a competitive struggle, both between polities and within 
their territory, in which some contenders obtained victory and other ones lost. 
Tilly’s influence was very important but it cannot be said that Tilly’s first major 
contribution to the debate stopped more traditional Western medievalists 
from continuing to use less theoretically informed categories of state and 
state-building. In his first major contributions to the debate in 1975, Tilly ar-
gued that the modern state essentially developed within a dialectical interplay 
with ‘war’ and ‘taxes’ as the two core elements. Charles Tilly had come to this 
simple but brilliant and still very appealing hypothesis by building upon an 
impressive wave of historical-sociological work during the first decades after 
World War ii. At least some of this work, mostly appearing in the format of 
grand narratives, deserves to be introduced here before explaining how Tilly 
further developed his paradigm.
Thinkers like Moore, Skocpol and Tilly himself wrote very grand narratives, 
on states and revolution, and they combined Marx and Weber in very appealing 
ways according to the dominant structuralist and large-scale comparative para-
digms of the day. But another classic historiographical debate was taking place 
at the same time: the one on ‘the transition from feudalism to capitalism’ which 
was rather an internal-Marxist discussion but also brought in some Smithian 
68 Bulst and Genet, La ville, la bourgeoisie et la genèse de l’état moderne; Blockmans and Gen-
et, The Origins of the Modern State.
69 Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship; Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions.
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elements.70 Perry Anderson is another authority in the field who took up a spe-
cifically Marxist position in the state formation discussion by writing two very 
readable and eclectic books. In these he tried to link the transition from one 
‘mode of production’ (or according to him rather a genuinely existing ‘social 
formation’) into another with the specific ‘superstructural’ forms of domination 
and authority.71 Finally, as a later offshoot of this branch of grand narratives in 
historical sociology, there was Michael Mann’s ‘Sources of Social Power’. This 
new Weberian approach to multicausality in historical developments, howev-
er, seems to have come too late to still be influential, as by the late eighties 
poststructuralism and postcolonial theories were rapidly gaining ground. Al-
though like Anderson’s work, this approach originally departed from Engels’ 
famous phrase on the “relative autonomy of the state”, Mann’s model never 
seemed to inspire the more empirically oriented historians in the strict sense 
in the same way as Tilly’s one, which was institutionally propagated by Block-
mans and Genet. In general, however, both the more classical Marxist ap-
proaches and Mann’s work start from the extra-economic appropriation of 
surplus, whereas the more Weberian-inspired historical sociologists were also 
very preoccupied with the question of legitimate forms of domination.
Another notable influence on Tilly and his generation was the work of yet 
another student of Max Weber: the sociologist Norbert Elias. His Civilizing 
Process, written in 1939 but only receiving real attention from the 1960s on-
wards, considered the state formation process in terms of growing networks 
of interdependency.72 Elias’ work put networks of clientage and patronage, 
and notably those in which the nobility and other state elites were involved, 
strongly on the agenda, so that historians working under his influence again 
mainly made use of the prosopographical method. Questions like the relations 
between local and central elites, and the role of factions and party struggle 
within state formation were often studied, making implicit or explicit use of 
Elias’ insights.73
But Elias’ impact on the discussion was rather short-lived and it was Tilly’s 
paradigm that would remain exerting the strongest influence. In his most ma-
ture definition of 1990, Charles Tilly defined states as “coercion-wielding orga-
nizations that are distinct from households and kinship groups and exercise 
clear priority in some respects over all other organizations within substantial 
territories”. This definition includes “city states, empires and many other forms 
70 Sweezy, The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism.
71 Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State.
72 Elias, The Civilizing Process.
73 Blockmans, “Patronage, Brokerage and Corruption”.
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of government, but excludes tribes, lineages, firms and churches”. Tilly made 
further distinctions between “national states” as “states governing multiple 
contiguous regions and their cities by means of centralized, differentiated and 
autonomous structures” and “nation states” as states “whose people share a 
strong linguistic, religious and symbolic identity”.74 Thus, Tilly’s ‘national state’ 
is an ideal type close to Weber’s bureaucratic form of legitimacy.
The influences of Strayer and Hintze were also present in the above- 
mentioned multi-volume series of books directed by Genet and Blockmans.75 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, a series of conferences was organized on the topic, 
first in France and later on a European level. The focus here was on the ‘genèse 
de l’État moderne’, during which various specialists empirically and theoreti-
cally discussed aspects of state building. These included the role of burghers, 
aristocrats and state officials, usually informed by the prosopographical meth-
od which became ever more popular as an innovative way to study institutions 
from the social point of view. These aspects furthermore also included the im-
portance of finance and taxation, the influence of culture and ideology and the 
relationship between ‘Church and State’.76 We can summarize the fundamen-
tal grand narrative presented by the two medievalists as follows. Between c. 
1280 and c. 1360 the development of ‘modern states’ in Europe was determined 
by the interplay of the two main Tillyan factors of ‘War’ and ‘Taxation’. In other 
words: states developed in their ‘modern’ form within a dialectics between 
centralized surplus extraction and state building through military expenses. 
Taxes were needed to build armies and armies were needed to defend the state 
from both external and internal threats, namely foreign predators and revolts. 
This process developed an internal logic which further stimulated the devel-
opment of centralized judicial, fiscal-financial, administrative and military 
institutions, institutions which over time developed their own ‘relative auton-
omy’ and gave birth to a professional class of state servants with ‘bureaucratic’ 
characteristics. The bureaucrats then diffused a proper form of ‘state ideology’ 
that served their own interests as well as those of the state over ‘localist’, ‘patri-
monial’ or ‘feudal’ interests. The modern state thus succeeded in exercising 
ever more control on its subjects and territory and in mobilizing ever more 
men and means in its efforts to further centralize, and this became a self- 
perpetuating process, although it was often also kept in check by parliamen-
tary institutions, urban revolts or attempts by aristocrats and state officials to 
re-appropriate elements of public power for themselves. Thus, in this narrative 
74 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, pp. 1–2 (see also fn. 5).
75 Genet, “L’État moderne: un modèle opératoire”.
76 Blockmans and Genet, The Origins of the Modern State.
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the state, its institutions and its officer class are to some degree ‘superposed’ 
and to some degree ‘integrated’ in local societies or communities, in the inter-
play between centrifugal and centripetal social and political forces. The spe-
cific institutional shape which this process took resulted in what is now ever 
more termed a ‘path dependency’, a structural inertia of development able to 
determine the forms and functions of state formation and the adjoining fields 
of tension for centuries to come. Genet also integrated Tilly’s model into a 
broader Marxist analysis by articulating the ‘modern state’ with the feudal 
mode of production. As a result of this, ‘state feudalism’ led to an ever-greater 
share of surplus product being extra-economically appropriated, not in the 
form of classic feudal rent but as centralized taxes, to be redistributed again 
among the state elites.77
Like any other historical discussion on ‘modernity’—the same thing nota-
bly goes for ‘capitalism’—the state formation debate in studies on the medi-
eval and early modern West seems to be trapped within inevitable sets of di-
chotomies. Apart from ‘pre-modern’ and ‘modern’ itself, the discussion on the 
‘early modern’ or ‘modern state’ includes classical bipolar oppositions such as: 
‘centripetal’ versus ‘centrifugal’ forces, ‘bureaucracy’ versus ‘patrimonialism’ or 
‘feudalism’ (or, with an East-West opposition added to it, ‘sultanism’), ‘state’ 
versus ‘cities’ or ‘local communities’, ‘conflict’ versus ‘harmony’, ‘community’ or 
‘integration’, ‘the elite’ or ‘ruling class’ versus ‘the people’ etc. One can perhaps 
also add to this analytical canon of bipolar oppositions Ibn Khaldun’s afore-
mentioned tension between the dynastic and urban elements on the one hand 
and the nomadic and pastoral ones on the other. There now seems to be a 
quasi-general consensus among scholars studying state formation on the rele-
vance of all of these oppositions.
Moreover, since the 1990s, it seems that Charles Tilly has successfully man-
aged to add to the mix a new fundamental scheme of interpretation which is 
also constructed in a bipolar manner, namely his analytical distinction be-
tween ‘capital’ and ‘coercion’ within paths of development. In his last work on 
state formation, published in 1990, apart from a “coercion-intensive” path of 
state formation, Tilly also distinguished a more “capital-intensive” possibility. 
Basically, ‘coercion’ means ‘the state’ while ‘capital’ means ‘the city’. Tilly de-
fines capital very broadly as “any tangible mobile resources, and enforceable 
claims on such resources”.78 According to Tilly’s further explanation, in a vol-
ume published in 1994, “cities shape the destinies of states chiefly by serving as 
77 Genet,“Féodalisme et naissance de l’état moderne”.
78 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, p. 17.
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containers and distributing points of capital”.79 In the same volume Blockmans 
nuances this by stressing the importance of “bottom-up movements” contrib-
uting to the outcome of power struggles, at least in areas of “high urban den-
sity” although his main emphasis also remains a fiscal and commercial one.80 
More generally, in his brief account of the Burgundian state, the  aforementioned 
historical sociologist Michael Mann also has the tendency to reduce cities to 
their economic role and does not really consider them as socio-political com-
munities. He also fails to take into account other types of communities such as 
villages and corporate groups. Moreover, the role of the state elites is almost 
never discussed in terms of the urban background which many of them shared, 
even if only in education or culture. They are mostly considered either as doc-
ile servants of the state or as intermediaries in negotiating for it with the local 
communities. Thus, in the mainstream narratives on state formation, notwith-
standing the work of Blockmans, Blickle and others, the city still has no real 
‘agency’ except as a source of capital and perhaps as home to some elites who 
will join the state apparatus. Even in the Italian ‘city-states’, proper state forma-
tion is only recognized as soon as a city tightened its grip on the contado, the 
surrounding countryside which it exploited, and thus stopped being a com-
mune and instead became a territorial principality, a signoria.81
But can the city really be merely considered as a source of ‘capital’ as it is in 
Tilly’s model (note that he uses the term very broadly in the sense of material 
resources and not in a Marxist way). Tilly’s logic of state formation fundamen-
tally considers flow from the bottom to the top of material resources (by way of 
taxing the subjects) and men (soldiers). Of course, how could it be denied that 
these surplus flows were necessary for the building of any kind of state struc-
ture? And this then becomes the grid of analysis which Tilly uses to distinguish 
between forms of state formation which are ‘coercion intensive’ (e.g. Tsarist 
Russia) and ‘capital intensive’ (e.g. the Netherlands). Although Blockmans and 
Genet had also always placed much weight on the factors of ‘negotiation’ with 
local and regional political communities and the ‘political society’ of the elites, 
in the model they shared with Tilly, the autonomous agency of these local com-
munities and the proper interests of these emerging state elites somewhat dis-
appear. As a result, another line of thought in sociology seems to have been 
slightly obscured during the last decades of the hegemony of Tilly, Genet and 
Blockmans (although the latter two certainly never entirely lost sight of it). This 
line goes from Otto von Gierke’s ‘Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht’ to Walter 
79 Tilly and Blockmans, Cities and the Rise of States in Europe, p. 8.
80 Tilly and Blockmans, Cities and the Rise of States in Europe, p. 225.
81 Chittolini, La formazione dello Stato regionale.
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 Ullmann’s ‘ascending theory of power’ and Peter Blickle’s ‘Kommunalismus’.82 
Leaving aside all the nuances in theory and formulation, one might say that 
this is a tradition which emphasizes the idea of a state formation ‘from below’ 
more than the rather top-down model of the centralizing and coercive state 
hungry for war and taxes and the full administrative control over its inhabit-
ants. Again, it must be said that Genet and certainly Blockmans also acknowl-
edged this bottom-up tradition, given that one of the volumes of ‘The Origins 
of the Modern State’ was edited by Peter Blickle. Moreover, in the Belgian school 
of medievalists there was also certainly a tradition, starting with Henri Pi-
renne, of considering state formation to emerge from the tension between ‘the 
state’ and ‘the city’, especially during the ‘Burgundian’ fifteenth century. Never-
theless, it seems that this tradition of state formation ‘from below’ continues to 
represent a largely neglected, and at the same time highly promising, 
paradigm.
Current work in the field offers a pluralism in theoretical approaches that is 
not easily summarized here. Recently, Lecuppre-Desjardin even returned to a 
Brunnerian point of view of a composite principality based on local customary 
and political traditions and on personal relations, warning about an all too 
easy use of the term ‘state’ in the Burgundian context.83 For the aforemen-
tioned John Watts the structures of government and the shared patterns of 
political life that were already in place were reinforced during the fourteenth 
and fifteenth century exactly because of war and crisis. Watts emphasizes not 
only that the state saw its power and authority rising but also that we must 
take into account the role played by smaller political structures such as cities 
and lordships, other institutions like the Church or guilds, networks of patron-
age and vassalage, as well as ideological discourse. At the same time, he also 
suggests that developments in taxation, law and justice are still central to 
state-building.84
Thus, for over a century now the issue of the state and its development has 
been, and continues to be, a prominent one for both empirically oriented his-
torians and sociological model building within scholarship of the later medi-
eval and early modern state in Europe. As will be detailed below, however, 
these occasionally fierce debates on the state’s uses and conceptualizations do 
not really have any similarly impactful counterparts in the study of fifteenth-
century Islamic West-Asia.
82 Ullmann, Medieval Political Thought; Blickle, Kommunalismus.
83 Lecuppre-Desjardin, Le royaume inachevé.
84 Watts, The Making of Polities.
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3 Studying State Formation in Fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia
Empirical studies engaging with questions of ‘the state’ in late medieval, and 
especially fifteenth-century, Islamic West-Asia are as unwieldy and diverse as is 
true for late medieval Europe. Research on the region has long been dominated 
by dynastic historiography, and this continues to be the case. As such, all types 
of empirical studies in the field have always situated themselves one way or 
another within the statist frameworks of Ottoman and Timurid family rule, of 
Turkmen nomadic leaderships, and of the Sultanate of Cairo and its central 
power elites of mamlūk origins. As with the above survey of work on Europe, 
therefore, for the study of West-Asia it would be also impossible to do more 
than take stock of dominant historiographical trends as these have defined 
these distinct dynastic traditions.
These trends, however, do not just all share a more or less explicitly dynastic 
understanding of social and cultural realities, including of political organiza-
tion, dividing the field into three separate research traditions of Mamlukolo-
gists, (early) Ottomanists and specialists of Turkmen and Timurid history. As 
will be further explained below, many, if not most, of these historians of late 
medieval Islamic West-Asia also share a lack of any explicit concern with more 
theoretical reflections on that political organization, meaning that assump-
tions about its statist appearances tend to be taken for granted rather than ex-
plained. With a handful of notable exceptions, defining the concept and heu-
ristic meanings of state formation was never really a priority within mainstream 
historiography of late medieval Islamic West-Asia. It is therefore not straight-
forward to describe those dominant historiographical trends, many of which 
we have to reconstruct from implicit assumptions rather than from explicit 
choices and arguments. Nevertheless, as mentioned, the (dynastic) state has 
been significant in the historiography of late medieval Islamic West-Asia, 
meaning that it is certainly useful to provide a general reconstruction of how 
the state actually mattered, if only to uncover how also here Marxist and, espe-
cially, Weberian readings of resource accumulation, war-making and state-
making have left their traces. Before engaging with particular contributions 
and ideas in each of the three dynastic research traditions, we will therefore 
first provide a general outline of the wider frameworks that informed all three 
traditions and that appear to have coalesced around Weber’s concepts of ei-
ther traditional or, especially, legal authority.
3.1 The Dominance of Legalistic Readings and the Sociological Turns of 
Lapidus, Hodgson and Chamberlain
As noted earlier in this chapter, the history of state studies in general has been 
marred by an analytical dichotomy between legalistic and sociological 
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approaches. At least, this somewhat reductive legalistic versus sociological 
framing seems very useful to organize and understand how the state has been 
considered in the different dynastic historiographies of West-Asia. In fact, with-
in these historiographies there is an interesting prevalence of the former, legal-
istic, frame. This is largely due to the fact that within these historiographical 
traditions there has always been a strong presence of Islamicists and modern 
specialists of Islam. These scholars have always been primarily interested in the 
formation of Islam as a normative cultural, social and political practice and have 
always tended to see the history of Sunni Islam’s legal system as one of the crucial 
vectors of this formative process. This Islamicist focus means that for a long 
time, understandings of political organization in Islamic West-Asia have been 
considered first and foremost from a legal perspective of formal procedures, 
structures and discourses that were somehow related to the implementation of 
God’s Law (shariʿa). Contemporary writings and related sources in Arabic and 
Persian certainly lend themselves easily to these legalistic interpretations. This 
is not just because of the legal training and employment shared by most of their 
authors, but also because of the prescriptive, normative and legitimating agen-
das that these texts all served. At the same time this legalistic frame was also in-
formed by particular modern narratives of Asian otherness and of an Islamic 
state formation process that was considered fundamentally different from the 
secular and liberal destiny of the West. The notion of the absolutist rule of divine 
law and of legal conservatism offered a highly functional framework which 
many modern scholars have used to explain the post-Abbasid Islamic world’s 
absorption of Inner Asian nomadic conquerors and the maladroit condomini-
um between violence-wielding Turko-Mongol ‘outsiders’ and that world’s so-
phisticated urban elites, especially its religious scholars and judges as well as the 
caliphs of Baghdad and, eventually, Cairo.85
In the early 1990s the Ottomanist Rifa’at ʿAli Abou-El-Haj heavily criticized 
this traditional reading of the state which had also for a long time permeat-
ed early modern Ottoman studies. In fact, in a programmatic publication on 
the study of Ottoman state formation he usefully summarized the basic— 
a-historical and absolutist—assumptions of this legalistic trend in scholarship. 
On the one hand, Abou-El-Haj lamented the fact that “in twentieth century 
scholarly writing on Ottoman affairs, the concept, the institution, and the na-
ture of the state have been treated as if, regardless of the passage of time, the 
state had remained essentially the same”. On the other hand, he claims that 
85 Representative and, at the same time, constitutive examples of this particular legalistic 
trend are Tyan, Institutions du droit public musulman; Schimmel, “Kalif und Kadi im spät-
mittelalterlichen Ägypten”; Lambton, State and Government in medieval Islam.
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modern West-Asian scholarship is predisposed “to regard the modern nation-
state with its meritocratic bureaucracy as a paradigm”, so that “modern socio-
logically evolved standards as merit, public service, equity, and rationalized 
practices” tend to be used to “measure the early modern Ottoman state”. For 
Abou-El-Haj this perspective derives from “the misapprehension that prior 
to the seventeenth century the Ottoman state was a centralized, efficient, 
and rational public entity, unique in the period during which it flourished”.86  
In Abou-El-Haj’s reading these are highly problematic assumptions of pre- 
seventeenth century Ottoman meritocratic maximalism and uniqueness. In 
fact, these assumptions have for a long time been constituent partners of the 
legalistic trend in general. In this dominant reading the idea, or the ideal, of 
the state as a continuous and autonomous constitutionalist bureaucracy actu-
ally served as an interpretative norm against which historians were supposed 
to weigh the course of state formation in post-Abbasid West-Asian history writ 
large, as if the whole was meant to culminate in Ottoman absolutism.
The field of Islamic West-Asian political history continues to be easily lured 
by the clear-cut categories and well-trodden narratives of legalistic readings. 
Starting in the middle of the twentieth century, however, there also emerged 
more sociologically inspired approaches to political organization and state for-
mation in later medieval Islamic West-Asia. For a long time, such develop-
ments mostly happened in the margins of the field and its legalistic readings, 
and it has to be acknowledged that the pioneering beginnings of this alterna-
tive, sociological approach arguably lie in assumptions of the growing irrele-
vance of traditional statist structures in the face of Turko-Mongol irruption. 
This overture therefore engaged with a search for alternative conceptualiza-
tions of power and its organization in response to a presumed ineptness or 
even failure of the continuing legalistic state and its bureaucratic apparatus of 
power. The basic ingredients that were proposed to solve this analytical irrele-
vance of the legalistic state were Weberian traditional authority and the mili-
tary household and family rule, patronage and mostly urban institutions for 
the local management and organization of resource flows. There are three pio-
neering contributions to this critical sociological turn in Islamic state forma-
tion studies that deserve to be expanded upon more explicitly. First and fore-
most, there are the writings of Ira Lapidus and Marshall Hodgson which are 
particular products of mid-twentieth century structuralism and systems the-
ory. They fused the dominant legalistic reading of the state in Islamic West-
Asian studies with a search for alternatives in highly creative and influential 
ways. Alongside these two authors we will also consider here the writings of 
86 Abou-El-Haj, Formation of the Modern State, pp. 8, 9, 10.
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Michael Chamberlain, as they represent an important translation of the ideas 
of Lapidus and Hodgson to late twentieth century post-structuralism and also 
as Chamberlain was arguably the first to truly think without the traditional 
legalistic paradigm.
Ira Lapidus, in his Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages, argued that the 
locus of power in the urban centers of late medieval Egypt and Syria no longer 
lay with the state. Indeed, here he still conceptualized the state in a legalistic 
fashion as the central bureaucratic apparatus that organized these centers’ 
protection and exploitation. Due to what Lapidus defined as “the privatization 
of power”, power instead lay with the capacities of the state’s agents to engage 
in mutually beneficial informal relations of patronage and service beyond trib-
utary and military needs. These agents were military commanders (“the Mam-
luks”) with their expansive urban households and religious scholars (“the Ula-
ma”), who were quasi-integrated in the state apparatus and simultaneously 
endowed with ambitious urban communal roles. Lapidus explained that he 
was “drawing on the work of Weber, Parsons, and other students of social pro-
cess” and following the systemic readings by these theorists he proposed that 
“the Political System” was not confined to the state, but joined “the Mamluk 
State and the Urban Notables” in the balancing act of “a governing condomin-
ium” which boiled down to “a shared control over the society”. More specifi-
cally, this meant that
while the Mamluks took up the massive economic and military responsi-
bilities, the notables lent their intimate grasp of local affairs to the service 
of the state and coordinated the government of society at more intricate 
levels. Their original social importance made them indispensable auxilia-
ries of the Mamluk state apparatus, and in turn their partial assimilation 
to the regime served to validate their local status and to assure their suc-
cess in communal roles.87
Marshall Hodgson (1922–1968) is best known for his magisterial, posthumously 
published three-volume The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World 
Civilisation. In this total history of Islamic societies and cultures Hodgson was 
certainly more explicitly concerned with processes of political transformation 
than his younger colleague Lapidus in Muslim Cities. At the same time, even 
though also indebted to the predominance of systems theory in post-World 
War ii times, Hodgson’s writings were less theoretically grounded than Lapi-
dus’ work. Nevertheless, Hodgson’s particular conceptualizations of time, 
87 Lapidus, Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages, quotes pp. viii, 116.
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space and phenomena pertaining to the longue durée of Islamic history were 
no less compelling or influential. This is also apparent from Lapidus’ later mag-
num opus of similar ambition A History of Islamic Societies (1988). Lapidus’ dis-
cussion in that book of “the Post-ʿAbbasid Concept of the State” concludes, in 
a very Hodgsonian ‘historicization’ and ‘nomadization’ of his above-mentioned 
understanding of the state and wider ‘political system’, that
between 950 and 1500, a region-wide pattern of governmental institu-
tions took shape. These institutions began with the late ʿAbbasid practice 
of the caliphate, the use of slave military forces and iqtaʿ forms of tax 
administration, and nomadic concepts of family and state authority. This 
new order first took shape in the eastern provinces of the former ʿAbbasid 
Empire under the aegis of the Buwayhids, the Ghaznavids, and the early 
Saljuqs.88
For Hodgson, as for Lapidus, the locus of power in what Hodgson termed ‘the 
Middle Periods’ (1000–1500 ce) had actually shifted towards specific social ac-
tors, in a double process defined as ‘militarization’ and ‘unitary contractual-
ism’. In this process military amirs and urban notables (aʿyan) primarily pur-
sued personal interests and responsibilities in mutual relationships that 
“amounted sometimes to a relation of personal patronage—a type of relation 
that played a major role in such a society”. In this egalitarian context, authority 
did not simply derive from any impersonal state apparatus, but was an achieve-
ment of personal relationships. These empowering bonds appeared in the for-
mat of contract-like arrangements that subscribed to a uniform communal 
framework of obligations and expectations, mainly though not exclusively in-
formed by divine law (Shariʿa). Alluding to Weber’s aforementioned defini-
tions of legitimate authority and its three ideal types as well as to Weber’s idea 
of the state as a monopolist of legitimate physical coercion, Hodgson formu-
lated this ‘medieval’ empowerment of society, as a Muslim community, as 
follows:
Whether an independent position of authority was legitimized by appeal 
to personal charisma or to explicit law or to custom, it was conceived as 
established by mutual agreement and as assuming mutual obligations 
between one individual and others. […] always it was a contract-type ar-
rangement which had to be renewed personally with each new holder of 
authority and was properly binding only on those who had personally 
88 Lapidus, Islamic Societies to the Nineteenth Century, pp. 262.
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accepted it. […] The religious community was […] almost—though not 
quite—liberated from dependence on an agrarian-based state; so that its 
communal law, built on its communal presuppositions, and not that of 
any territorial state, assumed the persisting primacy that accrues to what-
ever possesses exclusive legitimacy. It was not quite liberated: the ulti-
mate sanction of force remained critical, and was left in the hands of the 
state. But the role of the state was as far reduced, especially in the basic 
sphere of law, as it ever has been in citied high culture.89
For Hodgson this ‘communal’ empowerment was part and parcel of a historical 
process of state-society polarization that involved “the collapse of the caliphal 
state and its bureaucracy”. This led to the subsequent difficulty “to develop any 
really integrated states”, and the formation—especially in the wake of the 
Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century—of new “military constructions”. 
Despite moments of brilliance, time and again these constructions “failed to 
provide sufficient strength to self-perpetuating bureaucracies which would 
have assured a continuity of authority despite the personality of the amir, and 
often failed to go far beyond a purely tribal, essentially irresponsible notion of 
power, in which the whole land became the proper prey of the prowess of a 
vigorous tribe”.90
Hodgson was trying to come to terms here with the Middle Periods’ histori-
cal context of short-lived military state formations constructed around politi-
cal patterns informed by nomadism, Turko-Mongol ideas and ideals of power, 
and Inner Asian steppe life. For this context, Hodgson actually developed his 
own statist model parallel to Lapidus’ “governing condominium”, to under-
stand how these patterns also included a “nomad-urban symbiosis” which 
eventually, in early modern times, helped to overcome the structural problem 
of failing political integration and insufficient bureaucratic power. This be-
came the highly influential model of the ‘military patronage state’, in which 
“the steppe principles of nomad patronage of urban culture were generalized”, 
and which, for Hodgson, had a particular, historical effect on processes of state 
formation in late medieval and early modern Islamic West-Asia. In his reading 
of these patterns and processes, the state-society scales were again tipped in 
favor of the state, which thus gradually re-appeared as an absolutist legal struc-
ture and an institutional apparatus of centralizing power. Hodgson summa-
rized this model and its evolutionary process as follows:
89 Hodgson, The Venture of Islam. Volume 2, pp. 348, 349–350.
90 Hodgson, The Venture of Islam. Volume 2, pp. 398, 400, 404.
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
121Studying Rulers & States across 15th Century Western Eurasia
<UN>
The Mongol states did, nevertheless, introduce the notions characteriz-
ing the ‘military patronage state’, which was to have a great future; and in 
doing so they modified the context of the Muslim institutions. Already in 
central Eurasia itself, the nomad-urban symbiosis had been raised above 
the level of simple plundering exploitation. In the agrarian societies of 
Islamdom, under the impulse of the tremendous successes of the Mon-
gols and of the Turkic tribes that had shared their victories, the symbiosis 
was raised to a yet higher level. The Mongols from the first acted in a 
spirit of monumental achievement: they destroyed in the grand manner, 
they built in the grand manner too. All this had a relatively enduring in-
stitutional residue which we may pinpoint under three heads, recalling, 
however, that no one state is being described, but only features that fre-
quently did occur under the Mongols and among their heirs, and that 
show mutual relevance. First, a legitimation of independent dynastic 
law; second, the conception of the whole state as a single military force; 
third, the attempt to exploit all economic and high-cultural resources as 
appanages of the chief military families. However, most of these institu-
tional tendencies merely had their beginnings in Mongol times, which 
still displayed much continuity with the Earlier Middle Period; some 
were not developed fully till the sixteenth century, when the use of gun-
powder weapons had given the central states (and the patterns they em-
bodied) much more power.91
Hodgson’s model of the ‘military patronage state’92 conceived of the state as a 
rudimentary military apparatus of violence and exploitation that pursued le-
gitimate authority and local connectivity via its leading military families’ pa-
tronage of cultural elites and resources. It was applied as an interpretive tool in 
his detailed historical survey of the Middle Periods, where he built upon much 
extant historiographical scholarship to also engage with ‘medieval’ polities 
such as those of the fifteenth century. In the case of so-called Mamluk Cairo, 
Hodgson especially stressed the military element and the total exclusion of 
non-military society from an institutionalized type of absolutist power that he 
identified as oligarchic and as qualified by “chivalry” and “incessant intestine 
fights”.93 In the Timurid case, Hodgson preferred to highlight the factor of cul-
tural patronage, explaining that “in the field of the arts the Timurids illustrate 
91 Hodgson, The Venture of Islam. Volume 2, pp. 405–406.
92 See also Crossley, “Military Patronage and Hodgson’s Genealogy of State Centralization”, 
esp. pp. 103–108 (‘What was the Military Patronage State?’).
93 Hodgson, The Venture of Islam. Volume 2, pp. 417–419.
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the patronage state at its best”. This was despite—or rather thanks to—the fact 
that “the chronicle of the Timurid reigns is even fuller of fratricide and power 
lust and low intrigue than is most Muslim history in the Middle Periods”.94 As 
for the Ottomans, they appear in Hodgson’s writings as combining the best of 
these two worlds: absolutist military states marred by internecine warfare 
combined with local societies blessed by a flowering of, especially, Persianate 
culture. The fact that the Ottoman polity was “founded in ghazi traditions rath-
er than steppe traditions” meant according to Hodgson that it was organized 
more coherently around the Ottoman family, its ghazis or frontier warriors, 
and the many resources that the Muslim-Christian frontier had to offer.95 For 
Hodgson the mid-fifteenth-century conquest of Istanbul boosted this solid 
and integrated dynastic and military core to an imperial level, so that “from a 
frontier ghazi state, [it] became an absolutism assimilable to the military pa-
tronage type, and one of the cultural foci of Islamdom”.96 Eventually, in Hodg-
son’s reading, an absolutist centralizing state arose around the Ottoman court 
that integrated a wide diversity of social elites, practices and ideas into its sta-
bilized military structures. In Hodgson’s own words, this culminated in “an ab-
solutism in which the whole government—even the imâms of the mosques, as 
governmental appointees—were regarded as military (’askerî) even though 
not as ‘men of the sword’ (sayfî); and all that was valuable in society at large 
was regarded as in the dispensation of the royal family and its servants”.97
Michael Chamberlain is another historian of Islamic West-Asia who  deserves 
to be mentioned in this overview of the sociological turn in West-Asian studies, 
despite the fact that he did not engage with the fifteenth century. In fact, Cham-
berlain is one of the very few scholars who have engaged with the work of both 
Lapidus and Hodgson and who also thought about the concept of the state. 
This was done in his work on the organization of elite life in thirteenth- and 
fourteenth-century Damascus and in two later surveys of West-Asian power 
politics between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries.98 Chamberlain’s think-
ing about political organization followed that of his teacher Ira Lapidus in 
particular in being very consciously and critically informed by contemporary 
sociological theory. In Chamberlain’s case, however, this involved late twentieth- 
century post-structuralism rather than systems theory and functionalism.99 As 
94 Hodgson, The Venture of Islam. Volume 2, pp. 490–493 (quotes pp. 490, 493).
95 Hodgson, The Venture of Islam. Volume 2, p. 427.
96 Hodgson, The Venture of Islam. Volume 2, p. 559.
97 Hodgson, The Venture of Islam. Volume 2, pp. 562–563.
98 Chamberlain, Knowledge and Social Practice; Chamberlain, “Ayyūbid dynasty”; Chamber-
lain, “Military Patronage States”.
99 See on this Clifford, “Ubi Sumus?”.
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a result, Chamberlain arguably emerges as the most successful representative 
of this sociologically inspired trend in West-Asian historiography, since unlike 
Lapidus and Hodgson he was not seduced by the structuralist categories of 
the dominant legalistic tradition. Chamberlain actually managed to entirely 
break with that tradition’s evolutionary Hegelianism, freeing himself from the 
recurrent maximalist interpretations of the state in legalistic readings. He was 
able to think beyond the strict Orientalist categories of a state-(civil) society 
relationship that should be measured in bipolar terms of strength or weak-
ness, or of the state’s failure, or not, to integrate society.100 Basically, Cham-
berlain rethought the latter issue that had also haunted Lapidus and Hodgson, 
namely the relationship between the legalistic appearances of the state and 
the actual locus of power in ‘the Middle Periods’: military and other, especially 
urban strongmen and their kin groups or households. Whereas the two other 
scholars thought about the changing quality of that relationship in terms of 
“privatization” (Lapidus) or of “militarization” (Hodgson), Chamberlain radi-
cally questioned the validity of this entire relational construct. He actually 
moved away from the idea of society’s ‘subalternity’ and disruptive ‘medieval’ 
empowerment to that of the priority of social practice and the state as a fluid 
and messy by-product of that practice. This analytical reversal followed the 
ideas of Norbert Elias and, especially, Pierre Bourdieu, to favor social practice 
and power as a social phenomenon and moved against the idea of the state as 
a metahistorical bureaucratic actor. Chamberlain develops this approach most 
forcefully, and as a tacit correction to Lapidus, in Knowledge and Social Prac-
tice. Here, he is very explicit about his highly critical and minimalist thinking 
about the state as a historical concept, explaining that
The state in this period was not an impersonal entity, possessing special-
ized agencies, capable of formulating long-term strategies to pursue po-
litical goals. The politics of the city consisted of continuously renegoti-
ated relationships among the ruling household, the important amīrs and 
their households, and civilian elites with specialized knowledge or reli-
gious prestige. If we are to speak of the state at all, it is as an abstraction 
of the personal ties of alliance, dependence, and dominance among 
these three groups. Rather than look for the mechanisms by which the 
state, as the primary embodiment and agent of power, diffused power 
from the top down, we need to understand a more complex situation. 
Studies of the bureaucracy, of such entities as the sultanate and the ca-
liphate, of the legal and ‘public’ aspects of power, are undeniably useful 
100 See on the Orientalism of these state-society polarities, Sadowski, “New Orientalism”.
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in themselves. These, however, do not cover the entirety, or even perhaps 
the most important part, of relations among power, cultural practices, 
and the social strategies of groups. Such approaches have been useful in 
medieval Islamic history only with so much qualification that they lose 
the very precision they are intended to introduce.101
In Knowledge and Social Practice Chamberlain defined the pattern of power 
relationships that emerges from this analytical turn to urban practice as “a 
kind of maladroit patrimonialism”, and it was through this pattern of personal 
ties rather than through any state structure that “Ayyūbid and Mamlūk warrior 
households […] made political use of existing social, cultural and administra-
tive practices”.102 In two subsequent studies, Chamberlain further qualified this 
correction of Lapidus’ functionalist universe through the notion of “maladroit 
patrimonialism” by bringing in the Hodgsonian concept of “the military pa-
tronage state”. This happened as Chamberlain was expanding his historical 
 horizon beyond the narrow confines of thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Da-
mascus. In so doing he was summarily following in the footsteps that had 
already led his teacher Lapidus from the Syro-Egyptian focus of his Muslim Cit-
ies to the global one of his Islamic Civilizations and its critical engagements with 
Hodgson’s conceptualizations of “the Middle Periods”. Chamberlain’s own criti-
cal engagements focused especially on how competition, conflict and related 
social practices helped to better understand Turko-Saljuq and post-Saljuq 
West-Asia as a meaningfully connected political space. In making this argu-
ment, Chamberlain simultaneously expanded the horizon of the concept of a 
‘military patronage state’ beyond the spatial and temporal (and structuralist) 
confines of Hodgson’s Mongol and post-Mongol uses. In his contribution to the 
Cambridge History of Egypt, published in 1998, Chamberlain described how at 
the time of the late twelfth-century Ayyubids, Egypt also came to share “a num-
ber of characteristics with […] the post-Saljuk Muslim military patronage 
states”. This meant that “political power was concentrated in, and emanated 
from, the household (bayt)” and that “its political economy was marked by a 
relatively weak bureaucracy and ruling establishment, partial control of land 
revenue by horse warriors and religious leaders, indirect rule through religious 
and military magnates, and parcelized and derived sovereignties”.103 His chap-
ter “Military Patronage States and the Political Economy of the Frontier, 1000–
1250”, first published in 2005, subsequently engaged along similar, practical 
101 Chamberlain, Knowledge and Social Practice, pp. 60.
102 Chamberlain, Knowledge and Social Practice, pp. 60.
103 Chamberlain, “Ayyūbid dynasty”, pp. 238, 241.
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lines with these post-Saljuq military patronage states in Islamic West-Asia, and 
with their Saljuq predecessors. In fact, that chapter explained even more clearly 
Chamberlain’s explicitly non-legalistic understanding of Hodgson’s ‘military 
patronage state’, as he insisted on the fact “that we should not think of the 
Seljuks as a unitary state, but rather as a collection of powerful households 
kept in check by the head of the most powerful among them”. He furthermore 
also refined his own earlier minimalist understanding of the state as a so-called 
‘abstraction’ of particular social relationships, claiming that “the ruling house-
hold’s adoption of monarchical and legal arguments for legitimate authority 
was one way of fending off the claims of the other households within the rul-
ing family”.104 Chamberlain thus argued that rather than simply being margin-
alized or regularly broken by social practice’s key features of competition and 
struggle for power (as in a way Lapidus and Hodgson had suggested), the legal-
istic state was actually reproduced by those features. Like the aforementioned 
Charles Tilly, Chamberlain thus also believed that “war made the state and the 
state made war”. For Chamberlain at least, the state did so in highly minimalist 
ways, as an empowering set of ideas of legitimate political order and sover-
eignty that was part of the tools that were strategically deployed by powerful 
competing households. “The military patronage state”, Chamberlain con-
cludes, “thus permitted the ideal of the universal cosmopolitan empire to sur-
vive within a political-economic context that tended towards fragmentation”.105
It remains difficult to gauge the actual impact of these more sociologically 
inspired approaches of Lapidus and Hodgson, and more recently of Cham-
berlain, on the different dynastic historiographies of post-Temür West-Asia. 
A recent survey article of Syro-Egyptian social history identified the enormous 
impact of Lapidus’ Muslim Cities in redirecting the field towards the study of 
informal social networks, urban elites and social equilibrium. At the same 
time, this survey acknowledged that there has been a lack of critical engage-
ment with Lapidus’ systemic thinking. It furthermore questioned the value of 
Chamberlain’s contribution in this respect, claiming that “Chamberlain’s Da-
mascus is ‘no longer a society’, but only a space for elite struggles, and therefore 
an unsatisfactory model of social action”.106 Even though the latter assessment 
104 Chamberlain, “Military Patronage States”, p. 142.
105 Chamberlain, “Military Patronage States”, p. 152.
106 Rapoport, “New Directions”, p. 144; Rapoport took the ‘no longer a society’ quote from 
Clifford, but framed it in a far more one-dimensional reading than implied by Clifford, 
who here was mainly comparing Chamberlain’s to Lapidus’ notions of ‘society’. Clifford 
actually explained that for Chamberlain “Damascus, in effect, is no longer a society—the 
locus of social cooperation—merely a social space dedicated to unlimited ‘struggle for 
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is certainly too harsh, especially as far as the invigorating impact of Chamber-
lain on the study of Islamic knowledge practices and their practitioners is con-
cerned, it is undoubtedly true that scholars today have tended to  easily take for 
granted Lapidus’, and also Chamberlain’s, more general theoretical concerns, 
or even have forgotten them, whenever their more specific analytical tools 
were deployed in contemporary research. This observation of theoretical qui-
etism regarding the state is certainly also valid for many more understandings 
of fifteenth-century West-Asian state formation, even those that do not engage 
with Lapidus or Chamberlain at all. Mostly unwittingly, uncritical legalistic 
readings of the state have arguably remained the norm, not just in modern 
Syro-Egyptian historiography, but—as Abou-El-Haj suggested—also in work 
on the Ottoman dynasty, and to some extent even in the arguably more the-
oretically informed work on Timurid and Turkmen dispensations. As will be 
demonstrated below, in the latter dynastic contexts, and also in the Ottoman 
case, some basic organizational principles related to ideas about princely 
courts, military households and dynastic dispensations, and cultural patron-
age have certainly been around for a long time, even long before Hodgson 
modelled them as ‘military patronage states’.107 However, just as Hodgson’s 
own engagement with those ideas continued to be rooted in that legalistic 
framework, so did most of the engagements of any dynastic specialist with the 
state in fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia. In general, such engagements have 
therefore restricted their readings of the state to a theoretical quietism that 
favors merely descriptive accounts of diverse bureaucratic institutions, meri-
tocratic practices and legal norms or of their roles in governing groups, com-
munities and resources. They have prioritized detailed empirical reconstruc-
tions of the ranks and careers of dynasts, administrators and courtiers or of 
how centripetal phenomena expanded or contracted or were reproduced. In 
short, the dominant question has always remained how states successfully—
or unsuccessfully—maximized their relations with, and their autonomy from, 
West-Asia’s societies, without genuinely contemplating the validity and impli-
cations of this type of question.108
social power and status’. And yet, Chamberlain’s observation that elite social competition 
(fitnah) was responsive to mediation seems to recognize ultimately a limitation to the 
radical contingency of social practice and strategy” (Clifford, “Ubi Sumus?” p. 60).
107 See e.g. Barthold, Ulugh-beg; Aubin, Deux sayyids; Wittek, Fürstentum Mentesche; Köprülü, 
Origins of the Ottoman Empire.
108 Representative, and/or seminal, publications in this respect are, for the fifteenth-century 
Ottomans: Babinger, Mehmed der Eroberer; Inalcik, The Ottoman State; idem, The Ottoman 
Empire; Imber, The Ottoman Empire; İhsanoğlu, History of the Ottoman state; Murphey, 
Exploring Ottoman Sovereignty. For the Turkmen and Timurids: Busse, Untersuchungen 
zum islamische Kanzleiwesen; Savory, “Struggle for Supremacy”; Sümer, “Ḳara-Ḳoyunlu”; 
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In studying, or simply taking for granted, such specific issues and questions, 
many of these legalistic readings of state formation in fifteenth-century Syro-
Egyptian, Ottoman, Timurid and Turkmen contexts actually quietly adopt an 
interpretation that considers the process of the endless development of the 
state in rather structured and linear terms. Interestingly this is at odds with 
the insights which, as explained above, now appear as mainstream in both the 
long history of the theoretical study of the premodern state and the study of 
state formation in late medieval Western Europe. In their maximalist, even ab-
solutist, constitutionalism, these legalistic readings also often impose assump-
tions of what states do, or what they wish to do or should do, that go far beyond 
Tilly’s interlocking practices of exclusion, integration, reproduction and ap-
propriation. This divergence may well be a function of the West-Asian particu-
larity of these fifteenth-century contexts. At the same time, however, this may 
also be a result of the lasting impact of a particular generation of historical 
scholarship in Islamic West-Asian studies that once also made Europeanist 
readings of the state prioritize a dominant line of thinking that is identified as 
legalistic here. In any case, as seen above, when detailing the value of Cham-
berlain’s contribution, from a historical and historiographical perspective 
these interpretations and assumptions are not without their challenges. As 
Abou-El-Haj also lamented in the early 1990s about Ottoman studies, this is 
especially true when such approaches are adopted without much critical re-
flection. Nowadays any active stakeholder in fifteenth-century West-Asian 
scholarship obviously tends to readily acknowledge many of these more theo-
retical challenges and their rootedness in some resilient anachronism, or even 
in “‘the four sins’ of modernist (social) theory: reductionism […], functional-
ism […], essentialism […], and universalism […]”.109 Nevertheless, it is not easy 
to provide a constructive response, especially not when the exigencies of the 
legalistic framework continue to intervene. Making abstraction of these macro- 
historical challenges in the light of other, less arcane and more down-to-earth 
matters of scholarly interest appears therefore as an easy escape route for 
many engagements with fifteenth-century West-Asian history.
Minorsky, “Civil and Military Review”; idem, “The Aq-qoyunlu”; Roemer, “Tīmūr”; Mor-
gan, Medieval Persia, pp. 83–111. For the fifteenth-century Sultanate of Cairo see Björkman, 
Staatskanzlei; Ayalon, “Studies”; Popper, Egypt and Syria; Darrag, Barsbay; Holt, “Struc-
ture”; idem, The Age of the Crusades, pp. 178–202; idem, “Mamluk Institution”; Petry, Civil-
ian Elite; idem, Twilight of Majesty; idem, Protectors or Praetorians?; idem, Criminal Under-
world; Humphreys, “Fiscal Administration”; Martel-Thoumian, Les civils et l’administration; 
idem, Délinquance et ordre social; Igarashi, Land Tenure; Meloy, “Economic Intervention”; 
Meloy, Imperial Power and Maritime Trade; Loiseau, Les Mamelouks.
109 Joyce, “The Return of History”, p. 212; quoted in Green, Houses of history, p. 297.
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However, in each of the dynastic historiographies of fifteenth-century West-
Asia there certainly also are exceptions to this general tendency of combining 
legalistic readings of the state with a kind of theoretical quietism. It is worth 
mentioning a few of these more explicit engagements with the notion of state 
formation, if only to illustrate how the trans-dynastic sensitivities found in 
Lapidus, Hodgson and Chamberlain did not operate in conceptual voids. This 
also serves to show how their more theoretically informed ideas did not go 
entirely unnoticed, or how these did have at least some counterparts in dynas-
tically oriented scholarship.
3.2 Defining Early Ottoman ‘state formation’
For Ottoman fifteenth-century history, Hodgson’s aforementioned modelling 
was very much informed by foundational debates among (early) Ottomanists 
on charismatic origins in frontier warfare, fluid identities and loyalties, and 
how early Ottoman groups transformed into something more than simple 
warbands.110 In fact Hodgson’s understanding still aptly summarizes the domi-
nant paradigm of fifteenth-century Ottoman state formation. As explained be-
fore, this is the paradigm of the rise of a centralizing state around the Ottoman 
dynastic court, which integrated an ever-wider diversity of social elites, prac-
tices and ideas into its stabilizing military structures. In recent decades, one 
important factor has been interpreted as sparking this fifteenth-century dy-
namic of centralization and integration, namely the shifting of the balance 
between the centrifugal forces of marsher lords and old power elites and cen-
tripetal forces coalescing around the Ottoman household in favor of the latter, 
especially after the conquest of Constantinople by Mehmed ii.111 For Cemal 
Kafadar, this was part of a long process of Ottoman state formation, beginning 
in the early fourteenth century, and marked by the diversity of social forces 
and the fluid and mobile relationships that define any frontier, as well as by 
the local resilience “of sedentary administrative traditions in both the Perso- 
Islamic and the Byzantine modes”.112 On the basis of a critical reading of the 
ideological and narrative agendas of extant contemporary sources, Kafadar 
chose to understand this process as that of “a coalition of various forces, some 
of which were eventually driven to drop out of the enterprise or subdued or 
marginalized”. He concluded that this interaction of centripetal and  centrifugal 
110 For these debates, see especially Wittek, Rise of the Ottoman Empire; Köprülü, Origins of 
the Ottoman Empire; and their reconstructions in Kafadar, Between Two Worlds; Lowry, 
Nature of the early Ottoman state.
111 İnalcik, Ottoman Empire, pp. 13–14.
112 Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, p. 140.
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mobilities was determined by “the Ottoman success [to harness] that mobility 
to their own ends while shaping and taming it to conform to their stability-
seeking, centralizing vision”.113
One of the few Ottomanist scholars who have interpreted this more socially 
oriented understanding of Ottoman state formation through the lens of an ex-
plicitly sociological reading is Karen Barkey. Her work provides an ambitious 
endeavor to better understand ‘the longevity of empire’, the longue durée of 
Ottoman political continuities between the fourteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. For the Ottoman fifteenth century, Barkey explained that she actu-
ally built her novel interpretation mostly on the empirical work presented by 
Heath Lowry in his The Nature of the Early Ottoman State. In his analysis of 
Ottoman state building in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Lowry was 
working in a dialogue with many Ottomanists, including Kafadar. Above all, 
Lowry stressed the hybrid nature of the ‘Ottomans’ themselves, and the fact 
that Byzantine and other Christian elites had become active stakeholders in 
Ottoman centripetal forces.114 For Barkey, however, “Lowry’s framework lacks a 
sociological account of how a few men make a revolutionary change in their 
immediate social relations and transform them into relations of power and 
influence”.115 Focusing on these relationships and their transformation, Barkey 
explained that “state transformation then is the resolution of organizational 
and boundary problems realized in the intermediate zone by state actors and 
social actors embedded in networks of negotiations”.116 The state in this con-
text is explicitly defined by Barkey with Weber’s “monopoly of the legitimate 
use of physical force over a given territory”, to which however she added “Bour-
dieu’s conceptualization of the state, where he talks of ‘symbolic violence over 
a definite territory and the totality of its corresponding population’”.117 Bar-
key’s analysis is further informed by connecting “historical institutionalism 
with network analysis, because the mechanisms of institutional continuity, 
flexibility, and change are embedded in the meso-level network structures that 
link micro-level events and phenomena to macro-social and political 
outcomes”.118 With the assistance of these analytical tools, Barkey explained 
how Ottoman political success is one of flexible and adaptive “brokerage 
across structural holes”, which offered a means for the successful vertical inte-
gration of diverse networks into Ottoman leadership and at the same time the 
113 Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, p. 140.
114 Lowry, Nature of the early Ottoman state.
115 Barkey, Empire of Difference, p. 32.
116 Barkey, Empire of Difference, p. 17.
117 Barkey, Empire of Difference, p. 32.
118 Barkey, Empire of Difference, p. 17.
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horizontal segmentation of these networks so as to maintain Ottoman priority. 
As far as the Ottoman fifteenth century is concerned Barkey argued that this 
integration and segmentation took the shape of “‘institutional layering’, which 
involves attaching new elements onto an otherwise settled institutional 
frame”.119 More particularly, as a consequence of “the layering of Byzantine and 
new Ottoman organizations and practices”,120 Barkey explained her vision on 
fifteenth-century Ottoman state formation as follows:
The empire that was built after 1453 became a robust, flexible, and adap-
tive political entity where a patrimonial center, a strong army, and a de-
pendent and assimilated state elite interconnected with many diverse 
and multilingual populations ensconced in their ecological and territo-
rial niches. The Ottoman imperial order was to be found in the three 
components of empire—legitimacy, control over elites and resources, 
and the maintenance of diversity—each forged through the relations be-
tween state forces and social forces, center and periphery, state and re-
gional elites, and central officials and local populations.121
3.3 Defining Turkmen and Timurid ‘state making’
Timurid and Turkmen political history writing is marked by a similar Weberian 
modelling of co-constitutive relations between state actors and social actors. 
In fact, among the three dynastic research traditions surveyed here, Turkmen 
and Timurid historiography is arguably the field which has most explicitly en-
gaged with this paradigm and with the conceptualization of state formation 
more generally. Hodgson’s qualification of Timurid state formation as a histori-
cal process of state-society polarization offers a case in point. His ‘military pa-
tronage state’ model describes a successful and culturally efflorescent nomad-
urban symbiosis, albeit not a peaceful nor continuous one, operating within an 
immanent institutional framework of absolutist tendencies. This model is not 
just widespread in modern Timurid and Turkmen historiography but as sug-
gested above, it is simultaneously rooted in that historiography’s own centen-
nial lineage. It is moreover the object of empirically informed refinements and 
adjustments by a group of historians who like Hodgson all have some link with 
The University of Chicago and its intellectual legacies. The work and teaching of 
John Woods, professor of Middle Eastern history at The University of Chicago, 
119 Barkey, Empire of Difference, p. 71.
120 Barkey, Empire of Difference, p. 72.
121 Barkey, Empire of Difference, pp. 67–68.
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has been particularly seminal in this respect. In his widely acclaimed The 
Aqquyunlu: Clan, Confederation, Empire, Woods engaged empirically with 
Hodgson’s historical model of the erratic empowerment of an apparatus of 
centralizing power in a volatile context of Turko-Mongol rule and nomad- 
urban symbiosis.122 Importantly, Woods did this by situating his historical 
work in a carefully considered conceptualization of the “Aqquyunlu social and 
political structure”.123 Central to Woods’ understanding of the Aqquyunlu sys-
tem is “the political and institutional separation and accommodation” which 
marked the relationship “between the nomadic military elite (‘Turks’) and the 
urban elite of eastern Anatolia and Iran (‘Tajiks’)”.124 Woods argued that this 
mix of centrifugal and centripetal tendencies manifested itself especially “in 
the structure of both the central and the provincial administration” in the for-
mat of a division of labor and power, and of “interlocking interests of these two 
groups”.125 Identifying this division and interlocking explicitly with the symbi-
otic “a’yan-amir system as defined by Marshall Hodgson”, Woods also echoed 
Hodgson by suggesting that this “proved to be a remarkably effective mecha-
nism for maintaining order and preserving the fabric of society in the absence 
of a powerful central authority”.126 In fact, the latter problem of “absence” is 
equally central to Woods’ understanding of the Aqquyunlu system, as it also 
was for Hodgson more in general. Just like Hodgson, Woods explained this 
struggle for “central authority” as a political pattern that was informed by the 
elite’s nomadism, by Turko-Mongol ideas and ideals of corporative power, and 
by the latter’s creative clashes with the absolutist claims of local administra-
tive traditions and individual military successes.127 The historical process 
which emerged from this pattern was one of regular dynastic turmoil and, as 
122 Woods, The Aqquyunlu, p. 10: “the political, economic, and social evolution of the 
Aqquyunlu confederation from a band of nomadic “cossack” freebooters into a relatively 
centralized, territorial principality based on a regularized but essentially predatory rela-
tionship with agriculture and commerce. … transform the polity into a traditional Irano-
Islamic agrarian empire by gaining physical control of the land and its inhabitants, as well 
as the centers of commercial activity, by reforming administrative practice to extract 
maximum economic advantage, by developing a truly symbiotic relationship with the 
sedentary populations under their rule, and by substituting universalizing Islamic legiti-
mizing principles and institutions for particularistic nomadic ideals, kinship ties, and 
personal loyalties”.
123 Woods, The Aqquyunlu, pp. 10–23.
124 Woods, The Aqquyunlu, p. 16.
125 Woods, The Aqquyunlu, p. 19.
126 Woods, The Aqquyunlu, p. 19.
127 Woods, The Aqquyunlu, pp. 19–23.
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suggested, erratic empowerment of an apparatus of centralizing power. More 
precisely, Woods concluded, in general, historicizing terms, that
[i]t is precisely the interplay of these two tendencies among the 
Aqquyunlu—the centrifugalism or segmentation associated with clan 
corporateness together with nomadic traditions and the centralizing 
forces characteristic of charismatic, personal, or bureaucratic concepts 
of sovereignty—that constitutes one of the major dynamics in both Prin-
cipality and Empire Periods. Though such systems have been declared 
explosive and ultimately unworkable, it was precisely this volatility—
the continual elimination of entire houses from political contention 
and the consequent renewal of the sovereign mandate in successive 
 dispensations—that helped the system continue to function among the 
Aqquyunlu for almost a century. Viewed in terms of the preceding dis-
cussion, Aqquyunlu dynastic history must therefore be resolved into a 
succession of three dispensations to the houses of Tūr ʿAli, Qara ʿUsman, 
and Uzun Ḥasan.128
These particular centrifugal and centripetal tendencies are explained here as 
not just being an integral part of a state-society dynamic, but simultaneously 
as being internal to Turko-Mongol dispensations such as that of the Aqquyun-
lu. These tendencies re-appear as central building blocks for the highly inspir-
ing analyses that Beatrice Manz has pursued for Timurid political history. In 
her Rise and Rule of Tamerlane she focused almost entirely on this internal dy-
namic to explain Temür’s exceptional political and territorial successes, from 
his rise to power within the Turko-Mongol Chaghatay tribal formation to his 
death as the undisputed leader of “a new imperial dispensation”. For Manz, the 
secret to Temür’s success lay not just in his charismatic personality and his suc-
cessful “rule through people rather than institutions”.129 Above all, his achieve-
ment lay in “the careful division and limitation of power”.130 Manz explained 
how Temür managed to de-center Chaghatay nomadic politics, and to defuse 
the devastating impact of—as Woods had explained—“the centrifugalism or 
segmentation associated with clan corporateness together with nomadic tra-
ditions”, by managing to create an entirely new politico-military elite around 
his person and around the “charismatic, personal, and bureaucratic concepts 
of his sovereignty”. This new elite was composed mainly of his “own family and 
128 Woods, The Aqquyunlu, pp. 22–23.
129 Manz, Rise and Rule of Tamerlane, p. 107.
130 Manz, Rise and Rule of Tamerlane, p. 126.
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his personal followers” with their armies, thus subordinating the existing 
political practices, institutions and elites in and beyond the Ulus Chaghatay 
under an entirely new, trans-regional political order.131 This new political order 
was implemented, fed, and kept under Temür’s control, Manz explained, “by 
undertaking a war of conquest which kept him and his followers out of the 
Ulus Chaghatay almost constantly for the rest of his life”.132
Following this remarkable analysis of how war-making and state-making 
went hand in hand in very particular ways in Temür’s personal politics, Manz 
studied the reign of Temür’s son and successor Shah Rukh from a similar per-
spective in her Power, Politics and Religion in Timurid Iran. In this study, how-
ever, Manz expanded her focus to again more explicitly include the state- 
society relationship that also interested Woods, and Hodgson before him. At 
the same time Manz engaged critically with some of the assumptions that had 
informed this bipolar model. Manz mainly argued that the relative absence of 
war-making during a significant part of Shah Rukh’s reign paradoxically weak-
ened central authority, as this allowed for more autonomous political actors 
and centrifugal tendencies to reemerge with more power. In this context, how-
ever, she explained that any analysis of Timurid politics and state formation 
should acknowledge the fact that “the towns from which the Timurids ruled 
their dominions were like an archipelago within a sea of semi-independent 
regions, over which control was a matter of luck, alliance and an occasional 
punitive expedition”.133 In this diverse and multipolar, rather than uniformly 
bipolar, socio-political context, she claimed that “the division between mili-
tary and civil responsibility and between city and state may have been less 
marked than [Hodgson’s] aʿyān-amīr dichotomy suggests”.134 More specifically, 
power was not the exclusive domain of any one social group or ruler, but was 
“an individual achievement”. Manz concluded that power “was what one per-
son could make out of a variety of affiliations which sometimes went across 
the boundaries between military and civil affairs and between the religious 
and the governmental spheres”.135
131 Manz, Rise and Rule of Tamerlane, p. 88.
132 Manz, Rise and Rule of Tamerlane, p. 89.
133 Manz, Power, Politics and Religion, p. 2.
134 Manz, Power, Politics and Religion, pp. 117–118.
135 Manz, Power, Politics and Religion, p. 277. For this diffuse and socially constructed under-
standing of power, Manz explicitly follows Mottahedeh’s ideas about how different types 
of ‘loyalties’ (especially, for Mottahedeh, ‘acquired loyalties’ and ‘loyalties of category’) 
bound people together in power constellations in tenth- and eleventh-century Buyid Iran 
(Mottahedeh, Loyalty and Leadership).
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At the same time, Manz explored the impact of this empowering mix of 
centrifugal and centripetal tendencies which co-existed within the relational 
constructs surrounding individual actors, also framed here as a “multiplicity of 
conflicting allegiances”. She argued that these prevented clear-cut social 
boundaries from establishing themselves and “thus promoted the cohesion of 
society as a whole”.136 Most importantly for the present context, she explained 
how this fluid social nature of power “helped to attach society as a whole to the 
ruling elite”.137 For Manz, this in fact almost means that the state-society di-
chotomy is resolved in favor of an interpretive integration of the state, and of 
“the practice of politics” more generally, in society. Manz therefore reconceptu-
alized “the central government”—the “Timurid state”, here again identified 
with the chancery and financial administration and also, in conflicting ways, 
with military leaderships, dynastic members and their entourages and 
courts.138 She sees that state as “a source of money, employment, status, and 
military power, which might be converted into political capital within one’s 
own region or profession” whereas the usefulness and uses on many levels of 
central government, and even stakeholdership in government “helped to legiti-
mize it and to further its influence”.139 In fact, Manz prioritized these far more 
fluid and co-constitutive conceptions of center and periphery as an alternative 
to the traditional state-society paradigm. They proved useful tools to construct 
more complex and constructive understandings of issues which, as shown 
above, Woods had also identified in a similar (and contemporary Turkmen) 
context as “the absence of powerful central authority”. To this end, Manz again 
‘de-centered’ power, this time not from the clan to the individual chief, as in her 
study of Temür, but, as explained above, from the state or central government 
and the ruler to a multiplicity of individual social actors. At the same time, 
136 Manz, Power, Politics and Religion, p. 280.
137 Manz, Power, Politics and Religion, p. 280.
138 Manz, Power, Politics and Religion, pp. 13–48, 79–110.
139 Manz, Power, Politics and Religion, p. 282. There is a less explicitly theorized but related 
paradigm that deserves to be mentioned here. It is considered related here despite the 
fact that to some extent it returned to the state-society binary in the form of Hodgson’s 
‘aʿyān-amīr system’, reformulated as a court/non-court polarity and interpreting the for-
mer with Woods’ dynastic concept of competing ‘dispensations’. This paradigm was fore-
grounded in the reconstruction of a particular set of political stakeholders by Evrim 
Binbaş, in the form of a peer-to-peer network of Perso-Islamic intellectuals organized 
around particular occult knowledge practices who were deeply engaged in early-fifteenth-
century Timurid politics as autonomous transregional agents. Binbaş actually argued that 
as a function of the Timurid state formation process these “informal networks” disap-
peared as political stakeholders and gave way, in the second half of the fifteenth century, 
to “formal Sufi networks” to play a part in Timurid politics (Binbaş, Intellectual Networks 
in Timurid Iran).
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Manz acknowledged the implications of this conceptual shift. Proposing a far 
more minimalist understanding of the Timurid state, she considered it as the 
messy locus of multiple conflicting interests, resources and center-periphery 
relationships. In line with her archipelago metaphor that already suggests very 
vividly what this means for her understanding of the Timurid center, Manz 
advocated a kind of spatial approach to appreciations of Timurid authority 
and regional control, explaining that “Timurid government represented a 
spectrum from relatively direct rule over central regions, under princely gover-
nors, to a hopeful fiction of suzerainty over neighboring confederations”.140
Hodgson’s historical model of the erratic empowerment of an apparatus 
of centralizing power in a volatile context of Turko-Mongol rule and nomad- 
urban symbiosis arguably continues to linger at the background of Manz’ criti-
cal interpretations too. That model is also present in very conscious, yet also 
very different, ways in Maria Subtelny’s Timurids in Transition. Turko-Persian 
Politics and Acculturation in Medieval Iran. Focusing on the reign of the last 
Timurid ruler, Sultan-Husayn Bayqara, Subtelny took an explicitly Weberian 
approach to further conceptualize Hodgson’s notion of the Timurid military 
patronage state141 and, more generally, “the process of transition and state for-
mation under the Timurids”, which she pitched explicitly as “the process of 
transition from a nomadic empire based on a booty economy to a state on 
the sedentary Persian model”.142 Weberian concepts of personal charisma and 
its “routinization”, of the traditional patrimonial household state, and of the 
rational bureaucratic state are Subtelny’s basic tools to analyze this so-called 
process of transition.143 The tension between centrifugal and centripetal 
140 Manz, Power, Politics and Religion, p. 128. See also p. 111: “Timurid control over society radi-
ated outward from a few major cities, and the level of governmental impact varied widely 
from one region to another. We can draw a hierarchy of city and regional control, starting 
with the capital city of Herat, largely dominated by the Timurid court, to the major provin-
cial capitals such as Shiraz and Samarqand, ruled by princely governors heading large 
armies, then to the secondary capitals like Yazd and Kerman, with governors drawn from 
among the lesser princes and the emirs, who often came to identify closely with their re-
gion. Each governor had at his disposal a provincial dīwān and an army of Chaghatay 
soldiers”.
141 See Subtelny, Timurids in Transition, pp. 40–41: “the court of Sulṭān-Ḥusain Bayqara epito-
mized what Marshall Hodgson termed ‘the military patronage state’”.
142 See Subtelny, Timurids in Transition, pp. 39, 41 (amongst others).
143 See Subtelny, Timurids in Transition, p. 2; the “routinization of charisma” is explicitly de-
fined here as a historical process “according to which economic factors served as the chief 
impetus for the reorganization of administrative structures and redefinition of the raison 
d’être of the state”. (p. 15; referring to Weber, Economy and Society, pp. 1121–1123: Chapter 14: 
Charisma and its Transformation; ii. The Genesis and Transformation of Charismatic 
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 tendencies again appears as the driving force behind her understanding of this 
process. However, in contrast to Manz’ multipolar and minimalist approach 
and in an interesting parallel to Woods’ understanding of “the political and in-
stitutional separation and accommodation” between ‘Turks’ and ‘Tajiks’, Sub-
telny interpreted this tension not just in maximalist and almost teleological 
ways, but also in the strictly dichotomous terms of a nomadic-urban polarity, 
which at the same time she framed within that resilient framework of legalistic 
models of the state as follows.
Once set in motion, the process of transition created a dialectic relation-
ship between two basic and opposing tendencies—the one centrifugal, 
represented by the Turko-Mongolian military elite who wanted to pre-
serve the decentralized patrimonial system and values embodied in the 
törä [Timurid custom]; the other centripetal, represented by the propo-
nents of the Persian bureaucratic tradition who sought to establish a bu-
reaucratic state on the Perso-Islamic model in which the Sharīʿa repre-
sented the chief ideological basis for centralization.144
Subtelny argued that this dialectic relationship faltered as “the Timurids would 
ultimately be unsuccessful in effecting […] the routinization of charisma”, and 
the Timurid transition from patrimonial to bureaucratic state never entirely 
materialized.145 Echoing Woods’ suggestion of “the absence of a powerful cen-
tral authority” in the face of dynastic volatility, she suggested that the Timurid 
state, as well as its regional successor states, therefore remained stuck in an 
intermediate stage between so-called Turko-Mongol traditionalism and Perso-
Islamic rationalism, conceptualized here as “a patrimonial-bureaucratic re-
gime at best”.146
Authority; 1. The Routinization of Charisma). More generally, Subtelny referred to the 
 Weberian interpretations that were applied by Thomas Allsen to the thirteenth- and four-
teenth-century Mongol empire and by Stephen Blake to the sixteenth-century Mughal 
empire as the main sources of inspiration for her reading of fifteenth-century Timurid 
political history (pp. 2, 33); in many ways, her work may be understood as an attempt to 
empirically and historically connect the respective patrimonial and patrimonial- 
bureaucratic models that were operationalized by both authors. This ambition to con-
nect Allsen’s and Blake’s models also explains her very particular, historicizing, uses and 
applications of Weber’s three ideal types of legitimate authority. (See Allsen, “Guard and 
Government”; idem, Mongol Imperialism; idem, Culture and Conquest; Blake, “The 
Patrimonial-Bureaucratic Empire of the Mughals”; idem, “Returning the Household to the 
Patrimonial-Bureaucratic Empire”).
144 Subtelny, Timurids in Transition, pp. 39–40.
145 Subtelny Timurids in Transition, p. 41.
146 Subtelny Timurids in Transition, pp. 39, 41, 102, 233. See also p. 8: “The resultant Timurid 
polity may thus be characterized as resembling more closely the modified Weberian mod-
el of the patrimonial-bureaucratic regime that combined a patrimonial household/guard 
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3.4 Defining the Syro-Egyptian Sultanate’s ‘state’
Unlike in these fifteenth-century Timurid and Turkmen contexts, and to some 
extent also in Ottoman contexts, most modern historiography of the Syro-
Egyptian Sultanate has never really engaged with any of the more  sociologically 
inspired models that have so far been surveyed here. Whereas, as explained 
above, the writings of Lapidus and Chamberlain have had an invigorating im-
pact in redirecting the fields of Syro-Egyptian social and cultural history, in 
general this has not happened at all in the field of Syro-Egyptian political his-
tory. There, Lapidus’ legalistic statist model of a continuous central bureau-
cratic apparatus that organized protection and exploitation for Syro-Egypt’s 
urban centers and military elites has remained the quiet interpretive norm. 
This tends to be in direct continuity with conceptualizions of the state from 
before Lapidus, without really engaging with Lapidus’ particular framing of 
this bureaucratic state as marginalized by urban society due to a so-called 
“privatization of power”.147 Moreover, Hodgson’s model of the military patron-
age state has arguably not been directly engaged with at all in this fifteenth-
century context. This is somewhat understandable, given the origins of this 
model in Hodgson’s readings into Mongol and post-Mongol history and his 
rather peripheral and therefore also superficial, interest in the Sultanate. What 
is remarkable, however, is the fact that Hodgson’s impression of a very strong 
state-society polarity—as manifested in his somewhat simplifying claim that 
“the great Mamlûk amîrs formed an exclusive oligarchy” and “the civilians of 
Cairo [were] despised and permanently excluded from power”—148 remains 
an unqualified assumption in many, if not most, scholarly engagements with 
the Sultanate’s state, its institutions, practices, norms and actors, and their 
eventful fifteenth-century histories.149
establishment on the political and military level with traditional Persian bureaucratic 
and chancery practices on the administrative level”. For the introduction of this notion of 
a ‘modified model’, see Blake “The Patrimonial-Bureaucratic Empire of the Mughals”.
147 See e.g. Popper’s detailed description of ‘Geography’ and ‘Government’ in Egypt and Syria, 
published in 1955, an example from pre-Lapidus times. See also Igarashi’s development of 
“a new framework in which to understand state and society”, focusing on “the wide-rang-
ing reforms and financial and administrative reorganization that the Mamluk state un-
derwent during the 14th–16th centuries” in Land Tenure, Fiscal Policy and Imperial Power, 
published in 2015, which is an example of ongoing maximalist assumptions of a bureau-
cratic state.
148 Hodgson, The Venture of Islam. Volume 2, pp. 418, 419.
149 See e.g. Elbendary’s interesting argument “for a more nuanced and comprehensive narra-
tive of Mamluk state and society in late medieval Egypt and Syria”. She pitches “Mamluk 
subjects” and “Mamluk rulers” against each other in contexts of socio-economic stress, 
and interprets this in a kind of one-dimensional parallel to Lapidus’ notion of a privatiza-
tion of power, as moments of political empowerment for the former and of administra-
tive “dysfunction” and “decentralization” for the latter (Elbendary, Crowds and Sultans).
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Nevertheless, there are a handful of recent empirical insights that are worth 
referring to here briefly as promising avenues for further, more sociologically 
informed, reflection. This overview comes with the caveat that, conceptually, 
most of these studies equally continued, and continue, to situate themselves 
rather vaguely within the legalistic tradition’s structural models of absolutist 
bureaucratic power. These recent insights mostly involve the remarkable cen-
tralizing empowerment of the sultan’s household in the fifteenth century 
which scholars have seen as a function of its growing socio-economic weight, 
impact and autonomy and of the changing nature of its agents and their rela-
tionships. This approach is present in a survey chapter by Jean-Claude Garcin 
and also especially in detailed studies by Julien Loiseau and Francisco Apel-
lániz.150 In Reconstruire la maison du sultan Loiseau has an interesting (albeit 
mainly empirical) way of describing the rise to prominence in the first half of 
this century of royal household officials and families of administrators 
(“l’avènement des grands commis civils”). Here he demonstrated how these 
officials appeared as increasingly autonomous royal household agents and, 
eventually, bureaucratic leaders, empowered by their success in expanding 
royal income and investments, ultimately becoming active stakeholders in “a 
new Mamluk order (‘un nouvel ordre mamelouk’)”.151 Apellániz engaged with a 
similar model of fifteenth-century central socio-economic transformation. In 
his monograph Pouvoir et finance en Méditerranée pré-moderne he focused in 
particular on the “commercialization” of the Sultanate’s political economy, 
with another set of new royal agents and partners (including the Venetians) 
tapping into new sources of royal income and simultaneously opening up new 
avenues of political power along parallel old (military) and new (commercial) 
structures. However, in analyzing this kind of ‘layering of organizations and 
practices’ (as the aforementioned Ottomanist Barkey termed this phenome-
non of parallel structures in the Ottoman context), Apellániz argued that 
150 See Garcin, “Regime of the Circassian Mamlūks”; Loiseau, Reconstruire la maison du sul-
tan; Apellániz Ruiz de Galarreta, Pouvoir et finance en méditerranée pré-moderne.
151 Loiseau, Reconstruire la maison du sultan, vol. 1, pp. 179–214 (“Chapitre 4: Refondation de 
l’état, redistribution du pouvoir: vers un nouvel ordre mamelouk”); expanded in Loiseau, 
Les Mamelouks, pp. 101–105. These powerful administrators also figure prominently in Iga-
rashi, “Office of the Ustādār al-ʿĀliya”; Martel-Thoumian, Les civils et l’administration; 
Petry, The Civilian Elite of Cairo; Miura, “Administrative Networks in the Mamlūk Period”. 
The related theme of (de-)centralization returns in the writings of Yossef Rapoport and 
Robert Irwin who explain changes in the administration of justice in similar terms of the 
expansion of state power (Rapoport, “Royal Justice and Religious Law”; see also Stilt, Is-
lamic Law in Action) or of its exact opposite, as privatization (Irwin, “Privatization of ‘Jus-
tice’”; see also Meloy, “Privatization of Protection”).
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these generated opposite, decentralizing tendencies towards the end of the 
century.152
Here we see at least an allusion to the challenging analytical horizons of the 
fifteenth-century Syro-Egyptian process of state formation, from the manifes-
tation of deep socio-economic transformations and a widening political par-
ticipation to the formation of a new political order and its construction out of 
variously interacting centripetal and centrifugal tendencies.
The most explicit theorization of these developments is arguably to be 
found in a joint publication by Van Steenbergen, Wing and D’hulster. “The 
Mamlukization of the Mamluk Sultanate? State Formation and the History of 
Fifteenth Century Egypt and Syria” presents an argument for modelling these 
different analytical horizons as “the growth of the state, both as a non-dynastic 
idea of hegemonic political order and as a coercive bureaucratic apparatus 
that was produced by, and that was set up to reproduce that order”.153 This 
conceptualization was inspired by Ibn Khaldun’s notion of the sedentarization 
of nomad power and by Pierre Bourdieu’s model of transformation “from the 
king’s house to the reason of state”. It sees the changing loci of central power in 
the fifteenth century as the manifestation of a radical social transformation. 
This again involved the above-mentioned idea of ‘layering’, but now in a social 
rather than institutional way. The range of empowering relationships was ex-
panded during this period from personal service being given to individuals or 
households to specialized service being offered to the sultan’s court in Cairo, 
and to its agents and local offshoots, and their diverse interests. Further, “The 
Mamlukization of the Mamluk Sultanate?” suggested that this social layering 
was “part of a broader development in which the messy paths to power and 
influence, to a share in the central state’s political system, became ever more 
meritocratic and bureaucratized”. The paper also claimed that this involved, 
almost by default, the performative imagination of that central state in in-
creasingly meritocratic, non-dynastic, and ‘Mamluk’ terms.154
In many ways, this theorization of fifteenth-century Syro-Egyptian social 
transformation (and its ‘Mamlukization’, as a form of ‘meritocratization’) 
152 Apellániz, Pouvoir et finance en méditerranée pré-moderne. This kind of ‘layering’, or of a 
parallelism of political structures, was also used as an interpretive framework by Petry, 
Protectors or Praetorians?, even though in that context it was rather more negatively rep-
resented as a juxtaposition of institutional conservatism and clandestine pragmatism, 
and defined as “overt institutional inertia” and “covert practical innovation”.
153 Van Steenbergen, Wing & D’hulster, “Mamlukization of the Mamluk Sultanate?-ii”, p. 561.
154 Van Steenbergen, Wing & D’hulster, “Mamlukization of the Mamluk Sultanate?-ii”, 
pp. 565–566, quote p. 565.
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builds on various scholars’ re-interpretations of thirteenth- and fourteenth-
century Syro-Egyptian state formation through the lens of elite households, 
dynastic practices and Hodgson’s model of the military patronage state.155 Van 
Steenbergen also elaborated on the issue in two more generalizing theoretical 
essays which complement each other in their respective diachronic and spa-
tial approaches to the theoretical problem of Syro-Egyptian state formation 
under the Cairo sultans between the thirteenth and early sixteenth centuries. 
“Appearances of Dawla and Political Order in late medieval Syro-Egypt” makes 
an explicit attempt to connect with the cultural turn in state studies, and with 
Chamberlain’s prioritization of social practice. This essay also pays particular 
attention to Mitchell’s above-mentioned Foucauldian understanding of the 
state as a structural appearance and “as the powerful, metaphysical effect of 
practices that make [actual] structures appear to exist”.156 Following Cham-
berlain, “Appearances of Dawla” proposes a useful way out of the longstanding 
state-society predicament and the legalistic structuralism that it implied by 
advocating for an analytical turn towards social practice. It is suggested that 
priority should be given to exploring practices of reproduction, integration 
and segmentation among Syro-Egyptian power elites, and that, as Mitchell 
suggested, this should be coupled with an interpretation of representations of 
statist institutions, practices and discourses as both structural and structuring 
effects of what these elites did. This is then suggested to imply that we should 
accept as an entry point for any historical analysis and interpretation the messy 
micro-historical diversity of elitist actors and agencies in which these practical 
arrangements of reproduction, integration and segmentation and their effects 
continued to manifest themselves. On this basis, “Appearances of Dawla” 
claimed that scholars ought to approach the long history of the Sultanate as a 
discontinuous one, in which a preponderance of state-making over the messi-
ness of war-making happened only “in contexts of successful, relatively long 
and charismatic authority”. In the long fifteenth century, these contexts are sug-
gested here to have emerged especially during the reigns of the sultans Barsbay 
and Jaqmaq in the 1430s and 40s, of Qaytbay in the 1470s and 80s, and of Qan-
sawh in the 1500s.157 “An alternative model for understanding late medieval 
155 Chamberlain, Knowledge and Social Practice. See also Loiseau, Les Mamelouks, pp. 111–124; 
Bauden, “The Sons of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad”; Koby, “Mamluks and their Relatives”; Ey-
chenne, Liens personnels, clientélisme et réseaux de pouvoir; Flinterman & Van Steenber-
gen, “Al-Nasir Muhammad and the Formation of the Qalawunid State”; Van Steenbergen, 
“The Mamluk Sultanate as a Military Patronage State”.
156 Mitchell, “Limits of the State”, p. 94.
157 Van Steenbergen, “Appearances of Dawla”, esp. p. 77; see also Van Steenbergen, “‘Mamluki-
sation’ between social theory and social practice”, esp. p. 33.
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Syro-Egyptian political organisation that emerges from all this”, this essay con-
cludes more generally,
is then one of sultanic political order—the state—as process, in constant 
flux as the structural effect and structuring embodiment of constantly 
changing practices of social reproduction, elite integration and political 
distinction, in contexts that range between multipolar and unipolar so-
cial organisation at and around Cairo’s court and its military elites.158
Furthermore, in the essay “Revisiting the Mamlūk Empire. Political Action, Re-
lationships of Power, Entangled Networks, and the Sultanate of Cairo in late 
medieval Syro-Egypt”, a transregional and at the same time socially  constructed 
center-periphery dimension is added to the diachronic model of Syro- Egyptian 
state formation that was formulated in “Appearances of Dawla”. Taking inspira-
tion from, amongst others, Barkey’s aforementioned rethinking of the ques-
tion of Ottoman longevity, “Revisiting the Mamlūk Empire” suggests thinking 
of Syro-Egyptian power groups and their patrimonial leaders as different bun-
dles “of diverse but entangled networks, that appear to operate—or present 
themselves as operating—on a trans-local canvas of connectivity”. However, 
these networks were “always constructed in the micro-history of people and 
their negotiation of particular cultural, socio-economic and political relation-
ships”. As a result, these relationships did not just connect central and periph-
eral elites (as Barkey suggested for the Ottoman case). They also actually 
constituted different groups, or entangled networks, as such central and pe-
ripheral elites, in continuously disputed and reconfigured ways. Furthermore, 
these particular sets of centering relationships always appeared as “permeable 
and as crisscrossed by many other, equally fluid, relational realities that seemed 
to be pulsating from other local or trans-local centers of social, economic, cul-
tural or even political action”.159
4 Concluding Observations: West-Asian and Eurasian Parallels, 
Connections and Divergences?
The modelling of the state in fifteenth-century Syro-Egypt as one among a ‘lay-
ered’ variety of fluid, permeable and competitive social processes of power, 
158 Van Steenbergen, “Appearances of Dawla”, p. 78; see also Van Steenbergen, “‘Mamlukisa-
tion’ between social theory and social practice”, p. 34.
159 Van Steenbergen, “Revisiting the Mamlūk Empire”.
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mainly marked out from other processes by its irregular growth and consti-
tutive political effects, certainly connects in multiple ways with some of the 
Ottoman, Turkmen and Timurid models presented here. It appeals to the view 
of Ottomanists such as Kafadar and, especially, Barkey who tried to reconceive 
of the Ottoman state formation process of the fifteenth century with new, or 
at least more explicitly defined, analytical tools, turning to social relations and 
networks, center-periphery dynamics, and institutional layering. It also demon-
strates interesting parallels with Woods’ suggestion of Turkmen discontinuity 
in the regular “renewal of the sovereign mandate in successive dispensations”. 
It connects even more, in complementary ways, with Manz’ understanding of 
“the practice of politics” in Timurid history, not least with her ‘de- centering’ 
of that history and its more minimalist modelling along her archipelago 
metaphor. At the same time, however, this Syro-Egyptian model perhaps of-
fers an additional way of integrating these particular Ottoman, Turkmen and 
Timurid models in more entangled, trans-dynastic and West-Asian historical 
considerations, not just by imagining resource accumulation, war-making 
and  state-making from the perspective of particular, West-Asian practices of 
reproduction, integration and segmentation, but also by interpreting their ef-
fects as a socially rather than a merely geographically constituted process of 
‘centering’ power around various Turko-Mongol elites across fifteenth-century 
Islamic West-Asia. In other words, this Syro-Egyptian model makes a more ex-
plicit call for an interpretive turn to consider shared power practices and to 
identify more clearly which factors distinguished these shared practices from 
each other. It invites researchers to consider how the appearance of local co-
herence and regional difference in the format of Ottoman, Turkmen, Timurid 
and ‘Mamluk’ states was the contingent outcome of practical arrangements 
continuously (and often also violently) negotiated between various and multi-
valent groups of in- and outsiders, acting along local, regional or transregional 
stakes in different parallel, overlapping and intersecting social processes.
As suggested in the introduction to this chapter the aim here was not just to 
describe the many winding roads of the study of political organization and 
state formation across fifteenth-century West-Asia and Western Eurasia. In ad-
dition to this theoretical contextualization of the present volume and its con-
tributions, this chapter also sought to lay a heuristic ground for meaningful 
comparison, and for better understanding the parallels, connections and di-
vergences of approaches to fifteenth-century statist appearances in modern 
scholarship. The rather different research trajectories and interpretive con-
texts described here certainly offer much food for thought. Some connections 
and parallels can easily be drawn, even beyond the rather clear-cut epistemo-
logical boundaries that separate West-Asian and European research traditions. 
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First and foremost, there are the diverse impacts of the trajectories of twenti-
eth century social theory. This goes up to postmodern renewed interests in the 
state, but above all relates to the Weberian paradigm, which regularly re-
emerges in more or less subtle ways, and in more or less critically informed 
contexts. More generally, there are the legalistic or sociological traditions, 
structural or practical perspectives, and maximalist or minimalist interpreta-
tions that appear everywhere as more or less consciously constructed points of 
conceptual departure and debate. These shared points furthermore include 
variables such as the state/society polarity, the centrifugal/centripetal dynam-
ic, and the war-making/state-making symbiosis that regularly appear as ex-
planatory tools in a variety of guises. Finally, another parallel emerges through 
a more particular fifteenth-century Western Eurasian moment of state forma-
tion, variously framed as bureaucratization, routinization, imperial formation, 
an increase in the distribution of statist labor, a lengthening of the chains of 
authority and agency, an expansion in the ranks of statist stakeholders, or sim-
ply as state growth. This obviously represents another parallel within the dif-
ferent research traditions, even though perhaps it appears as such more on an 
empirical than on any shared interpretive level.
As suggested by the latter observation of interpretive dissonance in a more 
specific context of fifteenth-century state formation, it must also be acknowl-
edged that these connections and parallels only appear to exist in their most 
generalizing formulations when their specific uses are abstracted, even within 
the different West-Asian and European research traditions. Above all it is clear 
that as far as fifteenth-century state formation is concerned, not much inter-
pretive interaction nor integration of analytical solutions has happened be-
yond the East-West divide. Even within each tradition, especially the West-
Asian tradition, across the diverse political landscapes there are still very few 
theoretically-informed dialogues. The study of the state in fifteenth-century 
Western Eurasia thus appears itself as a very ‘layered’ and ‘de-centered’ phe-
nomenon, in institutional as well as practical terms. This is obviously a func-
tion of the particular historical trajectories followed by these historiographical 
traditions of state studies, determined amongst others by the different empiri-
cal realities, the different sets of research skills, and the different relations with 
the modern world that mark each tradition. At the same time, this lack of dia-
logue remains surprising, especially given that there are many parallels which 
at least on a more general level appear to connect rather than to separate, and 
which could offer many opportunities for fruitful interpretive exchanges.
Research has thus been conducted on the fifteenth-century state in di-
verging ways, not just for Europe and Islamic West-Asia in general, but also 
for many of the different dynastic and proto-nationalist constituents of each 
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
Dumolyn and Van Steenbergen144
<UN>
region. That divergence, however, also harbors many opportunities for an en-
riching exchange of ideas. As argued earlier in this chapter, any study of states 
and of their impact on human history should internalize the assumption that 
all statist manifestations are specific. For this reason, they can only be consid-
ered as contextually defined exceptions of any ideal type that may be employed 
for analysis. Rather than trying to reduce that specificity and exceptionality to, 
prioritize it within, or exclude it from a statist ideal, the priority in compara-
tive research, and, for that matter also in non-comparative historical research, 
should be to use that ideal to acknowledge for, and to decipher, specificity and 
exceptionality. Searching for shared conceptual tools to enhance the compara-
tive potential of the Eurasian canvas of empirical historical research as pre-
sented in this volume is therefore not just about finding parallels and connec-
tions, but rather more about identifying divergence from a shared model.
As explained before, Walter Scheidel regarded Tilly’s “model of state forma-
tion driven by interstate and class conflict” and by the interplay of war-making 
and state-making as holding the most promise for comparative research.160 At 
the end of this chapter, we want to suggest that future work should integrate 
Tilly’s into a more practical model. This should also be informed by Mitchell’s 
suggestion that states do not make history, but that history makes states, as and 
when successful social practices of exclusion, integration, reproduction and 
appropriation start appearing, and presenting themselves, as pertaining to a 
coherent apparatus of coercion, distinction, differentiation and hegemony. 
This approach certainly resonates with the particular model of social practices 
of reproduction, integration and segmentation and their performative center-
ing effects that appeared to connect at least some of the West-Asian model-
lings reviewed above. Considered together, in a socially de-centered and lay-
ered way, as what made states appear across fifteenth-century Western Eurasia, 
these practices and their effects may well represent a useful touchstone to help 
identify specificity and exceptionality in the many processes of state formation 
that defined fifteenth-century Western Eurasia.
Bibliography
Abou-El-Haj, Rifaʿat ʿAli, Formation of the Modern State: the Ottoman Empire, Six-
teenth to Eighteenth Centuries (Syracuse [N.Y.]: Syracuse University Press, 2005, 
2nd ed.).
160 Scheidel, “Studying the State”, p. 38.
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
145Studying Rulers & States across 15th Century Western Eurasia
<UN>
Abrams, Philip, “Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State (1977)”, Journal of Histori-
cal Sociology 1/1/ (1988): 58–89.
Allsen, Thomas T., “Guard and Government in the Reign of the Grand Qan Möngke, 
1251–59”, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 46/2 (1986): 495–521.
Allsen, Thomas T., Mongol Imperialism. The Policies of the Grand Qan Möngke in China, 
Russia, and the Islamic Lands, 1251–1259 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1987).
Allsen, Thomas T., Culture and Conquest in Mongol Eurasia (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001).
Ando, Clifford, Seth F.C. Richardson, eds., Ancient States and Infrastructural Power: Eu-
rope, Asia, and America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017).
Apellániz Ruiz de Galarreta, Francisco J., Pouvoir et finance en méditerranée pré- 
moderne: le deuxième état mamelouk et le commerce des épices (1382–1517) ( Barcelona: 
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, 2009).
Anderson, Perry, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: Verso, 1974).
Aubin, Jean, Deux sayyids de Bam au xv. Siècle; contribution à l’histoire de l’Iran timouride 
(Wiesbaden: Verlag der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, 1956).
Ayalon, David, “Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army”, Bulletin of the School of 
Oriental and African Studies 15; 16 (1953; 1954): 203–228, 448–476; 57–90.
Babinger, Franz C.H., Mehmed der Eroberer und seine Zeit: Weltenstürmer einer Zeiten-
wende (München: F. Brückmann, 1959).
Bang, Peter F., Walter Scheidel, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the State in the Ancient 
Near East and Mediterranean (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
Barkey, Karen, Empire of Difference: the Ottomans in Comparative Perspective (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
Barthold, Vladimir V., Four Studies on the History of Central Asia. 2: Ulugh-beg, V. Minor-
sky, trans. (Leiden: Brill, 1958).
Bates, Thomas R., “Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony”, Journal of the History of 
Ideas 36/2 (1975): 351–366.
Bauden, Frédéric, “The Sons of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad and the Politics of Puppets: where 
did it all start?”, Mamlūk Studies Review 13/1 (2009): 53–81.
Binbaş, İ. Evrim, Intellectual Networks in Timurid Iran. Sharaf al-Dīn ʿAlī Yazdī and the 
Islamicate Republic of Letters (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
Björkman, Walther, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Staatskanzlei im islamischen Ägypten 
(Hamburg: Friederichsen, De Gruyter, & Co, 1928).
Blake, Stephen P., “The Patrimonial-Bureaucratic Empire of the Mughals”, Journal of 
Asian Studies 39/1 (1979): 77–94.
Blake, Stephen P., “Returning the Household to the Patrimonial-Bureaucratic Empire: 
Gender, Succession, and Ritual in the Mughal, Safavid and Ottoman Empires”, in P.F. 
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
Dumolyn and Van Steenbergen146
<UN>
Bang and C.A. Bayly, eds., Tributary Empires in Global History (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), pp. 214–246.
Blickle, Peter, Kommunalismus: Skizzen einer gesellschaftlichen Organisationsform 
(Munich: Oldenbourg, 2000).
Blockmans, Willem P. and Jean-Philippe Genet, eds., The Origins of the Modern State in 
Europe: 13th to 18th Centuries (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995–2000).
Blockmans, Willem P. and Jean-Philippe Genet, “Patronage, Brokerage and Corruption 
as Symptoms of Incipient State Formation in the Burgundian-Habsburg Nether-
lands”, in A. Maczak and E. Müller-Luckner, eds., Klientelsysteme im Europa der 
frühen Neuzeit (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1988), pp. 117–126.
Bourdieu, Pierre, “Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic 
Field”, L.J.D. Wacquant, S. Farage, trans., Sociological Theory 12/1 (1994): 1–18 (repub-
lished in G. Steinmetz, ed., State/Culture. State-Formation after the cultural turn 
[Ithaca (N.Y.) and London: Cornell University Press, 1999]) (originally published as: 
“Esprits d’État: genèse et structure du champ bureaucratic”, Actes de la recherche en 
sciences sociales 96–97 (1993): 49–62).
Bourdieu, Pierre, “From the King’s House to the Reason of State: A Model of the Gen-
esis of the Bureaucratic Field”, R. Nice, L. Wacquant, trans., Constellations 11/1 (2004): 
16–36 (originally published as “De la maison du roi à la raison d’État: un modèle de 
la genèse du champ bureaucratique”, Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales 118 
(1997): 55–68).
Bourdieu, Pierre, On the State. Lectures at the Collège de France, 1989–1992, P. Cham-
pagne, R. Lenoir, F. Poupeau, M-C. Rivière, eds.; D. Fernbach, trans. (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2014) (originally published as Sur l’État [Paris: Éditions Raisons d’Agir/
Éditions du Seuil, 2012]).
Brunner, Otto, Land und Herrschaft. Grundfragen der territorialen Verfassungsgeschich-
te Österreichs im Mittellater (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1973).
Bulst, Neithard and Jean-Philippe Genet, eds., La ville, la bourgeoisie et la genèse de 
l’état moderne (xiie–xviiie siècle) (Paris: CNRS, 1988).
Busse, Heribert, Untersuchungen zum islamischen Kanzleiwesen an Hand turkmenisch-
er und safawidischer Urkunden (Cairo: Deutsches Archäologisches Institut, 1959).
Canning, Joseph P., “Ideas of the State in Thirteenth- and Fourteenth-Century Com-
mentators on Roman Law”, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, series 5, 33 
(1983): 1–28.
Chamberlain, Michael, Knowledge and Social Practice in Medieval Damascus, 1190–1350 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
Chamberlain, Michael, “The Crusader Era and the Ayyūbid dynasty”, in C.F. Petry, ed., 
The Cambridge History of Egypt. Vol. 1. Islamic Egypt, 640–1517 (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1998), pp. 211–241.
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
147Studying Rulers & States across 15th Century Western Eurasia
<UN>
Chamberlain, Michael, “Chapter Seven: Military Patronage States and the Political 
Economy of the Frontier, 1000–1250”, in Y.M. Choueiri, ed., A Companion to the His-
tory of the Middle East (Chichester: Blackwell, 2008), pp. 135–153.
Chittolini, Giorgio, La formazione dello Stato regionale e le istituzioni del contado. Secoli 
xiv e xv (Turin: Piccola Bilioteca Einaudi, 1979).
Clifford, Winslow W., “Ubi Sumus? Mamluk History and Social Theory”, Mamlūk Stud-
ies Review 1 (1998): 45–62.
Clifford, Winslow W., State Formation and the structure of politics in Mamluk Syro-
Egypt, 648–741 a.h./1250–1340 c.e., St. Conermann, ed. (Bonn: Bonn University Press 
& V&R Unipress, 2013).
Crone, Patricia, “The Tribe and the State”, in J.A. Hall, ed., States in History (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1986), pp. 48–77.
Crossley, Pamela K., “Military Patronage and Hodgson’s Genealogy of State Centraliza-
tion in Early Modern Eurasia”, in E. Burke and R.J. Mankin, eds., Islam and World 
History. The Ventures of Marshall Hodgson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2018), pp. 102–114.
Curtis, Michael, Orientalism and Islam: European Thinkers on Oriental Despotism in the 
Middle East and India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
Darrag, Ahmad, L’Égypte sous le règne de Barsbay, 825–841/1422–1438 (Damascus: Insti-
tut français de Damas, 1961).
Davies, Rees, “The Medieval State: The Tyranny of a Concept?”, Journal of Historical 
Sociology 16/2 (2003): 280.
De Weerdt, Hilde, Catherine Holmes and John Watts, “Politics, c. 1000–1500: mediation 
and communication”, Past and Present 238, issue supplement 13 (2018): 261–296.
Di Cosmo, Nicola, “State Formation and Periodization in Inner Asian History”, Journal 
of World History 10/1 (1999): 1–40.
Donner, Fred M., “The Formation of the Islamic State”, Journal of the American Oriental 
Society 106/2 (1986): 283–296.
Duindam, Jeroen, “Dynasty and Elites: From Early Modern Europe to Late Imperial 
China”, in L. Geevers & M. Marinin, eds., Dynastic Identity in Early Modern Europe. 
Rulers, Aristocrats and the Formation of Identities (Routledge, 2015), pp. 59–84.
Elbendary, Amina, Crowds and Sultans. Urban Protest in Late Medieval Egypt and Syria 
(Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2015).
Elias, Norbert, The Civilizing Process. The Development of Manners: Changes in the Code 
of Conduct and Feeling in Early Modern Times, E. Jephcott, trans. (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1978) (originally published as Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation: soziogenetische und 
psychogenetische Untersuchungen [Basel: Haus zum Falken, 1939]).
Eychenne, Mathieu, Liens personnels, clientélisme et réseaux de pouvoir dans le sultanat 
mamelouk (milieu xiii–fin xiv siècle) (Damascus-Beirut: Presses de l’ifpo, 2013).
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
Dumolyn and Van Steenbergen148
<UN>
Flach, Jacques, Les origines de l’ancienne France. Vol. 3: La renaissance de l’État. La roy-
auté et le principat (Paris: Larose et Forcel, 1904).
Flinterman, Willem, Jo Van Steenbergen, “Al-Nasir Muhammad and the Formation of 
the Qalawunid State”, in A. Landau, ed., Pearls on a String: Artists, Patrons, and Poets 
at the Great Islamic Courts (Seattle: Walters Art Museum and University of Washing-
ton Press, 2015), pp. 86–113.
Garcin, Jean-Claude, “The Regime of the Circassian Mamlūks”, in C.F. Petry, ed., The 
Cambridge History of Egypt. Vol. 1. Islamic Egypt, 640–1517 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), pp. 290–317.
Geertz, Clifford, Negara: the Theatre State in nineteenth-century Bali (Princeton (N.J.): 
Princeton University Press, 1980).
Gellner, Ernest, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).
Genet, Jean-Philippe, “L’État moderne: un modèle opératoire”, in J.-P. Genet, ed., Ge-
nèse de l’État moderne: bilans et perspectives (Paris: Éditions du CNRS, 1990), 
pp. 261–281.
Genet, Jean-Philippe, “Féodalisme et naissance de l’état moderne: à propos des thèses 
de Charles Tilly”, in Monique Bourin, ed., Villes, bonnes villes, cités et capitales: 
Etudes d’histoire urbaine (xiie–xviiie siècle) offertes à Bernard Chevalier (Caen: Par-
adigme, 1993), pp. 239–246.
Giddens, Anthony, The Nation-State and Violence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987).
Goldstone, Jack A., and John F. Haldon, “Ancient States, Empires, and Exploitation”, in 
I. Morris & W. Scheidel, eds., The Dynamics of Ancient Empires: State Power from As-
syria to Byzantium (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009), pp. 3–29.
Gramsci, Antonio, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, trans. G.N. Smitt, Q. Hoare 
(New York, 1971).
Green, Anna, Kathleen Troup, The Houses of History. A Critical Reader in Twentieth-
century History and Theory (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999).
Guenée, Bernard, L’Occident aux xive superscript et xve siècles: les États (Paris: Presses 
universitaires de France, 1971).
Haldon, John F., The State and the Tributary Mode of Production (London: Verso, 1993).
Hall, John A., “Varieties of State Experience”, in St. Leibfried, E. Huber, M. Lange, J.D. 
Levy & J.D. Stephens, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Transformations of the State  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
Hintze, Otto, Staat und Verfassung: gesammelte Abhandlungen zur allgemeinen Verfas-
sungsgeschichte (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962).
Hodgson, Marshall G.S., The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civili-
zation. Volume 2: The Expansion of Islam in the Middle Periods (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1974).
Holt, Peter M., “The Structure of Government in the Mamluk Sultanate”, in P.M. Holt, 
ed., The Eastern Mediterranean Lands in the Period of the Crusades (Warminster: 
Aris and Philips, 1977), pp. 44–61.
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
149Studying Rulers & States across 15th Century Western Eurasia
<UN>
Holt, Peter M., The Age of the Crusades: the Near East from the Eleventh Century to 1517 
(London: Longman, 1986).
Holt, Peter M., “The Mamluk Institution”, in Y.M. Choueiri, ed., A Companion to the His-
tory of the Middle East (Blackwell Companions to World History) (Chichester: 
 Wiley-Blackwell, 2008) pp. 154–169.
Humphreys, R. Stephen, “The Fiscal Administration of the Mamluk Empire”, in R.St. 
Humphreys, Islamic History. A Framework for Inquiry (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1991), pp. 169–186.
Ibn Khaldūn, Muqaddimat Ibn Khaldūn, Kh. Shaḥāda, ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 2001).
Ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddimah: an Introduction to History, Fr. Rosenthal, trans., 3 vols. 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1958).
Ibn Khaldūn, Le livre des exemples, 1. Autobiographie. Muqaddima, A. Cheddadi, trans. 
(Paris: Gallimard, 2002).
Igarashi, Daisuke, Land Tenure, Fiscal Policy, and Imperial Power in medieval Syro-Egypt 
(Chicago: Middle East Documentation Center, 2015).
Igarashi, Daisuke, “The Office of the Ustādār al-ʿĀliya in the Circassian Mamluk Era”, in 
Y. Ben-Bassat, ed., Developing Perspectives in Mamluk History: Essays in Honor of 
Amalia Levanoni (Leiden: Brill, 2017), pp. 115–142.
İhsanoğlu, Ekmeleddin, History of the Ottoman state, society & civilisation (Istanbul: 
Research Center for Islamic History, Art and Culture, 2001–2).
Imber, Colin, The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1481 (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1990).
Imber, Colin, The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650: the Structure of Power (Houndmills: Pal-
grave Macmillan, 2009).
İnalcik, Halil, The Ottoman State: Economy and Society, 1300–1600, H. Inalcik, D. Qua-
taert, eds., An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire. Part 1 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994).
İnalcik, Halil, The Ottoman Empire: the classical age, 1300–1600 (London: Phoenix Press, 
2000).
Irwin, Robert, “The Privatization of ‘Justice’ under the Circassian Mamluks”, Mamlūk 
Studies Review 6 (2002): 63–70.
Joyce, Patrick, “The Return of History. Postmodernism and the Politics of Academic 
History in Britain”, Past and Present 158 (1998): 207–235.
Kafadar, Cemal, Between Two Worlds: the Construction of the Ottoman State (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1996).
Kantorowicz, Ernst, The King’s Two Bodies: a Study in Mediaeval Political Theology 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).
Kiser, Edgar, Margaret Levi, “Chapter 19: Interpreting the comparative history of fiscal 
regimes”, in A. Monson & W. Scheidel, eds., Fiscal Regimes and the Political Economy 
of Premodern States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 557–571.
Koby, Yosef, “Mamluks and their Relatives in the period of the Mamluk Sultanate 
(1250–1517)”, Mamlūk Studies Review 16 (2012): 55–69.
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
Dumolyn and Van Steenbergen150
<UN>
Köprülü, Mehmed F., The Origins of the Ottoman Empire, G. Leiser, ed. & trans. (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1992).
Lambton, Ann K.S., State and Government in Medieval Islam: an Introduction to the 
Study of Islamic Political Theory: the Jurists (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981).
Lecuppre-Desjardin, Élodie, Le Royaume inachevé des ducs de Bourgogne (xive–xve 
siècles) (Paris: Belin, 2016).
Lindholm, Charles, The Islamic Middle East: an Historical Anthropology (Malden 
(Mass.): Blackwell, 2002, 2nd ed.).
Lapidus, Ira M., Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages. Student Edition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984 [first edition: Harvard University Press, 1967]).
Lapidus, Ira M., “Tribes and State Formation in Islamic History”, in Ph.S. Khoury, J. 
Kostiner, eds., Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1990), pp. 25–47.
Lapidus, Ira M., Islamic Societies to the Nineteenth Century. A Global History (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) (revised and updated partial publication 
of A History of Islamic Societies [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988]).
Loiseau, Julien, Les Mamelouks: xiiie–xvie siècle: une expérience de pouvoir dans l’Islam 
médieval (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2014).
Loiseau, Julien, Reconstruire la maison du sultan, 1350–1450: ruine et recomposition de 
l’ordre urbain au Caire (Cairo: Institut français d’archéologie orientale, 2010).
Lowry, Heath W., The Nature of the Early Ottoman State (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 2003).
Loyal, Steven, Bourdieu’s Theory of the State. A Critical Introduction (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2017).
Mann, Michael, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and 
Results”, Archives européennes de sociologie 25 (1984): 185–213.
Mann, Michael, The Sources of Social Power. Volume i: A history of power from the begin-
ning to a.d. 1760; Volume ii: The rise of classes and nation-states, 1760–1914; Volume iii: 
Global empires and revolution, 1890–1945; Volume iv: Globalizations, 1945–2011 (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, 1993, 2012, 2013).
Manz, Beatrice F., The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999).
Manz, Beatrice F., Power, Politics and Religion in Timurid Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007).
Maravall, José A., Estado moderno y mentalidad social (siglos xv a xvii) (Madrid: Edi-
ciones de la Revista de Occidente, 1972).
Martel-Thoumian, Bernadette, Les civils et l’administration dans l’état militaire mamlūk 
(ixe/xve siècle) (Damascus: Institut français de Damas, 1992).
Martel-Thoumian, Bernadette, Délinquance et ordre social. L’état mamlouk syro- 
égyptien face au crime à la fin du ixe–xve siècle (Bordeaux: Ausonius Editions, 2012).
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
151Studying Rulers & States across 15th Century Western Eurasia
<UN>
Martinez-Gros, Gabriel, Ibn Khaldûn et les sept vies de l’Islam (Paris: Sindbad-Actes 
Sud, 2006).
Meloy, John L., “The Privatization of Protection: Extortion and the State in the Circas-
sian Mamluk Period”, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 47/2 
(2004): 195–212.
Meloy, John L., “Economic Intervention and the Political Economy of the Mamluk 
State under al-Ashraf Barsbāy”, Mamlūk Studies Review 9/2 (2005): 85–103.
Meloy, John L., Imperial Power and Maritime Trade: Mecca and Cairo in the later Middle 
Ages (Chicago: Middle East Documentation Center, 2010).
Minorsky, Vladimir, “A Civil and Military Review in Fars in 881/1476”, Bulletin of the 
School of Oriental and African Studies 10/1 (1939): 141–178.
Minorsky, Vladimir, “The Aq-qoyunlu and Land Reforms”, Bulletin of the School of Ori-
ental and African Studies 17/3 (1955): 449–462.
Mitchell, Timothy, “The Limits of the State: beyond statist approaches and their crit-
ics”, The American Political Science Review 85/1 (1991): 77–96.
Mitchell, Timothy “Society, Economy, and the State Effect”, in G. Steinmetz, ed., State/
Culture: State-Formation after the cultural turn (Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University 
Press, 1999), pp. 76–97; republished in The Anthropology of the State: a reader (Black-
well readers in anthropology vol. 9) (Malden: Blackwell, 2006).
Mitchell, Timothy, Rule of Experts: Egypt, techno-politics, modernity (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 2002).
Miura, Toru, “Administrative Networks in the Mamlūk Period: Taxation, Legal Execu-
tion, and Bribery”, in Ts. Sato, ed., Islamic Urbanism in Human History: Political Pow-
er and Social Networks (London and New York: Kegan Paul International, 1997), 
pp. 39–76.
Mitteis, Heinrich, Lehnrecht und Staatsgewalt—Untersuchungen zur mittelalterlichen 
Verfassungsgeschichte (Weimar: Böhlau, 1958).
Mitteis, Heinrich, Der Staat des hohen Mittelalters : Grundlinien einer vergleichenden 
Verfassungsgeschichte des Lehnszeitalters (Weimar: Böhlau, 1940).
Monson, Andrew, Walter Scheidel, eds., Fiscal Regimes and the Political Economy of Pre-
modern States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
Moore, Barrington, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in 
the Making of the Modern World (Harmondsworth: Penguin books, 1977).
Morgan, David, Medieval Persia. 1040–1797 (London: Longman, 1988).
Morris, Ian, Walter Scheidel, eds., The Dynamics of Ancient Empires: State Power from 
Assyria to Byzantium (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009).
Mottahedeh, Roy P., Loyalty and Leadership in an early Islamic Society (Princeton (N.J.): 
Princeton University Press, 1980).
Murphey, Rhoads, Exploring Ottoman Sovereignty: Tradition, Image and Practice in the 
Ottoman Imperial Household, 1400–1800 (London: Continuum, 2008).
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
Dumolyn and Van Steenbergen152
<UN>
Paul, Jürgen, “The State and the Military—a Nomadic Perspective”, in I. Schneider, 
ed., Militär und Staatlichkeit (Halle: Orientwisschenschaftliches Zentrum der 
Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, 2003), pp. 25–68.
Paul, Jürgen, “Violence and State-Building in the Islamic East” (Online Working Paper 
No. 4) (Halle-Wittenberg: Graduate School Asian and Africa in World Reference Sys-
tems, Martin-Luther-University Halle-Wittenberg, 2006).
Paul, Jürgen, Lokale und imperiale Herrschaft im Iran des 12. Jahrhunderts: Herrschafts-
praxis und Konzepte (Wiesbaden: Reichert Verlag, 2016).
Petry, Carl F., The Civilian Elite of Cairo in the later Middle Ages (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1981).
Petry, Carl F., Twilight of Majesty: the Reigns of Mamlūk Sultans al-Ashraf Qāytbāy and 
Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī in Egypt (Seattle: Seattle University Press, 1993).
Petry, Carl F., Protectors or Praetorians? The Last Mamluk Sultans and Egypt’s Waning as 
a Great Power (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994).
Petry, Carl F., The Criminal Underworld in a Medieval Islamic Society: narratives from 
Cairo and Damascus under the Mamluks (Chicago: Middle East Documentation 
Center, 2012).
Polybius, The Histories, Volume iii (Books 5–8), W.R. Paton, trans., revised by F.W. Wal-
bank (Loeb Classical Library 138) (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2011).
Polybius, Polybius. The Histories. A New Translation by Robin Waterfield (Oxford World’s 
Classics) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
Popper, William, Egypt and Syria under the Circassian Sultans, 1382–1468 a.d.: System-
atic Notes to Ibn Taghrî Birdî’s Chronicles of Egypt (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1955, 1957, 1963).
Post, Gaines, “Law and Politics in the Middle Ages: The Medieval State as a Work of 
Art”, in K.F. Drew and F.S. Lead eds., Perspectives in Medieval History (Chicago, 1963), 
pp. 59–76.
Post, Gaines, Studies in Medieval Legal Thought: Public Law and the State, 1100–1322 
(Princeton (N.J.): Princeton University Press, 1964).
Powicke, Frederick M., “Reflections on the Medieval State”, Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society, series 4, 19 (1936): 1–18.
Pirenne, Henri, “The Formation and Constitution of the Burgundian State”, The Ameri-
can Historical Review 14 (1908/09): 477–502.
Rapoport, Yossef, “New Directions in the Social History of the Mamluk Era”, in St. Con-
ermann, ed., History and Society during the Mamluk Period (1250–1517). Studies of the 
Annemarie Schimmel College i (Bonn: Bonn University Press, V&R unipress, 2014), 
pp. 143–155.
Rapoport, Yossef, “Royal Justice and Religious Law: Siyāsah and Shariʿah under the 
Mamluks”, Mamlūk Studies Review 16 (2012): 70–102.
Roemer, Hans R., “Tīmūr in Iran”, in P. Jackson and L. Lockhart, eds., Cambridge History 
of Iran. Vol. 6. The Timurid and Safavid Periods (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986), pp. 42–97.
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
153Studying Rulers & States across 15th Century Western Eurasia
<UN>
Runciman, W. Garry, A Treatise on Social Theory ii: Substantive Social Theory (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
Sadowski, Yahya, “The New Orientalism and the Democracy Debate”, Middle East Re-
port 183 (Political Islam) (1993): 14–21, 40.
Savory, Roger M., “The Struggle for Supremacy in Persia after the death of Tīmūr”, Der 
Islam 40 (1964): 35–65.
Scheidel, Walter, “Chapter 1: Studying the State”, in P.F. Bang and W. Scheidel, eds., The 
Oxford Handbook of the State in the Ancient Near East and Mediterranean (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 5–57.
Schimmel, Annemarie, “Kalif und Kadi im spätmittelalterlichen Ägypten”, Die Welt des 
Islams 24 (1942): 1–128.
Schramm, Percy E., Herrschaftszeichen und Staatssymbolik. Beiträge zu ihrer Geschichte 
vom 3. bis zum 16. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann Verlag, 1954–1978).
Skocpol, Theda, “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research”, 
in P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer & Th. Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 3–38.
Skocpol, Theda, States and Social Revolutions: a Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, 
and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
Steinmetz, George, “Introduction: Culture and the State”, in G. Steinmetz, ed., State/
Culture. State-Formation after the cultural turn (Ithaca (N.Y.) and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1999), pp. 1–49.
Stilt, K., Islamic Law in Action: Authority, Discretion and Everyday Experiences in Mam-
luk Egypt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
Strayer, Joseph R., On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State (Princeton (N.J.): Princ-
eton University Press, 1970).
Strayer, Joseph R., The Reign of Philip the Fair (Princeton (N.J.): Princeton University 
Press, 1980).
Subtelny, Maria E., Timurids in Transition: Turko-Persian politics and acculturation in 
medieval Iran (Leiden: Brill, 2007).
Sümer, Farük, “Ḳara-Ḳoyunlu”, Encyclopaedia of Islam. 2nd Edition (Leiden: Brill, 
1960–2009), 4: 584–588.
Sweezy, Paul et al., The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism (London: Verso, 1980).
Tilly, Charles, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime”, in P. Evans, D. Rue-
schemeyer & Th. Skocpol, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 
pp. 169–187.
Tilly, Charles, Coercion, Capital, and European States, ad 990–1990 (Studies in Social Dis-
continuity vol. 1) (Cambridge (Mass.): Blackwell, 1994, or. Published 1990).
Tilly, Charles and Wim P. Blockmans, eds., Cities and the Rise of States in Europe, a.d. 
1000 to 1800 (Boulder [Color.]: Westview Press, 1994).
Tyan, Emile, Institutions du droit public musulman: sultanat et califat (Paris: Recueil 
Sirey, 1956).
Ullmann, Walter, Medieval Political Thought (Harmondsworth: Penguin books, 1975).
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
Dumolyn and Van Steenbergen154
<UN>
Van Steenbergen, Jo, “The Mamluk Sultanate as a Military Patronage State: household 
politics and the case of the Qalāwūnid bayt (1279–1382)”, Journal of the Economic 
and Social History of the Orient 56/2 (2013): 189–217.
Van Steenbergen, Jo, “‘Mamlukisation’ between social theory and social practice: An 
essay on reflexivity, state formation, and the late medieval sultanate of Cairo” (ASK 
Working Paper 22) (Bonn: Annemarie Schimmel Kolleg, 2015).
Van Steenbergen, Jo, “Appearances of Dawla and Political Order in late medieval 
Syro-Egypt. The state, social theory, and the political history of the Cairo Sultanate 
( thirteenth-sixteenth centuries)”, in St. Conermann, ed., History and Society during 
the Mamluk Period (1250–1517): studies of the Annemarie Schimmel Research College ii 
(Mamluk Studies 12) (Bonn: Bonn University Press, V&R unipress, 2016), pp. 53–88.
Van Steenbergen, Jo, “Revisiting the Mamlūk Empire. Political Action, Relationships of 
Power, Entangled Networks, and the Sultanate of Cairo in late medieval Syro-Egypt”, 
in R. Amitai & St. Conermann, eds., The Mamluk Sultanate from the Perspective of 
Regional and World History. (Mamluk Studies 16) (Bonn & Göttingen: Bonn Univer-
sity Press & V&R Unipress GmbH, 2019), pp. 77–107.
Van Steenbergen, Jo, Patrick Wing, Kristof D’hulster, “The Mamlukization of the Mam-
luk Sultanate? State formation and the history of fifteenth century Egypt and Syria. 
Part i: old problems and new trends”, History Compass 14/11 (2016): 549–559.
Van Steenbergen, Jo, Patrick Wing, Kristof D’hulster, “The Mamlukization of the Mam-
luk Sultanate? State formation and the history of fifteenth century Egypt and Syria. 
Part ii: comparative solutions and a new research agenda”, History Compass 14/11 
(2016): 560–569.
Vaughan, Richard, Philip the Bold. The Formation of the Burgundian State (London: 
Longman, 1962).
von Below, Georg, Der deutsche Staat des Mittelalters : eine Grundlegung der deutschen 
Verfassungsgeschichte (Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer: 1925).
von Gierke, Otto F., Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht (Berlin: Weidmann, 
1868–1881).
von Ranke, Leopold, History of the Popes, their Church and State, and Especially of their 
Conflicts with Protestantism in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (London: 
Bell, 1871).
Watts, John, The Making of Polities: Europe, 1300–1500 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2009).
Weber, Max, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Grundriss der Sozialökonomik iii. Abteilung) 
(Tübingen: Verlang von J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1922).
Weber, Max, Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, G. Roth & C. 
Wittich, eds. (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1968 
[1978]).
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
155Studying Rulers & States across 15th Century Western Eurasia
<UN>
Wittek, Paul, Das Fürstentum Mentesche: Studie zur Geschichte Westkleinasiens im 13.-15. 
Jh (Amsterdam: Oriental Press, 1967; reprint of Istanbul, 1934).
Wittek, Paul, The Rise of the Ottoman Empire: Studies in the History of Turkey, Thirteenth-
Fifteenth Centuries, C. Heywood, ed. (New York: Routledge, 2013).
Wittfogel, Karl A., Oriental Despotism: a Comparative Study of Total Power (New Haven 
(Conn.): Yale University Press, 1957).
Woods, John E., The Aqquyunlu. Clan, Confederation, Empire. Revised and Expanded 
Edition (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 1999).
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
<UN>
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
Part 2
From Cairo to Constantinople: The Construction of 
West-Asian Centers of Power
∵
<UN>
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
© kristof d’hulster, ���� | doi:10.1163/9789004431317_005
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.
<UN>
Chapter 3
The Road to the Citadel as a Chain of Opportunity: 
Mamluks’ Careers between Contingency and 
Institutionalization
Kristof D’hulster
In the weeks following the demise of the Mamluk sultan al-Ashraf Barsbāy 
in  Dhū l-Ḥijja 841/June 1438, although he was immediately—indeed 
automatically— succeeded by his son, al-ʿAzīz Yūsuf, there ensued a struggle 
for the sultanate.1 The protagonists here were the amirs Jaqmaq and Qurqumās. 
Of these two, it was the former who emerged victorious as the next sultan, al-
Ẓāhir Jaqmaq. His opponent, Qurqumās, paid dearly for his failed attempt, and 
was executed in December of the same year. It therefore appears that in spite 
of being succeeded by his son, Barsbāy’s death sparked off a struggle for the 
sultanate, and opened up the road to the citadel for a number of Mamluk con-
testants, all equally eager and seemingly equally eligible to force their way into 
the citadel and to become the next sultan.
While the short-lived sultanate of the fourteen-year-old al-ʿAzīz Yūsuf is in-
teresting enough in its own right, my focus here will not be the issue of under-
age rule and its common conceptualization as a mere stopgap in a faltering 
political system. In fact, neither this nor any other similar struggle in fifteenth-
century Mamluk history will be dealt with in much detail here. The reason why 
I refer to this episode nonetheless is that it provides the historical backdrop for 
the question raised in this chapter. My central question here is informed first 
and foremost by bringing together two seemingly disparate quotations: one in 
relation to the episode above, taken from Ibn Taghrībirdī’s chronicle, al-Nujūm 
al-Zāhira fī Mulūk Miṣr wa-l-Qāhira (“Stars that Shine among the Kings of 
Egypt and Cairo”); the other is taken from one of the famous speeches or ora-
tiones of the Roman author and politician Marcus Tullius Cicero, the De Lege 
Agraria contra Rullum (“On the Agrarian Law Proposed by Rullus”). Agreed, it 
1 This chapter was originally written in the context of the project ‘The Mamlukisation of the 
Mamluk Sultanate: Political Traditions and State Formation in Fifteenth-Century Egypt and 
Syria’ (UGent, 2009–14); this project has received funding from the European Research Coun-
cil (erc) under the European Union’s Seventh Framework ‘Ideas’ program (Starting Grant 
agreement No 240865).
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is a long way from Ibn Taghrībirdī’s fifteenth-century Cairo to Cicero’s first-
century bce Rome. Yet, as will be argued, juxtaposing these two quotations 
nonetheless makes sense, as bringing in the second allows me to problematize 
the first; and combined, they provide the perfect backdrop for the research 
question which I will introduce below.
1 From Ibn Taghrībirdī’s Cairo to Cicero’s Rome and Back: A 
Sultanate ex virtute or ex officio?
As already stated, Qurqumās was defeated by Jaqmaq, and his undoing was, in 
the words of Ibn Taghrībirdī, that ḥarraka Qurqumās li l-rukūb fī ghayr waqtihi: 
the fact that Qurqumās “had made his move untimely” or “at the wrong time”.2 
This quotation seems clear enough: the “time” Ibn Taghrībirdī was referring to 
was—obviously—a particular moment in the course of the struggle. Put dif-
ferently, Qurqumās’ problem was not that he was not entitled to make a move 
for the sultanate but that tactically, he did so at an ill-chosen moment during 
the struggle. In short, the author was saying that Qurqumās was eligible for the 
sultanate, just like Jaqmaq, but unlike Jaqmaq was a poor strategist.
However, in light of the second quotation, taken from Cicero’s De Lege 
Agraria, another possible interpretation emerges. In his oration, Cicero re-
ferred to the Roman cursus honorum, a strict sequence of four offices, each at-
tainable only at a certain age, and culminating in the office of consul. As such, 
this Roman cursus was an institutionalized course of honors, fixed first by pre-
cedence and later codified into a Roman lex. In this particular oratione, Cicero 
boasted that he had held each of the four successive offices suo anno, “at the 
youngest possible age”, thus having run through this cursus at maximum speed:
(…) I am the only one of all the new men whom we can remember who 
have stood for the consulship the first moment that by law I could,—who 
have been elected consul the first time that I have stood (…) (and) this 
honour which you have conferred on me, ha(s) been sought by me at the 
proper time.3
2 Ibn Taghrībirdī, Nujūm, 7: 30.
3 The full passage runs as follows: “You will find that those new men who have at any time been 
made consuls without a repulse, have been elected after long toil, and on some critical emer-
gency, having stood for it many years after they had been praetors, and a good deal later than 
they might have done according to the laws regulating the age of candidates for the office; 
but that those who stood for it in their regular year (quit autem anno suo petierint) were not 
elected without a repulse; that I am the only one of all the new men whom we can remember 
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By bringing into this discussion Cicero’s suo anno and the Roman cursus 
honorum,4 I suggest that we reconsider Ibn Taghrībirdī’s comment over the 
1438 incident, by problematizing the very referential meaning of the author’s 
“time”: was he perhaps referring not to a particular ill-chosen moment in the 
course of the struggle, but to a particular moment in Qurqumās’ personal ca-
reer? That is, was the problem not that Qurqumās was a poor strategist, but 
rather that he was not entitled to run for sultan in the first place, as he, unlike 
Jaqmaq, had not yet reached the proper career position to do so? As Cicero 
would have it, perhaps Qurqumās’ run for sultan was not suo anno, but “insti-
tutionally premature”?5
who have stood for the consulship the first moment that by law I could,—who have been 
elected consul the first time that I have stood (me esse unum ex omnibus novis hominibus de 
quibus meminisse possimus, qui consulatum petierim cum primum licitum sit, consul factus sim 
cum primum petierim); so that this honour which you have conferred on me, having been 
sought by me at the proper time (ad mei temporis diem petitus), appears not to have been 
filched by me on the occasion of some unpopular candidate offering himself,—not to have 
been gained by long perseverance in asking for it, but to have been fairly earned by my worth 
and dignity. This, also, is a most honourable thing for me, O Romans, which I have mentioned 
a few minutes ago,—that I am the first new man for many years on whom you have conferred 
this honour,—that you have conferred in on my first application, in my proper year (quod 
anno meo)” (Latin text : Cicero, M. Tulli Ciceronis Orationes, speech 2, chapter 2; English trans-
lation: Cicero, The Orations of Marcus Tullius Cicero). See also Wex, “On the Leges Annales of 
the Romans”, and, more generally, Beck, Karriere und Hierarchie.
4 Quoting Cicero is not to be read as an implicit claim that the Roman Empire and the Mamluk 
Sultanate, with their Praetorians and mamlūks respectively, converge in this way or any other 
(see Irwin, The Middle East in the Middle Ages, 7). There are striking similarities (such as the 
Roman tres militae and the Mamluk three-tier military ranking of amirs of 10, 50 and 100), yet 
such superficialities hardly warrant sweeping claims.
Nonetheless, more deliberate comparisons might prove rewarding. Alongside the amicitia-
khushdāshiyya parallel hinted at by Irwin (p. 89), one could compare, e.g., their commemora-
tive practices, by juxtaposing Roman epitaphs and entries on mamlūks in the biographical 
dictionaries, and exploring the way in which the cursus honorum are recorded therein. (See 
here e.g., Meyer, “Explaining the Epigraphic Habit in the Roman Empire”). Turning to the 
vexed issue of the Mamluk mode of sultanic succession (dynasty vs. tanistry, heredity vs. 
merit), why not consider the Roman case (an imperial dynasty vs. a “Republican façade”, a “de 
facto monarch” vs. a “de jure princeps”)? Didn’t Barqūq and Augustus, both “de jure” no more 
than primi inter pares, strive to found a dynasty around their respective households (the bayt 
Barqūq and the domus augusta)? Particularly enlightening here is Hekster, Emperors and 
Ancestors.
5 Throughout the chapter, “institution” is not to be understood in its broader sense, as a 
structure of social order, but rather as convenient shorthand for “formal political institu-
tion” (cf. Pierson, Politics in time, 104). It relates to political offices that come with a “form”, 
be that a diploma, a robe of investiture, a fixed seating or standing positions, etc., “formal” 
thus being understood, quite literally, as “having an outward form”, without implying (yet 
not precluding) “actual substance”. It is not without reason that I prefer to use “formal” 
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When confronted with the question as to how understand “time” in the 
given context, I argue that Mamlukologists will most likely go with Qurqumās, 
the “poor strategist”, and not with Qurqumās, the “institutionally premature” 
Mamluk. In their eyes, surely Ibn Taghrībirdī must have been referring to an 
ill-chosen moment in the course of the fight. Surely Qurqumās must have been 
“allowed” to play the game and run for sultan, just as Jaqmaq. Surely there was 
no Mamluk qānūn or yāsa, either written or unwritten, which, as an equivalent 
to the Roman lex Villia Annalis, would have stipulated temporal and institu-
tional constraints on the sultanate. Obviously, this is not to say that Mamlu-
kologists have thus far thought of the sultanate as something fully “uncon-
strained”, that is, open to all. Apart from the obvious numerical constraint (that 
is, that there can only be one sultan), scholars have rightfully observed that, if 
one was not the son of a sultan, one had to be a mamlūk in order to become 
one.6 So, at the very least, there must have been a “mamlūk constraint”.7 Writ-
ing in the 1930s, Gaston Wiet suggested that there was no other constraint on 
the sultanate than this broad “mamlūk constraint”; and that all mamlūks would 
be equally eligible to the sultanate: “C’est un monde bien étrange que ce milieu 
des Mamlouks, qui, presque tous, croyaient ‘porter dans leur giberne’ le sceptre 
du sultanat”.8 Finding the pool of eligible Mamluks to be slightly less broad, lat-
er Mamlukologists have amended this statement by adding more constraints, 
albeit still broad and/or ill-defined ones. One commentator, Levanoni, added 
an “amiral constraint”, stating that all amirs—and thus, by implication, only 
amirs—were eligible for the sultanate.9 Another, Holt, narrowed down the 
pool of eligible mamlūks to “the Royal Mamlūks, and indeed (to) a smaller 
(and in the following, as its opposite, “informal”) to other dichotomies found in the litera-
ture: this particular dichotomy, far more than the others, leaves open the question as to 
whether the “form” comes with actual substance or not (i.e. whether it comes with power in 
its own right or not). As this is precisely one of the questions dealt with here, this is a crucial 
subtlety. Unlike, e.g., “titular power”, “formal” allows me to label those aspects that I want to 
investigate in terms of agency, without already attributing some agency to them.
6 Sultan-caliph al-Mustaʿīn bi-llāh (r. 815/1412) is exceptional, in that he was neither a mamlūk 
nor the son of a sultan.
7 This constraint itself is hard to unpack; yet, prima facie, it must have subsumed a gender 
constraint (being male, not female), a military constraint (having a mamlūk military train-
ing), a social constraint (being part of a mamlūk network), and, perhaps, an ethnic/linguistic 
constraint. For a discussion of the spatial dimension to Mamluk identity, see Garcin, “The 
Regime of the Circassian Mamlūks”, 310; and especially Loiseau, “L’émir en sa maison”.
8 H. Munier & G. Wiet, Précis de l’histoire d’Égypte par divers historiens et archéologues: L’Égypte 
byzantine et musulmane (Le Caire : Institut français d’archéologie orientale du Caire, 1932), ii: 
238 (quoted in Holt, “The position and power of the Mamlūk Sultan”, 240).
9 Levanoni, “The Mamluk Conception of the Sultanate”, 376.
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inner circle of these”.10 Thus, in the eyes of Wiet, Levanoni and Holt, and argu-
ably, in the eyes of most Mamlukologists, Jaqmaq and Qurqumās, both “Royal 
Mamlūk” and ostensibly members of their “inner circle”, were equally eligible 
for the sultanate. Thus, for many Mamlukologists, the sultanate was not open 
to all, but it was at least open to both Qurqumās and Jaqmaq. Qurqumās be-
ing the worse strategist of the two, his failure was one ex virtute; Jaqmaq being 
the best strategist, his success was also ex virtute. Indeed, Jaqmaq is consid-
ered the “Heerkönig”,11 emerging victorious “from the coterie of contenders for 
the imperials office”,12 and from the “factional strife (that) remained the key to 
power”.13
Yet, I wonder, is that all there is to the matter? Is the sultanate truly at the 
mercy of an “institutionalized competition”14 among all those Mamluks who 
belong to the “inner circle of Royal mamlūks”? Unlike with the Roman cursus 
honorum, are there no more stringent and explicit constraints on the sultanate, 
be they temporal, institutional or otherwise?15 Was the mamlūk’s age, for ex-
ample, irrelevant when running for this or that office?16 Did not his previous 
10 Holt, “The position and power of the Mamlūk Sultan”, 241.
11 Sievert, “Family, friend or foe?”, 112, note 159.
12 Petry, Protectors or Praetorians, 20. This somewhat disparaging quotation should not be 
taken as a slight on an otherwise excellent monograph.
13 Levanoni, “The Mamluk conception of the sultanate”, 374. Chamberlain captures this as 
“political dexterity” (Knowledge and Social Practice in Medieval Damascus, 94: “As manṣabs 
[i.e., non-political offices] were not inherited or attained through examination, and there 
was no concept of a ‘right’ to them, acquiring and holding on to a manṣab was usually a 
reward for political dexterity”) while for Petry “adroitness” is the key term (Protectors or 
Praetorians, 79: “an effective, if brutal, system of mobility by merit that rewarded the 
adroit”).
14 Darling, “Political Change and Political Discourse”, 512. Obviously, this competition can be 
considered “institutionalized” only when the latter is understood broadly. Hence, this 
quotation by no means contradicts the gist of the chapter.
15 Another aspect hardly touched upon in discussions on mamlūk “career development” is 
“honor” and its counterpart, “disgrace”. In fact, ʿizza, nāmūs and related concepts remain 
grossly understudied, even though they deserve as much attention as (again!) their Ro-
man counterpart of dignitas.
16 As Garcin aptly put it, by the fifteenth century, “the initial rhythm of Mamlūk political life 
(had) much slowed down”, meaning that mamlūks “came to power later and later in life”, 
and, by consequence, those who made it to sultan all “belong(ed) to senior age groups”. 
(“The Regime of the Circassian Mamlūks”, pp. 293). However, we may suspect this to be a 
social constraint in temporal “disguise” (i.e., a strong social network), rather than a veri-
table temporal constraint (i.e., a stringent age requirement for the sultanate). For the (un-
related) issue of the age of sultan-sons, see, among others, Hirschler, “He is a child and 
this land is a borderland of Islam”; Stewart, “Between Baybars and Qalāwūn”; Van Steen-
bergen, “Is anyone my guardian…?”.
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tenures, their specific sequence and their respective terms matter the least 
when running for sultan? In all fairness, it must be acknowledged that, per-
haps, some Mamlukologists might beg to differ, arguing that Qurqumās’ failure 
makes sense, since the case of Qurqumās versus Jaqmaq is not just one of “in-
stitutionalized competition” among institutionally undifferentiated peers. 
These may have picked up a clue already left by David Ayalon in the 1950s. In 
his short entry on the atābak al-ʿasākir in the first edition of the Encyclopaedia 
of Islam, Ayalon stated that the atābak
became the most important amīr in the Sultanate, his functions (being) 
much broader than the name of the office indicates. For all intents and 
purposes he had become the sultan’s viceroy […] It was common, espe-
cially in the Circassian period, for him to succeed the sultan on the 
throne.17
Working from this observation and from other clues scattered throughout the 
literature—using information which is more often implicit than explicit and 
never detailed in any way—these Mamlukologists might have come to think of 
the office of atābak as the key to the sultanate, and might thus add the 
atābakiyya as another, more stringent constraint on the sultanate. For them, it 
might make sense that Jaqmaq made it to sultan, not Qurqumās. After all, it 
was Jaqmaq who held the atābakiyya at the sultan’s death, not Qurqumās! Yet 
while these Mamlukologists might think of the atābakiyya as the key to the 
sultanate, I believe that even they will be reluctant to recognize this institu-
tional constraint on the sultanate as a rule proper. Qurqumās’ failure may 
make sense, given Jaqmaq’s atābakiyya, but, surely, neither the former’s failure 
nor the latter’s success can be explained ex officio! Levanoni and Sievert offer 
two good cases in point here. In her entry on the atābak in the Encylopaedia’s 
third edition, thus updating Ayalon’s entry from the first edition, Levanoni 
does not think of the atābakiyya as a rule proper. Instead, she reduces it to a 
mere advantage: “In such periods of political transition (e.g. the death of the 
sultan), the atābak held an advantage in seizing power over other magnates 
holding positions in the sultan’s court”.18 For Levanoni, Jaqmaq remains first 
and foremost the “Heerkönig”, emerging victorious from the “institutionalized 
competition” among the “inner circle of Royal mamlūks”. The same observa-
tion holds true for Sievert. On the one hand, Sievert is careful to point out the 
17 Ayalon, “Atābak al-ʿasākir”; idem, “Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army iii”, 
58–59.
18 Levanoni, “Atābak (Atabeg)”.
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role of the atābak, “one of the old regime’s leading amirs”, who would often 
become “the real successor”.19 Yet, in the end, even for Sievert, when a sultan 
died,
several rivalising factions started to struggle for succession. As each fac-
tional leader, usually an amir of the highest rank (…) could only rely on 
his extended household as well as a number of clients (…) rivalising fac-
tions started to form and fight each other until the most powerful and 
shrewd amir could decide the conflict in his favour (and) became 
sultan.20
So it seems that, in spite of Ayalon’s cogent observations on the rule of the 
 fifteenth-century atābakiyya as an institutional constraint to the sultanate in 
the 1950s and 1960s, to date these observations seems to have been mimicked 
at best, downsized or at worst, even ignored. How to explain the apparent re-
luctance to think of the atābakiyya as a rule proper? Why can this only be—at 
most—a “rule”?21
I deal with this question in three successive sections: from ‘The atābakiyya 
as a “rule”’, through ‘A genealogy of reluctance’, towards ‘The atābakiyya as a 
rule in the making?’ As Ayalon’s statement has not been explicated to date, the 
first section of this chapter outlines the empirical basis that informed his state-
ment, by mapping the “road to the citadel” from an institutional point of 
view.22 Was it indeed “common for (the atābak) to succeed the sultan on the 
throne”? Answering this in the positive, that there is in fact a “rule”, I then ad-
dress the question of why this “rule” appears to not have been fully explicated 
nor considered in its broader ramifications, instead being mimicked at best, 
downsized at worst. Taking a reflexive turn in this second section, I offer a “Ge-
nealogy of reluctance”. That is to say, I explore the reasons why we—myself 
19 Sievert, “Family, friend or foe?”, 111.
20 Ibid., 109.
21 In the following, I capture the apparent reluctance to rethink the atābakiyya as a rule 
proper by referring to it as a “rule” with inverted commas. Thus, rather than identifying a 
verbatim quotation from an author, these inverted commas are used here as convenient 
shorthand for capturing this reluctance. For such use of inverted commas, known also as 
scare quotes, see Finnegan, Why Do We Quote, 50: quotation marks are “also used for ex-
pression an attitude to words, allowing participants to both use words and dissociate 
themselves from them. They could indicate that the speaker regarded something as (…) ‘a 
word that isn’t the exact word I want’, or ‘to indicate that they are using a word or phrase 
that they would not normally use’”.
22 Yalçın uses a similar metaphor when discussing the nāʾib al-salṭana in the early Mamluk 
period (“A path to throne among the Mamluks” [sic]).
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included23—tend to settle with a “rule” (that is, with inverted commas) at 
most. In the third section, I move “Towards the atābakiyya as a rule in the mak-
ing”. I reflect on the consequences of dropping the inverted commas and ex-
plore how this reframing comes to bear on broader processes of institutional-
ization and state (trans)formation in the Mamluk sultanate and beyond. 
Following some final thoughts are two supplements: first, an excursus on three 
further aspects relating to the atābakiyya; second, a table of atābak al-ʿasākirs 
for the period in question.
While a detailed study of Mamluk career trajectories and their possible con-
straints is a definite desideratum for future scholarship, it is beyond the scope 
of a short chapter such as this. For now, I focus on the upper end of the “road 
to the citadel” during the fifteenth century,24 and on the role of institutional 
constraints, to the exclusion of temporal ones.
2 The Atābakiyya as a “Rule”: An Institutional Reading of Fifteenth-
century Mamluk History
In this section, I explicate the pivotal role of the atābakiyya as observed by 
Ayalon and others, by laying out the empirical basis behind this observation. 
Whereas the inverted commas of this “rule” are dealt with in the following sec-
tion, here it is the rule itself that is unpacked. Rather than working backwards 
from the “rule”, I think it wise to work the other way around, starting from the 
data. I do this by looking at the pre-sultanic careers of Mamluk sultans through 
a strictly institutional lens, that is, by rewriting these social trajectories as se-
quences of offices held prior to accession. Do these sequences display a com-
mon institutional factor—either in terms of offices held or in terms of their 
respective chronological order—that moves beyond the sweeping category of 
being a “Royal Mamluk amir”, and thus add a more stringent constraint on the 
sultanate? To return to our Roman parallel, was there a Mamluk cursus hono-
rum, an institutionally fixed road to the citadel, with clearly identifiable steps 
23 In this section and elsewhere, I switch from the first person singular to the first person 
plural. This “we” is neither indicative of poor editorship, nor is it to be mistaken for a 
pluralis majestatis. Instead, it functions as a pluralis auctoris. Far from being a shallow 
attempt to eschew the more responsible “I” presentation, I use it most consciously for 
expressing particular understandings that are shared—or so I argue—by myself and 
other Mamlukologists.
24 As for its lower end, Garcin offers the generic observation that “promotions of grand 
amīrs generally followed ascending order of rank”, but he does not explicate this any fur-
ther (“The Regime of the Circassian Mamlūks”, p. 305).
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in a sequential order, each of which coming with their own possibilities for 
further promotion, and crowned as it were by the highest office of all, the sul-
tanate? If there is no such thing, then clearly, Ibn Taghrībirdī must have meant 
that Qurqumās was a poor strategist. If there is such a thing, then he might 
have meant that Qurqumās’ move was institutionally premature and that he 
had not ascended high enough up the cursus honorum to run for sultan.
Obviously, by reducing the sultans’ social trajectories to office sequences, I 
am making full abstraction of all other data available on these sultans, abun-
dant data that ranged wide in scope (financial means, military skills, piety, cha-
risma, pedigree, ethnicity, networks, physical characteristics, …), and that—I 
know all too well—must have mattered. Of all these types of “capital”, to use 
Bourdieu’s terminology, it is arguably “social capital” that has received most 
attention in recent years. This is deservedly so, for what mattered a great deal—
perhaps more than anything else—was the sum total of people whom one 
could engage/by whom one could be engaged,25 whether by invoking sanguine, 
marital, patrimonial, mamlūk, or some other type of ties. However, it is easy to 
feel blinded rather than elucidated when confronted with these abundant data 
on networks and other variables. An obvious way out of such a conundrum is 
to make abstraction , and this is the approach I take here. Using Algazi’s “hands 
off rule”,26 from all data available I will retain only the sequence of offices. It 
goes without saying that limiting myself to “institutional data” at the expense 
of other “extra-institutional data”, comes at a cost. Indeed, rather than a novel 
or valid paradigmatic “turn”, this could even be seen as an unwarranted and 
25 While the concepts of “friend” and “patron” might appear very different to the modern 
mind (the first one implying “equality” and the second one implying “inequality”), the 
Mamluks could express both these concepts with one and the same word, ṣāḥib. This 
observation immediately reminds us of Mauss’ seminal work on do ut des, “Essai sur le 
don” (for which, see, e.g., Algazi, Groebner & Jussen, Negotiating the Gift; Rustow, “Patron-
age in the Context of Solidarity and Reciprocity”; as well as the works of S. Gordon and I. 
Krausman Ben-Amos). On the Mamluk practice of gift giving, see mainly the publications 
of D. Behrens-Abouseif, E.I. Muhanna, and M. Springberg-Hinsen. Eychenne (in “Le bayt 
à l’époque mamlouke”, 277–283) offers an inspiring lexico-semantic study of the Mamluk 
vocabulary of “friendship” and “patronage” (compare to Hellegouarcʾh, Le vocabulaire 
latin des relations). A general discussion is given in Nicols, Civic Patronage in the Roman 
Empire, 2.
26 I borrow this phrase from Algazi (“Comparing Medieval Institutions”, 3), who, in another, 
yet reminiscent context, argues that “(s)ome of the advantages of the focus on institu-
tions would be familiar to any practitioner of the craft of history. Most importantly, it 
imposes a few useful limitations, a few simple ‘hands off rules’ for comparative historical 
research: No invocations of mysterious ‘mentalities’ to explain (….) No summary invoca-
tions of ‘culture’ as a summary explanation of differences between historical, differenti-
ated societies-not even of culture’s older sister, ‘religion’”.
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unwanted “re-turn” to the past! This pitfall, however, is duly recognized, and I 
return to it later on.27
Let me therefore consider, for example, the offices held by sultan al-Ẓāhir 
Khushqadam (r. 865–872/1461–1467) prior to his accession.28 Some time after 
being imported into the Egyptian domains in 815 or 816, aged 8 or 9, Khushqa-
dam was purchased by sultan al-Muʾayyad Shaykh, thus becoming a mamlūk 
kuttābī. Being then manumitted by Shaykh, he made it to mamlūk sulṭānī. In 
824, under the short reign of Shaykh’s son, al-Muẓaffar Aḥmad, Khushqadam 
rose to the rank of khāṣṣakī. During the sultanate of al-Ẓāhir Jaqmaq, Khushqa-
dam steadily kept climbing the ranks, moving from sāqī in 842, through ra’s 
nawba and amīr of 10 in 846, and amīr of 100 in Damascus in 850, up to ḥājib 
ḥujjāb and amīr of 100 back in Egypt in 854. In 857, at the onset of his sultanate, 
al-Ashraf Īnāl appointed him as amīr silāḥ. Immediately following the sultan’s 
death in 865, the latter’s son-successor, Aḥmad b. Īnāl finally appointed the 58 
year-old Khushqadam as atābak al-ʿasākir. At last, some four months later, 
atābak al-ʿasākir Khushqadam was able to oust the sultan-son al-Muʾayyad 
Aḥmad, and to seize the sultanate himself.
It is thus clear that Khushqadam’s last pre-sultanic office was that of atābak 
al-ʿasākir. As for the office itself, commonly translated as “commander-in-chief 
of the armies”, it is not necessary here to explain either its origins or its duties 
and prerogatives.29 Suffice to say that on the whole, the atābak had no duties 
“except those of leading the armies in action” (and in this capacity he could be 
replaced by the muqaddam al-ʿasākir or “(acting) commander of the armies”), 
and, generally, “sitting on the sultan’s advisory council”.30 What is interesting 
about the atābakiyya in the present context is the fact that this was the last 
pre-sultanic office held by a significant number of sultans in the period in 
question here (815/1412–901/1496, from al-Muʾayyad Shaykh, r. 815–824/1412–
1421, up to al-Ashraf Qāytbāy, r. 872–901/1468–1496). Out of a total of fourteen 
27 See Pierson’s observations on the role of prior expectations in research and on the need 
to “think through these” explicitly and carefully (Politics in Time, 7).
28 Succinctly presented by Ibn Taghrībirdī (Nujūm, 7: 687–689).
29 See ʿAbd al-Jawād, “Atābak al-ʿasākir fī l-Qāhira” (non vidi); Ayalon, “Studies on the 
 Structure of the Mamluk Army—iii”, 58–59 and 81–85; idem, “Atābak al-ʿasākir”; Holt, 
“The structure of government in the Mamluk Sultanate”, 53–55; Levanoni, “Atābak (Ata-
beg)”; and Popper, Egypt and Syria under the Circassian Sultans, 90–91. Cahen (“Atabak”) 
provides a general aperçu, while Eddé (“Quelques institutions militaires ayyoubides”, 
 163–174) deals with its Ayyubid precursor. References to the administrative manuals of 
al-Qalqashandī, al-ʿUmarī and al-Ẓāhirī can be found in these titles.
30 Popper, Egypt and Syria under the Circassian Sultans, 90–91.
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sultans,31 no less than eight had moved directly from the atābakiyya to the sul-
tanate: Shaykh, Jaqmaq, Īnāl, Aḥmad b. Īnal, Khushqadam, Yilbāy, Timurbughā, 
and Qāytbāy.32 As such, these eight sultans followed a precedent created by 
al-Ẓāhir Barqūq (r. 784–791/1382–1389 and 792–801/1390–1399), who, from his 
position as atābak al-ʿasākir, deposed the last puppet-sultan of the Qalāwūnid 
household in 784/1382, and subsequently proclaimed himself sultan.33 The 
 empirical data thus confirms the “rule” of the atābakiyya: as David Ayalon had 
already observed for the first time in the 1950s, clearly this office was indeed 
the key to the Mamluk sultanate.34 As already stated, the inverted commas of 
this “rule” will be examined in the next section. Before doing so, however, it is 
worthwhile to first elaborate on this “rule” by taking a closer look at the list of 
the atābak ʿasākirs for the period under scrutiny, tabulated at the end of this 
chapter.35
First, it appears that, as a “rule”, sultans are succeeded by their last atābak. 
For example, sultan al-Mustaʿīn is succeeded by his atābak Shaykh, Yūsuf b. 
Barsbāy by Jaqmaq, and Timurbughā by Qāytbāy. So the atābakiyya appears to 
have been the institutional key par excellence to unlock the gates of the cita-
del. The sources do in fact confirm this intimate link between the atābakiyya 
31 One should keep in mind that, of the total of 14 sultans, 5 were sultans-sons, who, as such, 
operated outside of the Mamluk cursus honorum. See the table for more details.
32 Of the many references, the most apt are Ibn Taghrībirdī, Nujūm, 6: 323, 7:423, 764, 822, 
825, 849, 865; Ibn Taghrībirdī, Manhal, 9: 58. The fact that Ibn Taghrībirdī’s father himself 
was the atābak just before the period in question (810–813/1407–1410) adds an interesting 
psychological dimension.
33 This is not to say that the office of atābak was not important before Barqūq. On the con-
trary, already before this time atābaks were often effectively the strongest of the Sultanate 
(think for example of Qalāwūn, atābak of sultan Salāmish b. Baybars in the 1270s). Yet, 
unlike atābak Barqūq, Barqūq’s predecessors continued to function under the legitimiz-
ing institutional umbrella of a Qalāwūnid dynasty, rather than claiming the institutional 
highest authority for themselves.
34 Brinner (“The struggle for power in the Mamlûk state”) correctly identified the move of 
Barqūq from atābak to sultan as a pivotal moment in history of the former office. Thus 
ending “the fiction that had grown up around the title of sultan”, Brinner continues, 
Barqūq had also “destroyed the significance of the office of the atābak so that thereafter 
it was essential for an ambitious amir to seize the sultanate for himself”. (“The struggle for 
power in the Mamlūk state”, 233–234). Somewhat carelessly worded, this statement may 
hence be easily misunderstood. Undoubtedly, what Brinner wanted to convey was not 
that the atābakiyya itself had become irrelevant, but rather that the atābakiyya ceased to 
be the highest office a mamlūk could aspire to obtain.
35 The number of references in the table has been kept to a minimum, and the dates are as 
accurate as possible. As for sultans’ sons, only those who made it to sultan are included, 
and their ages are given only when relevant. As for vacancies, only the longer ones are 
indicated explicitly, while the shorter ones can be inferred from the gaps in dates.
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and the sultanate. Immediately following sultan Yilbāy’s appointment of 
Timurbughā as atābak, “everybody was convinced that the power would even-
tually come to Timurbughā, and thus it happened (taḥaqqaqa kull aḥad anna 
l-amr yaʾūl ilayhi fa-kāna)”.36
A second observation relates to those cases where a “sultan-son” is involved. 
If a late sultan has a (grown-up) son, it appears that the same principle holds, 
only this time operating at an interval. First, the sultan is succeeded by his son. 
This sultan-son’s sultanate, however, is short-lived and before long, he is ousted 
by the atābak whom he “inherited” from his father along with the sultanate. 
Barsbāy, for example, is succeeded first by his son, Yūsuf, who is subsequently 
succeeded by their joint atābak, Jaqmaq. A second case in point is the sequence 
of sultan Jaqmaq, his son ʿUthmān and their joint atābak Īnāl.37 Thus rewriting 
the “rule”, I might say that sultans are succeeded by their atābak, either imme-
diately, if there is no son, or after a short interval, in case there is one.38
Admittedly, even when rewritten, this “rule” has its “exceptions”: three to be 
precise. Yet, as I argue, far from invalidating the “rule”, these exceptions cor-
roborate the importance of the atābakiyya. First, there is the succession of sul-
tan Īnāl by his son, Aḥmad, in 865, exceptional in that Aḥmad was both the 
sultan’s son and his atābak.39 As a matter of fact, al-Ashraf Īnāl appointed 
his  son and future sultan, Aḥmad, twice as atābak. The first time he did so 
36 Ibn Taghrībirdī, Nujūm, 7: 848–849.
37 As appears from the list, Khushqadam, Yilbāy and Timurbughā were not succeeded by a 
son. This may be due to the fact that they didn’t have a son when they passed away (in 
fact, only Khushqadam appears to have had one, aged 5 at the time of his father’s death), 
or because, by then, the sultans had come to realize that succession by a son (even as a 
mere stopgap) was no longer an option. Either way, this discussion has little bearing on 
the present question.
38 As already stated, the sultanate of sultan-sons lies outside the scope of this chapter.
39 This is exceptional in that Aḥmad appears to be the only sultan-son who was atābak at 
the time when the father-sultan died. Already in the 820s, al-Muʾayyad Shaykh had turned 
to this same “institutional ploy”, appointing his choice son, Ibrāhīm, as atābak. In that 
case, however, the son did not outlive his father but he passed away, aged 23, some 6 
months before Shaykh himself. As atābak, Ibrāhīm was succeeded in office by a mamlūk, 
Alṭunbughā al-Qurmushī (al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk 4: 477, 517; Ibn Taghrībirdī, Nujūm, 6: 476; al-
ʿAynī, ʿIqd, 1: 231). As sultan, Shaykh was succeeded for some 8 months by another son, 
al-Muẓaffar Aḥmad, aged “1 year, 8 months and 7 days” at the time of accession (al-
Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 4: 563).
Perhaps, Jaqmaq had appointed his son ʿUthmān, the future sultan, as atābak as well, but the 
evidence is limited to one single (?) reference to the latter’s tenure, in the list of office-
holders at the beginning of 857 as recorded in Ibn Taghrībirdī’s Ḥawādith (see Ibn 
Taghrībirdī, Nujūm, 7: 237, note l: “The atābak al-ʿasākir is Īnāl al-ʿAlāʾī al-Nāṣirī (i.e., the 
future sultan), and (wa) his Excellency al-Fakhrī ʿUthmān, son of sultan (Jaqmaq)”; see 
also Sievert, Der Herrscherwechsel im Mamlukensultanat, 124).
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 immediately following his own accession in 857. Yet, tellingly, this appoint-
ment was met with growing unease, and the very next day Īnāl felt obliged to 
rescind his son’s appointment.40 As Ibn Taghrībirdī explains:
The appointment of the sultan’s son to the position of atābak is an of-
fense against common usage (min kharq al-ʿawāʾid), for we haven’t heard 
of any of the rulers’ sons befalling that (…) The appointment troubled the 
people (shaqqa dhālika ʿalā l-nās). The sultan got word of that and he 
then set right his faux pas (fa-stadraka farṭahu), removing his son and 
appointing Tanibak instead.41
Five years later on, however, in 862, Īnāl was in a strong enough position to re-
appoint his son as atābak and to get away with it. In the same chronicler’s 
words,
At a time when the sky had become cloudless for the sultan, he finally 
achieved what he had aimed at all along (mā kāna fī gharaḍihi), without 
anyone contending, without word or talk (min ghayr munāziʿ wa-lā kalām 
wa-lā qāla).42
This time, Aḥmad remained in office until his father died, and then progressed 
directly from atābak to sultan. What should we make of these two appoint-
ments? First, it is clear that Īnāl was acutely aware of the fact that, by then, the 
dynastic principle of sultanic succession had yielded to a mamlūk principle, 
with “royal blood” no longer a match for a “mamlūk identity”. Second, and more 
specifically, he fully recognized the atābakiyya as the key element to the sul-
tanate’s new reality. As he hoped for his non-mamlūk son to truly succeed him, 
thus going against precedent, he thought he could enhance the latter’s chances 
by appointing him atābak, thereby—perhaps advertently—“mamlūkizing” 
him.43 In the end, Īnāl’s “institutional” efforts were nonetheless to no avail, as 
just four months later Aḥmad was deposed by his own atābak, the mamlūk 
Khushqadam. Ibn Taghrībirdī was somewhat caught by surprise over the quick 
downfall of al-Muʾayyad Aḥmad:
40 Ibn Taghrībirdī, Nujūm, 7: 425–426.
41 Ibn Taghrībirdī, ḥawādith, 318.
42 Ibid.
43 Jaqmaq appointed his son, ʿUthmān, as atābak because, according to Sievert, “he did not 
want to burden him with an inherited sultanate” (nicht mit dem “Makel” des ererbten Sul-
tanats belasten) (Der Herrscherswechsel im Mamlukensultanat, 124).
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Al-Muʾayyad [Aḥmad]’s reign came to an end most quickly, as if it had 
never been (…) in spite of the large numbers of his dependents (ḥawāshī), 
his vast possessions and the fact that he was [deemed] exalted in the 
souls of men (ʿaẓamatihi fī l-nufūs), as opposed to the other sons of rulers 
who had become sultan (al-mustalṭinīn min awlād al-mulūk) (…) and [in 
spite of] the fact that he had been made atābak in the days of his father, 
for all sons of rulers who were deposed [from the sultanate] were time 
and again overcome by [the one who occupied] the office of atābak (fa-
inna kull man khuliʿa min awlād al-mulūk mā ukhidha illā min jihat al-
atābakiyya), but this [man’s] father had not had any other atābak than 
his son.44
Hence, rather than an exception, this particular succession episode is a cor-
roborating variation to the “rule” of the atābakiyya as the key to the sultanate.
A somewhat bigger challenge is posed by the two other cases, the succes-
sions of Aḥmad b. Shaykh by Ṭaṭar in 824, and that of Muḥammad b. Ṭaṭar by 
Barsbāy in 825. These cases are exceptional in that here the sultan-sons are not 
succeeded by their respective atābak, whom they had “inherited” from their 
father. Instead, their atābak appears to have been “overruled” in his “claim” to 
the sultanate by another official, the niẓām al-mulk or “regent”. Unlike the 
atābakiyya, this was an occasional office given by a sultan to an amir in case 
the sultan-son was still underage.45 From an institutional point of view—that 
is, in light of the “rule” established above—it would make sense for this occa-
sional office to be combined with that of atābak, and indeed, Shaykh, Jānibak 
al-Ṣūfī and Jaqmaq46 combined the two offices. The cases of Ṭaṭar and Barsbāy, 
however, are the only examples in which the two offices were split rather than 
combined. First, under the sultanate of Aḥmad b. Shaykh in 824, Jānibak al-
Ṣūfī held the atābakiyya, while Ṭaṭar was the niẓām al-mulk of the sultan-son. 
The next sultan turned out not to be the sultan-son’s atābak, Jānibak, but his 
niẓām al-mulk, Ṭaṭar. Second, under the sultanate of Muḥammad b. Ṭaṭar in 
825, Jānibak first combined the atābakiyya and the office of niẓām al-mulk. Yet, 
44 Ibn Taghrībirdī, Ḥawādith, 396–397.
45 See Popper, Egypt and Syria under the Circassian Sultans, 90.
46 Jaqmaq is only referred to as the mudabbir al-mulk of Yūsuf b. Barsbāy, and not as his 
niẓām al-mulk (Ibn Taghrībirdī, Manhal, 4: 279), but I assume that the titles have become 
interchangeable by that time (the fact that Ṭaṭar, Jānibak and Barsbāy all held the two ti-
tles simultaneously might explain the confusion). Thorough research that disentangles 
the offices of mudabbir al-dawla, lālā, niẓām al-mulk, atābak, and the elusive amīr kabīr 
remains a major desideratum in the field (see, among others, Levanoni, “The Mamluk 
conception of the sultanate”, 383–384).
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
173The Road to the Citadel as a Chain of Opportunity
<UN>
the ‘jack-in-the box’ Barsbāy appeared on the scene and “finished him off insti-
tutionally”, by himself becoming the the niẓām al-mulk, and passing on the 
office of atābak to Ṭarabāy al-Ẓāhirī. In the end, it was niẓām al-mulk Barsbāy 
who succeeded sultan Muḥammad b. Ṭaṭar, and not the former atābak-cum-
niẓām al-mulk Jānibak or the later atābak Ṭarabāy. So, it appears, if the offices 
of niẓām al-mulk and atābak are split, it is the niẓām al-mulk who “overrules” 
the atābak. In relation to these last two episodes, there is a telling confusion in 
the sources regarding the offices held by the protagonists. In four instances, the 
niẓām al-mulks Ṭaṭar and Barsbāy are referred to as atābak. Ṭaṭar is referred to 
like this three times, all by Ibn Taghrībirdī .47 In his Nujūm, for example, the 
author stated that “the length of (Ṭaṭar’s) rule, since the death of al-Malik al-
Muʾayyad Shaykh until he himself died, was eleven months minus 5 days, of 
which ninety-four days as sultan and the remainder of which as atābak” (wa-
bāqī dhālika ayyām atābakiyyatihi).48 In the Manhal entry of Ṭarabāy al-Ẓāhirī, 
Ibn Taghrībirdī stated that “al-Malik al-Muʾayyad Shaykh died in the year 824 
and his son al-Malik al-Muẓaffar Aḥmad Abū l-Saʿāda became sultan after him 
[while] Ṭaṭar became his atābak and niẓām al-mulk”.49 As for Barsbāy, he seems 
to be referred to as atābak only once. According to Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, while 
on his deathbed al-Ẓāhir Ṭaṭar had designated his son Muḥammad as his suc-
cessor and had appointed al-dawādār al-kabīr Barsbāy as the atābak al-
ʿasākir.50 Apart from these four references, however, there is no further explicit 
proof of either Ṭaṭar or Barsbāy being appointed atābak, and, consequently, 
there is little reason to assume that they actually held this office.51 Why then 
are they still referred to as such? If anything, these references are clear proof of 
the utmost importance of the atābakiyya, and of its intimate link both with the 
sultanate and with the office of niẓām al-mulk. Both Ṭaṭar and Barsbāy had 
been the niẓām al-mulk to the sultan-son, and both eventually made it to be-
come sultan; surely, both of them must therefore have also been atābak, or—if 
not—might still be referred to as such, as an authorial lapsus! Leaving the of-
fice of niẓām al-mulk out of the discussion, one might say that, in a way, the 
47 The third reference, not given here, is Ibn Taghrībirdī, Nujūm, 7: 619–621.
48 Ibn Taghrībirdī, Nujūm, 6: 517.
49 Ibn Taghrībirdī, Manhal, 6: 373–378.
50 Ibn Ḥajar, Inbāʾ, 7: 425–426.
51 Not only the small number of references is suspicious, but also the context in which these 
references are found: mostly capsule biographies and obituaries, and not the day-to-day 
historiographical recordings. Moreover, for exactly the same timeframe, we find refer-
ences to other atābaks that are both more numerous and more explicit (see the table at 
the end of this chapter). Of course, ultimately, if these suspicions were found to be un-
founded, this would only corroborate my basic argument.
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connection between atābakiyya and sultanate was so strong that it worked 
“retro-actively”. For, if as a “rule”, atābaks become sultans, then all sultans (sul-
tans-sons excepted) must have been atābak prior to accession!
Recapitulating this section, I have thus far outlined the empirical basis of 
Ayalon’s generic statement, thus demonstrating the “rule” of the atābakiyya. 
Indeed, some exceptions notwithstanding, it is the atābak who becomes the 
next sultan. This “institutional turn” now needs to be followed by a “reflexive 
turn”: why, in the face of empirical evidence, are we52 Mamlukologists reluc-
tant to explicate this “rule” and to consider its broader ramifications? Why do 
we reiterate it at best, and downsize or omit it at worst? Why are we reluctant 
to drop the inverted commas of the “rule” and to think of it as a rule proper 
instead?
3 A Genealogy of Reluctance: The Circularity of Informality, 
Networks and Contingency
In the preceding section, I have demonstrated the potential of a strictly institu-
tional reading as a useful and valid tool. For one, it “suggests” insights which 
are easily confirmed by extra-institutional data. The fact that Īnāl, for example, 
twice appointed his son as atābak strongly suggests that he sincerely hoped 
that his son would succeed him. Indeed, Īnāl’s fatherly concern can be traced 
extra-institutionally as well. Moreover, not only does an institutional reading 
suggest or confirm extra-institutional data, it elucidates this as well, by adding 
novel and surprisingly clear-cut insights. Apart from suggesting that Īnāl want-
ed to see his son succeed him, the institutional reading clearly spells out one of 
the strategies to which the father-sultan turned in order to achieve this: a strat-
egy of institutional mamlūkization. To take another example, from an institu-
tional perspective, the split tenure of atābakiyya and niẓām al-mulk, involving 
Ṭaṭar and Barsbāy (as opposed to the combined tenure by Shaykh and Jaq-
maq), seems to spell doom, and indeed, the chronicles portray these two sul-
tanic successions as particularly messy and protracted. The case of Jānibak al-
Ṣūfī is especially revealing in this respect: from an institutional perspective, 
al-Ṣūfī’s defeat at the hands of Barsbāy is surely one of the bitterest ones 
throughout Mamluk history.53 At one point, all institutional odds were with 
Jānibak, and against Barsbāy: it was Jānibak who combined the offices of 
52 On the conscious use of this pluralis auctoris here and in the following section, see above.
53 For a biography, see Adriaenssens & Van Steenbergen, “Mamluk authorities and Anato-
lian realities”.
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atābak and niẓām al-mulk to Ṭaṭar’s son, it was he who was to be next sultan! 
Yet, against all institutional odds, in 1422 he ended up not in the throne hall of 
the citadel, but first as a refugee in Anatolia, and, finally, in 1438, as a severed 
head, stuck on a spear and paraded before sultan Barsbāy. What a turn of luck, 
if there ever was one! Of course, this particular story does not become nonsen-
sical if we leave aside its institutional dimension. Yet, one must agree, the bit-
terness of Jānibak’s defeat and the fact that, in spite of this defeat, he remained 
Barsbāy’s nemesis for many years become all the more clear by adding the in-
stitutional dimension as another useful layer of interpretation.
Yet, admittedly, however suggestive or elucidating an institutional reading 
may be, it has its obvious limits. Think for example of the bitter defeat of 
Jānibak at the hands of Barsbāy: while an institutional reading allows us to 
fully appreciate its bitterness, it falls short of explaining how this could happen 
or why. How could Barsbāy, a “mere” dawādār kabīr, “institutionally finish off” 
Jānibak, the atābak-cum-niẓām al-mulk, and gain the sultanate for himself? A 
second example is the cases of Yilbāy and Timurbughā: both were atābak to 
the previous sultan and as expected they did in fact become sultan. Yet, how 
come they were unable to remain in that position? While I argue that institu-
tions did matter and that, in fact, there were institutional constraints to the 
sultanate that moved beyond the sweeping category of “Royal Mamluk amirs”, 
it is clear that these facts cannot possibly tell the whole story. Hence, the time 
has come to bring in the extra-institutional data which so far has been missing 
from the discussion. By doing so, I will explicate some of the underlying as-
sumptions that, in my view, inform our understanding of fifteenth-century 
Mamluk socio-political culture. These assumptions,54 so I argue, lead to the 
ascendance of network analysis at the expense of institutional history, to the 
primacy of historical contingency at the expense of diachronicity, and, ulti-
mately, to the rise of “rules” at the expense of rules proper.
When bringing in the extra-institutional data, the question arises as to 
whether the institutional and the extra-institutional55 relate to one another, 
and if so, how. While the question of whether these two were related is readily 
answered in the affirmative by Mamlukologists, we seem to find the question 
of how this interrelation worked, however, much harder to answer. Especially 
for the fourteenth century, quite a few authors such as Chamberlain, Clifford 
and Van Steenbergen have grappled with this question. As I see it, their various 
54 Or, as Charles Tilly would put it, “pernicious postulates” (see Tilly, Big Structures, Large 
Processes, Huge Comparisons, 11).
55 “Extra-institutional” means “all that is not institutional” (itself a shorthand, it will be re-
called, for “formal political institutional”).
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understandings share first and foremost a dichotomous conceptualization of 
the institutional and the extra-institutional,56 being referred to as “nominal” 
and “factual”,57 “titular power” and “actual power”,58 “legitimate power” and “ef-
fective power” (being the “two sides of the same coin”),59 or “monetized hon-
our” and “political dexterity”.60 In fact, such dichotomous understanding is not 
alien to the sources, where it is rendered by the pair of ism, litt. “name”, or ḥiss, 
litt. “sound”, vs. maʿnā, litt. “meaning”. For example, someone might be said to 
be an ustādār “nominally” only, the “factual” ustādār being his ustādh (wa- 
waliya l-ustādāriyya ḥissan wa-maʿnāhu ustādhihi).
Ideally then, either side of the coin could serve as a proxy for the other, thus 
allowing us to use the “nominal side” to talk about the “factual side” and vice 
versa. In reality, however, we have found that the two sides of the coin don’t. 
The sources sometimes refer to “institutional bubbles”. In the most flagrant 
cases, the “two sides of the coin” have gone out of sync, and individuals are 
explicitly said to be in power mujarrad al-ism, isman, bi-l-ism or ḥissan, “in 
name only, nominally, in a titular manner”, while the maʿnā or “factual power” 
of their office resides with somebody else.61 Often, however, such cases are not 
marked explicitly. Barsbāy vs. Ṭarābāy is a good case in point here: while none 
of the protagonists are explicitly said to be in power mujarrad al-ism only, the 
sources do portray the gradual build-up of an “institutional bubble” and the 
losing party’s growing unease over this fact.62 However marked, what we take 
56 Hereby not implying that the various authors conceptualize these dichotomies in identi-
cal ways.
57 Brinner, “The struggle for power in the Mamlūk state”, 232.
58 Stewart, “Between Baybars and Qalāwūn”, 47 (with reference to the “potestas/nomen 
debate”).
59 Van Steenbergen, Order out of Chaos, 6–7. Alternatively called “institutions” or “the insti-
tutional framework” versus “the individuals that populated them” or “(socio-political) 
practice”.
60 Chamberlain, Knowledge and Social Practice in Medieval Damascus, 92, 94. Himself deal-
ing with non-political offices, Chamberlain recognizes the same mechanics at work for 
political offices.
61 Using ism, litt. “name”, said for example of caliph al-Muʿtaḍid bi-llāh (wa-laysa lahu min 
al-khilāfa illā mujarrad al-ism), of sultans Muḥammad b. Ṭaṭar, Yūsuf b. Barsbāy, and 
Yilbāy (ṣāra huwa sman fī l-salṭana wa-l-maʿnā li Khayrbak, the “factual sultan” being 
Khayrbak), and of kātib al-sirr Muḥibb al-Dīn b. al-Ashqar (bi-l-ism lā ghayr) (al-Maqrīzī, 
Sulūk, 4: 677, 1078; Ibn Taghrībirdī, Nujūm, 7: 839, 838; Ibn Taghrībirdī, Ḥawādith, 297, 610, 
614; Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ al-Zuhūr, 2: 79).
62 See for example Ibn Taghrībirdī, Nujūm, 6: 537–538. Following the death of Ṭaṭar and the 
joint removal of Jānibak by Ṭarābāy and Barsbāy, thus clearing the road to the citadel, 
these two protagonists had agreed that “the control of the government would be divided 
between them equally, and that no one would get preference over the other in any  matter”. 
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from these cases is that while they may be interrelated, the interface that 
links  them is not transparent and synchronous, but rather opaque and a- 
synchronous. Ideally, the “nominal side” would “name” “factual” power rela-
tions synchronously (that is, fully in sync with factual power relations) and 
transparently (with neat one-on-one correspondences). In reality, however, it 
seems to do so a-synchronously (that is, out of sync with factual power rela-
tions), and opaquely (that is, without neat one-on-one correspondences).
Conceptualizing the relation of the institutional and the extra-institutional 
as a dichotomy with a vexed interface, however, comes with serious conse-
quences. First, when we understand institutions as little more than opaque, out 
of sync or inferior alter egos to extra-institutional power, the question arises as 
to why one should study “institutions” in the first place. Finding this question 
difficult to answer, we Mamlukologists have tended to acquiesce to the old say-
ing that it is first and foremost “the man who makes the office honourable, not 
the office which dignifies the man”. Indeed, while we may still see these two 
sides as alter egos, eventually we settle on the extra-institutional side of things 
as the “superior” one.63 As Chamberlain formulated this programmatically:
Once we look for practices and strategies rather than institutions and 
rules, at the strategic rather than the taxonomic, we are in a much better 
position to exploit (politics and social life).64
Directing our attention there obviously comes at the expense of all things in-
stitutional. A second consequence which ensues from the first is that we have 
Before long, however, and in spite of their gentlemen’s agreement—indeed, in violation 
of it—, Ṭarabāy found himself next in line to be institutionally caught up by his onetime 
brother-in-arms. A bubble started to build, as the dexterous niẓām al-mulk Barsbāy gradu-
ally accumulated ever more factual power, draining this from atābak Ṭarābāy and thus 
disturbing the carefully negotiated balance of power. By the time that Ṭarābāy had “come 
to realize that the situation was the opposite of what he had hoped for”, the bubble had 
grown too large and was readily pricked by Barsbāy.
63 While Van Steenbergen readily acknowledges their interrelatedness and stresses the fact 
that neither can be properly analysed without the other, his “legitimate power” is explic-
itly said to come second to the “effective power”, the latter being referred to as the former’s 
“superior alter ego” (Order Out of Chaos, 7).
64 Chamberlain, Knowledge and Social Practice in Medieval Damascus, 178. In the words of 
Clifford (“Ubi sumus?”, 53), “Chamberlain has adopted Lapidus’ position on “institutional 
history”, arguing that an undifferentiated social formation can be better explained in 
terms of informal social networks than formal communal institutions”. This can be com-
pared to Sievert’s call for us to focus on “interpersonal relations between individual ac-
tors” (“Family, friend or foe?”, 118), and Van Steenbergen’s recent observations (“‘Mamluki-
sation’ between social theory and social practice”, 7–9).
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started to undervalue the individual agents’ respective offices (that is, the insti-
tutional structure in which these operated), and their institutional trajectories 
(that is, the previous career tracks that brought them there). Instead, we have 
come to focus on agents’ extra-institutional trajectories, by tracking the on-
going reconfiguration of their economic, social, cultural and symbolic capital, 
to the extent that the sources allow. Of these various types of capital, we have 
put social capital center stage, fueled in this by the nature of the sources and 
by our understanding of Mamluk society as a patrimonial one. The most ap-
propriate analytical tool for mapping social capital was found in network anal-
ysis. Hence, to a large extent, “informal network analysis” remains, in the words 
of Winslow Clifford, “the basic thrust line of Mamluk history”.65
As a third consequence, I argue that this preponderance comes at its own 
cost. In his sensitive Narrative Social Structure, Recep Şentürk made the— 
deceptively obvious—observation that social life “is by definition diachronic, 
since it involves sequential events”. Yet, he continues, social scientists “have 
paid little attention to the diachronic dimension of social structure (…) errone-
ously conceptualiz(ing) social structure as above and beyond time and consti-
tuted only by synchronic relations”.66 Alternatively, Şentürk calls for social 
structure to be embedded in diachronic time, although this is no easy task:
The major methodological problems in a study of structure through time 
(…) stem from the embryonic state of diachronic analytical tools in the 
social sciences. (….) The query for structures has remained synchronic in 
focus, thereby creating a gap between diachronic and synchronic analy-
sis of structures. A cross-temporal structure is produced by the enduring 
patterns of diachronic social relations between actors who are differenti-
ated from each other by virtue of time. Sociological research has concen-
trated for the most part on the structures produced by the enduring rela-
tions between social actors who are differentiated from each other, and 
thus stratified into different groups, by virtue of economic, social and 
cultural attributes. However, structural analysis of social relations cannot 
reach its full potential without developing methods to explore cross- 
temporal structures. Any analysis that ignores the passage of time and 
65 Clifford, “Ubi sumus?”, 53. Almost 20 years later, Rapoport observed that “the traditional 
paradigm of equilibrium achieved through the informal networks of the elite” still looms 
large (“New Directions in the Social History of the Mamluk Era”, 145).
66 Şentürk, Narrative Social Structure, 124. For a penetrating presentation of social scientists’ 
difficulty in infusing “structure” with “temporality”, and, vice versa, of historians’ difficulty 
in infusing “temporality” with “structure”, see Sewell Jr., Logics of History, a must-read that 
every historian should grapple with.
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the temporal constraints arising from it produces hypothetical and inau-
thentic images of social and discursive processes.67
Linking Şentürk’s observation with the above, where does that leave us? Clif-
ford’s observation that the study of “informal social network analysis” has re-
mained the “basic thrust line of history”, mutatis mutandis, implies that we 
have neglected diachronicity. Analyzing a network is first and foremost a ques-
tion of reconstructing and interpreting a network at a particular point of time. 
Indeed, in his state-of-the-art on Mamluk network analyses, Sievert acknowl-
edges this. Introducing a thoughtful presentation of various properties of net-
works (such as density, direction, and centrality, none of which imply a dia-
chronic dimension by definition), Sievert writes that:
Even proof of existence (of verifiable connections) alone does not neces-
sarily support far-reaching conclusions. Besides, evidence of a relation-
ship usually represents a snapshot in time, while its content, strength and 
other characteristics are subject to change.68
So it seems that while we know that struggles over the sultanate were fought 
not just over the late sultan’s deathbed, we have still found it hard to accom-
modate the long and protracted nature of these struggles into informal net-
work analyses. By consequence, we have tended to explain away the outcome 
of these struggles in terms other than of sequential events. As diachronicity 
was pushed aside by synchronicity, sequentiality saw itself outmaneuvered 
by what I refer to in this chapter—perhaps somewhat flippantly—as “histori-
cal contingency”.69 What I mean to convey here is the fact that we deem the 
67 Ibid. Starting from the “often-invoked but rarely examined declaration that ‘history mat-
ters’”, Pierson (Politics in Time, 2) calls for us to place politics back in time, and to work 
with “‘moving pictures’ rather than snapshots”. For a good introduction to institutional 
path dependency, see Schreyögg & Sydow, “Understanding Institutional and Organiza-
tional Path Dependencies”.
68 Sievert, “Family, Friend or Foe?”, 86 (italics mine).
69 This “contingency” is not to be misunderstood as “vicissitudes of fates”, which incidentally 
is the way in which Ibn Taghrībirdī referred to the endless reshuffling of offices (taqallubāt 
al-dahr, Nujūm, 7: 236). A “contingent event” is not an event which occurs as arbitrarily as 
a roll of the dice. Rather, it is an event which occurs “subject to unseen effects” (compare, 
e.g., the definition as found in Merriam-Webster). Said otherwise, the very fact that events 
are considered first and foremost as being determined by informal and ad hoc features—
features that are knowable only imperfectly and ex post facto to a large extent—this is 
what makes them “contingent”. Compare to Clifford’s observation regarding Chamber-
lain’s work (“Ubi sumus?”, 60): “(This) remains fundamentally indebted to Bourdieu’s 
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outcome of struggles to be determined by the agents’ informal and ad hoc fea-
tures first and foremost, while the institutional career track that brought them 
there is mostly left invalidated.
In my view, as these consequences feed back into the initial assumptions, a 
circularity is set off and offices and career tracks have a hard time escaping 
from this. While, at the onset, institutions may be considered only less (but 
thus still somewhat) important, they are easily caught up in this circularity and 
tend to recede to the background ever more, indeed eventually to vanishing 
point.70 This runaway logic thus leaves us with institutions that are little more 
than a wardrobe of khilʿas, ever more fancifully embroidered yet ever less em-
powering. Along the same lines, career tracks are seen as those long lists of of-
fices in the entries of biographical dictionaries, useful to us only when slicing 
up history in synchronic snapshots and when identifying the main players 
there and then.
Let me now return to the particular phrase that opened this chapter, Ibn 
Taghrībirdī’s fī ghayr waqtihi. As demonstrated in the previous section, it would 
seem that Jaqmaq’s victory over Qurqumās makes sense as being ex officio, for 
he, not Qurqumās, was the atābak. Hence, we could read Ibn Taghrībirdī’s 
“wrong time” as referring a point in Qurqumās’ career: as Qurqumās was not 
the atābak, his run for sultan must have been “institutionally premature”. How-
ever, I have also maintained that—even in spite of Ayalon’s statement and in 
the face of empirical evidence—we are reluctant to take the argument that far. 
Whence the reluctance? In light of the foregoing, I argue that this reluctance 
stems from our understanding of fourteenth-century socio-political culture, 
with its runaway logic of extra-institutionalism and contingency which spills 
over into our understanding of the fifteenth. Let me demonstrate this.
 basic understanding of social structures as a product of radically contingent action by 
self-reflective individuals rather than an ‘institutionalized call to order’”.
Neither my critique nor my subsequent call for sequentiality implicates a teleological 
reading of history, as I espouse the “global contingency” as described by Sewell Jr (Log-
ics  of History, chapter 3, “Three Temporalities. Toward an Eventful Sociology” 81–123, 
here 102: “The eventful conception of temporality, then, assumes that social relations are 
characterized by path dependency, temporally heterogeneous causalities, and global 
contingency”.)
70 In relation to the fourteenth century, a good case in point would be Van Steenbergen’s 
“The Mamluk Sultanate as a Military Patronage State”. Building on the work by Hodgson 
and Chamberlain, Van Steenbergen rethinks the Mamluk Sultanate as a military patron-
age state, which “eschews the idea of the polity as a unitary state and an institution that 
existed autonomously of its ruling elite”, instead seeing “the state or polity as no more 
than a fragile ‘collection of powerful households kept in check by the most powerful 
among them’” (194).
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Thus far, I have been talking about the “institutional”, which it will be re-
called is a shorthand for “formal political institutional”. Conceptualizing this 
“institutional” along the dichotomous line of thought relating to the fourteenth 
century, it makes sense to think of it as the “formal” side of the coin, as opposed 
to the extra-institutional as its “informal” side. Subsequently one can think of 
the institutional as the “formalization of the informal”.71 Tenures, titles, par-
ticular types of sartorial privileges, seating or standing position in assemblies 
or parades, and iqṭāʿ classes are thus recast as ex post facto “formalizations” of 
a priori acquired informal power.72 Consequently, it becomes increasingly dif-
ficult to think of institutions as strong rather than weak, as empowering in 
their own right, instead of merely reflections of power. Likewise, careers are 
reduced to a progression of historical contingencies, constrained only infor-
mally, and not (also) as a formally constrained sequence of events. Hence, we 
surely cannot explain the fact that atābak Jaqmaq makes it to sultan (also) 
from a formal and sequential perspective as something ex officio (that is, on 
account of his last pre-sultanic office and of the institutional career track that 
brought him there). Rather, we can (only) do so from an informal and a contin-
gent perspective as something ex virtute (that is, by the fact that, apparently, 
there and then, it was he who happened to have the strongest informal capital 
configuration, due to a larger network, more money to spend, a greater cha-
risma, etc.). Jaqmaq’s victory must be seen as the latest of a progression of his-
torical contingencies, not as the last of a formally constrained sequence of 
events. At best, his atābakiyya is still considered an “advantage” (as under-de-
fined as this may be); at worst, it is not even considered, and atābak Jaqmaq is 
left to emerge victoriously “from a coterie of contenders”.73
Concluding, let me stress that I see no particular reason to make a case for 
re-evaluating our understanding of the fourteenth century. Neither do I ques-
tion the validity of network analysis as a useful tool to map a concept which 
mattered a great deal, namely social capital. I merely argue that we should not 
71 For a similar use of a ṣūra vs. maʿnā (“appearance” vs. “reality”) dichotomy, this time in-
formed by an Ottoman poem and applied to Ottoman-Mamluk diplomacy and to the 
history of diplomatic protocol in general, see D’hulster, “Fixed Rules to a Changing 
Game?” To return to the Romans once more, compare with Kunkel & Wittman, Staatsord-
nung und Staatspraxis der römischen Republik.
72 Compare to Chamberlain, for example, who thinks of the institutional as monetized hon-
ors in reward of political dexterity. Institutions are thus ex post facto translations of a priori 
established power relations.
73 It is quite telling, for example, that a monograph on the last two great Mamluk sultans, 
Qāytbāy and Qānṣūh, fails to record their last pre-sultanic office. All one learns is that 
they were amirs of 100 (Petry, Protectors or Praetorians, 14, 20).
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
D’hulster182
<UN>
allow our understanding of the fifteenth century to be caught up in this run-
away logic, as what happened to institutions and career tracks in the preceding 
paragraphs, and, indeed, as what happens to us, when we—in the face of em-
pirical evidence—are reluctant to drop the inverted commas of the “rule”. 
However founded and cautious the basic assumptions regarding the four-
teenth century may be, they trigger a circularity, and it becomes ever more 
difficult for analyses of fifteenth-century institutions and careers to escape 
from this, thereby making it ever more difficult for us to detect possible institu-
tional or sequential changes.
4 Towards the Atābakiyya as a Rule in the Making? “Endowing messy 
past realities with new meanings”74
In the first section, I have dealt with the question as to why Ayalon considered 
the atābakiyya as a key to the sultanate. Next I answered the question as to why 
we are reluctant to call this a rule proper, by exploring how we have come to 
think of the road to the citadel as a “historically contingent progression of 
events”, rather than as an “institutionally constrained sequence of events”. We 
are therefore now in a much better position to appreciate the institutional 
reading of the first section, and to understand exactly what such a reading of-
fers. It infuses our understanding of fifteenth-century Mamluk socio-political 
culture with an explicit institutional and sequential dimension, thus allowing 
institutions and careers to break free from the circularity argued above. As 
such, it enables us to re-think these as (at least potentially) strong and (at least 
partially) institutionally constrained. It also lets us yield to Ayalon’s statement 
and to the empirical evidence that informed this, and thus—at last!—to drop 
the inverted commas of the “rule”. Hence, in this section, I start by discussing 
in more detail what it takes for offices to be “strong” and for “careers” to be in-
stitutionally constrained. Next, I ponder the consequences of that understand-
ing for the wider framework of institutionalization and state (trans)formation 
in the Sultanate of Cairo and beyond.
As one of the few examples of genuine social network studies of cross- 
temporal structures, Şentürk, quoted above, refers to Harrison White’s 1970 
monograph, Chains of Opportunity, System Models of Mobility in Organiza-
tions. In his work, to which the present chapter owes more than its title, White 
 analyzed the structure of opportunity in large organizations as “chains of up-
ward moves sequentially ordered in time”. In its own idiosyncratic way, the 
74 Paraphrasing Algazi, “Comparing Medieval Institutions”, 12.
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 institutional reading offered here does precisely that. By infusing the sequen-
tial approach, much undervalued in social network studies, this reading allows 
us to rethink the “road to the citadel” and Mamluk careers in more novel terms 
as “chains of upward moves”. Atābak Īnāl becoming sultan is now no longer the 
historically contingent outcome of a power struggle, but rather the last move 
in a long social sequential trajectory. A sequential perspective reveals that the 
battle over the sultanate following Jaqmaq’s death in 857 did not start over 
Jaqmaq’s deathbed but was concluded over it! In other words, it points to the 
fact that Īnāl was already well on his way, indeed, well-nigh unstoppable, in 
reaching the citadel, already ten years before, when sultan Jaqmaq appointed 
him atābak al-ʿasākir.
Obviously, “re-cognizing” Mamluk careers as upward moves sequentially or-
dered in time rather than as historically contingent events is one thing. Re-
thinking these moves as actually institutionally constrained is yet another. At 
this point, institutions may still be thought of as “weak”, that is as little more 
than rather faltering reflections of the ups and downs of individuals’ informal 
capital. What we have established thus far is that Īnāl’s atābakiyya and subse-
quent sultanate are part of a long chain of events, not that his atābakiyya was 
a form of capital in its own right, which, in tandem with other types of capital, 
propelled him towards the sultanate. While the old saying that “it is the man 
who makes the office honourable” may still hold true, in order to retain “insti-
tutional constraints” as a meaningful analytical tool we need offices that, in 
their turn, “dignify the man”. For this approach to work, we need offices that are 
more than just names, or ever more fanciful khilʿas, larger iqṭāʿs and better 
seats at the sultan’s majlis, which all, in the end, are reducible to ex post facto 
reflections of social mobility. In order to retain these constraints we need 
“strong” offices: offices that do not just “reflect social mobility, but determine 
its velocities as well”.75 In short, what we are looking for are offices that come 
with their own, new sort of capital, still inter-convertible with other, informal 
75 Hudson & Rodríguez, “Preface”, xi. In other words, offices that not just “communicate” (or 
“say”, “reproduce”, “express”, etc.) an individual’s existing informal capital configuration, 
but “perform” it (or “do”, “produce”, “empower”, etc.). Compare to Bodenhorn & vom 
Bruck’s discussion of the anthropology of names and naming (“Entangled Histories”, 4–5); 
and Searle, who argued that “the essential role of human institutions and the purpose of 
having institutions is not to constrain people as such, but, rather, to create new sorts of 
power relations. Human institutions are, above all, enabling, because they create power, 
but it is a special kind of power. It is the power that is marked by such terms as: rights, 
duties, obligations, authorizations, permissions, empowerments, requirements, and certi-
fications” (“What is an Institution?” Journal of Institutional Economics (2005): 1–22, here 
p. 10, quoted in Humfress, “Institutionalisation between Theory and Practice”, 27).
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types of capital, yet not reducible to these. For lack of a better term, I suggest 
we call this new type of capital “institutional capital”.76
It is important to realize that in order to do so, this actually requires us to 
part with the metaphor of Mamluk socio-political culture as a two-sided coin. 
Rather than a one-dimensional dichotomous pair, socio-political culture is re-
cast here as a multi-dimensional configuration of social, cultural, symbolic, 
economic and institutional capital, all of which are interrelated and inter- 
convertible, yet not reducible to one another. This novel conceptualization 
provides us with a plausible way to come to terms with a wide array of  episodes, 
both moments that are “institutionally uncomplicated” (such as Jaqmaq’s suc-
cessful transition from atābak to sultan) as well as “institutionally complicat-
ed” incidents (such as atābak Timurbughā’s failed sultanate, non-atābak 
Barsbāy’s successful sultanate, or the atābakiyya of sultan Īnāl’s son). The novel 
conceptualization does not claim that Jaqmaq made it sultan only because of 
his atābakiyya. All that it maintains is that, in sum total, Jaqmaq was the stron-
gest man, and that the atābakiyya may have been what gave him the edge over 
his other competitors. For all we know, Qurqumās may have been stronger 
than Jaqmaq economically, socially, culturally or symbolically. Yet, in total, the 
balance tipped in favor of Jaqmaq, and it might have been his institutional 
capital that made the difference. As for Barsbāy, as he had not been sultan he 
might be thought of as institutionally weak. Yet, he made it to sultan after all, 
because the sum total of his capital outweighed that of his competitors. For all 
we know, he may have been a better networker or a more charismatic individ-
ual than the atābak. How can we explain Timurbughā’s smooth move from 
atābak to sultan, followed by his quick downfall at the hands of Qāytbāy? Ini-
tially, what gave Timurbughā the edge over all other competitors and what 
gained him the sultanate might have been his institutional capital, that is the 
simple fact that he was the previous sultan’s atābak. His untimely downfall at 
the hands of Qāytbāy could then be explained by the fact that, Timurbughā 
was fairly weak in terms of other types of capital, or at least weaker than 
Qāytbāy. By being appointed by Timurbughā as his atābak, Qāytbāy’s institu-
tional capital boosted, now tipping the total balance in his favor. Finally, we 
76 Compare to Bourdieu’s concept of “capital étatique”, referring to the elaboration of bu-
reaucratic institutions and the channeling of resources and access to power through 
these institutions, which become divorced from their original dependence on the person 
of the ruler. Bourdieu coined the term, yet left it to others to turn this into an applicable 
analytical tool. For one such exercise, hardly relevant in the given context, see, e.g., Casey, 
“Defining Political Capital”.
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can now also re-evaluate Īnāl’s appointment of his son as atābak. Whatever the 
father-sultan hoped to achieve, clearly this was not something that he thought 
he could achieve in a different way. Indeed, he must have thought of the 
atābakiyya as a strong office: an office that not only gave its holder a financial 
(and thus a social, cultural…) boost, but that added something irreducible to 
other types of capital.
This chapter does not make the sweeping claim that institutions “ruled”. In-
stead, it maintains more modestly, that institutions started to “matter” in the 
fifteenth century in novel ways. Even so, if we come from the mindset that is 
informed first and foremost by synchronically oriented informal network anal-
yses, thinking about Mamluk offices in terms of “institutional capital” may re-
quire no less than a “leap of faith”. Obviously, this is no great surprise. As Hugh 
Heclo rightfully observed, “to think institutionally is to stretch your horizon 
backwards and forwards so that the shadows of both past and future lengthen 
into the present”.77 In other words, this leap may be less daunting when we re-
alize that more than anything else, we are really talking about processes of in-
stitutionalization. We should be looking not for institutions per se but for “frag-
ile, emerging and wannabe-institutions”,78 not for codified rules but for 
practices of the “actual making of institutions (and of the) construction of 
their meaning”.79 As Gadi Algazi puts it:
(Institutional processes) occur only partly ‘in real time’; a significant part 
of the process happens ex post facto, as messy past realities are endowed 
with new meanings, as improvised practices are formalized and regular-
ized after the fact in ways that may not have been possible within their 
actual, contingent contexts.80
When looking for an apt term to capture this process of institutionalization, it is 
worth considering a recent article, written together with Jo Van Steenbergen and 
Patrick Wing, which posited a remarkably similar hypothesis, albeit along very 
different lines. In that article, we return to the concept of “Mamlukization”, as it 
was coined by Ulrich Haarmann to refer to the “long process of the erosion of the 
non-Mamluk elites’ power to the benefit of the sultan and the royal mamlūks 
77 Heclo, On thinking institutionally (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 109, quoted in Hum-
fress “Institutionalisation between Theory and Practice”, 29.
78 Algazi, “Comparing Medieval Institutions”, 15.
79 Ibid., 14.
80 Ibid., 12.
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who underpinned the system”.81 While this process of “Mamlukization” appears 
most saliently in the position of the sultan, we have hypothesized that it is part 
of a broader development of a “cultural (re)production of a ‘truly’ Mamluk 
state”, where identities, memories and repertoires of mamlūk-ness acquired 
‘statist’ meaning and value, referring now to powerful socio-political tools for 
distinction and entitlement, rather than to household bonding and military 
organization.82 As part of this development, loyalties increasingly came “to re-
side with the institutional order itself, rather than with a particular sultan’s 
household”.83 While Mamluks were still very much mamlūk—somebody’s 
mamlūk, somebody’s khushdāsh, somebody’s ustādh, loyal to and bound by 
personal networks—at the same time, they were turning “Mamluk” as well, 
that is, committed to a higher institutional order of Mamluk-ness.84 Or in other 
words—double-entendre intended!—mamlūk was being capitalized as 
Mamluk.
Rephrasing these re-centered “loyalties” along the lines set out in this chap-
ter, one could state that Mamluk careers gradually escaped from the logic of 
the sultan’s household and moved towards a new logic of the “Mamluk house 
of state”.85 No longer (only) determined by historically contingent patronage, 
Mamluk careers were in the process of turning into cursus honorum, a se-
quence of (partially) institutionally constrained events. What was Īnāl doing 
through the “mamlūkizing” appointment of his son as atābak? He was bending 
81 Haarmann, “The Mamluk System of Rule”, 22, quoted in Van Steenbergen, Wing & 
D’hulster, “The Mamlukisation of the Mamluk Sultanate? Part i” and “Part ii”, here “Part 
ii”, 565.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Apart from Bourdieu, compare this to Weber’s concept of “sanctification of acquired 
rights” (“Social strata, privileged through existing political, social, and economic orders…. 
wish to see their positions transformed from purely factual power relations into a cosmos 
of acquired rights, and to know that they are thus sanctified” (Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft) 
quoted in Wacquant, “On the Tracks of Symbolic Power”, 1), and to Schreyögg & Sydow’s 
take on institutionalisation as a transformative and self-reinforcing process (“the evolve-
ment and stabilization of social hierarchies have been explained by self-reinforcing pro-
cesses (…). Status hierarchies, for instance, once established, unfold self-reinforcing dy-
namics because the status of individuals determines how other individuals perceive and 
evaluate their behavior”; “the process starts with agency, an intended individual or collec-
tive action, which is enabled or constrained by structures and triggers reactions that 
transform the process into a dynamic reaction system beyond individual intentions”) 
(“Understanding Institutional and Organizational Path Dependencies”, 4, 8).
85 Paraphrasing Bourdieu’s “From the King’s House to the Reason of State”. Compare to 
Bourdieu, “Rethinking the State” (especially “From Honor to Cursus Honorum”, 10–12).
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the extra-personal logic to his advantage, in order to pursue his own household 
logic. What about those appointments and promotions that are referred to in 
the sources as dufʿatan wāḥidatan, “in one jump”?86 For example, when an 
amir of 100 is said to be appointed as ḥājib ḥujjāb “in one jump”, how else can 
we understand this than by the fact that, apparently, there was an extra- 
personal, Mamluk logic, against which a personal, mamlūk logic could be 
weighed…
5 On the Road Again…
By way of conclusion, let me return one last time to Ibn Taghrībirdī’s ghayr 
waqtihi, “the wrong time”. Are we now in a position to decide what “time” the 
author was referring to? Did he—or should we—think of Qurqumās as as valid 
a candidate for the sultanate as Jaqmaq was, yet a strategist much worse? Or 
did he rather think of Qurqumās as institutionally premature for the sultanate, 
as he was not an atābak? Concluding the previous section, I have referred to 
the expression dufʿatan wāḥidatan, and I have highlighted its important impli-
cation that the “road to the citadel” was (becoming) institutionally constrained. 
In this light, we might see Qurqumās as being institutionally unfit for the sul-
tanate. Yet, the crux of the matter here might be the fact that the expression 
dufʿatan wāḥidatan is a double-edged sword. For the phrase also implies some-
thing else: that these institutional constraints could still be overruled person-
ally. Perhaps no longer subject to personal whims alone, the road to the citadel 
was still very much open to personal interventions. It is in this second light 
that we might still think of Qurqumās’ failed run as a historical contingency. 
Although it is hard to substantiate, it is tempting to read the tension expressed 
by the double-edged sword of dufʿatan wāḥidatan in one of Ibn Taghrībirdī’s 
statements. Following the enumeration of the main office-holders of the year 
866/1461–1462, the annalist’s conventional opening of a new year, the author 
concludes: “We have mentioned them (…) according to their station and their 
seat at the sultan’s majlis (bi-ḥisb manāzilihim wa-julūsihim bi-majlis al-
sulṭān)”.87 I cannot tell what we should make of the pair of manzil and julūs, 
but this does suggest that there is more than just one velocity to Mamluk ca-
reers, one institutional (cursus honorum) and one extra-institutional (social 
mobility).
86 See the excursus for more details.
87 Ibn Taghrībirdī, Ḥawādith, 411.
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To reiterate, this chapter does not posit that institutions “ruled”, let alone 
that these “overruled” extra-institutional aspects. Rather, it maintains that in-
stitutional constraints “started to matter”. As a working hypothesis, the chap-
ter posits a process of “Mamlukization”, which above all involves institutional 
constraints in the making. Elaborating on the metaphor of the “Mamluk house 
of state”, the chapter sees this as an old house under reconstruction more than 
anything else. The process in question is a gradual, on-going and imperfect 
 refurbishing, “Mamluk style” this time, of the sultan’s household. It is eclec-
tic and erratic, with rooms being added, restyled or neglected. One room— 
probably in the back—is taken up by the Abbasid caliph. In another room, we 
find a fairly well kept Barqūqid vestiary, while next to it there is a dusty 
Qalāwūnid larder.88 On a more moderate scale, this chapter hopes to have re-
vealed and problematized some of the assumptions that continue to inform 
Mamluk socio-political studies, and to have highlighted the potential inherent 
in explicitly infusing these with an institutional and diachronic dimension, 
alongside (and thus not at the expense of) the extra-institutional and net-
works. Wang and Polillo perhaps give the best description of what this future 
research agenda might look like:
The relationship between informal and formal power in organizations 
is an unceasingly fascinating research topic. Unfortunately, the cur-
rent artificial separation between network analysis and organization 
studies as two subfields has slowed the study of the cross-fertilization 
of power resided in networks and organization. (…) The question then 
becomes how positional power that derives from structural positions in 
exchange networks differs from the one that is embedded in organization 
hierarchies.89
In a way, this chapter is as much about Mamluks as it is about Mamlukologists, 
or—putting this more modestly—as much about Qurqumās and Jaqmaq as it 
is about the present author. For the Mamluks, the road to the citadel must have 
been a long and winding one, both empowering and constrained ever more 
as they advanced. So too is this road for us today, as we are trying to endow 
Mamluk “messy past realities with new meanings”. And so we are on the road 
again….
88 This metaphor draws its inspiration from Van Steenbergen, “‘Mamlukisation’ between so-
cial theory and social practice”, passim.
89 Wang & Polillo, “Power in Organizational Society: Macro, Meso and Micro”, 56.
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 An excursus on the atābakiyya: opportunities seized, 
enhanced, missed
While the “road to the atābakiyya” itself, with its various bifurcations and dead 
ends, falls outside the scope of this chapter, three observations merit a brief 
discussion. Undoubtedly, more—but probably not that much more90—could 
be said about the fifteenth-century atābakiyya itself, but that will have to be 
saved for another occasion.
First, how did one become atābak? In brief, while the atābakiyya appears to 
have put one in the institutional “pole position” when running for sultan, the 
way to gain the atābakiyya itself seems to have been somewhat more “open 
institutionally”. Of all 28 atābaks attested for our period, 12 moved there from 
the office of amīr silāḥ, 5 from that of amīr majlis and 2 from that of amīr ākhūr 
kabīr. An institutional reading thus suggests that these three offices were the 
most common starting position when running for atābak, and indeed this new 
“rule” is confirmed by a comment in the chronicles. There were only two 
dawādārs who made it to the office of atābak dufʿatan wāḥidatan, “in one 
jump”: Barsbāy, whose career, as said before, truly skyrocketed from an institu-
tional perspective; and Īnāl. When the latter moved from dawādār to atābak 
“in one jump”, thus skipping the step of amīr silāḥ, amīr majlis or amīr ākhūr 
kabīr, Ibn Taghrībirdī stated:
Because of the appointment of (dawādār) Īnāl to the atābakiyya, there 
was a lot of backbiting (kalām kathīr fī-l-bāṭin), as the sultan had ad-
vanced him to the detriment of (qaddamahu ʿalā) the amīr silāḥ Timrāz 
al-Qurmishī, the amīr majlis Jarbāsh al-Karīmī and the amīr ākhūr 
Qarāqujā, all of them Ẓāhirīya Barqūqīya, even though one was (normal-
ly) transferred to the office of atābak from (one of) their offices, and not 
from the office of dawādār (wa-waẓāʾifuhum ayḍan taqtaḍī l-naql ilā al-
atābakiyya bi-khilāf al-dawādāriyya).91
90 It comes as little surprise that the major drawback to probing more closely into the 
atābakiyya is the sultan-centeredness of the chronicles. Compare, e.g., in UGent’s MP3 
database the number of sultan-related interactions recorded (4,307 out of a total of 11,471) 
with that of atābak-related interactions (a meager 325!). The nāʾib of Damascus fares 
slightly better than the atābak (396 interactions), the dawādār slightly worse (315 
interactions).
91 Ibn Taghrībirdī, Ḥawādith, 86–87. See also Ibn Taghrībirdī, Nujūm, 7: 424: “He was the 
dawādār until al-Ẓāhir (Jaqmaq) transferred him to the position of atābak al-ʿasākir in 
the Egyptian domains in one jump (dufʿatan wāḥidatan)”. Apart from this, quite some 
other career moves were referred to as surprisingly dufʿatan wāḥidatan, including the 
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This quotation proves that, even below the level of the atābakiyya, there 
were institutional constraints on Mamluk career trajectories. Clearly, these tra-
jectories were not as fully contingent as commonly assumed, but were institu-
tionally constrained in some way, and to some extent. The cumbersome exer-
cise of rewriting a large number of Mamluk careers into office sequences, from 
julbān upwards, might well yield more such constraints. This exercise,  however, 
will not be taken up here. As said before, this chapter focuses on the road to the 
citadel’s higher end only.
As a second, non-institutional excursus, it is interesting to note that many of 
the atābaks were related to sultans’ households through marriage:92 
Altunbughā al-Qurmushī, Jānibak al-Ṣūfī, Baybughā al-Muẓaffarī, Qujaq, Īnāl 
al-Jakamī, Qurqumās al-Shaʿbānī, Aqbughā al-Timrāzī, Yashbak al-Sūdūnī, and 
Jarbāsh Kurd all displayed such a marital tie, being married either to a (late) 
sultan’s daughter, umm walad or widow.93 This is an interesting observation, 
for it allows us to tentatively answer a question we have left open elsewhere. In 
a 2013 article on the sultans’ marriages, Van Steenbergen and myself demon-
strated that “new” sultans were often “married into” the household of late sul-
tans. Recognizing this as a deliberate marriage policy, we have argued that new 
sultans forged these marital ties to a late sultan first and foremost in order to 
boost their symbolic capital. If not related to a previous sultan by blood, then 
they would at least be linked by marital ties; if you could not be the late sultan’s 
son, then at least be his in-law!94 As the exact dates of these marriages are 
mostly left unrecorded, we were unable to establish whether such marital ties 
were forged prior to each new sultan’s accession (and hence could be consid-
ered preparatory maneuvers), or forged following their accession (and hence 
should be considered consolidating ones). Given the fact that also those 
atābaks who didn’t make it to sultan were often married into a sultan’s family, 
we might infer that also those who did make it to sultan had forged such 
move from amīr 5 to amīr 100, from atābak of Ṭarābulus to nāʾib of Ṣafad, from nāʾib of 
Ḥimṣ to nāʾib of Ṣafad, from amīr 100 to ḥājib ḥujjāb.
92 This same observation holds for the two niẓām al-mulks who made it to sultan: Ṭaṭar, who 
was married to Saʿādat, a wife of sultan Shaykh and the mother of the latter’s sultan-son, 
Aḥmad; and Barsbāy, who was married to Fāṭima, a daughter of sultan Ṭaṭar and a sister 
of the latter’s sultan-son Muḥammad.
93 Turning mamlūks into “royalty”, these marriages could be called “dynasticizing” or “royal-
izing” and reflect a move opposite to Īnāl’s “mamlūkizing” appointment of his non-
mamlūk son as atābak.
94 D’hulster & Van Steenbergen, “Family Matters”. See especially p. 76, where we already 
called for a consideration of the marital ties of those atābaks who didn’t make it to 
sultan.
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 marital ties prior to accession. In other words, marriages into sultans’ house-
holds were preparatory rather than consolidating maneuvers.95
Finally, given the importance of the atābakiyya, it is interesting to see what 
happened to those 20 (out of 28) atābaks who did not make it to sultan. Surely, 
they were unlikely to have given up such a prized office? Of those who did not 
make it, 7 died in function or were discharged due to high age or illness, 4 were 
appointed as nāʾib of Damascus (once of Aleppo), and the remaining ones re-
belled against the sultan and were consequently discharged. So it seems that 
the careers of atābaks hint at the office’s importance: most commonly, atābaks 
either succeed the late sultan or, in case the sultan outlives them, die in office; 
or, unwilling to bide their time, revolt against the sultan and are subsequently 
removed.96
95 It should be pointed out that there is nothing new in the fact itself that atābaks, as guard-
ians of the sultans’ sons, sometimes married the widows of their late master and thus the 
mothers of their pupils. Starting out as “guardians” of sultans’ sons (see above for the 
historical roots of the atābakiyya), these atābaks thus became “stepfathers” to these sons 
as well (this translation is somewhat flippant, yet more in line with the word’s etymolo-
gy). Think for example of the marriage of Tughtakīn of Damascus, atābak of Tutush ii and 
Baqtash, sons of the Seljuq ruler Duqaq, to the latter’s widow (Cahen, “Atabak”, 731).
96 For more details, see the right column in the table at the end.
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
D’hulster192
<UN>
Period of rule Sultan (age) Son Niẓām al-mulk Tenure Atābak Comments
-1/8/815 al-Mustaʿīn / Shaykha -1/8/815 Shaykb → Sultan
1/8/815–9/1/824 Shaykh Aḥmad / 8/8/815–2/9/817 Yilbughāc Dies
8/9/817–7/5/818 Alṭunbughā ʿUthmānīd → Nāʾib Damascus
7/5/818–6/818 Qānibāye Conflict with Shaykh
27/6/818–821 Alṭunbughā Qurmushīf Replaced by sultan’s son
821–15/6/823 Ibrāhīm b. Shaykhg Dies
15/6/823–9/1/824 Alṭunbughā Qurmushīh → Atābak
9/1/824–29/8/824 Aḥmad b. Shaykh (2) / Ṭaṭari 9/1/824–9/3/824 Alṭunbughā Qurmushīj Conflict with Ṭaṭar
9/3/824–16/5/824 Tanibak Miyiqk → Nāʾib Damascus
16/5/824–29/8/824 Jānibakl → Atābak
29/8/824–2/12/824 Ṭaṭar Muḥammad / 29/8/824–2/12/824 Jānibak → Atābak + niẓām al-mulk
2/12/824–8/4/825 Muḥammad b. Ṭaṭar (10) / Jānibakm 2/12/824–10/12/824 Jānibakn Conflict with Barsbāy
Barsbāyo 16/12/824–10/2/825 Ṭarabāyp Replaced by Barsbāy?
10/2/824–6/4/825 Vacantq
8/4/825–13/12/841 Barsbāy Yūsuf / 9/4/825–4/11/827 Baybughār Conflict with Barsbāy
4/11/827–12/9/829 Qujaqs Dies
12/9/829–5/6/831 Yashbak Sāqīt Dies
5/6/831–22/7/835 Jārquṭlūv → Nāʾib Damascus
22/7/835–19/3/837 Sūdūnu Sick
19/3/837–29/7/837 Vacant
29/7/837–8/3/839 Īnāl al-Jakamīw → Nāʾib Aleppo
8/3/839–13/12/841 Jaqmaqx → Atābak
13/12/841–19/3/842 Yūsuf b. Barsbāy (14) / Jaqmaqy 13/12/841–19/3/842 Jaqmaqz → Sultan
19/3/842–21/1/857 Jaqmaq ʿUthmān / 20/3/842–7/4/842 Qurqumāsaa Conflict with Jaqmaq
7/4/842–23/9/842 Āqbughāab → Nāʾib Damascus
23/9/842–10/10/842 Vacant
10/10/842–847 Yashbak Sūdūnīac Dies
3/8/847–21/1/857 Īnālad → Atābak (or ʿUthmān?ae)
21/1/857–7/3/857 ʿUthmān b. Jaq. (>10) / / (?) 21/1/857–7/3/857 Īnālaf → Sultan
Table 3.1  Cairo Sultans and their atābaks
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Period of rule Sultan (age) Son Niẓām al-mulk Tenure Atābak Comments
-1/8/815 al-Mustaʿīn / Shaykha -1/8/815 Shaykb → Sultan
1/8/815–9/1/824 Shaykh Aḥmad / 8/8/815–2/9/817 Yilbughāc Dies
8/9/817–7/5/818 Alṭunbughā ʿUthmānīd → Nāʾib Damascus
7/5/818–6/818 Qānibāye Conflict with Shaykh
27/6/818–821 Alṭunbughā Qurmushīf Replaced by sultan’s son
821–15/6/823 Ibrāhīm b. Shaykhg Dies
15/6/823–9/1/824 Alṭunbughā Qurmushīh → Atābak
9/1/824–29/8/824 Aḥmad b. Shaykh (2) / Ṭaṭari 9/1/824–9/3/824 Alṭunbughā Qurmushīj Conflict with Ṭaṭar
9/3/824–16/5/824 Tanibak Miyiqk → Nāʾib Damascus
16/5/824–29/8/824 Jānibakl → Atābak
29/8/824–2/12/824 Ṭaṭar Muḥammad / 29/8/824–2/12/824 Jānibak → Atābak + niẓām al-mulk
2/12/824–8/4/825 Muḥammad b. Ṭaṭar (10) / Jānibakm 2/12/824–10/12/824 Jānibakn Conflict with Barsbāy
Barsbāyo 16/12/824–10/2/825 Ṭarabāyp Replaced by Barsbāy?
10/2/824–6/4/825 Vacantq
8/4/825–13/12/841 Barsbāy Yūsuf / 9/4/825–4/11/827 Baybughār Conflict with Barsbāy
4/11/827–12/9/829 Qujaqs Dies
12/9/829–5/6/831 Yashbak Sāqīt Dies
5/6/831–22/7/835 Jārquṭlūv → Nāʾib Damascus
22/7/835–19/3/837 Sūdūnu Sick
19/3/837–29/7/837 Vacant
29/7/837–8/3/839 Īnāl al-Jakamīw → Nāʾib Aleppo
8/3/839–13/12/841 Jaqmaqx → Atābak
13/12/841–19/3/842 Yūsuf b. Barsbāy (14) / Jaqmaqy 13/12/841–19/3/842 Jaqmaqz → Sultan
19/3/842–21/1/857 Jaqmaq ʿUthmān / 20/3/842–7/4/842 Qurqumāsaa Conflict with Jaqmaq
7/4/842–23/9/842 Āqbughāab → Nāʾib Damascus
23/9/842–10/10/842 Vacant
10/10/842–847 Yashbak Sūdūnīac Dies
3/8/847–21/1/857 Īnālad → Atābak (or ʿUthmān?ae)
21/1/857–7/3/857 ʿUthmān b. Jaq. (>10) / / (?) 21/1/857–7/3/857 Īnālaf → Sultan
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a Al-ʿAynī, ʿIqd, 1: 144.
b Ibn Taghrībirdī, Nujūm, 6: 323–324.
c Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 4: 245–246; al-ʿAynī, ʿIqd, 1: 215–216.
d Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 4: 284; al-ʿAynī, ʿIqd, 1: 229.
e Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 4: 319, 325.
f Ibid., 325, 477, 517.
g Ibid.; Ibn Taghrībirdī, Nujūm, 6: 476.
h Ibid., 546–547. The sources are somewhat blurred, but it appears that sultan Shaykh had first 
replaced atābak Alṭunbughā with his son, Ibrāhīm (during which time Alṭunbughā held the 
title of amīr kabīr, a title often going hand in hand with that of atābak), and then reappointed 
him, following Ibrāhīm’s premature death.
i Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 4: 565, 582. See the discussion in Section 2.
j. Ibid.; Ibn Taghrībirdi¸ Nujūm, 6: 546–547.
k Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 4: 572–573, 578–579.
l Ibid., 4: 578–579.
m Ibn Taghrībirdī, Nujūm, 6: 531–532.
n Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ al-Zuhūr, 2: 76–77.
o Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 4: 593; Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ al-Zuhūr, 2: 79–80. See the discussion in Section 2.
p Ibn Taghrībirdī, Nujūm, 6: 531–532; al-Ṣayrafī, Nuzhat al-Nufūs, 2: 526.
q Al-ʿAynī, ʿIqd, 2: 181.
r Ibid.,181; Ibn Taghrībirdī, Manhal, 3: 489–492.
s Al-ʿAynī, ʿIqd, 2: 229, 300.
t Ibid., 300; al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 4: 773.
Period of rule Sultan (age) Son Niẓām al-mulk Tenure Atābak Comments
7/3/857–14/5/865 Īnāl Aḥmad b. Īnāl / 9/3/857–11/3/857 Aḥmad b. Īnālag Contested office
11/3/857–24/11/862 Tanibak Ẓāhirīah Dies
27/11/862–15/5/865 Aḥmad b. Īnālai → Sultan  
(contested office)
14/5/865–19/9/865 Aḥmad b. Īnāl (30) / / 15/5/865–19/9/865 Khushqadamaj → Sultan
19/9/865–10/3/872 Khushqadam / / 19/9/865–18/9/869 Jarbāshak Banished
20/9/869–11/2/871 Qānimal Dies
18/2/871–10/3/872 Yilbāyam → Sultan
10/3/872–7/5/872 Yilbāy / / 10/3/872–7/5/872 Timurbughāan → Sultan
7/5/872–5/7/872 Timurbughā / / 7/5/872–5/7/872 Qāytbāyao → Sultan
5/7/872- Qāytbāy
Table 3.1  Cairo Sultans and their atābaks (cont.)
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Period of rule Sultan (age) Son Niẓām al-mulk Tenure Atābak Comments
7/3/857–14/5/865 Īnāl Aḥmad b. Īnāl / 9/3/857–11/3/857 Aḥmad b. Īnālag Contested office
11/3/857–24/11/862 Tanibak Ẓāhirīah Dies
27/11/862–15/5/865 Aḥmad b. Īnālai → Sultan  
(contested office)
14/5/865–19/9/865 Aḥmad b. Īnāl (30) / / 15/5/865–19/9/865 Khushqadamaj → Sultan
19/9/865–10/3/872 Khushqadam / / 19/9/865–18/9/869 Jarbāshak Banished
20/9/869–11/2/871 Qānimal Dies
18/2/871–10/3/872 Yilbāyam → Sultan
10/3/872–7/5/872 Yilbāy / / 10/3/872–7/5/872 Timurbughāan → Sultan
7/5/872–5/7/872 Timurbughā / / 7/5/872–5/7/872 Qāytbāyao → Sultan
5/7/872- Qāytbāy
v Ibid, 773, 868.
u Ibid., 868, 906.
w Al-Ṣayrafī, Nuzhat al-Nufūs, 3: 282–283; al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 4: 958.
x Ibid., 958.
y Ibn Taghrībirdī, Manhal, 4: 279.
z Ibid., Manhal, 9: 58–59.
aa Al-ʿAynī, ʿIqd, 2: 516; al-Ṣayrafī, Nuzhat al-Nufūs, 4: 37.
ab Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 4: 1096, 1112.
ac Ibid., 1122–1123; Ibn Taghrībirdī, Nujūm, 7: 422–424.
ad Ibid., 422–424.
ae See the discussion in Section 2.
af Ibid., 420.
ag Ibid., 425–426; Ibn Taghrībirdī, Ḥawādith, 318. See the discussion in Section 2.
ah Ibn Taghrībirdī, Nujūm, 7: 425–426, 511.
ai Ibid., 511, 763. See the discussion in Section 2.
aj Ibid., 647–648, 685.
ak Ibid., 685–687, 733–734.
al Ibid., 733, 814–815.
am Ibid., 742–743, 821.
an Ibid., 823, 843.
ao Ibid., 843, 866.
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
D’hulster196
<UN>
 Bibliography
 Primary Sources
Al-ʿAynī, ʿIqd al-Jumān fī Tārīkh Ahl al-Zamān: al-Ḥawādith wa-l-Tarājim min Sanat 815 
h. ilā sanat 823 h., ed. A.Ṭ. al-Qarmūṭ (Cairo, 1985).
Al-Maqrīzī, Kitāb al-Sulūk li-Maʿrifat Duwal al-Mulūk, ed. S.A. ʿĀshūr (Cairo, 
1972–1973).
Al-Ṣayrafī, Nuzhat al-Nufūs wa-l-Abdān fī Tawārīkh al-Zamān, ed. Ḥ. Ḥabashī (Cairo, 
1974).
Cicero, M. Tullius, The Orations of Marcus Tullius Cicero, literally translated by C.D. 
Yonge (London, 1856) (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/, consulted June 30 
2015).
Cicero, M. Tullius, M. Tulli Ciceronis Orationes. Tomus iv: Pro P. Quinctio. Pro Q. Roscio 
Comoedo. Pro A. Caecina. De lege agraria contra Rullum. Pro C. Rabirio perduellionis 
reo. Pro L. Flacco. In L. Pisonem. Pro C. Rabirio Postumo, ed. A.C. Clark [Scriptorum 
Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis] (Oxford, 1909) (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/
hopper/, consulted June 2015).
Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Inbāʾ al-Ghumr bi-Abnāʾ al-ʿUmr (Beirut, 1986).
Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ al-Zuhūr fī Waqāʾiʿ al-Duhūr, eds. M. Mustafa et al. (Cairo-Wiesbaden, 
1960–1992).
Ibn Taghrībirdī, al-Nujūm al-Zāhira fī Mulūk Miṣr wa-l-Qāhira, ed. W. Popper [Univer-
sity of California Publications in Semitic Philology, vols. v–vii, xii, xiv, xvii–xix, 
xxii] (Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1915–1960).
Ibn Taghrībirdī, Ḥawādith al-Duhūr fī Madā al-Ayyām wa-l-Shuhūr, ed. W. Popper [Uni-
versity of California Publications in Semitic Philology, vol. viii] (Berkeley-Los An-
geles, 1930–1933).
Ibn Taghrībirdī, al-Manhal al-Ṣāfī wa-l-Mustawfā baʿda l-Wāfī, ed. M.M. Amīn (Cairo, 
1984–2009).
 Secondary Sources
ʿAbd al-Jawād, Ismāʿīl Laylā, “Atābak al-ʿasākir fī l-Qāhira fī ʿaṣr dawlat al-Mamālīk al-
Baḥriyya”, al-Muʾarrikh al-Miṣrī 10 (1993): 49–106.
Adriaenssens, Veerle & Jo Van Steenbergen, “Mamluk authorities and Anatolian reali-
ties: Jānibak al-Ṣūfī, sultan al-Ashraf Barsbāy, and the story of a social network in 
the Mamluk/Anatolian frontier zone, 1435–1438”, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 
26/4 (2016): 591–630.
Algazi, Gadi, “Comparing Medieval Institutions. A Few Introductory Remarks”, in 
J. Hudson and A. Rodríguez, eds., Diverging Paths? The Shapes of Power and Institu-
tions in Medieval Christendom and Islam, eds. (The Medieval Mediterranean vol. 101) 
(Leiden-Boston, 2014), pp. 3–15.
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
197The Road to the Citadel as a Chain of Opportunity
<UN>
Algazi, Gadi, Valentin Groebner & Bernhard Jussen, eds., Negotiating the Gift. Pre- 
Modern Figurations of Exchange (Göttingen, 2003).
Ayalon, D., “Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army—iii”, Bulletin of the School 
of Oriental and African Studies 16/1 (1954): 57–90.
Ayalon, D., “Atābak al-ʿasākir”, EI2, i: 732.
Beck, H., Karriere und Hierarchie. Die römische Aristokratie und die Anfänge des cursus 
honorum in der mittleren Republik (KLIO. Beiträge zur alten Geschichte) (Berlin, 
2005).
Bodenhorn, Barbara & Gabriele vom Bruck, “‘Entangled in Histories’: An Introduction 
to the Anthropology of Names and Naming”, in G. vom Bruck and B. Bodenhorn, 
eds., The Anthropology of Names and Naming (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 1–30.
Bourdieu, Pierre, “Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic 
Field”, Sociological Theory 12/1 (1994): 1–18.
Bourdieu, Pierre, “From the King’s House to the Reason of State: A Model of the Gen-
esis of the Bureaucratic Field”, Constellations, 11/1 (2004): 16–36.
Brinner, William M., “The struggle for power in the Mamlûk state: Some reflections on 
the transition from Bahrî to Burjî rule”, in Proceedings of the 26th International Con-
gress of Orientalists, New Delhi, 4–10 January 1964 (New Delhi, 1970), pp. 231–234.
Cahen, Claude, “Atabak (atabeg)”, EI2, I: 731–732.
Casey, Kimberley L., “Defining Political Capital: A Reconsideration of Bourdieu’s Inter-
convertibility Theory”, conference paper (2008).
Chamberlain, Michael, Knowledge and Social Practice in Medieval Damascus, 1190–1350 
(Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization) (Cambridge, 1994).
Clifford, Winslow W., “Ubi Sumus? Mamluk History and Social Theory”, Mamlūk Stud-
ies Review 1 (1997): 45–62.
D’hulster, Kristof, “Fixed Rules to a Changing Game? Sultan Meḥmed ii’s Re-
alignment of Ottoman-Mamluk Diplomatic Conventions with the International 
Power Constellation”, in F. Bauden & M. Dekkiche, eds., Mamluk Cairo. A Cross-
road for Embassies. Proceedings of the Liège Conference, Sept. 6–8, 2012 (Leiden, 
2019), pp. 484–508.
D’hulster, Kristof & Jo Van Steenbergen, “Family Matters: The “Family-In-Law 
 Impulse” in Mamluk Marriage Policy”, Annales Islamologiques 47 (2013): 61–82.
Darling, Linda, “Political Change and Political Discourse in the Early Modern Mediter-
ranean World”, Journal of Interdisciplinary History 38/4 (2008): 505–531.
Eddé, Anne-Marie, “Quelques institutions militaires ayyoubides”, in U. Vermeulen & 
D. De Smet, eds., Egypt and Syria in the Fatimid, Ayyubid and Mamluk Eras (Orienta-
lia Lovaniensia Analecta vol. 223) (Leuven, 1995), pp. 163–174.
Eychenne, Mathieu, “Le bayt à l’époque mamlouke. Une entité sociale à revisiter”, An-
nales Islamologiques 42 (2008): 275–295.
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
D’hulster198
<UN>
Finnegan, Ruth, Why Do We Quote? The Culture and History of Quotation (Cambridge, 
2011).
Garcin, Jean-Claude, “The Regime of the Circassian Mamlūks”, in Carl F. Petry, ed., The 
Cambridge History of Egypt, Volume I: Islamic Egypt, 640–1517 (Cambridge, 1998), 
pp. 290–317.
Hekster, Olivier, Emperors and Ancestors. Roman Rulers and the Constraints of Tradition 
(Oxford Studies in Ancient Culture & Representation) (Oxford, 2015).
Hellegouarc’h, Joseph, Le vocabulaire latin des relations et des partis politiques sous la 
république (Paris, 1963).
Hirschler, Konrad, “‘He is a child and this land is a borderland of Islam’: Under-age Rule 
and the Quest for Political Stability”, al-Masāq 19/1 (2007): 29–46.
Holt, Peter M., “The position and power of the Mamlūk sultan”, Bulletin of the School of 
Oriental and African Studies 38/2 (1975): 237–249.
Holt, Peter M., “The structure of government in the Mamluk Sultanate”, in P.M. Holt, 
ed., The Eastern Mediterranean Lands in the Period of the Crusades (Warminster, 
1977), pp. 44–61.
Hudson, John & Ana Rodríguez, “Preface”, in J. Hudson & A. Rodríguez, Diverging 
Paths? The Shapes of Power and Institutions in Medieval Christendom and Islam (The 
Medieval Mediterranean vol. 101) (Leiden-Boston, 2014), pp. ix–xiii.
Humfress, Caroline, “Institutionalisation between Theory and Practice. Comparative 
Approaches to Medieval Islamic and Late Roman Law”, in J. Hudson & A. Rodríguez, 
Diverging Paths? The Shapes of Power and Institutions in Medieval Christendom and 
Islam (The Medieval Mediterranean vol. 101) (Leiden-Boston, 2014), pp. 16–29.
Irwin, Robert, The Middle East in the Middle Ages. The Early Mamluk Sultanate  1250–1382 
(Carbondale-Edwardsville, 1986).
Kunkel, Wolfgang & Roland Wittman, Staatsordnung und Staatspraxis der römisch-
en Republik. Zweiter Abschnitt: Die Magistratur (Rechtsgeschichte der Altertums 
im Rahmen des Handbuchs der Altertumswissenschaft, iii/2/2) (München, 1995).
Levanoni, Amalia, “The Mamluk conception of the sultanate”, International Journal of 
Middle East Studies 26/3 (1994): 373–392.
Levanoni, Amalia, “Atābak (Atabeg)”, EI3, Brill Online (consulted June 2015).
Loiseau, Julien, “L’émir en sa maison. Parcours politique et patrimoine urbain au Caire, 
d’après les biographies du Manhal al-Ṣāfī”, Annales Islamologiques 36 (2002): 
117–137.
Mauss, Marcel, “Essai sur le don. Forme et raison de l’échange dans les sociétés archa-
ïques”, L’Année sociologique, Nouv. Série 1 (1923–1924): 30–186.
Meyer, Elizabeth A., “Explaining the Epigraphic Habit in the Roman Empire: The Evi-
dence of Epitaphs”, Journal of Roman Studies 80 (1990): 74–96.
MP3 (Mamluk Political Prosopography Project, database partially available on www 
.mamluk.ugent.be/prosopography).
Nicols, John, Civic Patronage in the Roman Empire (Leiden, 2014).
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
199The Road to the Citadel as a Chain of Opportunity
<UN>
Petry, Carl F., Protectors or Praetorians? The Last Mamluk Sultans and Egypt’s Waning as 
a Great Power (Albany, 1994).
Pierson, Paul, Politics in Time. History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton, 
2004).
Popper, William, Egypt and Syria under the Circassian Sultans 1382–1468 a.d. Systematic 
Notes to Ibn Taghrî Birdî’s Chronicles of Egypt (University of California Press Publica-
tions in Semitic Philology, vol. 15) (Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1955).
Rapoport, Yossef, “New Directions in the Social History of the Mamluk Era”, in S. Con-
ermann, ed., History and Society during the Mamluk Period (1250–1517) (Studies of the 
Annemarie Schimmel Research College, vol. 1) (Bonn: 2014), pp. 143–157.
Rustow, Marina, “Patronage in the Context of Solidarity and Reciprocity: Two Para-
digms of Social Cohesion in the Premodern Mediterranean”, in E. Alfonso & J. Dec-
ter, eds., Patronage, Production, and Transmission of Texts in Medieval and Early 
Modern Jewish Cultures (Turnhout, 2014), pp. 13–44.
Schreyögg, Georg & Jörg Sydow, “Understanding Institutional and Organizational 
Path  Dependencies”, in J. Sydow & G. Schreyögg, eds., The Hidden Dynamics of 
Path  Dependence. Institutions and Organizations (Basingstoke-New York, 2010), 
pp. 3–12.
Şenturk, Recep, Narrative Social Structure. Anatomy of the Hadith Transmission Net-
work 610–1505 (Stanford, CA, 2005).
Sewell Jr., William H., Logics of History. Social Theory and Social Transformation (Chi-
cago & London: Chicago University Press, 2005).
Sievert, Henning, “Der Kampf um die Macht im Mamlukenreich des 15. Jahrhunderts”, 
in A. Pistor-Hatam & St. Conermann, eds., Die Mamluken. Studien zu ihrer Geschich-
te und Kultur. Zum Gedenken an Ulrich Haarmann (1942–1999) (Hamburg, 2003), 
pp. 335–366.
Sievert, Henning, Der Herrscherswechsel im Mamlukensultanat. Historische und histo-
riographische Untersuchungen zu Abū Ḥāmid al-Qudsī und Ibn Taġrībirdī (Islam-
kundliche Untersuchungen, vol. 254) (Berlin, 2003).
Sievert, Henning, “Family, friend or foe? Factions, households and interpersonal 
 relations in Mamluk Egypt and Syria”, in S. Conermann, ed., Everything is on the 
Move. The Mamluk Empire as a Node in (Trans-)Regional Networks (Bonn, 2014), 
pp. 83–126.
Stewart, Angus D., “Between Baybars and Qalāwūn: Under-age Rulers and Succession 
in the Early Mamlūk Sultanate”, al-Masāq 19/1 (2007): 27–54.
Tilly, Charles, Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons (New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation, 1984).
Van Steenbergen, Jo, Order Out of Chaos. Patronage, Conflict and Mamluk Socio-Political 
Culture, 1341–1382 (Leiden-Boston, 2006).
Van Steenbergen, Jo, “‘Is anyone my guardian…?’ Mamlūk Under-age Rule and the Lat-
er Qalāwūnids”, al-Masaq 19/1 (2007): 55–65.
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
D’hulster200
<UN>
Van Steenbergen, Jo, “The Mamluk Sultanate as a Military Patronage State: Household 
Politics and the Case of the Qalāwūnid Bayt (1279–1382)”, JESHO, 56/2 (2013): 
189–2017.
Van Steenbergen, Jo, “‘Mamlukisation’ between social theory and social practice: An 
essay on reflexivity, state formation, and the late medieval sultanate of Cairo [ASK 
Working Paper xxii]” (Bonn, 2015).
Van Steenbergen, Jo, Patrick Wing & Kristof D’hulster, “The Mamlukisation of the 
Mamluk Sultanate? State Formation and the History of Fifteenth Century Egypt and 
Syria: Part ii—Comparative Solutions and a New Research Agenda”, History Com-
pass 14/11 (2016): 560–569.
Van Steenbergen, Jo, Patrick Wing & Kristof D’hulster, “The Mamlukisation of the Mam-
luk Sultanate? State Formation and the History of Fifteenth Century Egypt and Syria: 
Part i—Old Problems and New Trends”, History Compass, 14/11 (2016): 549–559.
Wacquant, Loïc J.D., “On the Tracks of Symbolic Power: Prefatory Notes to Bourdieu’s 
‘State Nobility’”, Theory, Culture & Society, 10/1 (1993): 1–17.
Wang, Yingyao & Simone Polillo, “Power in Organizational Society: Macro, Meso and 
Micro”, in S. Abrutyn, ed., Handbook of Contemporary Sociological Theory (Springer, 
2016) pp. 43–62.
Wex, C., “On the Leges Annales of the Romans”, The Classical Museum. A Journal of 
Philology, and of Ancient History and Literature, 3 (1846): 405–416.
White, Harrison, Chains of Opportunity. System Models of Mobility in Organizations 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1970).
Yalçın, M. Fatih, “A path to throne among the Mamluks in early period: Naʾib al-Saltana 
(Regent of reign) [sic]”, Tarih Okulu Dergisi/Journal of History School 20 (2014): 
81–96.
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
© albrecht fuess, ���� | doi:10.1163/9789004431317_006
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.
300845
Chapter 4
The Syro-Egyptian Sultanate in Transformation, 
1496–1498. Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy 
and the reformation of mamlūk institutions and 
symbols of state power
Albrecht Fuess
1 Introduction
When the Abbasid shadow Caliph of Cairo al-Mutawakkil died in Cairo at the 
end of September 1497 [end of Muḥarram of 903] a dispute arose between al-
Mutawakkil’s son Yaʿqūb and his nephew Khalīl about who should become the 
new caliph. According to our main source for the period, the chronicler Ibn 
Iyās, Sultan al-Malik al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy summoned the two pre-
tenders to the citadel. He listened to the different arguments of both men, un-
til Khalīl argued that his cousin Yaʿqūb lacked experience and proper judgment 
for the office of the caliphate. At this point in the discussion the young sultan 
addressed the audience and shouted in the direction of Khalīl: “Was his father 
a Caliph?” On receiving a negative answer he said: “No one knows the caliphate 
from his own experience except the son of a caliph”. For this reason, Ibn Iyās 
explained, Yāʿqūb was chosen as the successor of his father.1
What is quite remarkable about this story is that it represents the only time 
in Ibn Iyās’ 70-page account of the reign of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy 
that we actually hear the sultan himself talk. As this chapter will argue, this 
unusual episode can in fact be read as no less than the governmental program 
of sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy. Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad faced similar 
accusations from mamlūk amirs towards his sultanate as Yaʿqūb had from 
Khalīl. The leading officers of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad’s father al-Ashraf Qāytbāy 
(r. 1468–1496) argued that al-Nāṣir Muḥammad totally lacked the experience 
they had acquired in the long years of service to the late sultan. In Ibn Iyās’ 
story of the succession of al-Mutawakkil in 1497, this reasoning was countered 
by al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy when he publicly claimed that no one is 
closer to a father than his own son.
1 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ al-zuhūr, vol. 3, 379–380; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, Tome ii, pp. 419–420.
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In order to see where the current chapter stands within the framework of 
this volume we first need a short contextualization. At the end of the fifteenth 
century, the Sultanate’s state had reached a high degree of centralization and 
adopted a ruling system, which according to Van Steenbergen, Wing and 
D’hulster was formed by a steady process of “Mamlukization”. As the argument 
goes, the Mamluk political order had a two-sided function: first “as a non- 
dynastic idea of hegemonic political order” and second “as a coercive bureau-
cratic apparatus that was produced by, and that was set up to reproduce that 
order”.2 There have been other studies in the field such as the work by Appe-
lániz regarding the centralization of trade by sultanic agencies with novel 
trade procedures, or Julien Loiseau’s study of the rise of civil servant families. 
These scholars underline the fact that the fifteenth century Sultanate had de-
veloped a distinct state model which contributed to its stability.3 At my present 
stage of reasoning, and with the information currently available, I would tenta-
tively term this dualism and intertwining of the civil and military elite the 
“deep Mamluk state”. From my point of view the “deep Mamluk state” actually 
meant that institutions and networks did function independently of individu-
al sultans or civil servants while on the other hand refined selection processes 
in the military and administrative sector ensured the availability of a large res-
ervoir of highly qualified personnel. In the course of the fifteenth century this 
meant that sons of old sultans were seen as unfit to rule as they lacked the 
quality of experienced leadership. Their function was reduced to that of a 
placeholder after the death of the old sultan until the high leading amirs of the 
previous sultan would choose the real successor from among their ranks. When 
sultan al-Ashraf Qāytbāy died in 1496 after almost thirty years of rule, however, 
the situation was somehow different from prior cases of sultanic successions 
in the fifteenth century. In the 1490s the Sultanate faced challenges from sev-
eral external military and ideological threats. On the one hand, the Sultanate’s 
world had seen tremendous changes after the Ottoman conquest of Constan-
tinople in 1453. This historic event made the Sultanate’s leadership vigilant 
about the Ottomans’ further moves. In 1492 Granada was taken by the forces of 
the Reconquista. Whereas sultan Qāytbāy and his amirs reacted only by diplo-
matic means, the Ottomans fought the Christians effectively. The Ottoman-
Mamluk war from 1485 and 1491 ended the Sultanate’s influence over larger 
parts of Eastern Anatolia, and made clear that the Sultanate’s mamlūk military 
structure had to be reformed if they wanted to withstand the Ottoman military 
2 Van Steenbergen, Wing & D’hulster, “Mamlukization of the Mamluk Sultanate?-ii”, p. 561.
3 Apellániz, Pouvoir et finance en méditerranée pré-moderne and Loiseau, Reconstruire la mai-
son du sultan, vol. 1, pp. 179–214.
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machine for much longer.4 On the other hand, the Sultanate’s mamlūk leader-
ship must have been aware of the European naval expansions in the Atlantic 
Ocean, which in 1498 would even bring the Portuguese in the Red Sea, literally 
turning the Sultanate’s worldview upside down.
The period therefore posed tremendous challenges, and Sultan Qāytbāy had 
already responded by initiating various reforms.5 However, his military reforms 
in particular worked to the detriment of the existing elite while his financial 
reforms, aiming to bring in more cash, were also not much liked. Ibn Iyās dates 
the first use of rifles in 1490, during the Ottoman-Mamluk conflict. Qāytbāy 
sent awlād an-nās and other soldiers to the front equipped with guns, and after 
having shown their newly acquired expertise in a public display to the sultan, 
they were sent off to the North.6 In the aftermath of the war, then, we witness 
increasing moves by the Sultanate’s agents in order to gain more knowledge 
about the usage of canons and rifles and to make contact with foreign experts. 
At the same time, this all meant that traditional military training and adminis-
trative proceedings had to be adjusted and sometimes fought through against 
the old elite, the “deep Mamluk state”. The old sultan had had the prestige to 
carry on with these reforms and to adjust the system accordingly. When he 
died in 1496, however, these reforms had only begun to be initiated, the Sultan-
ate was still under existential external threats, and the need for accommoda-
tion and adaptation remained urgent.
At this moment of insecurity, as I will argue, Qāytbāy’s young son al-Nāṣir 
Muḥammad tried to put himself at the helm of these reforms and to build a 
power base among the new military forces and the younger mamlūk leadership 
in order to get rid of his veteran rivals. That he succeeded, at least to a certain 
extent, is for me an indication of the extent of the crisis in the Sultanate’s state in 
1496. As I will argue more specifically below, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy 
actually addressed this crisis also by bolstering his claims ideologically. The as-
sumption of this chapter will be that al-Nāṣir Muḥammad managed this espe-
cially by making all kinds of implicit references to al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. 
Qalāwūn (r. 1293–4/1299–1309 /1310–41), a famous sultan of the fourteenth cen-
tury who himself had been a son of a mamlūk sultan and at the same time one of 
the most important rulers in the history of the Sultanate. By holding on to power 
and ruling successfully for over four decades, this al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, son of 
the mamlūk ruler al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn (r. 1279–1290) had come to represent a 
4 Har-El, Struggle for Domination in the Middle East.
5 Petry, “The military institution and innovation in the late Mamlūk period”.
6 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ al-zuhūr, vol. 3, p. 269.
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model for later sons of mamlūk rulers who argued in favor of the dynastic prin-
ciple instead of meritocratic succession.
The present contribution will try to show how al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. 
Qāytbāy tried to copy his predecessor sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn 
in order to overcome the popular slogan “al-mulk ʿaqīm” (regency is infertile). 
This slogan had initially been used as propaganda against Sultan al-Nāṣir 
Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn at the beginning of the fourteenth century, but he had 
prevailed despite hostile agitations against him. However, under his succes-
sors, the dynastic principle weakened considerably as a means of making suc-
cessful claims to the sultanate. Since the beginning of the fifteenth century “al-
mulk ʿ aqīm” had then developed into the factual norm regarding the Sultanate’s 
succession procedure.7 From then on, no son managed to stay on as a new sul-
tan for longer periods after the death of his father, or even tried to do so. Al-
Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy proved in many respects to be the odd one out.
2 A Biography of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy
Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy was born in November 1482 [Shawwāl of 
887].8 His father sultan al-Ashraf Qāytbāy had reigned in the Sultanate from 
7 Haarmann, “Der arabische Osten im späten Mittelalter, 1250–1517”, p. 229.
8 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, 197; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, p. 217.
Figure 4.1 Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy (1496–1498)
von harff, Die Pilgerfahrt des Ritters Arnold von Harff, p. 90
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1468 to 1496. Contemporary sources described Qāytbāy’s reign as stable and 
prosperous and the public image one encounters in historiography is highly 
positive compared to the one of his son and later successors. The mother of 
Qāytbāy’s son and successor was a Circassian slave concubine of Qāytbāy 
named Aṣalbāy. The parents called their little boy Muḥammad.
Important relatives in Muhammad’s life were his maternal uncle, the amir 
Qānṣūh, and his paternal cousins Jānim and Jānibak, whose father Qait had 
come with them to Cairo from Cyprus in the year 900/1495. The two brothers 
were integrated into the mamlūk barracks and became close friends of their 
cousin Muḥammad.9 Little Muḥammad apparently also had a fond relation-
ship with Āqbardī the powerful Great Dawādār and cousin of his father.10
Little is known about al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy prior to his ascension 
to the throne, except the story of one event which happened when the boy was 
13 years old. Around the time of the arrival of his nephews in Egypt, Sultan 
Qāytbāy had decided that his son should enter the mamlūk barrack of the Hip-
podrome, where the incoming young military slaves, who had been purchased 
in Central Asia, were garrisoned after their arrival in Cairo in order to receive 
their military training. Sultan Qāytbāy told the commander of the barrack to 
treat Muḥammad as a simple recruit. According to Ibn Iyās this decision was 
the result of the anger and hate the sultan bore towards his son. After a few 
days the Atābak11 Azbaq took the young boy into his own house, so that he 
would be at least separated from the others at night.12 In any case it seems that 
Qāytbāy wanted to prepare his son as successor by ensuring that he would have 
a real mamlūk education and allowing him to build up a khushdāshiyya (net-
work of comrades) of his own among the young recruits, as this was around 
about the same time as Muḥammad’s cousins entered the barracks.
When his father died in the summer of 901/1496 Muḥammad was still only 
fourteen years old and soon found himself caught in the middle of the power 
struggle of the leading amirs. Ibn Iyās presents the enthronement of al-Nāṣir 
Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy as the result of the battle of the amirs who could not 
agree on who should become the successor among them. Therefore, they opted 
9 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, p. 308; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, 349. Ibn al-Ḥimṣī says that the brother of 
the Sultan had spent thirty years in Cyprus, see: Ibn al-Ḥimṣī, Ḥawādith al-zamān, vol. 1, 
p. 382. Nothing is known as to whether there was a good or bad relationship between the 
maternal uncle and the paternal cousins.
10 Holt, “al-Nāṣir”.
11 The atābak (commander in chief) represented the second highest position in the realm. 
Not only did he command the army but he was the sultan’s deputy in case of absence. See: 
Sievert, Der Herrscherwechsel im Mamlukensultanat, p. 68. If this anecdote holds true, the 
sheltering of Muḥammad at night presented a case of insubordination of the atābak 
against the sultan, but apparently with no consequences.
12 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, p. 307; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, p. 349.
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for al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy in order to gain time to settle the question 
of real succession at a later date. Two leading amirs were especially promi-
nent in this affair in the aftermath of Qāytbāy’s death. They were Qānṣūh al-
Khamsamīya the new commander in chief (atābak) and Kurtbāy al-Aḥmar 
who became Vizier, Ustādār (head of the sultan’s household) and inspector of 
the provinces.13 Together they had already plotted against a third rival, the 
aforementioned cousin of Qāytbāy, Āqbardī the Great-Dawādār (the keeper of 
the royal inkwell) who headed the royal administration. After Āqbardī’s house 
in Cairo had been attacked by followers of his rivals in the final days of the old 
sultan, he had fled and gathered troops in Syria.14
Āqbardī’s return to Egypt was anticipated by many and apparently hoped 
for by al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy, who was secretly looking out for the 
followers of Āqbardī and then declared an amnesty for them in January 1497 
[Jumādā I 902].15 Qānṣūh  al-Khamsamīya responded to these steps by declar-
ing himself sultan in February of 1497 [Jumādā I 902] and besieged the citadel 
where the young  sultan was sheltering. In the battle which now ensued al-
Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy was victorious because his former comrades, the 
young mamlūk recruits, fought for him under the command of his maternal 
uncle Qānṣūh  Moreover, a unit of black slaves with firearms was deployed very 
successfully during this skirmish. Qānṣūh al-Khamsamīya finally fled to Syria 
some days later and was put to death by his arch enemy Āqbardī, the Great 
Dawādār.16 Afterwards the sultan promoted his uncle Qānṣūh, to the rank of 
the inspector of beverages (shādd al-shirābkhāna). This proved to be the first 
step in what turned out to be an astonishing career for uncle Qānṣūh.17
Meanwhile the Great Dawādār Āqbardī returned to Cairo and resumed his 
offices. However, almost immediately he started to plot against the young sul-
tan and his entourage. In August of 1497 (Dhū al-Ḥijja 902) came the turn of 
Āqbardī to besiege his relative in the Citadel. He put up headquarters in the 
Mosque complex of Sultan Ḥasan beneath the citadel and attacked al-Nāṣir 
Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy and his troops from below. But although Āqbardī had 
hired an Italian canon caster and was in possession of firearms, he did not suc-
ceed in conquering the fortress and went back to Syria.18 In doing so he could 
save his head in contrast to the Italian caster Domenico who lost his, which 
was then shown on a pike on Bāb al-Silsila, the formal entrance to the royal 
court.19
13 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, p. 324, 336; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, p. 366, 375.
14 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, p. 322; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, p. 363.
15 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, pp. 339, 341.; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, p. 378, 382.
16 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, pp. 343, 350; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, p. 384, 391.
17 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, p. 347; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, p. 387.
18 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, pp. 366–376; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, pp. 406–416.
19 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, p. 375; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, p. 415.
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
207The Syro-Egyptian Sultanate in Transformation, 1496–1498
300845
In Syria Āqbardī temporarily managed to take hold of Gaza20 and then tried 
to gain Damascus but was only able to pillage small villages in the neighbor-
hood. He and his troops nevertheless remained active over the next two years 
especially in Northern Syria.21 At the end of 1497 al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy 
declared an amnesty for Āqbardī’s followers in Cairo and quite a few of them 
resurfaced. There were even rumors that the sultan had tried to strengthen ties 
with Āqbardī despite their fighting in summer.22 Finally Āqbardī managed to 
outlive al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy and re-entered the official political 
scene when he was nominated as governor of Tripoli in the summer of summer 
1499 (904) only to succumb to illness immediately afterwards.23
But let us return to the summer of 1497 and the victory of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad 
b. Qāytbāy against Āqbardī and his flight to Syria. We learn that al-Nāṣir 
Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy again promoted his uncle Qānṣūh who at that time 
was around thirty years of age, to the office of Great Dawādār. Despite this 
promotion in June 1498 [Dhū al-Qaʿda 903] rumors reached Damascus about a 
fall out between the sultan and his uncle.24 In order to calm the tension the 
sultan’s mother Aṣalbāy had both men summoned to the Citadel in February 
1498 [Rajab 903] and made them swear in her presence on the Quran copy of 
the third Caliph ʿ Uthmān (r. 644–656) that they would not fight each other. But 
this oath turned out meaningless.25 High ranking officers were highly critical 
of the role Aṣalbāy played in governmental affairs. Ibn Iyās quotes Kurtbāy 
 al-Aḥmar, who had meanwhile been sent off from Cairo as viceroy of Damas-
cus, as crying out loud in the council hall of Damascus “We are governed by a 
boy and a woman!”26
In September 1498 [Safar 904] the sources then speak of a heavy dispute 
between al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy and his mother about his marriage to 
the Circassian lady Miṣirbāy, the widow of Kurtbāy, the former governor of 
Gaza and brother of the former Dawādār Āqbardī. Ibn Iyās says in this context 
that this marriage did nothing but bring al-Nāṣir Muḥammad bad luck as he 
would be killed less than a month later.27 The political intentions behind this 
marriage remain unclear, but maybe given his parallel activities to grant an 
amnesty to the followers of Āqbardī al-Nāṣir Muḥammad might have wanted 
to reconcile with this side of his family, especially when his maternal uncle 
20 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, p. 378; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, p. 419.
21 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, p. 381; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, p. 422.
22 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, p. 383 f.; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, p. 424.
23 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, p. 420 f.; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, p. 460; Ibn al-Ḥimṣī, Ḥawādith, vol. 2, 
p. 78.
24 Ibn Ṭūlūn, Mufākahat, vol 1, Cairo 1962, p. 197.
25 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, p. 387; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, p. 428.
26 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, p. 406; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, p. 448.
27 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, p. 399; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, p. 441.
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went astray. Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad’s death came about in October of 1498 as he 
went with his two cousins Jānim and Jānibak to the Nile near Giza. There they 
met the Second Dawādār Tuman Bāy with his soldiers at the encampment of 
Ṭālibiyya. The sultan and his cousins did not expect an attack and were there-
fore slain on the spot. They fell victim to a complot which was apparently co-
mastered by al-Nāṣir Muḥammad’s maternal uncle Qānṣūh, who then became 
enthroned as the new Sultan with the regal title al-Malik al-Zāhir.28 A year later 
al-Ẓāhir Qānṣūh completed his claim to the sultanate by marrying Miṣirbāy, 
the widow of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy, as an additional wife.29 Accord-
ing to historical sources, she also did not bring him luck as he was himself 
toppled from power in June of 1500. The story goes that upon arrival of enemy 
troops, Qānṣūh fled in women’s clothes from the citadel and that was the last 
to be heard of him.30
His nephew al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy was buried in the Mausoleum 
of Qāytbāy in Cairo’s Northern Cemetery, beside the tomb of his father. He was 
survived by his mother Aṣalbāy who went on to lead a remarkable life which 
was very closely bound to the sultanate. She was at first the concubine of Sul-
tan Qāytbāy, then the mother of Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy, later 
the sister of Sultan al-Ẓāhir Qānṣūh (r. 1498–1500), then the wife of Sultan al-
Ashraf Jān Bulāṭ (r. 1500–1501) until Sultan Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī (r- 1501–1516) 
forced her to go into exile after her pilgrimage to Mecca in 914/1508. She died in 
Mecca one year later.31
3 The Sources
The main source for the reign of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy is the chron-
icle of the contemporary Egyptian scholar Ibn Iyās (d. around 1524), Badāʾiʿ al-
zuhūr fī waqāʾiʿ al-duhūr. But Ibn Iyās deeply despised al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. 
Qāytbāy, and the obituary of the ill-fated young sultan reads as follows: “He was 
said to have possessed an incredible generosity and that he was very brave, but 
he was a brute with a fast hand. He loved to spill blood, had no manners and 
liked the company of the lowest people in society”.32 Almost everything the 
28 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, pp. 401, 404; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, p. 444, 446.
29 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, p. 426; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, p. 466.
30 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, p., 436; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, p. 476.; Petrus Martyr Anglerius a Spanish 
envoy who visited Cairo in 1501 says in contrast, that Qānṣūh had been taken prisoner and 
brought to the Citadel of Alexandria, Anglerius, Legatio Babylonica, p. 265.
31 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 4, pp. 131, 159.
32 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, p. 402; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, p. 444.
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young sultan did is described by Ibn Iyās as “something never heard of” and the 
comments always have negative connotations. For example, when the sultan 
commands that houses near the waterfront should be lit in the evenings, Ibn 
Iyās commentates this by saying that the sultan ordered it because he and his 
cousins wanted to look from their boat through the windows of the houses to 
check on the women inside. If they were pleased with what they saw they en-
tered the house and captured the women.33
It is anyone’s guess why Ibn Iyās paints this negative image of the sultan. It 
seems that he was a staunch supporter of the old Mamluk system of gover-
nance of Qāytbāy and his predecessors. For him a new sultan should come out 
of the ranks of the experienced amirs and not be the young son of the de-
ceased ruler, and more than once Ibn Iyās complains of the foolishness of the 
young sultan.34 Moreover, Ibn Iyās argues that the sultan had taken away prop-
erty and salaries of the descendants of mamlūks (awlād al-nās). Ibn Iyās, who 
was himself a grandson of a mamlūk soldier, believed that such confiscations 
were highly deplorable as they threatened his income base. In any case, Ibn 
Iyās is responsible for most of the bad press which al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. 
Qāytbāy has received in historical writing until now.35 Other contemporary au-
thors like Ibn al-Ḥimṣī (d. 934/ 1528) and the Damascene author Ibn Ṭūlūn (d. 
953/1546) do not add much detail to the life of the sultan, but they take a more 
or less neutral stance.36
We find a more literary approach, which however is far more positive to-
wards the sultan, in a work entitled al-Badr al-zāhir fī nuṣrat al-Malik al-Nāṣir, 
which Peter Holt attributes to Ibn Shiḥna (d. 921/1515) a Ḥanbalī judge from 
Aleppo who frequently traveled to Cairo. This Ibn Shiḥna was an eyewitness of 
the defeat of Qānṣūh al-Khamsamīya in 1497. That is the only historical ac-
count described in the work, and besides the siege passage, the book contains 
33 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, p. 397; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, p. 440.
34 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, pp. 339, 397, 406; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, pp. 379, 440, 448.
35 For example, David Ayalon mentions as reasons of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy’s 
downfall his “unstable character, his being the son of a Mamluk and not himself a Mam-
luk, the great contrast between him and his illustrious father”, see: Ayalon, Gunpowder 
and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom, p. 71. Garcin speaks of a “fifteen year old sultan who 
was said to be unbalanced”, see: Garcin, “The regime of the Circassian Mamluks”, p. 296. 
Loiseau describes the beginning of his reigns as follows : “Son avènement en 1496 à l’âge 
de quatorze ans ouvrit une période d’instabilité et d’affrontements qui se solda par son 
assassinat deux ans plus tard”, see Loiseau, Les Mamloukes, xiiie–xvie siècle, p. 135. Haar-
mann explains the revolt against Qāytbāy by his outrageous recruitment of black slaves, 
although these units must have existed prior to his ascendance to the throne, see: Haar-
mann, “Der arabische Osten”, p. 252.
36 Ibn al-Ḥimṣī, Ḥawādith, vol. 2, pp. 9–59; Ibn Ṭūlūn, Mufākahat, pp. 167–205.
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eulogies on the virtues of the young sultan. The final part also contains a col-
lection of sixteen dreams that all predict the victory of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. 
Qāytbāy.37 The existence of such a work hints at the fact that there had been 
feelings of sympathy towards Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy in the Sultanate 
and that he was not as negatively seen as other sources portray him.
The story of the rise and decline of the young sultan even fascinated Euro-
pean travelers. The German knight and pilgrim Arnold von Harff visited Cairo 
in the aftermath of the defeat of Qānṣūh al-Khamsamīya. His work contains 
the only existing drawing of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy (see figure 4.1). 
During his stay in Cairo, von Harff speaks about court politics, which he has 
apparently discussed in wine-drinking sessions with two German-speaking 
mamlūks he met in Cairo. Von Harff describes how, according to his infor-
mants, since the time of the biblical Joseph, who had been sold by his brothers, 
sultans had to have roots in slavery, heathendom and foreign origins. Neverthe-
less, this young sultan had now challenged that tradition and so far fought off 
all his enemies. However, at the time when he wrote down his travel experi-
ence back home in Germany, von Harff was wondering what might have hap-
pened to the young sultan in the meantime.38
The Northern Italian religious scholar Petrus Martyr Anglerius already knew 
something about the fate of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy, when he visited 
Egypt in 1501/2. In Egypt he acted as Spanish envoy and tried to convince Sul-
tan Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī that the conquest of Granada was in fact an internal 
matter for the Spanish and should not hamper the traditional good relations 
between Spain and the Sultanate.39 Of high interest for the present chapter is 
Anglerius’ portrayal of the turbulent reign of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy. 
According to Petrus Martyr Anglerius the old Sultan Qāytbāy had never con-
sented to the succession of his son as he feared for his son’s life. The amirs, 
however, had at first agreed to put the young son on the throne, as they had no 
clear favorite among them. Therefore, Muḥammad was declared sultan by the 
Egyptian High Priest (“a summo eorum pontifice”), i.e. the caliph. However, the 
young sultan then misbehaved badly from the beginning of his reign. He 
planned to kill all his enemies at a banquet, even including his uncle. This plan 
was indeed so horrible that his mother revealed it to her brother Qānṣūh. 
Qānṣūh then had Muḥammad killed and used his personal network to become 
37 Ibn Shihna, al-Badr al-zāhir; see for a description of author and manuscript: Holt, “Liter-
ary offerings”, pp. 12–13.
38 Von Harff, Die Pilgerfahrt des Ritters Arnold von Harff, pp. 86–89.
39 Anglerius, Legatio Babylonica, pp. 53–55.
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the new sultan.40 We do not have the exact source of this information but it 
might be that the Spanish-born Taghrī Birdī, the well-known translator (drago-
man) of the royal court in Cairo might be behind this official information as he 
was in contact with the envoy.41
4 Reviving the Legacy of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn
Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy and his supporters knew that staying in power 
was a difficult task for a sultan’s son in the fifteenth century. In this context it is 
a matter of speculation whether his father Qāytbāy was behind the plan to stay 
in office, or not. However, the fact that he placed his son as a simple recruit in 
the barracks might hint at the fact that Qāytbāy indeed wanted his son to be-
come his successor or at least a full member of the military elite. When al-Nāṣir 
Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy and his circle then decided to assume power, it seems 
quite a logical move to evoke the image of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn 
as a case in point for the rule of a sultan’s son. Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad 
b. Qalāwūn had managed to become a very powerful sultan in the early four-
teenth century, despite being the son of a sultan and not being imported as a 
military slave at a young age. Twice al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn had been 
installed as a sultan at an early age by the amirs of his father and twice he had 
again lost power. When he finally ascended the throne for the third time in 
1310 at the age of 25 he experienced a long and stable rule from 1310 to 1341. 
Amalia Levanoni has written a substantial monograph on al-Nāṣir Muḥammad 
b. Qalāwūn, and she explains his success by the fact that he undermined the 
existing traditions of the old members of the military elite through a num-
ber of reforms, yet at the same time gathered enough support from other parts 
of the military establishment especially among the young soldiers, so that his 
controversial reforms could be successful.42 More recently, Jo Van Steenbergen 
and Willem Flinterman have argued that the power transition under al-Nāṣir 
Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn, from elder grandees of his father who were pushed 
aside by him to form a new entourage, might have been smoother than Leva-
noni suggested. Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn was helped in changing the elites by his 
family network and a more docile and ambitious generation of younger amirs 
who had spent their career with him. In addition to this he gathered around him 
40 Anglerius, Legatio Babylonica, pp. 260–263.
41 On Taghrī Birdī, see: Anglerius, Legatio Babylonica, pp. 81–91.
42 Levanoni, A Turning point in Mamluk History, pp. 29–80. (Chapter two: Undermining 
traditions).
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ambitious mamlūks of a similar age to him who had depended on Muḥammad 
b. Qalāwūn’s sultanic predecessors or defeated rivals. As their former mas-
ters were out of favor or dead the career outlooks of these younger mamlūks 
had been bleak; therefore, they were ready to support al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. 
Qalāwūn when he offered them unexpected new opportunities.43
Remarkable parallels appear when we realize that in the late fifteenth cen-
tury al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy tried to pursue the same path as al-Nāṣir 
Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn in the fourteenth century, with a young entourage 
bolstered with the support of middle-aged amirs in order to get rid of the elder 
grandees of his father. Similar to the initial experiences of his famous name-
sake, however, the young Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy’s chances of success were 
rather bleak. The grandees of his father never seem to have considered the ac-
tual possibility that he might stand in office for long. As depicted above they 
had already started the power race by fighting amongst themselves; they did 
not expect to be rivalled by the young sultan. The young sultan therefore had 
to make a symbolic entrance in the game by literally “throwing his hat in the 
ring” in order to be taken seriously as a contender.
However, before declaring his claim, he had to choose a regal name. Accord-
ing to Ibn Iyās the honorary name (laqab) “al-Manṣūr” was briefly considered 
for unknown reasons. “Al-Manṣūr” might have pointed to the father of al-Nāṣir 
Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn, sultan al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn (r. 1279–1290), but the 
name al-Nāṣir was soon chosen to legitimize the dynastic claim.44 Still, in the 
beginning the use of the royal style al-Nāṣir appears not really to have been 
seen as provocative for the establishment. However, the first uproar was soon 
to come as al-Nāṣir Muḥammad committed what was considered outrageous 
behavior.
One month after the death of his father, in September 1496 [Muḥarram of 
902], al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy appeared at the Friday prayer with some-
thing on his head which clearly shocked the present amirs. Ibn Iyās reports: 
“The peak of the fickleness of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad was that he went to the 
43 Flinterman and Van Steenbergen, “Al-Nasir Muhammad and the formation of the Qala-
wunid State”, pp. 95–98 (‘The Social Production of al-Nasir Muhammad’s State’).
44 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, p. 333; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, p. 372. However, in the turmoil of the fight-
ing against Qānṣūh al-Khamsamīya at the beginning of 1497 young mamlūk soldiers de-
manded that he should change his name from al-Nāṣir to al-Ashraf like his father. The 
reason was that they felt disfavored when they carried the common name al-Nāṣirīya, 
which identified them as being bought by the young sultan instead of the Ashrafīya of 
Qāytbāy. According to Ibn Iyās the soldiers achieved the change, but it does not seem that 
al-Ashraf was really used in any context, see: Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, p. 351; Ibn Iyās, His-
toire, p. 391.
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Friday prayer without wearing a kallawta on his head, instead he wore only a 
takhfīfa ṣaghīra and this shocked the amirs and they harshly criticized such a 
behavior”.45 However, the amirs did not limit themselves to verbal criticism. 
One month later, the highest ranking amirs, the commanders of a thousand, 
reacted in a very creative way: through fashion. They brought out a new head-
gear, modifying the official so-called takhīfa kabīra (‘the greater lighter one’) by 
putting horns on it.46 According to Ibn Iyās the amirs said that this new head-
gear arrangement was inspired by Dhū al-Qarnayn, the two-horned hero of the 
Quran [18: 83–98], who is commonly identified as Iskandar, or Alexander the 
Great, considered by contemporaries as the prototype of the Muslim hero. 
Veneration of Alexander had become increasingly popular in the fifteenth cen-
tury, especially through the Iskandername of the Ottoman poet Ahmadī 
(d. 1413).47 Ibn Iyās explains in another more detailed passage about the royal 
role of takhfīfa kabīra: “It nowadays takes the place of the crown of the kings of 
Egypt; with it the Turks show their might. It was worn by the Persian kings be-
fore” (see also figure 4.2).48
Although one might downplay the effects of these clothing issues, one has 
to bear in mind that Syro-Egyptian society was highly ritualized when it came 
to public outings of the Sultanate’s leaderships. Changes of style were there-
fore very meaningful. The intention of the leading amirs may well have been to 
show the young sultan that their rights to power were far better founded than 
his. Still this was not the end of the dispute. Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy 
showed them afterwards publicly what he thought about their new headgear 
creation. In the month of April 1497 [Sha‘bān  902] shortly after he had de-
feated Qānṣūh al-Khamsamīya, so Ibn Iyās narrates, he bestowed the takhfīfa 
with horns on Wafā, a gardener. Needless to say, in his report Ibn Iyās expressed 
outrage at this, as Wafā was one of the common people who should wear the 
simple turban.49
In the context of headgear, it is interesting to note that in the early four-
teenth century al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn had also had renewed facets 
of the official headgear. Around the end of the thirteenth century the color of 
the so-called kallawta cap switched from yellow to red. Mamlūk soldiers and 
amirs then started wrapping a turban around the kallawta. This new arrange-
ment became the official headgear under al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn and 
45 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, p. 339; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, p. 379.
46 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, p. 340; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, p. 380.
47 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, p. 340; Watt, “al-Iskandar”; Abel, “Iskandar Nāma”.
48 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 4, p. 332.
49 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, p. 359; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, p. 400.
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the old-style tricorn sharbūsh worn by earlier sultans went out of fashion.50 
While it seems that the initial change from yellow to red had already been or-
dered by al-Nāṣir Muḥammad’s brother Sultan al-Ashraf Khalīl (r. 1290–1293), 
the kallawta-cap arrangement with the turban grew much bigger in size and 
was also of better quality during his own long reign. It was then combined with 
another innovation. In 732/ 1332 al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn went on pil-
grimage and had his head completely shaven. After coming home, he kept his 
bald head instead of growing back the long hair that used to fall down loosely 
50 Al-Maqrīzī, al-Mawāʾiẓ wa-al-iʾtibār, vol. 3, p. 328.
Figure 4.2 Sultan Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī (r. 1501–1516) wearing the Takhfīfa Kabīra
giovio, Vitae Illustrium Virorum, p. 221
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on the neck, as was the custom. According to the secretary al-Qalqashandī this 
look was then copied by his entourage and he became a trendsetter.51
As there is a lack of direct evidence here one can only speculate that there 
exists a direct connection between the two headgear changes of al-Nāṣir 
Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn and al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy. But given the 
wider context and the argumentation of this chapter, it seems likely that al-
Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy might have heard of the fashion acts of his name-
sake and wanted to make a political statement through similar symbolic 
actions.
Another point where we can find interesting similarities between the two 
leaders is in the field of military reform. Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn 
undertook several changes in the military organization of his realm. Perhaps 
the most famous of these was his reform (sg. rawk) of the iqṭāʿ system used for 
the remuneration of the army. He rearranged the system in order to generate 
more income for the sultan and his central apparatus of power. The income of 
the leading amirs was thereby diminished as they received less iqṭāʿ-land than 
before.52
In the case of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy we see similar actions used 
to create ties with mamlūk leaderships. An example is the land tenure privi-
leges at the early beginning of his reign, when he was still much endangered 
by the activities of Qānṣūh al-Khamsamīya. In August 1496 (Dhū al-ḥijja 901) 
Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy is said to have distributed to mamlūk amirs around 
1,000 iqṭāʿs which had previously belonged to the dhakhīra (treasure/ source of 
royal income)53, the reserve of his father. He therefore opened up the royal re-
sources in order to buy loyalty.54 We do not know who actually benefitted from 
this act in reality, however it is one of the few measures taken by the young 
sultan about which we do not hear any complaints by Ibn Iyās.
Quite the contrary holds true for another action undertaken by al-Nāṣir 
Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy which according to Ibn Iyās constituted an abominable 
act, and was something no sultan had ever done before. What had happened? 
In January 1498 (Jumādā I 903) al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy had ordered 
an increase in the number of mamlūks which each amir had to maintain. The 
51 al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-ʿashā, vol. 4, pp. 39–40, See on the issue of Mamluk headgear: 
Fuess, “Sultans with Horns”.
52 See: Sato, State and Rural Society in Medieval Islam; Levanoni, A Turning Point, pp. 53–60.
53 See for the meaning of the term dhakhīra under Sultan Qāytbāy: Igarashi, Land Tenure, 
Fiscal Policy, p. 129.
54 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, p. 335; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, p. 374. Ibn Shiḥna, al-Badr al-Zāhir, p. 51. 
See for the question of the sultanic fisc: Daisuke, Land Tenure, Fiscal Policy, pp. 121–138 
(especially p. 131 on al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy).
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“commanders of thousand”55 had to finance an additional 30, the “amirs of 40” 
had to sustain 10 more and the “amirs of 10” had to bring an additional five.56 
However, the financial resources of the amirs were not augmented to compen-
sate for this, so this actual growth of their financial burden by 30% was a hard 
blow for the amirs. Once again one could speculate that both actions concern-
ing land tenure resonated with the practice of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn 
in the sense that the latter had earlier also tried to assure loyalties by giving 
55 The amir of 100 mamlūk horsemen and 1,000 infantrymen (amīr miʾa wa-muqaddam alf) 
represented the highest rank in the military hierarchy. As the name suggests, he usually 
had to equip 100 mamlūks. There were a maximum of 24 commanders of 1,000 at the same 
time and the highest position in the state were exclusively drawn from among them. The 
amir of 40 commanded 40 mamlūks and the amir of 10 accordingly 10.
56 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, p. 385; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, p. 425.
Figure 4.3 Mamluk soldiers wearing the red kallawta cap with turban, 1470
Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS Arabe 282, Ibn Akhī Khuzam, 
Kitāb al-makhzūn jāmiʿ al-funūn, fol. 28
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presents, and only later had he reformed the system in order to get a firmer fi-
nancial grip on the amirs.
In general, raising money was a necessity in 1496. At that time the Sultanate 
needed additional resources to combat the external threat represented by the 
expanding Ottoman Empire, especially in the field of new military techniques 
and the use of guns and firearms.57 As already stated above, the son followed a 
path in these reforms which his father had first taken in order to strengthen his 
military force. The young sultan, however, appears to have wanted to also use 
the opportunity to overthrow the old elite with the help of the new units. It 
actually was a unit of black slaves with rifles that helped the young sultan win 
the wars against the amirs Qānṣūh al-Khamsamīya and Āqbardī. When the sul-
tan descended from the citadel into town he was usually accompanied by his 
cousins Jānibak and Jānim and a troop of black slaves with rifles marching in 
front of them.58 This not only raised the anger of the amirs, but even the young 
mamlūk soldiers were not too happy to share their important role and eco-
nomic resources in the state with black slaves whom they looked down on be-
cause of prevalent forms of racial stereotyping.59
Ibn al-Ḥimsī presents us with a report of an event which highlights this ri-
valry. According to this story, in February of 1498 [Jumādā ii 903], the young 
sultan gave Faraj Allāh, who was the chief of the black slave rifle squadron, the 
right to wear clothes and headgear originally reserved for the mamlūk military 
elite and also gave him the right to marry a white Circassian slave girl. When 
the mamlūks of the young sultan saw this, they took to their arms and killed 
Faraj and 50 of the 500 black slaves, and in the fight lost only two of their own. 
After this incident al-Nāṣir Muḥammad’s advisors persuaded the sultan to stop 
equipping black slaves with rifles and to abstain from nocturnal outings with 
them. He promised to sell the black slaves to the Turkmen.60 If this story is true 
it was a serious setback for the sultan. According to this version, not only did 
57 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ, vol. 3, p. 269, footnote 14; see for the issue of Mamluk firearms: Fuess, “Les 
Janissaires, les Mamlouks et les armes à feu”.
58 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, p. 387; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, p. 427.
59 Unfortunately it is unclear how much they earned. In principle of course they were slaves 
but there had to be a kind of renumeration. We know for example that Sultan Qāytbāy 
had a firearm unit formed out of sons of mamlūks (the so-called awlād al-nās) at the be-
ginning of the 1490s and they received only half of the monthly payment of a full mamlūk 
soldier, i.e. 1,000 dirhams compared to 2,000 dirhams, see: Ayalon, Gunpowder, 65. Of 
course the contemporary racism meant that black slaves would have to do it for much a 
lower payment; but in my opinion it is improbable that they would have served without 
any salary even given their slave status. It is hard to imagine giving a slave a gun and then 
expecting service for free.
60 Ibn al-Ḥimṣī, Ḥawādith, vol. 2, pp. 36–37.
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he lose an important pillar for his military plans but he also had to balance his 
young mamlūks with the new unit of black slaves in order to counterbalance 
the veteran amirs. This was certainly a very difficult task.
Be it as it may, this episode did not bring about the end of infantry units of 
black slaves with guns in the Sultanate’s army. In fact, the Sultanate’s leader-
ship tried to acquire as many guns as possible in order to compete with the 
Ottomans. As black slaves were the cheapest slaves on the market and guns 
were easy to handle compared to other contemporary weapons, for obvious 
economic reasons the gun-carrying infantry units continued to be composed 
of black slaves. One case in point is the aforementioned powerful amir Kurtbāy 
al-Aḥmar (“The Red”) who was appointed as governor of Damascus. At the be-
ginning of the year 904 [August 1498], al-Aḥmar ordered the people of Damas-
cus to provide him with money and black slaves. He then trained a large group 
of black slaves to use firearms and formed a unit which upheld public security. 
Apparently because of his nickname “the red” they wore red clothes and red 
caps.61 There was therefore an ongoing continuity in the gun business and the 
black slaves using them. We hear for example of 500 black slaves with guns 
who were sent by Sultan Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī on a military expedition to the 
Hijaz in the spring of 1503 (Shawwāl 908).62
5 Looking for Allies
As argued above, when al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy deliberately took on 
the old elite he somehow stepped into the footsteps of his namesake of the 
fourteenth century. As was described above, he engaged in direct confronta-
tions with these veteran amirs, leaving the first of his powerful opponents dead 
and forced the second to flee to Northern Syria. The third very powerful amir, 
Kurtbāy al-Aḥmar, seems to have stayed loyal, but the sultan preferred to send 
him away from Cairo as governor of Damascus.
Nonetheless, in order to carry out his plans to oust the old guard from power 
and go on with his reforms he would have needed more support than a unit of 
black slave soldiers could provide. He tried to bolster his power base in two 
ways. The first was to get the populace behind him. The second was to create a 
personal network of family, friends and military comrades. It seems that he 
succeeded in the first aim. He gained a positive image among the common 
people, as even Ibn Iyās had to admit. Although Ibn Iyās comments that the 
61 Ibn Ṭūlūn, Mufākahat, vol. 1, p. 201.
62 Ibid., pp. 17–173.
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young sultan did only evil things during his numerous outings, it seems that 
al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy gained popularity by his public appearances 
especially by making the public space safe which had been hard hit by the two 
subsequent military sieges of the citadel. At one point in his account Ibn Iyās 
remarks that the young man was not bothered about acting with the dignity of 
his office, as his predecessors had done, and that he behaved like an ordinary 
policeman instead.63
As a result, it seems that he succeeded in restoring public order. However, he 
clearly misjudged the reliability of his family network. As he openly promoted 
a legitimacy based on family ties from father to son he needed the support of 
all family members. His closest allies were his two cousins Jānibak and Jānim 
who were later killed with him. Then there were mamlūk comrades who, just 
like his two cousins, had gone with him to the barracks. He might therefore 
have gained the support of the young mamlūk soldiers who were of his age. He 
even actively promoted some of these. One example can be seen in a young 
man with the name of Qānṣūh b. Sultan Jarkass who was appointed at the be-
ginning of 1498 to the office of Ḥājib (chamberlain) of Damascus. This was 
seen as exceptional because of his very young age.64 Moreover, he regularly 
promoted members of his family to higher ranks as in the case of his maternal 
uncle Qānṣūh. It seems that his mother was also active behind the scene to get 
alliances working.65
However, he did misjudge his family network as ultimately two members 
of his family would fail him. The first was the cousin of his father, the Great 
Dawādār Āqbardī, who besieged al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy in the citadel. 
According to Ibn Iyās, Āqbardī had stated that it was nothing personal and ar-
gued publicly that he did not fight the young sultan but only his bad advisors who 
belonged into prison.66 This time around al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy could 
overcome the threat, but with his maternal uncle Qānṣūh things turned  out 
differently. Although al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy had promoted Qānṣūh 
to high office after their common military victories, they fell out for unknown 
reasons and as we have seen, not even Aṣalbāy the mother of the sultan could 
breach the rift. Qānṣūh was finally convinced by other amirs (seemingly from 
the reconciled households of Qānṣūh al-Khamsamīya and Āqbardī) to get rid 
of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy. The price they had to offer was  something 
63 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, p. 387; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, p. 427.
64 Ibn Ṭūlūn, Mufākahat, vol. 1, p. 203.
65 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, p. 361; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, p. 401.
66 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, p. 366; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, p. 407.
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which al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy would never offer to Qānṣūh, i.e. the 
sultanate.67
The wish to conclude alliances could also be felt in external relations. An 
Ottoman source speaks of a marriage project between one of the daughters of 
the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid (r. 1481–1512) and al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy. 
This would obviously have strengthened the young sultan’s position. Bayezid 
might have preferred to marry his daughter to a young sultan of dynastic lin-
eage instead of an old sultan who had started his life as a slave.68 After the as-
sassination of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy Sultan Bayezid apparently pro-
tested in a hefty manner and showed his disappointment.69
6 Conclusion
The reign of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy represented a troublesome peri-
od full of fighting and deceit. Thanks to Ibn Iyās, Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad has a 
very negative image and he is perceived in historiography as having played 
only a minor role. However, al-Nāṣir followed up on reforms especially in the 
military sector which his father Qāytbāy had already begun. These initiatives 
were then continued by his successors, because the circumstances of this time 
period simply required them. What went against him was that, at the end of 
the fifteenth century Mamluk military society had become very reluctant to 
hand power over to an inexperienced juvenile.
Parallels with the image of al-Nāṣir Muhammad b. Qalāwūn, or what con-
temporaries thought they knew about that figure, may perhaps have helped 
al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy to counter any accusations of a lack of experi-
ence. Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy and his entourage knew they had to be 
wary of the grandees of his father and had to build a network of powerful peo-
ple, but, unfortunately, they could not get enough people to back them for long 
enough. Nevertheless, as his reign represents the longest of any ruling son of a 
sultan after the reign of al-Nāṣir Faraj b. Barqūq (r. 1309–1405; 1405–1412) at the 
beginning of the fifteenth century, this might still count as a kind of a success.
Despite all the parallels and similarities, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy did 
not develop into a second al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn. However, Ibn Iyās 
remarks, the former’s career and death did resemble that of the brother of the 
67 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, p. 400; Ibn Iyās, Histoire, p. 443.
68 Muslu, The Ottomans and the Mamluks, p. 161.
69 Muslu, The Ottomans and the Mamluks, p. 161; Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ. vol. 3, p. 411; Ibn Iyās, His-
toire, p. 453.
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latter and another son of Qalāwūn, al-Ashraf Khalīl (r. 1290–1293), who was also 
slain by rival amirs while hunting near Giza.70 Therefore al-Nāṣir Muḥammad 
b. Qāytbāy followed the model of at least one son of Qalāwūn right to the end. 
Seen from his personal perspective this was certainly the wrong model to fol-
low. In any case it is remarkable that Ibn Iyās mentions this unsuccessful son 
of Qalāwūn in the context of the death of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qāytbāy, 
 because he actually seems to have tried in vain to copy the other son, his fa-
mous namesake. The young sultan might even have been equally successful if 
not for the fact that at the end of the fifteenth century the dynastic principle 
was over for good and the Sultanate was fully “mamlukized”. The old mamlūk 
elite proved unwilling to accept the attempts of a sultan’s son to conquer the 
throne by a total replacement of old rituals and institutions. Therefore, that 
mamlūk elite prevailed and in 1501, the succession crisis was finally ended by 
Sultan Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī (r.  1501–1516), a member of the traditional elite. What 
is remarkable is that al-Ghawrī had to continue the path of reforms because 
of the Ottoman threat. There was simply not the possibility to keep the status 
quo. Still as Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī had been the successful candidate of the “deep 
Mamluk state”, his reforms were disliked but much less contested as he did not 
challenge the system as a whole.
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Chapter 5
Tales of Viziers and Wine: Interpreting Early 
Ottoman Narratives of State Centralization
Dimitri Kastritsis
The dominant paradigm of Ottoman state-building is one of progressive cen-
tralization and institutionalization, from the late fourteenth to the mid- 
sixteenth century ce. This paradigm was first developed by Paul Wittek in the 
1930s, and later refined by Halil İnalcık and others.1 According to Wittek’s well-
known thesis, the Ottoman state-building venture was at first an egalitarian 
affair. Frontiersmen with a more or less tribal and nomadic background, pos-
sessing a deep religious devotion embodied by holy men, carried out religious-
ly motivated raids (ġazā) into Christian territory. By means of such activity, 
they were able to push the frontiers of Islam from the Anatolian borders of 
Byzantium to the Danube and Adriatic. But as the borders of their principality 
grew and its frontier advanced into Europe, a hinterland developed, in which 
the need for central state institutions became apparent. Such institutions were 
modelled on those already present in other Islamic states. They included 
shariʿa courts, taxation based on population surveys, and employment of 
slaves in the army and state administration. Since at first the Ottoman princi-
pality consisted of territory newly conquered for Islam, in order to build such 
institutions, there was a need for scholars (ulema, Ar. ʿulamāʾ) imported from 
outside the Ottoman borders. Members of this new class (distinct from the 
holy men already mentioned) entered the Ottoman domains from rival Mus-
lim principalities to the east. At first they mainly came from the neighboring 
Turkish emirates (beyliks) of Anatolia. Some of these emirates enjoyed consid-
erable prestige in the region, and their competitive relationship with the Ot-
tomans meant that people coming from them were viewed with suspicion.
According to the Wittek paradigm, such negative perceptions were rooted in 
more than just political rivalry, but could ultimately be traced to cultural differ-
ences. For to the original founders of the Ottoman state (the ġāzī frontiersmen), 
1 Wittek, The Rise of the Ottoman Empire. On Wittek’s ideas, see especially Kafadar, Between 
Two Worlds; Wittek, ed. Heywood, The Rise of the Ottoman Empire. Publications reflecting the 
later formulation include İnalcık “Ottoman Methods of Conquest”; İnalcık, The Ottoman Em-
pire; Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, vol. 1.
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the newcomers were so different that they were perceived as threatening a for-
mer way of life. However, despite initial ġāzī resistance, after the conquest of 
Constantinople (1453), it became more difficult to question the nature of the 
empire and its institutions, many of which had been created by the aforemen-
tioned scholars. So the disenfranchised frontiersmen were forced to take out 
their frustrations in the field of literature. How else to explain the fact that 
histories compiled in the late fifteenth century include colorful stories, in 
which scholars and bureaucrats are vilified as the root of all evil in Ottoman 
society? In these accounts, the villains par excellence are the Çandarlı family 
of viziers, whose members dominated Ottoman central administration in the 
century preceding the conquest of Constantinople. Unlike later magnates, 
who were mostly of slave origin (ḳul), the Çandarlı were members of the ulema. 
But they were also known for their diplomatic skills. Their last prominent 
member, Çandarlı Halil Paşa, was executed following the conquest of Constan-
tinople, because he had favored a more flexible approach toward the Christian 
world. After this event, the entire family was disgraced, hence their vilification 
in the aforementioned texts. Or so the story goes.
It is not my purpose here to call into question the basic contours of the 
above paradigm, which however reductionist at times is not without its merits. 
In many respects, the scholarly debate over Wittek’s ideas has generated more 
heat than light over the past few decades, and it would be counterproductive 
to engage in any further polemics. Thanks to the work of Cemal Kafadar, Colin 
Heywood, and others, it is now mostly clear what is of value about Wittek’s 
theory and where the main problems lie.2 What is still largely absent, how-
ever, is a clear, detailed understanding of the historical evolution of Ottoman 
government and society in the century preceding 1453. Both Wittek’s and Ka-
fadar’s books are essentially extended essays, while Heywood’s work has fo-
cused on the intellectual underpinnings of Wittek’s ideas more than on early 
Ottoman history per se. Moreover, the focus of these works has been largely 
on the period of Ottoman history that is the most difficult to understand— 
namely, the reigns of the first three Ottoman rulers (Osman, Orhan, and Mu-
rad i, 1299–1389). This was a time when the Ottoman principality was not a ma-
jor power, so sources are few and far between. But in fact, far more can be done 
with the following century: the period that witnessed the first Ottoman attempt 
at empire, its collapse, its reconstruction, and its definitive establishment 
2 For analysis and bibliography, see the above cited works by Kafadar and Heywood. See also 
Lowry, The Nature of the Early Ottoman State. Yürekli, Architecture and Hagiography, 65–78 
also contains a useful discussion of the role of ġāzī elements in the production of alternative 
narratives of Ottoman state formation.
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under Mehmed ii (1389–1481).3 There is no recent monograph on this period 
as a whole, and despite the pioneering work of Halil İnalcık and others,4 our 
understanding of the Ottoman state, culture and institutions is still much 
poorer than that of the sixteenth-century ‘classical age’.
The present contribution is of limited scope. Its aim is to demonstrate that 
there is much to be gained from considering Ottoman narratives of the central 
state and its actors intertextually, as well as in light of the specific historical 
context, however unclear this may sometimes be. In order for such study to be 
possible, it is necessary to move beyond the familiar boundaries of language 
and genre. As we will see, careful consideration of the various stories about the 
Çandarlı and other elite actors, which survive not only in Turkish, but also in 
other languages, reveals that these tales are more widespread and complex 
than has thusfar been appreciated. Far from mere fabrications with obvious 
moral and political agendas, the tales have their own history, which in many 
cases spans a century or more. Not infrequently, they were originally rooted in 
actual events and situations, which may sometimes be traced even through 
archival records. Nevertheless, the relationship between historical reality and 
representation is still far from straightforward. Stories were altered through 
oral and textual transmission and adapted to suit changing political agendas, 
as well as the needs of different genres and audiences. However, by viewing 
them in the appropriate historical and literary context, it is often possible to 
gain a more nuanced understanding of the social tensions brought about by 
the Ottoman state-building enterprise.
1 The Çandarlı viziers and the Wittek Thesis
When discussing the rise of a discourse opposed to state centralization and its 
protagonists, historians have pointed to the key role played by the disaster of 
1402, in which Timur dismembered the first Ottoman attempt at empire and 
3 On this point, see Darling, “Introduction: Ottoman Identity”, 53. Franz Babinger’s monograph 
on Mehmed ii (Babinger, Mehmed the Conqueror) is dated, and there is still no extensive 
study of the reigns of Murad i and Bayezid i, the period that witnessed the first Ottoman at-
tempt at empire. Murphey, “Bayezid i’s Foreign Policy Plans and Priorities” is a step in the 
right direction, but is only a chapter in an edited volume. My own Sons of Bayezid shows what 
can be done with a single decade by carefully interpreting a variety of available documentary 
and narrative sources in different languages.
4 See especially İnalcık, Fatih Devri Üzerinde Tetkikler ve Vesikalar; Imber, The Ottoman Empire 
1300–1481.
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left the Ottomans in a state of civil war.5 As we will see below, it is indeed the 
case that sources datable to the immediate aftermath of the event in question 
already contain stories about the Çandarlı family, which had by that time al-
ready produced two powerful viziers, Kara Halil and Ali Paşa (d. 1406). The pres-
ence of such stories should come as no surprise, for there is every indication 
that Ottoman attempts to create a centralized empire before 1402, a process in 
which the Çandarlı had been intimately involved, had been highly controver-
sial. It is only natural that the failure of these efforts would have vindicated 
those opposed to them all along. More surprising, however, is that some of the 
key elements of the discourse of opposition can be traced to one of the Otto-
man princely courts of the time, that of Mehmed i, who reigned in parts of 
Anatolia from 1402–13, then as single Ottoman ruler until 1421. This curious 
fact, which will be discussed in detail in the coming pages, suggests that the 
discourse in question was intimately connected to political struggles at the 
highest levels of government. The implication is a political and social situation 
more complex than has so far been recognized. Of course, accepting these 
court connections does not disprove Wittek’s contention that discontented 
ġāzī frontiersmen are ultimately behind such perspectives. But at the very 
least, it complicates the story; for as we will see, it suggests that widespread 
anti-Çandarlı sentiment (ġāzī or otherwise) was manipulated for political 
gain. Moreover, although the tensions present at the turn of the fifteenth cen-
tury were not resolved in earnest until the end of that century, when the vilifi-
cation of the Çandarlı received its final formulation, earlier in the century the 
political situation was apparently more fluid, and so was the discourse. Indeed, 
it is this very fluidity that permitted such narratives to be deployed by such a 
wide range of groups and individuals, even including the court of an Ottoman 
prince.
In the pages that follow, I will focus largely on the negative presentation of 
the Çandarlı viziers in narrative sources, and the interpretive gaps that arise 
when this is understood simply by reference to the Wittek paradigm. But be-
fore proceeding, it is necessary to introduce the reader to the problem and its 
history. In modern historical scholarship, the vilification of the Çandarlı in 
early Ottoman literature has been evident for at least a century. It first attract-
ed the attention of scholars with Friedrich Giese’s publication in 1922 of a cor-
pus of historical texts from the fifteenth century, which have come to be known 
as the Anonymous Chronicles of the House of Osman (Tevārīḫ-i Āl-i ʿOsm̱ān, 
5 See especially Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, 93–95.
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hereafter Anonymous Chronicles).6 Among its many strands, this corpus con-
tains such passages as the following:
At that time [the reign of Murād i (1362–89)] … the rulers [pādishāh] 
were not greedy. Whatever came into their hands they gave away again, 
and they did not know what a treasury was. But when [Çandarlı] Hayred-
din Pasha came to the Gate [of government] greedy scholars became the 
companions of the rulers. They began by displaying piety and then went 
on to issue rulings. “He who is a ruler must have a treasury”, they said … 
Whatever oppression and corruption there is in this country is due to 
scholars. … [They] commit adultery and pederasty, lend money on inter-
est, and make no difference between permitted and forbidden. … Until 
Vulkoglu’s daughter came to him, Yıldırım Khan did not know what 
drinking parties were. He did not drink and held no carouses. In the times 
of Osmān, Orkhān Ghāzi, and Murād, wine was not drunk. At that time 
there were ulema who made their words effective. At that time the Sul-
tans were ashamed before the ulema. … When the Persians and the Kara-
manlis became the companions of the princes of the house of Osmān, 
these princes commited all kinds of sins. … Until then nothing was known 
of keeping account books. The practice of accumulating money and stor-
ing it in a treasury comes from them. … When [Çandarlı] ʿAlī Pasha … 
became vizier, sin and wickedness increased. … The house of Osmān was 
a sturdy people, but these outsiders came to them and introduced all 
kinds of tricks.7
The above summary was compiled by Cemal Kafadar, who has spoken of an 
“exceptionally poignant line of criticism” against schoolmen (dānışmends) and 
other educated people (ulema) who came to the Ottoman domains from cul-
tural centers further east.8 Like others before him, Kafadar has traced such views 
to frontier elements opposed to state centralization, while at the same time 
complicating the picture by considering a wider cultural setting in which this 
discourse should be understood. Despite the undoubtable value of such contex-
tualization, however, what is still largely absent is a detailed understanding of 
6 Anonymous, ed. Giese, Die altosmanischen anonymen Chroniken. For some basic information 
on this source, see Kastritsis, “Ottoman Anonymous Chronicles”. See also Kafadar, Between 
Two Worlds, 96, 102–116.
7 Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, 111. Original translations from Lewis, Islam from the Prophet 
Muhammad, vol. 1, 135–141.
8 Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, 110.
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the full scope of these views, as well as the specific historical context in which 
they evolved.
Before turning to some examples of what such a broader approach may of-
fer, a few more words are in order about the history of the existing interpreta-
tion. Just seven years after the publication of Giese’s edition of the Anonymous 
Chronicles, Wittek collaborated with Franz Taeschner on an important article 
which presented the careers and major monuments of the Çandarlı family’s 
principle members.9 Although this work is still useful today, as one might ex-
pect for a historical study dating to the 1920s, it is mostly a positivist exercise 
with little to say about the wider questions that concern us here. To the extent 
that the Anonymous Chronicles are mentioned at all, they are treated mainly as 
a source of more or less reliable historical data. The hostile attitudes present in 
these texts are mentioned in passing, then quickly dismissed as a predictable 
reaction against unpopular reforms and the rising power of the ulema.10
In fact, Wittek would make his position clearer in two subsequent publica-
tions.11 The first was The Rise of the Ottoman Empire (1938), a slim book for 
which Wittek is mostly remembered today, in which somewhat surprisingly 
the Çandarlı are not even mentioned. However, Wittek devoted a lengthy pas-
sage to them in the second, a less known article in French published around 
the same time. It is worth quoting from this in detail:
We shall later see further proof that the representatives of the ghâzî and 
Muslim tendencies found themselves set one against another in more 
or less open opposition. […] The cooperation of the two tendencies 
was not guaranteed by any superimposed institution, but was achieved 
rather by the personal cooperation of their representatives. Thus we see 
Murâd i, at the end of his reign, putting both [the marcher lord] Evre-
nos Bey and the theologian vizier Khaireddîn Pasha in charge of the con-
quest of Macedonia. This vizier, Khaireddîn Çandarlı, is the ancestor of 
a family for whom the position of vizier was hereditary throughout our 
period of study. Their place at the head of the administration brought the 
Çandarlı great wealth. Their economic interests led them to Byzantine 
9 Anonymous, ed. Giese, Die altosmanischen anonymen Chroniken; Taeschner and Wittek, 
“Die Vezirfamilie der Ǧandarlyzāde”.
10 Taeschner and Wittek, “Die Vezirfamilie der Ǧandarlyzāde”, 69, 79.
11 Wittek, The Rise of the Ottoman Empire; Wittek, ‘De la défaite d’Ankara’. Both pieces origi-
nated as public lectures: the first in London, the second in Paris. They were recently re-
published in English along with other material and an introduction by Colin Heywood 
(Wittek, ed. Heywood, The Rise of the Ottoman Empire). This book makes it possible to 
follow the evolution of Wittek’s thought over time.
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 Constantinople—still the commercial centre for the whole of the Levant. 
[…] The Çandarlı were the Ottoman state’s first ‘ministers of foreign af-
fairs’. […] ʿAlî Pasha and Ibrâhîm Pasha, Khaireddîn’s sons, are presented 
in the sources as prudent counsellors who endeavoured to lead Bâyezîd 
[i, 1389–1402] toward a policy of caution and moderation. But it would 
not be until the next generation that these early Ottoman diplomats 
would acquire enough experience to serve the state with a foreign policy 
that was no longer exclusively based on force[…]
As regards domestic policy, the Çandarlıs’ position was determined by 
the fact that they belonged to the class of the ʿulemâ: they are explicitly 
described as such in the sources. This, and their wealth, and their rela-
tions with the foreign world, suffice to explain why the chroniclers, ghâzî 
spokesmen in the main, are not very favourable towards them.12
The above discussion is striking both for its emphasis on the Çandarlı’s influ-
ence in diplomacy and foreign affairs, and for its superficial treatment of their 
role in matters of internal administration. To the extent that this role is men-
tioned at all, it is reduced to the fact that the Çandarlı were members of the 
ulema. We might expect as much, for such a perspective is perfectly in keeping 
with Wittek’s theory of a dichotomy between the raiders and religious classes 
in the early Ottoman polity.
For Wittek’s successors, however, it was precisely the Çandarlı family’s role 
in internal reforms that was most worthy of attention. Writing at a time when 
the Annales school of historiography was highly influential in Ottoman stud-
ies, Halil İnalcık drew attention primarily to internal social dynamics, specifi-
cally the conflict between centralizing and centrifugal elements in the early 
Ottoman polity.13 İnalcık and others following in Wittek’s footsteps understood 
that it was impossible to accept at face value his simple division between fron-
tiersmen and ulema. For them, the negative presentation of the Çandarlı was 
to be understood as a reaction of pre-existing elites (ġāzī or otherwise) against 
progressive Ottoman centralization and institutionalization. According to this 
theory, after the Çandarlı and other learned outsiders introduced such institu-
tions as Islamic courts, taxation, and bookkeeping, they were blamed for cor-
rupting a supposedly ‘pure’ social order embodied by frontiersmen and sufi 
12 Wittek, ‘De la défaite d’Ankara’, 12–13; English translation in Wittek, ed. Heywood, The Rise 
of the Ottoman Empire, 144–145.
13 For the period in question, see İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire, 10–14, 65; İnalcık, “Ottoman 
Methods of Conquest”. For the broader emphasis on social history in Ottoman studies, see 
İnalcık, An Economic and Social History; İnalcık, “Impact of the Annales School”; İnalcık, 
“Centralization and Decentralization”; Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats.
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mystics (the various dervish şeyhs and babas). When the central state and its 
institutions became firmly established under Mehmed ii, the previous elites 
found themselves dispossessed, and took out their frustration by writing their 
own version of Ottoman history. The Çandarlı became its villains. They were 
an easy target, since they were no longer in favor after 1453.
2 Çandarlı Kara Halil and the early Ottoman state
Whatever the merits of such a view, there can be little doubt that in order to 
properly address the question, it is necessary to consider in more detail the 
careers of individual members of the Çandarlı family. The following is a brief 
survey of what is known of the dynasty’s founder, Çandarlı Kara Halil. It should 
be stated outright that the state of our knowledge on the entire family consists 
of a small book by İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, which is in fact little more than an extend-
ed encyclopedia article.14 There are no other biographies or individual studies, 
despite the fact that three of the Çandarlı viziers were among the most impor-
tant statesmen in Islamic history. In fact, even basic facts about the family are 
still unclear or completely unknown. For example, although it seems obvious 
that the Çandarlı derived their name from their place of origin, this place is far 
from easy to trace. The most likely candidate is a small town in the district of 
Sivrihisar.15 This was presumably the original home of the family’s founding 
father, a man called Halil or Kara Halil, who became known as Hayreddin Paşa 
after he became vizier around 1365. Little is known about his background, 
scholarly or otherwise, apart from the fact that he came into Ottoman territory 
from further east. While Uzunçarşılı speculates about his education, he also 
admits that there is little to go on before Kara Halil’s appointment as qadi.16 
Although Halil was supposedly a member of the ulema, this needs to be quali-
fied; in fact, he appears to have been educated not in the madrasa, but rather 
in sufi circles. He was apparently a disciple of a certain Şeyh Fahreddin, and 
may have been connected to Şeyh Edebali, the holy man whose daughter the 
first Ottoman ruler Osman Gazi allegedly married.17
Although the few available sources present Kara Halil as a recent arrival 
from further east, apparently his career under the Ottomans had begun as early 
14 Uzunçarşılı, Çandarlı Vezir Ailesi. The author is himself a descendant of the family in 
question, as is clear from the genealogical appendix.
15 Uzunçarşılı, Çandarlı Vezir Ailesi, 1–2.
16 Uzunçarşılı, Çandarlı Vezir Ailesi, 3.
17 Uzunçarşılı, Çandarlı Vezir Ailesi, 3–5.
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as the reign of the dynasty’s founder, Osman Gazi (d. 1324?) By the standards of 
the time, he was sufficiently educated to qualify as an Islamic judge, for under 
Osman he became qadi of Bilecik, a small western Anatolian city that was 
an important Ottoman center. During the reign of Osman’s successor Orhan 
(d. 1362), he was promoted to the post of qadi of İznik (Nicaea), a major former 
Byzantine town which had fallen to the Ottomans in 1331. A few years later, he 
was made qadi of Bursa, the recently conquered Ottoman capital. But this last 
promotion was not immediate, only taking place in 1348, when the previous 
incumbent left the post to become vizier.18 At this time in Ottoman history, the 
vizierate was still a post of a purely consultative and administrative nature, 
rather than one with a military dimension. This might help explain why it was 
given to a man of learning rather than a general. As for the qadiship of Bursa, in 
1348 it was the top position in the Ottoman learned hierarchy. But this would 
change around 1362, when the post of qāḍī-ʿaskar (head military judge) was 
created for Kara Halil.19 Eventually, he would attain the vizierate, probably ca. 
1365, during the reign of Murad i (r. 1362–89). Kara Halil Çandarlı is considered 
the first grand vizier, because in his person the roles of vizier and general (bey-
lerbeyi) were combined for the first time.
Based on the above, it is possible to say that the career of Kara Halil closely 
followed the evolution of the Ottoman polity, from a minor principality to the 
main power-broker in Anatolia and the Balkans. The creation of new posts can 
be explained by the practical necessities of territorial expansion, but also in 
more political and international terms, as the result of an Ottoman need to 
compete for prestige with other local and regional powers. For example, it is 
probably no coincidence that the newly created Ottoman post of qāḍī-ʿaskar 
already existed among the Mamluks. As they became the main power in Ana-
tolia, the Ottomans began to compete with this major rival on their southern 
border, an established state that enjoyed the prestigious title of guardian of the 
holy shrines of Mecca and Medina (khādim al-ḥaramayn).20 All of this goes 
some way toward explaining how the Çandarlı family came to be so dominant 
in Ottoman administration. For it seems that already in the person of its 
founder Kara Halil, the family was making itself indispensable to the Ottoman 
rulers through a combination of scholarly, administrative, diplomatic, and 
even military skills. These roles were eventually separated, once the Ottoman 
ruling apparatus had reached a more structured and specialized state of devel-
opment. After the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, following a trend that 
had begun already under Mehmed i and Murad ii, slaves of the Porte (ḳul) 
18 Uzunçarşılı, Çandarlı Vezir Ailesi, 6. This man was Kayserili Sinaneddin Yusuf.
19 Uzunçarşılı, Çandarlı Vezir Ailesi, 6–7.
20 Uzunçarşılı, Çandarlı Vezir Ailesi, 7.
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came to dominate Ottoman administration, and it was no longer considered 
appropriate to appoint viziers from among the ulema.21
After these observations, we may return to the career of Kara Halil 
Çandarlı and his descendants. It is worth noting that after assuming the post 
of grand vizier, Kara Halil changed his name to the more Islamic Hayreddin 
(Ḫayr al-Dīn). In his foundation documents and building inscriptions, he ap-
pears with the even loftier name Ḫayr al-Mille ve ’d-Dīn. In fact, such practices 
follow parallel developments in the titulature of Ottoman sultans.22 As for 
Kara Halil’s military role, its importance has been known since the early work 
of Taeschner and Wittek.23 He was one of the protagonists of the conquest of 
Rumelia, the all-important European part of the Ottoman conquests, where he 
worked alongside the great marcher lord Hacı Evrenos on the east-west axis of 
the ancient Via Egnatia. There is little doubt that the new Ottoman conquests 
held a central place in Halil’s career. According to Uzunçarşılı, Halil was made 
vizier in Gallipoli, at a time when Murad i was leaving Rumelia to pursue other 
activities in Anatolia following the conquest of Adrianople (Edirne). That 
would explain why one of the three mosques built by Kara Halil was in Galli-
poli. The other two were in İznik and Serres (Siroz), towns that also marked 
significant stages in his career.24
To sum up, Kara Halil performed crucial services for the early Ottoman 
rulers, services that ranged from the judicial to the administrative, from the 
diplomatic to the military. He built major infrastructure in the form of mosques, 
and was one of the key protagonists of the conquest of new Ottoman territory 
in the southern Balkans. For his image in the Anonymous Chronicles, however, 
what is most crucial is his role in initiating administrative and military reform. 
Among the institutions for which he is credited (or more accurately, blamed) 
are the famous janissary corps and the yaya, a Turcoman infantry corps at-
tached to the janissaries. Moreover, if we are to trust the Anonymous Chroni-
cles, he was also behind the creation of a central treasury and taxation making 
21 İnalcık, An Economic and Social History, 13. It is worth noting that Mehmed i’s grand vizier 
Bayezid Paşa, the key figure behind his administration, was probably also a slave of the 
Porte. See Kastritsis, “Bayezid Paşa”.
22 In the Ottoman ruler Orhan’s endowment deed dated 1324, both Orhan and his father Os-
man are mentioned with similar Islamic epithets. See Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, 61, 168 
n. 4.
23 Taeschner and Wittek, “Die Vezirfamilie der Ǧandarlyzāde”, 71–76.
24 The mosque in Gallipoli does not survive. For the one in İznik, see Ayverdi, Osmanli 
Mi‘mârîsinin İlk Devri, 309–319. For the one in Serres, which was destroyed in the fire of 
1913, see Balta, “Les vakifs de Serrès”, 91–93. See also Taeschner and Wittek, “Die Vezirfami-
lie der Ǧandarlyzāde”, 62–65, 77–78.
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use of account books (defter). In short, he was responsible for Ottoman central 
administration as we know it.
3 The Image of the Çandarlı in the Anonymous Chronicles and 
Ahmedi
We have already considered in brief how the Çandarlı are presented in the 
Anonymous Chronicles, and how certain institutions of the central state, such 
as the treasury, are attributed to their negative influence and that of other 
scholars (ulema). After Kafadar’s general summary, which provides the main 
outlines, it is now time to take a more detailed look at some of these passages. 
The following is a close translation of one of the better-known extracts:
At that time [the reign of Murād i (1362–89)], tax [ḫarāc] was low. Things 
were such that even the infidels were not oppressed. They didn’t take 
away their clothes and oxen, or their son and daughter, by making them 
sell them or give them as security [to pay their taxes]. At that time, the 
rulers [pādişāhlar] were not greedy; whatever came into their hands 
they gave away again, and they didn’t know what a treasury was. But as 
soon as Hayreddin Paşa came to the gate of government, greedy scholars 
[dānişmend] became the companions of the rulers, and they gave up pi-
ety [taḳvā] in favor of the legal opinion [fetvā]. They said: “A treasury is a 
necessity for him who would call himself ruler”. At that time, they turned 
the rulers to their side. It is said: “Greed and oppression have made their 
appearance. Naturally, where there is greed there will be oppression”. 
Right now, it has become excessive. Whatever oppression and malice 
there is in these lands, it comes from the scholars. They are its cause. They 
realized that if they made use of their knowledge [ʿilm] then the entire 
population would submit to them.25
The anonymous source continues in the same vein, recounting a dialogue with 
a sufi holy man (baba) who blames corruption on members of the ulema. He 
goes on to point out how such corruption has increased in his own time (i.e. 
the late fifteenth century). Then comes the following passage:
25 Anonymous, ed. Giese, Die altosmanischen anonymen Chroniken, 25. My translation of 
this passage is a more literal version of that in Lewis, Islam, 135–136.
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In the times of Osmān, Orkhān Gāzī, and Murād, wine was not drunk. At 
that time there were ulema who made their words effective. At that time 
the Sultans were ashamed before the ulema and did not depart from what-
ever words they uttered. If in the house of Osmān any sin or injustice 
arose, they stopped it. Had they not stopped it, the ulema of that time 
would have left them, and none would have come to such a Pādishāh. The 
ulema of that time were not sinners like the ulema of today. They were 
men of standing who came to the gate of the Pādishāh… At that time, to fill 
the office of qāḍī, they used to seek a scholar from among the professors. 
A qadiship might remain vacant for a long time, and when a suitable 
scholar was found, he was not happy to accept appointment as qāḍī.26
From the above lines, it becomes clear that there are serious problems with 
Wittek’s stark distinction between frontiersmen and ulema. For here it is clear 
that what is at stake is not the value of the scholarly class per se, but the char-
acter of particular individuals belonging to it. Moreover, it is difficult to see in 
what way the discourse of decline in the above passages differs from that in the 
late sixteenth century Ottoman Empire, to say nothing of other times and 
places.27
So if not all ulema are to be blamed for the alleged corruption and decline of 
Ottoman society, whom in particular do the chronicles consider responsible 
for these problems? Once again, blame is placed squarely on the shoulders of 
Çandarlı Kara Halil. But he is not alone. Another scholar is also mentioned, 
who like Halil comes from the lands to the Ottomans’ immediate east:
When the Persians and the Karamanlis became the companions of the 
princes of the house of Osmān, these princes committed all kinds of sins. 
Čandarlı Kara Halīl and the Karamanian Turk Rüstem were both at the 
time considered as great and learned. When these two came to the Otto-
man princes, they filled the world with all kinds of cunning tricks. Until 
then nothing was known of keeping account books. When they came to 
the Ottoman princes, they compiled account books. The practice of ac-
cumulating money and storing it in a treasury comes from them. They 
26 Anonymous, ed. Giese, Die altosmanischen anonymen Chroniken, 29–30; trans. Lewis, Is-
lam, 138.
27 On the Ottoman decline discourse, see Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual, 201–213; Ka-
fadar, “The Question of Ottoman Decline”; Darling, A History of Social Justice, 139–148.
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had no thought of the end and did not remember that they would have to 
leave it all behind them, but were very proud of themselves.28
Apart from the above passage, nothing is known about “the Karamanian Turk 
Rüstem”. However, his name suggests that he must have come from the princi-
pality of Karaman, the main Anatolian rival of the Ottomans into the late fif-
teenth century. We may also note here another key element of the chronicle’s 
discourse: the idea that Kara Halil Çandarlı and Rüstem of Karaman were 
“both at the time considered as great and learned”. If we consider this along-
side other passages about ignorant qadis who cannot read and write, it is not 
difficult to see that contrary to Wittek’s distinction between learned scholars 
and rustic raiders, what is really at stake here is the scholarly pedigree of the 
Çandarlı and their associates.29
The question of the scholarly qualifications of the Çandarlı and other influ-
ential early Ottoman scholars is a fruitful line of inquiry, which leads to an-
other key source. This is the epic account of Ottoman history contained in Ah-
medi’s İskendernāme, a text generally thought of as the earliest extant, datable 
account of Ottoman history.30 In its final form, Ahmedi’s İskendernāme dates 
from around 1410, and it has long been known that the section on Ottoman his-
tory is based on a lost prose chronicle.31 As a whole, the work is altogether 
more complex, and is best described as a long, didactic philosophical poem in 
which history holds a prominent place for its value in demonstrating the van-
ity of the pursuit of power without justice. Ahmedi’s account of the Ottomans 
was written in the aftermath of their defeat by Timur in 1402 and contrasts 
their justice, piety, and zeal in the pursuit of religiously motivated warfare with 
the oppression of the Mongols who came before them. There is little doubt 
that descriptions of Mongol injustice are meant to evoke Timur; the work also 
contains references to the Byzantine-Ottoman conflict and other contempo-
rary historical events.32
28 Anonymous, ed. Giese, Die altosmanischen anonymen Chroniken, 30; trans. Lewis, Islam, 
139.
29 For the passages about scholars in the time of Bayezid i and “in our own time” (i.e. the late 
fifteenth century ce) see Anonymous, ed. Giese, Die altosmanischen anonymen Chronik-
en, 29–32; Lewis, Islam, 138–141.
30 For a recent critical edition and translation of the Ottoman section, see Aḥmedī, ed. Sılay, 
History of the Kings. For the entire work, the standard edition is Aḥmedī, ed. Ünver, 
İskender-nāme. This is in fact a facsimile of a single manuscript with an introduction and 
table of contents.
31 İnalcık, “The Rise of Ottoman Historiography”, 159–161.
32 For an analysis of this and other historical references in Ahmedi’s İskendernāme, see Kas-
tritsis, “The Alexander Romance”.
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The fact that Ahmedi refers to several Ottoman rulers as holy raiders (ġāzīs) 
made his work ideal evidence for Wittek, who based his theory of the rise of 
the Ottoman Empire largely upon it. But there are many other aspects of the 
historical poem that have failed to attract the same attention. These include 
the following description of Çandarlı Kara Halil-Hayreddin:
When the Holy Raider Murād took his place (on the throne),
holy war and holy raid were his desire.
…
Whoever came to him, whether poor or stranger,
would obtain a great share of his good fortune.
…
Leaving Çender on account of his poverty,
Ḫalīl-i Çenderī appeared before him.
Despite the fact that his knowledge was little.
That in every grace, he was lacking and untoward,
[Murād] was understanding of his exile, sad condition, and poverty,
So graciously, he appointed him to high office.
In the end, he appointed him vizier over the dominion.
What vizierate? For he became a great prince.33
What are we to make of this description? First of all, it is worth noting that 
Ahmedi, possibly following his lost source, does not present an accurate 
 account of Halil’s background and career under the Ottomans. For while it is 
true that Kara Halil’s rise to prominence coincided mostly with the reign of 
Murad i, who appointed him grand vizier, there is little to suggest that he was 
destitute before that time. Instead, Ahmedi’s verses should be taken as a veiled 
critique of Halil’s political influence, which the poet (or his lost source) seems 
to have considered out of proportion with his education. In other words, ac-
cording to the poet, Halil’s poverty was intellectual. Uzunçarşılı attributes this 
negative presentation to the fact that Ahmedi’s own education was of a higher 
level, since he had studied in Cairo.34 However, as we have seen, this view is 
also consistent with his presentation in the Anonymous Chronicles, a source 
not generally known for its intellectual elitism. Should this common ground be 
33 My translation is a more literal version of that in Aḥmedī, ed. Sılay, History of the Kings, 11. In 
the Ünver edition (Aḥmedī, İskendernāme) this passage corresponds to verses 7672–7682. 
However, not all verses are present in Ünver’s manuscript. For the full text based on 
 several manuscripts, see Aḥmedī, ed. Sılay, History of the Kings, 35–36 (verses 136–146).
34 Uzunçarşılı, Çandarlı Vezir Ailesi, 18.
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taken as a sign that Halil was indeed poorly educated? Not necessarily. But at 
the very least, we must accept that the question of scholarly qualifications and 
different educational backgrounds was one that was already being asked in 
early Ottoman society. This argument was apparently being used against the 
Çandarlı at the turn of the fifteenth century, if not earlier, by a court poet, 
whose sources (like those of the Anonymous Chronicles) were even older.
As indicated already, it is inadequate to speak of the Çandarlı family and its 
founder only in general terms. More detail is required if we are to approach the 
problem in its proper historical context. A brief account of key events will suf-
fice for our purposes here. As we have seen, Ahmedi was writing around 1410, at 
a time when Ottoman society was struggling with the aftermath of a crushing 
defeat. In July of 1402, the first Ottoman attempt at empire had come to a sud-
den end on a battlefield near Ankara. When Timur withdrew from Anatolia the 
following spring, he left a territory devastated by the depredations of his no-
madic army. The political landscape was highly fragmented, since Timur had 
reinstated as his clients several former beylik rulers, while also leaving Bayezid 
i’s sons to fight for what was left of the Ottoman domains. This resulted in a 
period of civil war, during most of which the main contender for the Ottoman 
throne was Ahmedi’s patron, Emir Süleyman (d. 1411). Süleyman’s success was 
largely due to the fact that he had on his side a great part of the Ottoman ruling 
establishment. At the head of his administration was Kara Halil’s son and suc-
cessor to the office of grand vizier, Çandarlı Ali Paşa. However, when Süleyman 
attempted to extend his power from the European side of the Ottoman do-
mains to Anatolia, he faced a serious adversary in the person of his brother 
Mehmed (the future Mehmed i, r. 1413–21). This forced Süleyman to spend 
much of his reign in Anatolia, in an effort to expand and defend his power 
against Mehmed and other enemies.35
Such a policy was only possible thanks to the conclusion of a treaty with the 
Christian powers of the Balkans, which had involved territorial and other con-
cessions. Çandarlı Ali Paşa played an important role in the peace negotiations 
leading to this treaty. However, he died in 1406, after Süleyman moved his base 
of operations to Anatolia. In the meantime, it seems that the marcher lords of 
Rumelia and other elements of Ottoman society based in Europe were becom-
ing increasingly displeased with the treaty, because it hindered their raiding 
activity against Byzantium and other Christian lands. Their resentment even-
tually led to Süleyman’s demise: various powers threatened by his rule (most 
notably his brother Mehmed) conspired to introduce yet another contender to 
35 For a full account of the Ottoman civil war, see Kastritsis, The Sons of Bayezid.
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
239Tales of Viziers and Wine
<UN>
the Ottoman throne. Presented with an alternative in the form of the young 
prince Musa, key members of Süleyman’s administration deserted to Musa and 
assisted him in taking his brother’s place. But in fact, after a mere two years, 
these same magnates began to desert Musa for Mehmed, who was thus able to 
take his brother’s throne and reunify the Ottoman domains. One of the key 
deserters was another member of the Çandarlı family, Ali’s brother İbrahim, 
the father of Murad ii and Mehmed ii’s vizier Çandarlı Halil Paşa, who was 
executed in 1453.
What bearing does all this have on Ahmedi’s early fifteenth-century repre-
sentation of Çandarlı Kara Halil? In fact, the above context is crucial to under-
standing his negative image, as well as that of the family as a whole. For regard-
less of when Ahmedi wrote the rest of his İskendernāme (and it is generally 
accepted that there were several drafts spanning decades), the section on Ot-
toman history was the last to be completed. In the aftermath of the 1402 de-
bacle, and in light of the civil war pitting Süleyman against his brothers, it was 
essential to present the Ottomans as holy raiders conquering Christian land in 
the name of Islam. For that reason, Ahmedi criticizes Bayezid i’s attacks against 
other Muslims. However, it was known to all that Süleyman had concluded a 
peace treaty with Byzantium and other Christian powers, which had been 
largely negotiated by Kara Halil’s son Çandarlı Ali Paşa. His death in 1406, along 
with the rising threat of Süleyman’s other magnates deserting to Musa, made it 
all the more important for Süleyman to distance himself from the Çandarlı and 
their past policies. It is in the context of this profound political crisis that we 
must interpret Ahmedi’s verses. For after Ali Paşa’s death in 1406, the Çandarlı 
were an easy target, just as they would be again after the execution of his neph-
ew Halil in 1453. It seems Ahmedi was more than happy to oblige, since from 
his own perspective, the scholarly pedigree of the Çandarlı may already have 
been in question.
Some further evidence adds weight to this interpretation. For despite its un-
questionable importance, the historical section of Ahmedi’s İskendernāme is 
neither the only account of Ottoman history produced in the early part of the 
fifteenth century, nor the only one from that time to cast the Çandarlı viziers in 
a negative light. Ahmedi’s verses must be considered alongside the anonymous 
Aḥvāl-i Sulṭān Meḥemmed (‘Tales of Sultan Mehmed’).
4 The Aḥvāl-i Sulṭān Meḥemmed and the Çandarlı
The Aḥvāl-i Sulṭān Meḥemmed (hereafter Aḥval) is an epic account in prose 
completed during the reign of Mehmed i (1413–21), which has survived 
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
Kastritsis240
<UN>
 incorporated into two later chronicles.36 This text was apparently composed in 
the court of Mehmed i in order to aid him in his struggles against his brothers, 
and eventually justify his violent rise to the throne. While it is impossible to be 
certain of its date of composition, its contents and structure suggest that it was 
written gradually as events were taking place, probably receiving its final form 
between 1413 and 1416. It is a lively work of epic prose, whose representation of 
its hero, Sultan Mehmed i, is reminiscent of the Persian epic Book of Kings 
(Firdawsi’s Shahnāma). The work has only one true hero, the conquering sul-
tan, but several villains including the grand vizier Çandarlı Ali Paşa. As we have 
seen, Ali was a suitable target because he was serving Mehmed’s brother and 
rival, Emir Süleyman. His role in the narrative is therefore connected to Süley-
man’s activity in Anatolia, where he and Mehmed competed for the Ottoman 
territory that remained after Timur’s departure. It is worth taking a detailed 
look at the presentation of Ali Paşa in the Aḥvāl. For as we will see, this shares 
some common elements with his more explicit vilification in the Anonymous 
Chronicles.
In the Aḥvāl, there are two key occasions on which Ali Paşa commits treach-
ery against Mehmed. Each involves military confrontation between the Otto-
man prince and his brother Süleyman, in which Mehmed would have gained 
the upper hand were it not for the deception of Ali Paşa. On the first of these, 
Ankara is under siege by Süleyman’s far superior army. Afraid of falling into his 
brother’s hands, Mehmed abandons the city and returns to his own base in the 
province of Rum (here defined as the region around Amasya and Tokat). He 
leaves the defense of Ankara in the hands of its governor, a man named Yakub 
Bey whose family played a prominent role in early Ottoman history.37 Howev-
er, its inhabitants open the gates to Süleyman, and Yakub has no choice but to 
take refuge in the citadel. Eventually he becomes desperate and sends messen-
gers to Mehmed requesting assistance. When they reach Mehmed, he instructs 
his chancery to compose a letter of reply to Yakub, informing him that he is 
prepared to come to his assistance if he can only hold out a few more days. His 
reply is sent back with the messengers who had brought the original letter. 
However, on their way back they are captured by Süleyman’s forces. As a result, 
36 On this work and its significance, see Kastritsis, “The Historical Epic”; Kastritsis, The Sons 
of Bayezid, 28–33, 206–216. For a full English translation, see Kastritsis, The Tales of Sultan 
Mehmed. I published an improved, annotated translation based on the most important 
manuscript in Anonymous, An Early Ottoman History: The Oxford Anonymous Chronicle 
(pp. 97–151).
37 His father had also been governor, and he was an ancestor of Tursun Bey, the chronicler 
of Mehmed the Conqueror. See Kastritsis, The Sons of Bayezid, 115.
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Yakub’s letter to Mehmed ends up in the hands of Ali Paşa, who replaces it with 
a forgery. Here is how the Aḥvāl presents this key moment in the narrative:
Bulgur Ağa took the letter and set out to deliver it, but was captured along 
the way. He was brought to Ali Paşa, who questioned him and was able to 
obtain full knowledge of the letter’s contents. [Ali] perpetrated a kind of 
deception, retaining the sultan’s letter and replacing it with one written 
by himself. This was addressed to Yakub Bey as if from the sultan’s mouth, 
and was sent back [with the same messenger]. It read, ‘Yakub Bey! Now 
you have sent a letter informing me of the citadel’s situation. This being 
the case, do not request assistance from me, for I am unable to reach you 
there. You have done well to make such a valiant effort to defend the cita-
del in my name. However, since matters have taken such a turn, you are 
to cease all fighting and surrender the castle to my older brother’. Perpe-
trating such a deception, Ali Paşa sent the letter to Yakub Bey. By the time 
it reached him, he had become most desperate. What could he do? Act-
ing out of ignorance, he opened the gate and came out, kissed Emir Sül-
eyman’s hand, and surrendered the citadel to him.38
What is most striking about this extract is that the negative presentation of Ali 
Paşa, while certainly present, is much less explicit than in the relevant passag-
es of the Anonymous Chronicles. This makes sense, since the later passages also 
reflect the perspective of a time when the Çandarlı family had been disgraced 
following the conquest of Constantinople. When the above passage from the 
Aḥvāl was written (ca. 1413), the family was still influential. It is true that Ali 
Paşa was an enemy of the Aḥval’s protagonist and patron, Mehmed i, because 
he had served his brother and rival. However, around 1411, Ali Paşa’s brother 
İbrahim actually joined Mehmed’s court.39 But in fact, there is a good chance 
that the passage we have just seen was written between 1406 and 1411, when 
there were as yet no members of the family on Mehmed’s side.
In any case, what is of greatest interest here is not the negative presentation 
per se, but the form that it takes. We can gain further insight into the nature of 
the critique by examining another passage. This comes later in the narrative, 
but still in the context of Mehmed and Süleyman’s power struggle in Anatolia. 
After losing Ankara to his brother, Mehmed withdraws to his base in Amasya-
Tokat. But he does not give up, and is always looking for an opportunity to 
38 Oxford Anonymous (Bodleian Marsh 313), 81v–82r. My updated translation. See also Kas-
tritsis, The Tales of Sultan Mehmed, 25–26, 70–71 (original text).
39 Kastritsis, The Sons of Bayezid, 165–166.
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confront Süleyman and regain the upper hand. While he is feasting with the 
people of his court, a messenger enters with the following message:
O Shah of the World! Some time ago you had sent your servant to Bursa. 
I went there and carried out a complete investigation. Your brother is 
practically alone, having only six hundred men by his side. He is occupied 
with drinking day and night, to such an extent that when he enters the 
bath to drink wine, he spends an entire month there feasting and enjoy-
ing himself. Such an opportunity presents itself but rarely. If you wish to 
attack, this is a most opportune moment.40
The story is a lengthy one, but may be summarized as follows. Mehmed be-
comes excited at the opportunity presented to confront his brother Süleyman. 
Seizing the day, he sets out with his army in the direction of Bursa. He eventu-
ally reaches the Sakarya river, where he encounters one of Süleyman’s officials, 
who has come to carry out a tax survey of the province.41 The official asks 
Mehmed’s men who they are; they reply, “You’ll see who we are!” and chase 
him away. He hastens back to Süleyman, who is thus informed of Mehmed’s 
imminent arrival. Süleyman panics, throws down his wine goblet, and declares 
that the only course of action is to escape to the safety of Rumelia, on the Eu-
ropean side of the straits. But Ali Paşa reassures him by suggesting a different 
plan. He reminds him that since he is in possession of the land, it is possible to 
hold out until Mehmed is forced to leave. He suggests an inaccessible place 
near Yenişehir, adding that if Mehmed is somehow able to gain the upper hand, 
Ali will write a letter convincing him to depart without delay. Events play out 
exactly as predicted. Mehmed and his army persevere, despite difficult terrain 
and inclement weather, and Ali Paşa resorts once again to his epistolary skills 
and his talent for deceit. He writes a letter to Mehmed, informing him of trea-
son in his ranks. Mehmed does not believe the letter and continues to fight, but 
the seeds of doubt have been sowed in his mind. When one of Mehmed’s cup-
bearers deserts to the enemy (perhaps unable to resist the temptation of em-
ployment at Süleyman’s court), Mehmed takes the event as a sign that Ali Paşa 
was right. He abandons the struggle, and Süleyman’s throne is saved.42
In the above story, we may discern several key elements. These include 
Mehmed’s bravery; Süleyman’s cowardice and love of luxury; and finally, 
40 Oxford Anonymous, 82v–83r; Kastritsis, The Tales of Sultan Mehmed, 26, 71.
41 il yazmaġa… gelmişdi. Oxford Anonymous, 83r; Kastritsis, The Tales of Sultan Mehmed, 26, 
72.
42 Oxford Anonymous, 83r–85r; Kastritsis, The Tales of Sultan Mehmed, 27–28, 72–73.
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Çandarlı Ali Paşa’s cunning and reliance on the written word. The mention of 
a land survey is especially intriguing, as it would probably have had special 
connotations for the Aḥvāl’s audience. Like other elements in the narrative, 
such references to Ottoman bureaucratic practices for which as we have seen 
the Çandarlı were held responsible may be regarded as a precursor to the much 
more explicit critique of the Anonymous Chronicles. However, as we saw in Ka-
fadar’s survey, another key discursive element in the Chronicles concerns the 
practice of courtly drinking parties. This, too, is present in the Aḥvāl, as well as 
in several other sources from the early fifteenth century. Specifically, what is 
critiqued in these narratives is the prince Süleyman’s love of wine and courtly 
entertainment. This constitutes another element deserving our attention, for it 
is directly related to the discourse about the Çandarlı and centralization. It is 
to this point that we will now turn.
5 Courtly Wine-drinking: topos or Reality?
If there is any doubt that stories about Süleyman’s drinking were circulating 
around the time of his death in 1411, this may be easily dispelled by the follow-
ing laconic entry in a Byzantine short chronicle:
As Emir Sülman had taken to bathing and was drinking one glass after 
another, the lords and grandees got fed up, and the armies left and began 
to desert to Musa Bey. When Emir Sülman heard this, he was afraid and 
tried to escape. But he was caught in the area of Bryse and strangled, on 
February 17 which was a Tuesday.43
We have seen that in the Anonymous Chronicles, a literary tradition that in its 
present form dates to the end of the fifteenth century, the topos of royal drink-
ing appears as one of many negative elements, alongside the corruption of the 
Çandarlı viziers and other members of the scholarly classes. The fact that many 
of these elements are already present in the early part of that century, many 
years before the centralizing reforms of Mehmed ii, demands an explanation. 
If such stories were indeed a reaction against increased royal power and cen-
tralization, this reaction was already present in the aftermath of 1402, when the 
first Ottoman attempt at empire collapsed and those opposed to it must have 
felt vindicated. In the ensuing dynastic war, first Mehmed and then Musa took 
43 Schreiner, Die byzantinischen Kleinchroniken, vol. 1, 637. My translation. For further com-
mentary on this passage, see Kastritsis, The Sons of Bayezid, 154–155.
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advantage of the fact that their successful older brother Süleyman had come to 
be associated with their late father Bayezid’s defeated regime, with its sup-
posed emphasis on court culture and centralization.
Süleyman’s association with Bayezid’s regime seems to have had several as-
pects. As we have seen, one of these was that he was served by Çandarlı Ali 
Paşa and other key members of Bayezid’s administration. Another was his 
close relationship with the Christian elites of Rumelia and the Aegean region. 
It is true that this relationship was essentially different, since Bayezid was 
able to follow an aggressive policy toward the Christian world, whereas Süley-
man was forced to surrender important Ottoman possessions to Byzantium 
and other powers in exchange for peace. Such important policy differences 
notwithstanding, however, the fact remains that both had extensive dealings 
with Christians. It was precisely in this area that the Çandarlı family’s role ap-
pears to have been indispensable. We have already seen that the last important 
member of the family, Çandarlı Halil Paşa, was executed following the con-
quest of Constantinople, because he was seen as a collaborator with the infidel 
(gāvur ortağı). This characterization is generally thought to have stemmed 
from the fact that he was opposed to prolonging the siege of the city, favoring 
instead a more accommodating stance toward Byzantium. But in fact, these 
accusations appear to have had deeper roots.44
To better elucidate the matter, we may now turn to another source, the late 
fifteenth-century chronicle of ʿĀşıkpaşazāde:
Emir Süleyman sent an ambassador to Karamanoğlu and Germiyanoğlu 
with the message, “Do not release my brother Musa, and I will be most 
friendly toward you”. When Musa found out that his brother had made 
peace with Karamanoğlu, he escaped to İsfendiyar. Emir Süleyman was in 
Bursa. He heard that Musa had gone to İsfendiyar and marched on him 
until he reached Göynük, where he camped on the banks of a river. At 
that time it was summer. When winter came he wintered there, never 
leaving that location. It became known thereafter as “the bey’s poplar”, 
because Emir Süleyman was always conversing and making merry there 
under a poplar tree. Then Süleyman made peace with İsfendiyar, so he 
left that place and reached İznik. There he occupied himself once again 
44 It is worth pointing out the parallels (and possible connections) between the Çandarlı 
before 1453 and the Notaras family in Byzantium at the same time. See Angold, The Fall of 
Constantinople, 8–9, 34–36; Necipoğlu, Byzantium between the Ottomans and the Latins, 
214–218.
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with merrymaking, drinking Ali Paşa’s free wine. İsfendiyar put Musa in a 
ship at Sinop and sent him to Wallachia.45
There is no need to dwell here in detail on the political events to which the 
passage refers. These were highly complex, and were related to the power 
struggle in Anatolia between the Ottoman princes Mehmed and Emir Süley-
man, which drew in many neighboring powers, including the ruler of Sinop, 
the İsfendiyar mentioned in the text.46 Suffice it to say, the key event that end-
ed the stalemate between the two brothers was the Black Sea crossing of a 
third prince, their brother Musa. In reality, this was the outcome of a coordi-
nated effort by Süleyman’s many enemies to undermine his rule by invading 
his European territory from the north. Intriguingly, however, in some manu-
scripts of the Anonymous Chronicles, there is another version of the above pas-
sage, which places responsibility for this cunning scheme squarely on the 
shoulders of Ali Paşa:
In the end, [Süleyman] made peace with İsfendiyar. Then he left and 
went to İznik. There he occupied himself once again with merrymaking. 
Seeing that he never stayed away from wine, all the people were offended 
by his bad habit. With the intercession of Ali Paşa, İsfendiyar put Musa in 
a ship at Sinop and sent him to Wallachia.47
It is worth digressing for a moment to consider this difference between 
ʿĀşıkpaşazāde and this version of the Anonymous Chronicles. As is usually the 
case, the texts in question are based on a common source, so discrepancies 
may be due at least in part to textual transmission. Even if this is the case, this 
passage deserves our attention: for the idea that Ali Paşa could have been be-
hind Musa’s Black Sea crossing is absurd, and shows the extent of the Çandarlı’s 
demonization. For Ali Paşa (d. 1406) was Süleyman’s vizier, and was almost cer-
tainly dead at the time of Musa’s Black Sea crossing.48
Such inconsistencies would have been obvious to ʿĀşıkpaşazāde, who had 
lived through some of the events in question. In his chronicle, as in the Aḥvāl, 
emphasis is placed instead on Süleyman’s courtly drinking habits. But there is 
a salient detail here that deserves further scrutiny: this is the reference to “Ali 
Paşa’s free wine” (ʿAlī Paşa’nıñ müft şarābı). As we saw earlier, in the Anonymous 
45 ʿĀşıkpaşazāde, ed. Giese, Tevārīḫ-i Āl-i ʿOsm̱ān, 73.
46 On these events and alliances, see Kastritsis, The Sons of Bayezid, 129–134.
47 Anonymous, ed. Giese, Die altosmanischen anonymen Chroniken, 48 (text), 132 (apparatus).
48 Kastritsis, The Sons of Bayezid, 135–136.
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Chronicles as summarized by Kafadar it is a Serbian princess who is blamed for 
introducing wine drinking to the Ottoman court. This is said to have happened 
during the reign of Süleyman’s father Bayezid, when the princess in question 
became his concubine following the Serbian defeat at Kosovo (1389). Needless 
to say, there is nothing striking about a Christian princess being blamed for 
introducing wine-drinking into a Muslim court. But the mention of Ali Paşa, 
and specifically the expression “free wine”, is an intriguing element that needs 
to be explained.
In fact, such explanation comes from a surprising quarter: the expense ac-
counts of the Genoese colony of Pera. There we may find the following brief 
entries:
1403, 26 June. Present made to his lordship Mosormano Jhalabi [i.e. Emir 
Süleyman Çelebi], who is dominant in Greece … for which we are owed 
… and it is for 8 jars, purchased from the same person to be filled with 
wine for them … Likewise, 27 June … for Malvasia wine … Likewise, 8 July, 
to Francisco de Canicia. And it is for 4 jars, in which was placed wine to 
be given as a gift to Ali Paşa and Balaban, who are barons of the afore-
mentioned Jhalabi [i.e. Süleyman] … Likewise, 28 June … for Malvasia, 
1 metron, presented and gifted to a certain Turk, who is the brother of Ali 
Paşa … hyperpyra 2, keratia 3 … 1403, 27 July. Present made to his lordship 
the Emperor Calojani Paleologo [John vii], etc. … for Malvasia … 1403, 10 
July. Present made to his lordship Balaban, lord of Greece and general, 
etc. … for Malvasia wine, 2 metra, purchased from a certain tavern-keeper 
for the aforementioned lord Balaban.49
One question that immediately arises concerns the identity of the man named 
Balaban. This name is common in early Ottoman history, and is associated 
with several early Ottoman magnates, so it is impossible to identify its bearer 
with complete certainty. However, one individual is by far the likeliest candi-
date: a protégé of Ali Paşa, one of three converts to Islam whose names appear 
as witnesses on the foundation document (vaḳfiyye, Ar. waqfiyya) of his foun-
dation in Bursa. The document is dated 1405, as is another apparently issued by 
the same Balaban, which is preserved in a monastic archive.50 If it is indeed the 
case that the Genoese accounts and the two Ottoman documents refer to the 
same person, then it makes sense to speak of someone belonging to Çandarlı 
49 Iorga, Notes et extraits (rol), 86–88.
50 Kotzageorgis, “An Ottoman Document”, 263. See also Uzunçarşılı, Çandarlı Vezir Ailesi, 45; 
Uzunçarşılı, “Çandarlı-zade Ali Paşa Vakfiyesi”, 558, 562.
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Ali’s inner circle. In fact, there is a strong likelihood that Balaban was a manu-
mitted Christian captive who had converted to Islam. Needless to say, this is all 
somewhat speculative; but the Genoese accounts leave little doubt that Bala-
ban and Ali were close associates, and were involved in procuring gifts of wine 
for the Ottoman prince Süleyman.
It is also worth noting the mention of Ali Paşa’s brother. There can be little 
doubt that the man in question is Çandarlı İbrahim, the father of the Halil Paşa 
executed in 1453. Although İbrahim played an important role in this period of 
Ottoman history, he has escaped the negative presentation accorded to his rela-
tives in the chronicles. His more positive image appears to have been due to the 
twin facts that he was less powerful than his brother, and that he eventually 
ended up in Mehmed i’s camp.51 The fact that his defection took place via Con-
stantinople suggests that he shared his family’s diplomatic links to the Byzan-
tine capital and its Genoese sister settlement, as demonstrated also by his pres-
ence in the above expense accounts.
The mention of Ottoman dignitaries in the Genoese accounts is highly sig-
nificant, for it sheds light on what appear in the Ottoman narratives to be little 
more than exaggerated stories designed to denigrate these people. It is striking 
to see some of them described in the Genoese records in similar terms as the 
Byzantine Emperor, notably as recipients of generous quantities of Malvasia 
wine. Of course, wine was not the only gift they received. Luxury textiles are 
also mentioned, as are expenses related to an elephant and some court jesters. 
But if anything, such gifts further confirm Süleyman’s presentation in Ottoman 
sources as a lover of courtly luxuries. It is clear that at least part of the time, 
these goods were also procured by the Çandarlı family and their dependents; 
and not everyone would have been sympathetic to the idea that they were nec-
essary trappings of an established Islamic ruler.
Finally, what should we make of the fact that Süleyman and his magnates 
seem indeed to have indulged in the consumption of wine? First of all, there is 
little doubt that this was far from uncommon in the Muslim courts of medieval 
Anatolia. In fact, devotees of the beverage apparently included even the great 
ġāzī leader Umur of Aydın.52 However, what seems to have been of key impor-
tance was the precise setting and mode of its consumption. In the anonymous 
Aḥval, following a common Persian convention, each chapter ends with the 
hero, Süleyman’s brother Mehmed, holding banquets and drinking parties 
with his men. Such feasting conforms to an epic mode that evokes the kings 
51 On İbrahim’s defection to Mehmed, see Kastritsis, The Sons of Bayezid, 165–166.
52 For some examples of wine-drinking involving Muslim rulers of Anatolia, see Fleet, Euro-
pean and Islamic Trade, 74.
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and other heroes of the Shāhnāma, and is therefore fundamentally different in 
nature from the same source’s presentation of Süleyman. Mehmed’s feasting is 
a suitable manly complement to hard-fought battles, which may be summa-
rized with the common Persian expression bazm u razm (‘banquet and battle’). 
In contrast, Süleyman’s drinking takes place in the bath, while surrounded by 
poets and other courtiers, deaf to his generals’ calls for military action. It is for 
this reason that he is ultimately unfit to occupy the throne.53
6 Conclusion: Tales, Contexts, Histories
The above analysis allows us to arrive at several tentative conclusions. The first 
concerns the development over time of a coherent political discourse opposed 
to the creation of a strong Ottoman central state. We have seen that a kernel of 
that discourse was already present in the early fifteenth century, but had not 
yet developed into what we might call the classic formulation of the Anony-
mous Chronicles. By the late fifteenth century, when these chronicles were 
compiled, it was possible to blame the development of Ottoman society over 
more than a century on several generations of the Çandarlı family, together 
with other people and groups. By then, generalizations could be made about 
“men of knowledge” (dānişmend) as a social category, which could be blamed 
retrospectively for “whatever oppression and corruption there is in this land”. 
It is precisely this discourse that was seized upon by Wittek and his followers, 
who read into it a neat distinction between ġāzīs and ulema. But in the early 
part of the fifteenth century, such social divisions were not yet as clear.
As we have seen, there can be little doubt that stories about Çandarlı Ali 
Paşa and his father, Kara Halil-Hayreddin, were already circulating in the years 
around 1402. This is hardly surprising, considering the strong role of the family 
in the first Ottoman attempt at empire under Bayezid i. It is undoubtedly the 
case that their close connection to power had created resentment, not least 
because the centralization and institutionalization with which they were in-
volved had alienated social groups with vested interests. In this respect, the 
late fourteenth century ce was not unlike the late fifteenth, when Mehmed ii 
made his unpopular centralizing reforms. But unlike Mehmed ii’s highly suc-
cessful imperial venture, the failure of the first Ottoman attempt at empire was 
taken by some as proof that those behind it were misguided, even guilty of a 
53 For the different accounts of Süleyman’s loss of power, see Kastritsis, The Sons of Bayezid, 
153–158. For the relevant section of the Aḥvāl, see Oxford Anonymous, 89v–91v; Kastritsis, 
The Tales of Sultan Mehmed, 31–32, 77–78.
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direct offense against God. For the Timurid debacle of 1402 had created a situ-
ation in which it was easy to draw connections between several trends that had 
been on the rise in the preceding years. These included the introduction of 
taxation, slave soldiers, and other centralizing institutions; aggressive policies 
toward other Muslim states, which relied largely on the aforementioned slave 
soldiers as well as armies provided by Christian clients; a rise in diplomatic 
activity, often involving Christian powers, in which it was standard practice to 
exchange gifts of wine and other luxury goods to be consumed in a courtly set-
ting; and the rise of the Ottoman court itself, which was now in a position to 
attract such important poets and intellectuals as Ahmedi.
These developments are closely mirrored in the careers of the first two 
Çandarlı viziers. After 1402, like other high-ranking members of Bayezid’s ad-
ministration, Ali Paşa had supported Bayezid i’s son Emir Süleyman. In the 
immediate aftermath of Timur’s victory, Süleyman and his court were forced to 
abandon Anatolia, then make peace with Byzantium and other Christian pow-
ers in exchange for security. In so doing, they alienated various social groups, 
especially the raiders and others relying for their livelihood on aggression 
against the Christian world. Although many of the grievances that surfaced in 
1402 seem to have had roots in the policies of Murad i and Bayezid i, neither of 
these rulers could be accused of taking a conciliatory stance toward Christen-
dom. But after the Ottoman defeat, their heirs were in the unenviable position 
of trying to reunite what was left under the pressure of numerous threats, the 
greatest of which was another Timurid intervention. Although peace with the 
Christian world gave Süleyman and Ali Paşa an opportunity to turn their atten-
tion toward Anatolia, this came at an enormous cost. For just as Süleyman had 
a competent advisor in the person of Ali Paşa and a court panegyrist in the 
poet Ahmedi, his brother and rival Mehmed had his own advisor, his very com-
petent tutor Bayezid Paşa, and literati of his own.54 Probably under the direc-
tion of Bayezid Paşa, Mehmed’s court was able to exploit popular discontent 
and the culture of epic poetry and storytelling in the service of his political 
agenda. For how else to explain the fact that rumors of events such as Ali Paşa’s 
diplomatic exploits and Emir Süleyman’s courtly wine-drinking found their 
way into the anonymous Aḥvāl, in addition to other historical narratives?
The most important lesson to be learned is that when considering social 
divisions in early Ottoman society as represented in literary sources, it is not 
enough to think in terms of such simple categories as frontiersmen versus 
ulema, or even centralization and its discontents. It is also necessary to con-
sider the role of rumors, propaganda, and the popularity of epic storytelling in 
54 On this man, see Kastritsis, “Bāyezīd Pasha”.
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the period in question. For how could stories we have come to associate with a 
coherent Ottoman discourse against centralization also appear in “official” 
propaganda narratives from an Ottoman court, as well as Christian sources? 
Crucially, this is not simply a matter of accepting that the stories in question 
must therefore be true. While they may indeed have been based on true events, 
they were also circulating as rumors that could cross the boundaries of lan-
guage. Such stories had a life of their own, but could also be manipulated for 
political purposes. In light of the above considerations, it is not unreasonable 
to suggest that what might appear by the late fifteenth century to be the voice 
of the ġāzīs opposed to Mehmed ii’s centralization reforms can be traced at 
least in part to the court of his grandfather and namesake, Mehmed i.
Perhaps the best illustration of the importance of context and storytelling is 
the following passage from the Greek chronicle of Chalkokondyles (ca. 1460s). 
Like many of the Ottoman ones we have considered, its protagonist is Çandarlı 
Kara Halil/Hayreddin:
Hayreddin took over Thessalonike and enslaved the rebels. He was held 
in high esteem by Murad, although previously too he had risen high in his 
service and wielded great power. Many worthwhile stories are told about 
Hayreddin, about how he would advise Murad on what needed to be 
done and accomplished great deeds in both Asia and Europe while serv-
ing him in most matters. Some of his sayings to Murad in discussions of 
judgment and strategy are recorded. It is thus said that he once asked, “O 
Sultan Murad, how should one best conduct a campaign so as to most 
easily accomplish one’s goals?” It is reported that Murad answered, “By 
planning well and treating the soldiers as well as possible”. Hayreddin 
asked again, “And how do you plan properly?” He said, “If you use the 
right calculations and do not make mistakes in them”. At this point it is 
said that Hayreddin laughed loudly and said to him, “O Sultan Murad, 
you might seem to be most wise. But how could one make these calcula-
tions without being present to actually observe both what needs to be 
done and its opposite, and thereby avoid the latter while choosing to pur-
sue the former, and so achieve what is necessary?” In this way he hinted 
that it was speed that accomplished great deeds, more so than other good 
qualities, and that there is nothing that a general should practice more 
than speed and swift application, and that he should be everywhere that 
he has to be. Conversing about such matters with each other, they showed 
that they did not lack judgment about what was required.55
55 Chalkokondyles, trans. Kaldellis, The Histories, vol. 1, 76–79.
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In certain respects, this story bears a remarkable resemblance to some of 
those in the Anonymous Chronicles. Without its original context, however, it 
ultimately makes little sense. As pointed out by the passage’s translator, An-
thony Kaldellis, this is one of many cases where Chalkokondyles is relying on 
Ottoman sources, which were probably communicated orally.56 Indeed, the 
chronicler states as much when he tells us that “many worthwhile stories are 
told about Hayreddin”. However, in the words of Kaldellis, here “the Turkish 
original only haunts the text” since “it is no longer alive”.57 In order to under-
stand this and other stories, it is necessary to study them side by side in the 
context of political events and social circumstances. This is a project begun by 
Paul Wittek, but only in the broadest, most impressionistic terms, and under 
the influence of a romantic view of history. Today, however, the time is ripe for 
a more detailed, careful, and comprehensive examination, one which should 
transcend the arbitrary boundaries of language, period, and genre.
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Chapter 6
Iranian Elites under the Timurids
Beatrice F. Manz
The pre-modern history of the Islamic Middle East is seen largely in two con-
texts: the court and the city. This is what our sources will illuminate for us. The 
cities we learn about are the largest ones—the dynastic and regional capitals. 
The elites described are the ones who inhabit these two major venues; the dy-
nasty and standing army, personnel of the court and chancellery (dīwān), and 
city notables, especially the religious classes. The bureaucrats might influence 
administrative policy, while the power of the ʿulamaʾ lay in their social influ-
ence and their ability to act as intermediaries between state and population. 
Seeking the link between government and society, naturally then we have 
looked to the relationship between court and city.
In the territory of Iran, with which I am concerned here, pre-Islamic society 
has been presented very differently. Regions were dominated by landed elites: 
on one level great lords and below them the famous gentry class, the dihqāns, 
central to both Sassanian administration and military might. There has been a 
general consensus among historians that this system changed gradually after 
the Arab conquest. At least at the lower level, the Iranian landowning elites 
remained important through the Samanid dynasty (819–1005 ad). After that 
they fade from view in the medieval historical sources, especially from the 
Seljukid period (1038–1194) when Turkic nomads from the steppe became rul-
ers over much of the Middle East. From this time on we read about Iranian 
bureaucrats and ʿulamaʾ, but the military has usually been understood to be-
long primarily to the Turks, whether slave soldiers or free nomad troops. In 
general, modern historical writing has mirrored this picture.1 The question we 
need to ask is whether the regional Iranian elite actually lost direct political 
and military importance, or simply became less visible in the written sources. 
I am using the term “Iranian” here in the sense in which medieval historians 
used the term “tajik”: meaning the non-turkic, primarily settled, population of 
Iran and Central Asia, in contrast to the Turks, identified as originally nomadic 
peoples of the steppe.
1 See for example: Garthwaite, The Persians, pp. 107, 124–125; Amitai, “Armies and their eco-
nomic basis in Iran”, pp. 539–544.
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The position of the Iranian elite, particularly in relation to military activity, 
has begun to receive attention over the last decade and a half. For the larger 
cities, the importance of both the urban population and the city notables in 
military defense has been clearly demonstrated. Several scholars writing on 
the middle periods of Islamic history (c. 1138–1500) have shown that the urban 
populations remained active in city defense under the leadership of city offi-
cials. It is harder to illuminate the position of local elites in smaller cities and 
in more rural areas, which of course made up the majority of territory and 
population. Even for such significant cities as Kashan, Qazwin or Damghan, we 
have almost no information. The sources give us just enough evidence to show 
that a significant number of elite Iranians continued to engage in military ac-
tivity, but we have to strain to see them. The relationship of elite status to land 
ownership also remains uncertain, though the fact that Iranian elites contin-
ued to hold regional power —as I shall show— presupposes an income from 
land, whether owned outright, or by government grants. (iqṭāʿ).2
Despite the paucity of evidence, I want to pose several questions about the 
nature of the Iranian elite, looking at both the civilian and the military sphere. 
I will engage in speculation beyond what the sources fully support and suggest 
that we consider the likelihood that Iranian landed elites remained wide-
spread, active and multifaceted, even in periods of strong central rule. I believe 
this is true not only of the city populations, which have already been studied, 
but of the elites of towns and rural regions as well. Although some of my con-
clusions must remain tentative, it seems to me that we can no longer accept 
uncritically the picture our sources suggest, of a politically weak elite, active 
primarily in civilian affairs. Since we know that our sources distort our picture, 
we need to work actively to correct the image they present.
1 The Problem of the Sources
Before we can attempt to understand the Iranian elites, we must face the ex-
tent of our ignorance. We are hampered in our search for understanding not 
only by the lack of sources, but also by the programmatic nature of the infor-
mation our texts give us. Since we have very few original documents for the 
pre-modern period, we are dependent on sources in which information has 
been collected and organized for a specific purpose. There are several types of 
systematic distortion common to all the works at our disposal.
2 On this subject see Paul, Lokale und imperiale Herrschaft im Iran des 12. Jahrhunderts, pp. 119, 
146.
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One problem comes from the genres into which historical writing was di-
vided. The political narrative is given in historical chronicles which focus on 
ruler and army; these are accounts of campaigns, disposition of territory, dy-
nastic and court events. Bureaucrats appear here occasionally when appoint-
ed, dismissed or associated with a particular event. The city notables and reli-
gious classes appear more rarely, usually in very short mentions. Our major 
source of information on the Iranian elites outside army and court is the bio-
graphical literature, which provides notices on the lives of ulama, poets, bu-
reaucrats, and Sufis. Here the ruler or a prince may appear, but political events, 
campaigns and the Turco-Mongolian military play a small part.3 Thus the orga-
nization of information in the sources emphasizes separation between the Ira-
nian and Turco-Mongolian populations, and between civilian and military 
spheres.
Another systematic distortion in our sources, particularly from the Seljukid 
period on, is the tendency to suppress coverage of Iranian military activity be-
cause the military was considered the sphere of the dynasty and its standing 
armies, with the occasional assistance of nomadic populations. War for reli-
gious purposes was one exception to this; otherwise histories regularly down-
played the military role of city or rural populations. This is particularly true of 
the histories written for the central court, on which we depend for much of our 
information on military activity.4 Even where regional armies are mentioned 
3 One can take as examples the famous biographical collection by the poet and vizier Navāʾī, 
Majālis al-nafāʾis (Persian translations from the Chaghatay original: The Latā’ifnāma of 
Fakhrī Harātī, and a translation by Muḥammad b. Mubārak Qazwīnī), and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 
Jāmī’s work on the lives of well-known Sufis, Nafaḥāt al-uns. An exception to the rule is the 
biographical collection of Dawlatshāh Samarqandī on the lives of poets; the unusual focus 
here is due probably to the fact that the author came from a military family, and himself held 
military posts in his early years (see Manz, Power, Politics and Religion, p. 62). Biographies of 
bureaucrats, who worked closely with both rulers and commanders, contain more informa-
tion on politics and military campaigns, but little on the part that viziers played in them. The 
two collections from the Timurid period are: Khwāndamīr, Dastūr, and ʿUqaylī, Āthār 
al-wuzarāʾ.
4 For the earlier period see Durand-Guédy, “Iranians at War under Turkish Domination”, 
pp. 588–590, 595. For the Timurid period, we have two histories of the reign of Temür, the 
Ẓafarnāma of Niẓām al-Dīn Shāmī written towards the end of Temür’s life, and the Ẓafarnāma 
of Sharaf al-Dīn ʿAlī Yazdī, written in Shiraz during Shāhrukh’s reign, and based on Shāmī’s 
history; both are focused strongly on Temür himself. (Shāmī, Ẓafarnāma; Yazdī, Ẓafarnāma). 
For the later periods there are four major histories, all written by scholars or bureaucrats 
close to the court and under court patronage. The history of Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, written for 
Shāhrukh, incorporates and expands the Ẓafarnāma of Niẓām al-Dīn Shāmī, continuing the 
story to the time of his death in 833/1430. This history in turn became the foundation of the 
Maṭlaʿ al-Saʿdayn wa majmaʿ al-baḥrayn of ʿAbd al-Razzāq Samarqandī, who served both 
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and where it is clear that they consist of Iranian troops, histories rarely report 
Iranian performance in battle or the names of regional commanders. Local 
military powers appear somewhat more clearly during periods of disorder, 
when no powerful state dominated the region and the limelight. At such times 
leading families took advantage of the confusion to establish control over their 
own regions and became significant actors in a general struggle for power.
A few areas in Iran have local historiographical traditions producing histori-
ans with a strong attachment to the region, writing both specifically local his-
tories and more general chronicles which contain valuable details on events in 
their own areas. Regional elites appear more clearly in such histories, particu-
larly those about areas distant from the center of power, such as the Caspian 
regions and the desert areas of eastern Iran like Farah and Sistan, both of which 
were often under their own kings. In the histories of these places we can see 
something of the activities of a second tier of actors, the lords and commanders 
under local kings. Histories of the regions close to provincial or imperial capi-
tals, such as the district of Yazd or Khurasan, provide less detailed information. 
However, though the difference is subtle, the role of local actors does emerge 
more clearly in these works than in most dynastic histories. Thus for instance, 
describing an uprising in Yazd in 798/1395–6, dynastic histories attribute the 
action to an outside amir of Turco-Mongolian descent, while local histories re-
veal that this amir was invited into the city by actors within it, and that not only 
Turco-Mongolian but also local officials were attacked.5 Writers describing 
events involving their own cities often provide valuable details on local actors 
ignored by the more centrally located historians. Such histories have helped 
scholars gain insight into the active military role played by the urban popula-
tion and notables in city defense. Here it is clear that religious personnel played 
an important part, and the effort was most often led by the city’s chief qāḍī. The 
notables and population might act in conjunction with Turco-Mongolian of-
ficials or separately. Many fighters were artisans but both they and their leaders 
clearly had some military experience, particularly in archery.6
Shāhrukh and his successor Sulṭān Abū Saʿīd, and completed his history in 875/1470. Samar-
qandī was trained in the religious sciences, and gives somewhat more coverage to chancel-
lery and religious affairs. The last two historians, Muḥammad b. Khwāndshāh b. Maḥmūd, 
known as Mīrkwhānd (d. 903/1498) and his grandson Khwāndamīr (d. 1530 or 1542), were also 
trained in religious sciences; both were active in the court of the last Timurid ruler, Sulṭān 
Ḥusayn-i Bayqara. Both likewise incorporated the work of earlier historians into their own. 
(See Manz, Power, Politics and Religion, pp. 51–61, for summary and references.).
5 See Manz, “Local Histories of Southern Iran”; for the Yazd uprising, pp. 272–275.
6 Durand-Guédy, “Iranians at War”; Paul, “Wehrhafte Städter”, pp. 182–190; Manz, “Nomad and 
Settled”, pp. 428, 434–446. For an earlier period, this subject was taken up by Claude Cahen 
many years ago in his monograph Mouvements populaires et autonomisme urbain.
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When we turn to the activity of elites in the civilian sphere, most notably 
within the religious professions, Sufi orders, and the dīwān, our sources are 
somewhat fuller. The biographical literature in Persian is far less detailed than 
it is in Arabic, especially for the middle periods, with which we are concerned 
here. While Arabic biographical dictionaries often provide quite long biogra-
phies covering an entire career, most Persian biographies, whether in collec-
tions or within narrative histories, rarely exceed a few paragraphs. Nonetheless 
we do have sketches of many scholars and some bureaucrats; there is also a 
rich fund of biographies of Sufi shaykhs, which are longer—if not more 
 systematic—than those of other people. Grave visitation manuals provide 
some additional material. Such sources usually stress intellectual and family 
filiations, and have been widely used for social history. However, it is important 
to recognize that these texts, though they enlighten, also distort. The problem 
here is that biographical collections are usually concerned with individual pro-
fessions or with individuals as they related to their occupation. The filiations 
they report are usually those that remain within the profession; we know of the 
sons who follow their fathers, and of disciples who marry into the family. But 
are those mentioned the only sons and the only marriageable daughters? If we 
do not hear about others, it might not be due to lack of success, but to their 
choice of a career path that does not fit into the narrative. The picture pre-
sented is not false, but we should recognize that it is also not complete and that 
the omissions are probably not random.
One further small fund of information is available which can help us to 
counteract the limitations of the master narrative, and this is the autobio-
graphical material included by some historians in their chronicles. The narra-
tive is almost never complete, and consists usually of brief mentions of specific 
occasions and relationships. Nonetheless it sometimes breaks outside of the 
conventions governing the central texts, to include information which would 
elsewhere be considered irrelevant. Here I would like to examine two exam-
ples of what can be learned. The first text I will examine is an historical com-
pendium known as Mujmal-i Faṣīḥī, written by a mid-level Khurasanian bu-
reaucrat, Aḥmad Faṣīḥ Khwāfī (d. after 1441/2). The Mujmal is an abbreviated 
chronicle starting with Adam and going up to the author’s time, giving for each 
year a list of major events, with births and deaths of important people. Faṣīḥ 
Khwāfī was a native of Khurasan with strong local connections, which are evi-
dent in the history. We are able to trace something of his ancestry, career path, 
and acquaintance. The Mujmal provides us a good illustration of how an elite 
regional family developed and how one individual placed himself within it.
As Faṣīḥ Khwāfī reaches his own time he begins to include the members of 
his own extended family, and indeed the births of his own sons, despite his 
rather modest standing. Although Faṣīḥ and those of his close relatives he 
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mentions did not have distinguished careers in the Timurid dīwān he did come 
from prominent ancestors on both sides. Faṣīḥ gives the death notice of his 
father in the year 1393/1394, tracing his ancestry back to Abū Imāma Ṣadī, com-
panion of the Prophet and ḥadīth transmitter. However, Faṣīḥ offers no infor-
mation about his father’s life besides his burial place, and I have found no 
other member of his family on this side elsewhere in the history.7 The family 
that was important locally, and which probably provided Faṣīḥ with his profes-
sional contacts, was that of his mother. This family also probably provided him 
with the nisba Khwāfī. The family claimed descent from the famous Ghaznavid 
vizier, Abū Naṣr Mishkān, a highly suitable ancestor for a dīwān family, but 
more immediately from a warlord of Khwāf, Majd al-Dīn Muḥammad, an am-
bitious and rebellious servitor of the Kartid kings (1245–1389) who ruled part of 
Khurasan from Herat. After Majd al-Dīn’s defeat by the Kartids some of his 
progeny apparently continued in the dynasty’s service. Aside from parents and 
sons, Faṣīḥ mentions only two people related to him; two second cousins from 
his mother’s branch, who appear to have served in the Herat dīwān during Te-
mür’s life.8 Faṣīḥ’s history thus lets us see two things which might not appear in 
a general history or standard biography. The first is the choice of connections 
an ambitious man might use; Faṣīḥ Khwāfī clearly profited from the promi-
nence and professional connections of his mother’s family rather than that of 
his father. The second and related revelation is the selectivity of the connec-
tions mentioned—the only contemporary relatives who appear are his second 
cousins, who were in a similar career path and probably somewhat more ad-
vanced than he.
I will conclude this section with an illustration of the influence that genre 
and the circumstances of writing have on the information offered about a giv-
en person in historical texts. We have a good example of the differing kinds 
of information offered by works of varying types in the portraits they give of 
one particular official who combined religious, bureaucratic and military ac-
tivity throughout a distinguished career. Khwāja Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad 
Rāzī, called Ḥāfiẓ Rāzī (d. April/May 1422), was the main vizier and ṣadr (su-
pervisor of religious offices) in Fars, and a prominent military commander 
for the Timurid prince Iskandar b. ʿUmar Shaykh (d. 1415), who was the semi- 
independent governor of Fars early in the reign of Shāhrukh (r. 1409–1447). 
As an important provincial figure, Ḥāfiẓ Rāzī is briefly mentioned in  several 
7 Faṣīḥ, Mujmal, iii, pp. 137–138.
8 Faṣīḥ, Mujmal, iii, genealogy: pp. 110, 214, 251. We know that Faṣīḥ’s relatives were dismissed 
by Sayyid Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad, sent by Temür to shake up the Herat dīwān and admin-
istration (p. 150).
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sources: he is listed as vizier for Iskandar in the dynastic genealogy, the 
Muʿizz al-ansāb; he is briefly noted in the Tadhkirat al-shuʿarāʾ of Dawlatshāh 
Samarqandī (d. after 1487), which chronicles the lives both of poets and of the 
dynasty; and his death and burial are mentioned in the Mujmal-i Faṣīḥī.9 Ḥāfiẓ 
Rāzī also appears in a Sufi source: the biography of Shāh Niʿmat Allāh Walī 
Kirmānī, active in the early Timurid period. Here he appears doing honor to 
Shāh Niʿmat Allāh at a public audience in Shiraz, and is identified as ṣadr and 
as a student of the famous scholar Sayyid ʿAlī Jurjānī.10 In each source he ap-
pears as he fits into the specific narrative being presented.
Ḥāfiẓ Rāzī was a native of Yazd, a city which produced a spate of historical 
writing during the Timurid period. In the local histories we learn considerably 
more about his activities. Three of the histories written in Yazd focus on the 
history of the city itself: the Tārīkh-i Yazd and Tārīkh-i jadīd-i Yazd from the 
Timurid period, and the somewhat later Jāmiʿ-i mufīdī. The first two histories 
are concerned primarily with the built environment and where Ḥāfiẓ Rāzī is 
mentioned it is usually in connection with buildings, though the fuller Tārīkh-i 
jadīd also identifies him as vizier and gives several anecdotes about his life 
centered on his relations with the dynasty.11 The Jāmiʿ-i mufīdī includes Ḥāfiẓ 
Rāzī in its biographies of notable figures; here there is discussion of his learn-
ing, his service as vizier under Iskandar, and later his entertainment of 
Shāhrukh and his involvement in producing a cover which Shāhrukh attempt-
ed to donate to the Kaʿba.12 In none of the histories focusing on the city of Yazd 
is there any mention of Ḥāfiẓ Rāzī’s military activity. However, the historian 
Jaʿfarī, who wrote the Tārīkh-i Yazd, also produced a general history up to his 
time, and here Ḥāfiẓ Rāzī is listed as one of several commanders that the prince 
Iskandar sent on an expedition against Qum.13 Much the fullest account of 
Ḥāfiẓ Rāzī, and the only extended discussion of his military role, is found in 
one history, the Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh-i ḥasanī, written in 1451–1453 by Ḥasan b. 
Shihāb Yazdī. Here Ḥāfiẓ Rāzī’s military position is given considerable promi-
nence. This unusual emphasis is undoubtedly due to the fact that the author 
served in the army under Ḥāfiẓ Rāzī, as commander of ten men. He states that 
Ḥāfiẓ Rāzī was tovachi (troop inspector, usually also in charge of conscription) 
of a tümen—that is to say a troop theoretically numbering 10,000, the largest 
size of regiment in the army. Ḥāfiẓ Rāzī also commanded a special regiment 
9 Muʿizz al-ansāb, f. 108a; Dawlatshāh, Tadhkirat, p. 375 (mentioned as vizier for a different 
prince); Faṣīḥ, Mujmal, iii, p. 251.
10 Aubin, Matériaux pour la biographie de Shah Niʿmatullah Wali Kermani pp. 86–87, 180.
11 Jaʿfarī, Tārīkh-i Yazd, p. 121; Kātib, Tārīkh-i jadīd-i Yazd, pp. 147–149, 207.
12 Bāfqī, Jāmiʿ-i mufīdī, iii, pp. 155–157.
13 Jaʿfarī, Tārīkh-i kabīr, f. 303a.
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known as the Qushun-i Jānbāz, and according to Ḥasanī accompanied the 
prince Iskandar on all important expeditions.14 When we take all these histo-
ries together, we can see the progression in information and the way in which 
different roles are separated; in sources written outside the province, Ḥāfiẓ 
Rāzī receives an occasional mention as vizier; in provincial biographical and 
urban literature he appears in his civilian role, while the locally written history 
describes local campaigns in sufficient detail to list him on one campaign. For 
an understanding of his military role we depend on the historical chance of a 
particular author who served under him.
2 Iranian Elites before the Timurids
While the central subject of this chapter is the elite of the Timurid period, the 
role of Iranians under the Timurids was not an exception but the continuation 
of an earlier pattern predating the Mongol invasion and lasting through it. 
I will therefore briefly review what we know about the military activities of the 
Iranian elites in earlier Islamic periods, concentrating on those outside the 
major cities. Despite our problematical sources it is possible to trace the evolu-
tion of the Iranian elite up to the Timurids, at least in its broadest outlines. 
Looking at the history of Iran from the Arab conquest we can see first the con-
tinuation of the dihqāns as a landed elite with a military tradition lasting 
through the Samanid dynasty, and after them an elite of probably mixed prov-
enance, who still held regional power at a local level and led retinues of sol-
diers. In several studies, Jürgen Paul has traced the activities of regional Iranian 
elites through several centuries, showing them active particularly in matters of 
local administration, but also sometimes in the military.15 Recent studies on 
Iran under the Seljukids likewise show families wielding regional military pow-
er; the picture is clearest for the city but at least some of the militias men-
tioned were clearly recruited from the countryside and used outside the city.16 
In the later Seljukid period the great notable families of Isfahan were able to 
keep out Seljukid claimants for power, and at the end of the Seljukid period 
14 Yazdī, Ḥasanī, pp. 14, 24; Manz, Power, Politics and Religion, p. 149.
15 Jürgen Paul provides an excellent detailed discussion of local Iranian elites in the twelfth 
century in his book, Lokale und imperiale Herrschaft im Iran des 12. Jahrhunderts, cited 
above. Several earlier works of his also provide information on elites before the Timurid 
period: The state and the military: the Samanid case; “Where did the dihqāns go?”; 
Herrscher, Gemeinwesen, Vermittler, pp. 93–146.
16 Durand-Guédy, Iranian Elites, pp. 58, 117, 174–176, 218.
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much of actual power within the Isfahan region was in the hands of local no-
table families, allying with outside powers for their own advantage.17
A particularly active period for Iranian military elites is the one just 
preceding the Mongol invasion, when Seljukid power had faded and the 
Khwarazmshāhs (c. 1077–1231), centered in the Aral Sea region, the caliph in 
Baghdad, and the Iranian Ghurid dynasty (c. 1100–1215) of the Herat region 
had exhausted themselves in their struggle over the Iranian plateau. The pres-
ence of competing claims in the area led to a proliferation of smaller regional 
powers which together controlled a large portion of the Iranian plateau. We 
find local dynasties and their servitors in Mazandaran, sometimes stretching 
to Damghan and Simnan on the northern corridor, in Quhistan, Ghuristan—
the area around Bamyan, stretching to Herat—, in Sistan, Hormuz, Fars, and 
Luristan. These small states were frequently at war, using local armies under 
subordinate commanders, who sometimes switched allegiance to other dy-
nasties. There was also considerable internal dissention caused by rivals for 
power within the dynasty and commanders eager for adventure.18 Within 
the Khwarazmshāh’s domains likewise, the importance of regional lords was 
recognized by the historian Nasawī (d. 1249–50) and the geographer Yāqūt 
(d. 1229), who attributed some of the weakness of the realm before the Mongol 
onslaught to the Khwarazmshāh’s execution of members of several powerful 
families, including the governors of major cities.19
Two histories from the early Mongol period give us an unusually detailed 
description of politics in eastern Iran on the eve of the Mongol invasion.20 
Among other things they allow us to follow the activities of regional military 
elites quite clearly in Ghuristan, a mountainous region in which prominent 
families centered themselves in fortresses and competed for power over neigh-
boring territories. Here for several decades before and after the Mongol con-
quest a number of powerful families vied for control over Herat and its region, 
some remaining loyal to the declining Ghurid dynasty, and others eager to ally 
with outside powers to gain their ends. In the end one of these families—the 
Kartids—surrendered their fortress to join the Mongols and founded a new 
polity which lasted to the Timurid conquest. Until the end of the Ilkhanate the 
Kartids remained loyal vassals to the Ilkhans, then becoming a largely indepen-
dent regional power until their defeat by Temür in 784–5/1383. We find several 
17 Durand-Guédy, Iranian Elites, pp. 172–173, 257–258, 281–292.
18 Manz, “Nomads and Regional Armies”, pp. 6–11.
19 Paul, “L’invasion mongole comme ‘révélateur’ de la societé iranienne”, pp. 45–46.
20 Jūzjānī, Ṭabaqāt, trans. Raverty; Jūzjānī, Ṭabaqāt, ed. Ḥabībī; Nasawī, Sīrat as-Sulṭān 
Dzhalāl ad-Dīn Mankburny.
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Ghurid commanders incorporated into the armies of the Khwarazmshāhs, and 
others following their own rulers into India where the Ghurids founded the 
Delhi Sultanate.21 Most remained and served the Kartid dynasty, under which 
the Ghurid amirs wielded considerable political power, especially at times of 
weak rule.22 The Kartid army was strong enough to inflict some defeats on the 
nomad armies of the Ulus Chaghatay, a tribal confederation based in Transoxi-
ana, until Temür’s rise to power changed the equation.23
Mongol conquest and rule did not destroy the power of local Iranian elites; 
in some places indeed they may well have profited. In Fars, ruled by the Turk-
men Salghurid dynasty (1148–1270) under Mongol oversight, regional elites be-
came agents of Salghurids and Mongols, serving as governors or local lords and 
administering many of the smaller cities and villages and referred to collec-
tively as ḥukkām and mulūk. Despite the increase in crown lands Iranian no-
tables, including shaykhs and bureaucrats, were able to build up large landed 
estates. Viziers, local notables, and the ḥukkām and mulūk all took an active 
part in politics and were not slow to enrich themselves both at the expense of 
the population and with bribes extracted from Mongol amirs.24
At the end of the Ilkhanid dynasty both Turco-Mongolian amirs and Iranian 
commanders hastened to take advantage; of the six substantial successor poli-
ties which emerged within the struggle, four were ruled by Iranians. The Kartid 
dynasty of Herat has already been mentioned. In Fars two dynasties founded 
by Iranian servitors of the Ilkhans—the Injuids (c. 1325–53) and the Muzaffa-
rids (1314–93)—competed for power. They were constantly at war, both against 
each other and within their own realms. It was not only within the vassal poli-
ties that local lords kept their power under the Mongols. Even in western 
Khurasan, which was a center for Mongol power during the Ilkhanate, regional 
elites were among the political powers active after the Ilkhans. These elites—
religious and secular—provided the impetus and most of the leadership for 
the Sarbadar movement, which controlled varying amounts of territory in the 
region from 1336 to 1381. The movement began with a rebellion by ʿAbd al-
Razzāq, member of a powerful family of Bashtin, near Sabzawar. His father is 
described as an amir, suggesting a military career. Beginning with his own re-
tainers, allies and relatives, he took Sabzawar, and from this time to the end of 
the dynasty we find the Sabzawari aristocracy as part of the leadership, not 
21 Manz, “Nomads and Regional Armies”, pp. 17–20; Jackson, The Delhi Sultanate, pp. 17–18, 
41–42.
22 Potter, “The Kart Dynasty of Herat”, pp. 68, 132–134.
23 Aubin, “Le Khanat de Čaġatai et le Khorasan”, pp. 23, 29, 35.
24 Aigle, Le Fārs sous la domination mongole, pp. 90–94, 128–129, 133, 138, 152–153.
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infrequently in competition with the elite of Bashtin. Several different families 
were active here, sometimes in alliance and sometimes in competition, and 
when the movement was powerful, other regional powers voluntarily submit-
ted.25 Despite frequent wars with its neighbors, the dynasty survived up to the 
time of Temür.
Alongside these powers were countless smaller realms kept or carved out in 
the post-Ilkhanid confusion. The historian Faryūmadī, describing the disorder 
after the Ilkhan Abū Saʿīd’s death in 1335, gives a list of local uprisings and sei-
zures. Some of the actors appear to have been Turco-Mongolian amirs, but 
many were Iranians. Thus, for example, power in the region of Kashan was 
taken for a while by Sayyid Latīf-Allāh Kāshī, a local sayyid and naqīb; Khwāja 
Tāj al-Dīn ʿAlī Aṣīl controlled Qum for a time; Amīr Jalāl Khurāsānī held Qalʿa-i 
Āwaral; Amīr Masʿūd Wazwāʾī held the fortress of Gīw until killed by his son.26
As we can see from the brief summary above, it is clear that Iranian elites 
continued to be part of the political and military landscape after the advent of 
foreign dynasties basing their power on armies of steppe soldiers, although 
these Iranian soldiers had ceased to be part of the master narrative presented 
by the historians. Only a few individuals reached high leadership positions 
within the central army or government under Turco-Mongolian rule. The poli-
ties created by such people, for instance those of the the Kartids, Muzaffarids 
and the Sarbadarids, often retained autonomy for significant periods but 
sometimes had to accept Turco-Mongolian overlordship. Nonetheless Iranian 
regional elites continued to exist and to play a significant part, not only in local 
administration, but also in military affairs.
3 Elites in the Timurid Period
The early Timurid period—the reigns of Temür (r. 1370–1405) and particularly 
of his son Shāhrukh (r. 1409–1447)—was a time of unusually centralized con-
trol for Iran, in which a number of subordinate dynasties became more fully 
integrated into the state. Nonetheless, many smaller cities and regions re-
mained under their own rulers for some time, and local military elites fought 
within Timurid provincial armies. Temür destroyed the regional powers strong 
enough to pose a potential threat: the Turco-Mongolian Jalayirids and the Ira-
nian Kartids, Sarbadarids, and Muzaffarids. He also exiled the Iranian Marʿashī 
25 Smith, The History of the Sarbadār Dynasty, pp. 103–104, 115, 119, 122–123, 145; Melville, 
“Sarbadārids”.
26 Shabānkāraʾī, Majmaʿ al-ansāb (this includes Faryūmadī’s continuation), pp. 342–343.
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sayyids of Mazandaran. A number of the former servitors of these dynasties 
were then enrolled in his armies. Many rulers near the periphery of the realm 
submitted and retained their thrones: the rulers of Badakhshan, Sistan, Farah, 
Hormuz, Luristan, and much of the Caspian region continued as Timurid vas-
sals.27 Of the smaller dynasties, many remained in place, though the sources 
give us only incidental information so we cannot gauge what proportion of the 
realm was fully incorporated. At the end of Ilkhanid rule we find the city of 
Qum under Iranian control, and the Timurid sources state that it remained 
under local rule through Temür’s reign until it was taken by Temür’s grandson 
Iskandar Sulṭān in 1414/1415.28 The nearby city of Sawa also appears to have 
remained under local rulership, as did the region of Tabas-i Gilak in Quhistan, 
where the family of the fortress keeper Amīr Shaykh ʿAlī carved out a realm of 
respectable size along the trade route between Khurasan and Fars, lasting into 
the reign of Temür.29
Temür often confirmed the offices of local powers who submitted, and some 
of these are associated with quite small places. For instance we see Temür 
passing through the regional town (qaṣaba) Kusuya in Khurasan, and showing 
favor to Pahlawān Mahdī Kūsūyī who came out to greet him.30 Local rulers of-
ten hastened to show submission to a successful conqueror; a number could 
thus increase their holdings, as did for instance Sayyid Riḍā Kiyā of Gilan.31 It 
is likely that the numerous “local rulers” who came to offer submission to Te-
mür on his arrival in their region included men at this level as well as the more 
prominent rulers like those of Shirwan and Gilan whose names appear in the 
histories.32
A number of Iranian elites who submitted to Temür came fully into Te-
mür’s service and held quite important places, sometimes outside their own 
regions. Most notable among these are the amirs of Khurasan. The last ruler 
of the Sarbadars, Khwāja ʿAlī Muʾayyad Sabzawārī, surrendered the town to 
Temür and entered his armies, where he and his family served with some dis-
tinction. He was allowed to keep control of much of his former territory and, 
at his death in 788/1386–7, his family and followers were granted important 
27 Manz, The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane, pp. 90–94, 137, 156; Aubin, “Les princes d’Ormuz du 
xiiie au xve siècle”, pp. 111–119.
28 Drechsler, Die Geschichte der Stadt Qom im Mittelalter, pp. 23, 237; Manz, Power, Politics 
and Religion, p. 129.
29 Aubin,“La fin de l’état Sarbadâr du Khorasan”, p. 98.
30 Faṣīḥ, Mujmal, iii, p. 116.
31 Shāmī, Ẓafarnāma, (Volume ii contains additions made by Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū.) ii, p. 171.
32 See for example Shāmī, Ẓafarnāma, i, pp. 101, 294.
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regions in Khurasan: Bayhaq, Juwayn, Nishapur, and Faryumad.33 The family 
seems to have fallen out of favor early in Shāhrukh’s reign; one member was 
executed, and many of their lands were confiscated. Later however some of 
the lands were returned, and a descendant known as Amīr Shāhī turns up as 
a prominent poet and landowner with connections to the Timurid dynasty. 
In the succession struggle after Shāhrukh’s death a Sabzawārī is mentioned as 
fortress keeper.34
Another Khurasanian amir prominent in Temür’s service was Jamshīd Qārin 
Ghūrī, who was appointed to Damghan and later made darugha (military gov-
ernor) of Sari in Mazandaran, apparently with some Khurasanian troops under 
his command. On his death his son was appointed to succeed him.35 One of 
the fullest enumerations of Temür’s commanders is the account of the long 
siege of Takrit in 796/1393; here we find a few Iranian commanders important 
enough to receive mention; they include one from Sawa and one from Qum. 
The conquest and incorporation of a region or town should not be seen as a 
sign that the local military elite were disenfranchised. The Timurids, like the 
Mongols before them, appointed military governors —darughas— to the cit-
ies and fortresses they controlled and sometimes also to vassal powers. These 
officials brought a small number of troops with them, usually in the low hun-
dreds, thus not enough to control more than the city or town itself. While the 
appointment of a darugha signaled submission to the ruling power, the da-
rughas might share power with local rulers or elites; thus their presence does 
not signal the extinction of regional commanders.36
The question before us is how to see below the ruling stratum of the Iranian 
leadership to the elite families who served them or the Timurids. As I suggest-
ed earlier, one solution is to look at regional histories, particularly those in the 
areas which retained relative independence and thus allow us to see into local 
politics. Just as the major dynastic histories present us with a history of the 
dynasty and its major servitors, so regional histories include the activities of 
people in the retinue of local rulers—men controlling towns or villages and 
leading modest military contingents. The historian Marʿashī who recorded the 
history of Mazandaran and Gilan in the Timurid period presents a vivid pic-
ture of local politics. Comparing his account with that of the dynastic histories 
for the same incidents, we can see how much is left out of the central Timurid 
33 Shāmī, Ẓafarnāma, i, p. 99, ii, pp. 90, 118; Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, Cinq opuscules, p. 26.
34 Faṣīḥ, Mujmal, iii, p. 194, Dawlatshāh, Tadhkirat, pp. 426–427; Ṭihrānī, Diyārbakriyya, 
p. 323.
35 Shāmī, Ẓafarnāma ii, p. 66; Marʿashī, Tārīkh-i Ṭabaristān, pp. 237–238, 244–246.
36 Manz, “The Office of Darugha under Tamerlane”, pp. 59–61.
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chronicles. Marʿashī’s account of the politics of the Kār-Kiyā dynasty (1367/8–
1592) of Lahijan and Ranikuh in Gilan for example shows constant political 
and military activity with the participation of neighboring dynasties related by 
marriage, numerous warring relatives, village headmen and fortress keepers, 
and local lords including the masters of Rasht, Lamsar and Kuhdum.37
In the provinces central to the Timurid state we can rarely see below the top 
level of Iranian leadership. One exception is the region of Qum, which as I have 
noted was under local control through Temür’s reign. The story of the taking of 
Qum from its ruler Muḥammad Qumī by Shāhrukh’s nephew Iskandar Sulṭān 
in 1412/1413 includes accounts of the actions of the keeper of a nearby fortress, 
a rebellious amir within the city, Muḥammad Qumī’s nephew and his retinue, 
and the ruler of Sawa. It is clear that this was a lively political field in which 
indigenous elites allied and fought each other. The success of the local leader 
depended heavily on the loyalty of the elites under him. In the event, Qum was 
taken with the help of one of Muḥammad Qumī’s servitors and a Timurid gov-
ernor was installed, but we still find local amirs active in the city and region 
well after this. Sawa remained under its own ruler probably at least through 
Shāhrukh’s reign, despite his brief defection to the Qaraqoyunlu.38 The city of 
Kashan was also part of this region, and there are some hints that its elites re-
mained important in both the military and the political spheres. The city was 
taken for Shāhrukh in 818/1415–16, but shortly after this when one of the 
Timurid princes rebelled and took refuge with the Qaraqoyunlu tribal confed-
eration of eastern Anatolia (1380–1468), Timurid rule appeared less secure and 
there were “disturbances” in several areas, including Kashan.39 During 
Shāhrukh’s final illness, when his grandson Sulṭān Muḥammad was governor 
of the region of Qum, rulers of local regions began to turn to him and those of 
Kashan were among these.40 Thus it seems likely that despite its inclusion 
within the Timurid realm, Kashan still retained some level of autonomy under 
its traditional elites, who influenced decisions about what stand to take in 
times of contested leadership. Sawa, Qum, and Kashan together form a large 
region in the middle of the Timurid realm, and it is significant to find the con-
tinuation of regional elites in a powerful position here.
In the more fully incorporated regions, Iranians entered directly into Timurid 
service in military as well as civilian roles. Analysis of the Timurid histories in-
dicates that the armies of the provinces played a significant part in campaigns, 
37 Manz, Power, Politics and Religion, pp. 142–144.
38 Ḥāfiẓ-i Abru, Zubdat, pp. 481–483; Manz, Power, Politics and Religion, pp. 129–130.
39 Ḥāfiẓ-i Abru, Zubdat, pp. 540, 591.
40 Manz, Power, Politics and Religion, pp. 252, 256.
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and that soldiers were recruited from the local Iranian population. Most were 
probably footmen, but there were some cavalry among them. We rarely hear 
of their commanders by name, but it is clear that many were Iranian, and seen 
as professionals.41 They seem to have included city populations and people of 
varied background beginning at a fairly low level and rising within the ranks. 
One example is two druggists from the bazar of Shiraz, who served in the army 
in Fars and rose to the status of commander, apparently through royal favor.42 
In a number of cases we simply hear of regional armies with their command-
ers or of the sardārān (commanders) of a particular region, one or two of 
whom may be named.43 For instance the history of Shāhrukh’s reign mentions 
sardārs of Qum and Kashan taking part in Shāhrukh’s campaigns under the 
Chaghatay governor.44 There is some suggestion of an hereditary military elite: 
in one battle the history states that one tümen of the prince Iskandar’s army 
was made up of sardārs or children of sardārs of Fars. These deserted in battle 
to join the ranks of the Isfahani opponents.45
Another soldier probably of urban origin who campaigned in the provincial 
army was the historian Tāj al-Dīn Ḥasan Yazdī, mentioned earlier for his dis-
cussion of his superior, Ḥāfiẓ al-Dīn Rāzī. His autobiographical information is 
of particular interest because it tells us of a career at a level which would oth-
erwise not appear in the sources. Tāj al-Dīn began his military service as a tova-
chi of a unit of ten men in the army of Yazd; at this time he was about twenty-
four. He gives a vivid description of the army’s campaign near Hamadan in the 
succession struggle after Temür’s death, in which his regiment first won and 
then lost an astounding amount of booty.46 Somewhat later we find him cam-
paigning in Kerman, still tovachi, now in the army of Yazd and Abarquh, which 
included a corps of 450 missile throwers.47 Later he served the governor of Ker-
man in bureaucratic and religious offices, supervising the ashrāf khāna-i 
khāṣṣa, zakat, and the camp market. He states that for thirty years he managed 
the waqfs of Kerman.48 At the top level, the command of regional armies was 
determined by the governor or the ruler and sometimes given to viziers; one of 
41 Manz, Rise and Rule of Tamerlane, pp. 96–100; idem, Power, Politics and Religion, 
pp. 123–126.
42 Manz, Power, Politics and Religion, p. 126.
43 See for example: Faṣīḥ, Mujmal, iii, p. 226; Ṭihrānī, Diyārbakriyya, p. 350.
44 Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, Zubdat, p. 720.
45 Ḥafiẓ-i Abrū, Zubdat, p. 347.
46 Yazdī, Ḥasanī, pp. 14, 30–32, 42.
47 Manz, Power, Politics and Religion, pp. 53, 124.
48 Yazdī, Ḥasanī, pp. 15, 48, 93.
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Temür’s viziers was appointed commander of the “Tajik forces”, and the vizier 
Ḥāfiẓ Rāzī, mentioned above, commanded a tümen of the army of Fars.49
Looking at Iranian elites under the Timurids then, we can see a spectrum of 
independence and activity, from local rulers acting as vassals and joining 
Timurid campaigns leading their own troops, to Iranian commanders serving 
the Timurids directly and commanded by officers appointed from above. In 
the middle there is a shadowy group of men controlling small territories, whose 
status is hard to determine. We really cannot tell what level of autonomy was 
enjoyed by the rulers of Kusuya, Sawa and Qum. For all of these people how-
ever, the level of power and independence they enjoyed depended on shifting 
circumstances. Over the early Timurid period, as with earlier times, we see the 
pendulum swinging back and forth between centralization and local control. 
During the disturbances after Shāhrukh’s death, vividly described by the histo-
rian Ṭihrānī, Iranian military elites again emerge as significant actors, men-
tioned by name.50 In periods of regional struggle members of the Iranian elite 
appear as independent rulers over a variety of realms, some ruling important 
cities and large portions of a province, others a few hundred square kilometers 
with a few towns. With the reassertion of central power, some rulers submit 
while some resist and are removed, but the underlying stratum of military ac-
tors remains in place, sometimes serving the higher power, sometimes pursu-
ing local rivalries. When central control weakens, they will reemerge in the 
pages of the histories.
4 The Nature of the Iranian Provincial Elite
In the first part of this chapter I have attempted to illuminate the role of the 
Iranian elite in the military sphere, to counteract the silence of our sources. 
A question I want to pose now is how separate and different Iranian military 
families were from the religious and bureaucratic lineages more fully described 
in the biographical literature. The literature about professional groups stresses 
doctrinal and familial relationships, sometimes allowing us to follow several 
generations. As I stated above, biographies give us the impression of relatively 
closed professions, with families in which a given specialization passed down 
from one generation to the next. They also naturally focus on the most promi-
nent figures, usually those active in the larger cities, and it is the life of these 
cities which has shaped our understanding of both the elite and the professions 
49 Manz, Power, Politics and Religion, pp. 106–107, 124.
50 Ṭihrānī, Diyārbakriyya, pp. 295, 350, 323, 326, 332, 343.
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they followed. However, a number of the families who produced bureaucratic 
and religious professionals were centered in smaller cities and more rural re-
gions. Here I will attempt to follow them back into the countryside.
When we go outside the major cities and try to pass from the lives of indi-
viduals to those of families, we face additional challenges from the silences of 
our sources. One solution, again, is to turn to the biographies of historians. Two 
historians from the Mongol period provide examples of families in which com-
binations of military and civilian activity were traditional. One is the historian 
Shihāb al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Nasawī (d. 1249/50), who served under the 
Khwarazmshāhs at the time of the Mongol invasion. His family held a fortress 
and surrounding villages near Nasa in Khurasan as freehold, which he claimed 
had belonged to his family from the beginning of Islamic rule in Khurasan. He 
was trained in both military and bureaucratic affairs, achieving mastery of Ara-
bic as well as Persian and expertise in chancellery practice. It appears that his 
family had a tradition of administrative service to the Khwarazmshāhs, and 
probably to earlier dynasties as well.51
Another historian of the Mongol conquest was Qāḍī Minhāj al-Dīn b. Sirāj 
al-Dīn Jūzjānī (d. probably after 1265), active first in Ghur and then in India 
in the service of the Delhi sultanate (1206–1555). His father’s family stemmed 
from Juzjan in northern Khurasan and was noted for its learning. On his moth-
er’s side he was connected to the Ghurid dynasty. Members of both families 
held the office of qāḍī. In Jūzjānī’s paternal line, the only person whose career 
we know about was his father, who was qāḍī both in the army and in Bamiyan 
where he also served as muḥtasib (religious inspector of market practice and 
public morality) and supervisor of two madrasas. He is mentioned acting as an 
envoy but never in a military role.52 On Jūzjānī’s maternal side, we have more 
information and find a mix of religious and military activity. Two relatives re-
ceive mention. One, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Salām Tūlakī, appar-
ently a first cousin of the author’s grandfather, was put in charge of the for-
tress Tabarhinda on its conquest by the Ghurid ruler in about 1191–2; both the 
cousin and the author’s grandfather are identified as qāḍīs. Once appointed to 
Tabarhinda Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn quickly requested that 1200 horsemen from Hindustan 
and Ghazna be sent to him to attach to his regiment. Later he was put in charge 
of Junabad.53 About thirty years later in 1220–2 when the town of Tulak, close-
ly connected to Minhāj’s family, was given up to one of the Ghurid rulers,— 
another relative, Qāḍī Jalāl al-Dīn Majd al-Mulk, was installed as governor 
51 Paul, “Dihqāns”, pp. 23–26.
52 Bosworth, “Menhāj”; Moin, “Qāḍī-Minhāj Sirāj al-Juzjānī”.
53 Jūzjānī, Ṭabaqāt, trans. Raverty, pp. 381, 457–458; ed. Ḥabībī, i, pp. 397–398.
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(ḥākim).54 The author was himself a qāḍī and was appointed to several religious 
offices during his long service in India, primarily as qāḍī but also as principal of 
a madrasa. In his early years he was active also militarily; in 1222–3 he helped 
to defend Tulak against the Mongols, and for four years after that joined with 
members of other major families in Tulak to fight the invaders. He mentions 
that the people of Tulak were all kinsmen and brothers.55 What we have here 
then is someone coming from two families with a tradition of religious train-
ing, one of which also played a military role over several generations; either 
one or both families married into a regional elite which was militarily active.
We can find several people who appear to come from provincial families of 
mixed profession serving in the dīwān in the Timurid period. One is the family 
of Sayyid Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn Junābādī, active in the dīwān under both Temür and 
Shāhrukh. Sayyid Zayn al-Dīn was a landowner in Junabad, a large town in 
Quhistan, who had at least some training in the religious sciences. His son 
likewise served in the dīwān and was also known for his learning in both exo-
teric and esoteric sciences.56 While the Junābādī family combined bureaucrat-
ic and religious activity, that of Jalāl Islām was involved in military and bureau-
cratic affairs. Jalāl Islām came from a regional family in Tabas Masinan, in 
Quhistan, which clearly had local military power. His brother served as fortress 
keeper and governor.57 Jalāl himself served as a vizier in Temür’s dīwān until 
he was slandered and dismissed from the dīwān. He was subsequently put in 
charge of the Tajik forces in the army. The historian and bureaucrat Isfizārī 
(d. 1510), writing in the later Timurid period, mentions a member of Jalāl 
Islām’s family as an acquaintance; he is given the title amīr, and presented as a 
cultured person, sending a rubāʿī (a quatrain of poetry) to the author, who 
answered in kind.58
Under the Timurids two regions provided an exceptionally large number of 
bureaucrats to the dīwān; these were Simnan and Khwaf. Both seem to have 
54 Jūzjānī, Ṭabaqāt, trans. Raverty, p. 1060; ed. Ḥabībī, ii, pp. 134–135. The passages concern-
ing the author’s maternal relatives are confusing, particularly the second one. Raverty 
decided that the two relatives mentioned in these two incidents were probably one per-
son, and that the word “grandfather” in the first passage should be considered an interpo-
lation. However, since the names and nasabs of the two men are different and the events 
described are thirty years apart, I suggest that these are probably different men; the rela-
tionship of the second however is not the same in all manuscripts, and in one variant, his 
position is ḥākim of Nishapur; what is clear is that he was a relative, and that he held the 
position of city governor.
55 Bosworth, “Menhāj”; Jūzjānī, Ṭabaqāt, trans. Raverty, p. 1061.
56 Manz, Power, Politics and Religion, p. 107.
57 Manz, Power, Politics and Religion, pp. 106–107.
58 Isfizārī, Rawḍāt al-jannāt, i, p. 114.
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had a tradition of military, religious and bureaucratic professions. It is signifi-
cant that the notable figures stemming from these regions did not abandon 
local attachments when they left to pursue a career elsewhere. Many used the 
money from their positions to endow institutions and public works in their 
native regions. It is perhaps for this reason that the areas continued as training 
grounds for various professions, most notably but not exclusively, the dīwān. In 
Simnan the combination of professions dated at least from the Mongol period, 
when we find Simnānīs as religious figures, bureaucrats and military men. In 
his collection of dīwān biographies, the Dastūr al-wuzarāʾ, the historian 
Khwāndamīr (d. 1539/40) writes that the region of Simnan had two prominent 
extended families (qabīla): the Bālīcha and the Bahrāmī. The Bahrāmī traced 
its descent from Bahrām Gūr, in classic Iranian fashion. These two families 
stood out among the rest for their aristocratic lineage; they commanded obedi-
ence and gave refuge to the population. There is no explicit mention of mili-
tary activity here, though the mention of obedience and protection suggest 
some level of military or paramilitary force. Two Simnānī viziers of the Timurid 
period were active militarily. One of the prominent Simnānī viziers who served 
under Temür and Shāhrukh died in battle, and Malik Ḥusayn Simnānī, almost 
certainly a member of the Bālīcha, served in the dīwān in Herat, then moved to 
the dīwān in Fars, where he led troops on important expeditions, and is men-
tioned as part of the council of great amirs.59
We are particularly well informed about the region of Khwaf in Quhistan, 
which produced a large number of men prominent in Khurasan, some of them 
historians. I have already discussed the family of the historian Faṣīḥ Khwāfī, 
active in the Herat dīwān. Here the family progenitor, Majd al-Dīn Muḥammad, 
was a military figure with regional power whose son came into the service of 
the Kartid rulers of Herat. Faṣīḥ himself and the two contemporary relatives he 
mentions seem to have been active in the dīwān.60 In the later Timurid period 
especially, we find members of the family active in both the bureaucracy and 
in the religious sciences.61 Among those working in the dīwān in the later pe-
riod was the vizier Qiwām al-Dīn Niẓām al-Mulk Khwāfī, patron of the histo-
rian Isfizārī, who gives him lavish praise and lists his many illustrious ancestors 
and relatives. The list of families named among his progenitors gives us an ex-
cellent illustration of what was considered prestigious, and of the variety of 
elite intermarriages. Like Faṣīḥ Khwāfī, Qiwām al-Dīn came from Khwaf and 
was descended from Majd al-Dīn Muḥammad Māyizhnābādī. He also claimed 
59 Khwāndamīr, Dastūr, pp. 380–381; Manz Power, Politics and Religion, pp. 101–103.
60 Manz, Power, Politics and Religion, pp. 96–98.
61 Manz, Power, Politics and Religion, p. 99.
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descent from the Sufi Ḥiḍrat Shāh Sanjān, whose family and shrine are high-
lighted in Faṣīḥ Khwāfī’s work. Two more major figures of the Khwaf region 
appear as ancestors: Malik-i Zūzan, who ruled in the region just before the 
Mongol invasion, and Qādī Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad of Zuzan, prominent 
in the Mongol period.62 The Sufi shaykh Aḥmad-i Jām, known as Zhinda Pīl, 
also counts among Qiwām al-Dīn’s ancestors; this connects him to the 
Shaykhs of Jam, also centered in Quhistan. Other ancestors are the amirs of 
Raza, near Bakharz, powerful in the Kartid period.63 In addition to incidental 
mentions of relations, Isfizārī gives a list of Qiwām al-Dīn’s ancestors by cat-
egory, which goes further afield and further back, and may well be embel-
lished. Here there are sayyids, great Sufi shaykhs, kings (of Badakhshan and 
Sistan), pillars of state including the Barmakids, and the great viziers of Sanjan 
and Mathirnabad.64
Leaving out stock figures such as the Barmakids, we find that most of the 
families mentioned are of local provenance, many of them from Quhistan not 
far from Khwaf. What we have is a picture of intermarriage among families of 
regional prominence in a number of professions, from local rulers and amirs to 
ʿulamaʾ and Sufis. For any ambitious man, such connections would offer a 
broad range of careers and connections among which to choose.
5 Conclusion
As I have shown there is evidence of elite Iranian families and individuals 
prominent in several professions, and of the presence of provincial armies in 
which Iranian personnel made up a significant part of recruits and command. 
When we allow for the bias of the sources, we should conclude that the exam-
ples we know of are a small proportion of those that existed. Therefore, it 
seems likely that many elite landholding families in Iran were trained and ac-
tive in more than one sphere and served their rulers in more than one capacity. 
If we accept this, we should change our view of Iranian society and govern-
ment in several ways. For one thing we need to consider the likelihood that the 
difference between the Iranian and the Turco-Mongolian elites was not quite 
as stark as it has been portrayed and that Iranians were not without a living 
martial tradition. This conclusion leads to the question of military education.
62 Isfizārī, Rawḍāt al-jannāt, i, pp.200–201, 215.
63 Isfizārī, Rawḍāt al-jannāt, i, pp. 217, 231.
64 Isfizārī, Rawḍāt al-jannāt, i, pp. 216–217.
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Historians have long noted that Iranian viziers sometimes led troops in bat-
tle. That makes sense. Since at least part of the dīwān accompanied the ruler 
on campaign, it was common for viziers to be present in the army camp. Pres-
ence does not in itself indicate an active military role, and for the Timurid pe-
riod at least, the level of actual military activity of the viziers seems to have 
varied considerably. The historian Abū Bakr Ṭihrānī Isfahānī (d. after 1481/2), 
active in the later Timurid period, gives us some details of his career; he states 
that he drafted several important documents and portrays himself as serving 
as mediator and influencing the council of amirs, but gives no indication that 
he participated in battle.65 For most viziers we have no information about mili-
tary command.
It is clear however that a number of viziers were active in battle and some 
appointed to significant command; three, Jalāl Islām, Malik Ḥusayn Simnānī, 
and Ḥāfiẓ Rāzī, have been discussed above. Jalāl Islām, having been denounced 
for irregularities in the dīwān, was then appointed to lead the Tajik armies. It is 
interesting to find a similar incident later, when Sulṭān Abū Saʿīd, acting on 
denunciations, dismissed his favored vizier, Khwāja Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad 
b. Sayyidi Aḥmad Shīrāzī, then later recalled him and sent him to take Isfahan 
from Jahānshāh Qaraqoyunlu, which he did successfully.66 The important 
commands held by these and some other viziers required significant military 
skills. The size of the commands that these men held suggest that they were 
mounted and probably trained also in mounted archery, a difficult art. They 
also had to know enough about combat to manage troops. The expertise re-
quired for such activity could not be acquired quickly and probably did not 
come only after they had been appointed to office. It seems likely that the vi-
ziers appointed to such commands were those who were known to have sig-
nificant training and experience already, probably from their youth.
While the military role of some viziers is well known, there has been less 
discussion of such activity on the part of the ʿulamaʾ, and particularly of the 
qāḍī. However, the military activity of the Simnānī qāḍīs and those of Jūzjānī’s 
family is not a phenomenon limited to the Mongol period. As I indicated ear-
lier, it is clear that in many, perhaps in most cities, while the defense of the cita-
del was the task of the garrison forces commanded by the darugha or the gov-
ernor, the walls and gates of the rest of the city were defended by the population, 
usually under the command of the qāḍī.67 In some cases the qāḍī and civilian 
population operated under the supervision of the governor, but this was not 
65 Ṭihrānī, Diyārbakriyya, pp. vii–xv, 290–293, 325, 343–346.
66 Khwāndamīr, Dastūr, pp. 367–369.
67 See footnote 4 above.
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always the case. It is useful to remember that sieges of the major cities were not 
an uncommon occurrence; the death of many, perhaps most, rulers ushered in 
a period of struggle lasting often several years. During this period major cities 
faced successive armies and needed to decide whether or not to submit, and, if 
they did not submit, had to organize a defense. It appears then that the defense 
of the city was a part of the chief qāḍī’s duties, and it was something he could 
expect to do during the course of his career. The defense of a large city was a 
complex operation, requiring an understanding of the city’s fortifications and 
also of the tactics and equipment of the army standing outside. It seems un-
likely that this task would be entrusted to someone whose only qualification 
was religious and social authority.
If military activity was part of the lives of many qāḍīs, we must consider 
what sort of training it required and when that would have been received. We 
know that archery was an art practiced by some of the Iranian population and 
was part of the futuwwa discipline that may well have been central to the de-
fenders of cities. We should not be surprised then when we find two people 
with the title Mawlānā, suggesting religious learning, mentioned as crucial de-
fenders of the Samarqand in a time of siege; we also find a mawlānā named 
elsewhere as a fortress keeper.68 While the skills needed to defend the city 
from within may have been limited to archery and paramilitary skills, it was 
not infrequent for city troops to make forays outside the city against the be-
sieging army. We see this happening for instance in Isfahan, at the beginning of 
Shāhrukh’s reign, under the leadership of Qāḍī Aḥmad Ṣāʿidī.69 If city troops 
were competent to engage an army of Turco-Mongolian troops, they must have 
been at least partially mounted and certainly competently led. Here again, 
long-term military training seems likely and would probably have begun early, 
within the circle of the family.
As with viziers, it is probable that qāḍīs and city populations varied in mili-
tary expertise. Qāḍī Aḥmad Ṣāʿidī belonged to a family which had long held the 
judgeship of Isfahan, and had held Isfahan and its region as an autonomous 
realm for some time during the late Seljukid period.70 The qāḍīs of Jūzjānī’s 
mother’s family also stood out for military activity. Some cities sent troops out 
to fight in the field, while others defended exclusively from within. We should 
recognize that a proportion of both ʿulamaʾ and bureaucrats probably had sig-
nificant military training, and used it as a part of their professional duties.
68 Manz, “Nomad and Settled”, p. 441; Ṭihrānī, Diyārbakriyya, p. 323.
69 Manz, “Nomad and Settled”, pp. 443–444.
70 Durand-Guédy, Iranian Elites, pp. 230–242, 281–297.
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A second conclusion to draw from the material presented above is that we 
need to look beyond the major cities in delineating the relationship between 
state and society. At the higher levels of administration, the dynastic and pro-
vincial capitals were undoubtedly the most prominent interface. In smaller 
cities and the countryside likewise Iranians elites were more than civilian sub-
jects or mediators between a local client population and a foreign government.
Scholars have usually seen the important role of local actors in the context 
of the limited reach of the central government Certainly it is clear that in times 
of disorder at the center, local elites were quick to take advantage and carve out 
autonomous spheres. However, this was not their only importance in the po-
litical arena. It is possible to look at the situation also in a different light. Where 
government could not fully control local populations, it still could bring elites 
into its sphere by offering advantages to connection with a higher power. Pro-
vincial landowning families lived in a competitive world and could profit from 
government service in different ways. They might serve in provincial armies, 
gaining booty, strengthening their retinues, and thus enhancing also their local 
power. Service in either provincial or central dīwāns could also bring wealth 
which translated into greater local power. In Khwaf and Simnan government 
officials sometimes invested their new wealth in their home regions, strength-
ening both the local society and their position within it. A family could con-
tinue to prosper through turns of fortune by adjusting the professions of its 
members and by marrying into families with other useful skills or connections.
We should not see the Iranian elite as civilians defenseless against the dep-
redations of the government and its armies; many were part both of that gov-
ernment and of those armies. The darughas stationed with a small number of 
troops in towns, forts and villages were often acting in concert with local power 
holders, in both the military and the civilian spheres. Thus despite their foreign 
origin, the Timurids and other Turco-Mongolian dynasties were probably not a 
distant and alien presence for many of their subjects. The Iranian elite were 
not equal to their Turco-Mongolian rulers, but they were politically active and 
connected to the central state at many different levels and venues, from the 
chancellery to the army, and from provincial capitals to townships and moun-
tain fortresses.
Bibliography
 Primary Sources
Muʿizz al-ansāb fī shajarat al-ansāb, MS Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, #67.
Bāfqī, Muḥammad Mufīd Mustawfī, Jāmiʿ-i mufīdī, Īraj Afshār, ed., 3 vols. (Tehran, 
1340).
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
Manz280
<UN>
Dawlatshāh Samarqandī, The Tadhkiratu ʾsh-shuʿarā (“Memoirs of the Poets”), E.G. 
Browne, ed. (London, 1901).
Faṣīḥ Khwāfī, Aḥmad b. Jalāl al-Dīn, Mujmal-i Faṣīḥī, Muḥammad Farrukh, ed. (Mash-
had, 1960/1961).
Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, Cinq opuscules de Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū concernant l’histoire de l’Iran au temps de 
Tamerlan, F. Tauer, ed. (Prague, 1959).
Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, Zubdat al-tawārīkh, Sayyid Kamāl Ḥājj Sayyid Jawādī, ed. (Tehran, sh. 
1372/1993–4).
Isfizārī, Muʿīn al-Dīn Zamchī, Rawḍāt al-jannāt fī awṣāf madīnat Harāt, Sayyid 
Muḥammad Kāẓim Imām, ed. (Tehran, sh. 1338/1959).
Jaʿfarī, Jaʿfar b. Muḥammad al-Ḥusaynī, Tārīkh-i kabīr, MS St. Peterburg, Publichnaia 
Biblioteka im Saltykova-Shchedrina, PNC 201.
Jaʿfarī, Jaʿfar b. Muḥammad al-Ḥusaynī, Tārīkh-i Yazd, Īraj Afshār, ed. (Tehran, 
1338/1960).
Jāmī, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, Nafaḥāt al-uns min ḥiḍrāt al-quds, Mahdī Tawḥīdīpūr, ed. (Teh-
ran, sh. 1375/1996–1997).
Jūzjānī, Minhāj Sirāj, Ṭabaḳāt-i Nāṣirī: A General History of the Muhammadan Dynasties 
of Asia, Including Hindustan, from A.H. 194 (810 a.d.) to A.H. 658 (1260 a.d.) and the 
Irruption of the Infidel Mughals into Islam, Henri G. Raverty, trans., 3 vols. (London, 
1881–97) (Reprint New Delhi, 1970).
Jūzjānī, Minhāj Sirāj, Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī, ʿAbd al-Ḥayy Ḥabībī, ed. (Kabul, 1964).
Kātib, Aḥmad b. Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī, Tārīkh-i jadīd-i Yazd, ed. Īraj Afshār (Tehran, 1345 sh./1966).
Khwāndamīr, Ghiyāth al-Dīn b. Humām al-Dīn, Dastūr al-wuzarāʾ, Saʿīd Nafīsī, ed. 
(Tehran, sh. 1317/1938–39).
Marʿashī, Sayyid Ẓahīr al-Dīn b. Naṣīr al-Dīn, Tārīkh-i Ṭabaristān wa Rūyān wa 
Māzandarān, Muḥammad Ḥusayn Tasbīḥī, ed. (Tehran, 1966).
Nasawī, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad, Sīrat as-Sulṭān Dzhalāl ad-Dīn Mankburny: Zhizneo-
pisanie Sultana Dzhalal ad-Dina Mankburny, Ziya M. Buniyatov, trans. (Pamyatniki 
pis’mennosti Vostoka 107) (Moscow, 1996).
Navāʾī, Mīr ʿAlī Shīr, Majālis al-nafāʾis dar tadhkirai-ii shuʿarāʾ-i qarn-i nuhum-i hijrī, 
taʾlīf-i Mīr-i Niẓām ʿAlī Shīr Nawāʾī, ʿAlī Asghar Ḥikmat, ed. (Tehran, sh. 1323/1945).
Shabānkāraʾī, Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. Muḥammad, Majmaʿ al-ansāb, M.H. Muḥaddith, 
ed. (Tehran, 1985/1986).
Shāmī, Niẓām al-Dīn, Histoire des conquêtes de Tamerlan intitulée Ẓafarnāma, par 
Niẓāmuddīn Šāmī, F. Tauer, ed. (Prague, vol. i, 1937, vol. ii, 1956).
Ṭihrānī Iṣfahānī, Abū Bakr, Kitāb-i Diyārbakriyya, N. Lugal and F. Sümer, eds. (Ankara, 
1962–1964).
ʿUqaylī, Sayf al-Dīn Ḥājjī b. Niẓām, Āthār al-wuzarāʾ, Mīr Jalāl al-Dīn Ḥusaynī Armawī, 
ed. (Tehran, sh. 1337/1959–1960).
Yazdī, Sharaf al-Dīn ʿAlī, Ẓafarnāma, Muḥammad ʿAbbāsī, ed. (Tehran, sh. 1336/1957).
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
281Iranian Elites under the Timurids
<UN>
Yazdī, Tāj al-Dīn Ḥasan b. Shihāb, Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh-i Ḥasanī, Ḥusayn Mudarrisī 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī and Īrāj Afshār, eds. (Karachi, 1987).
 Secondary Sources
Aigle, Denise, Le Fārs sous la domination mongole. Politique et fiscalité (xiiie–xive s.) 
(Cahiers de Studia Iranica 31) (Paris, 2005).
Amitai, Reuven, “Armies and their economic basis in Iran and the surrounding lands, 
c. 1000–1500 c.e”, in David O. Morgan and Anthony Reid, eds., New Cambridge His-
tory of Islam, vol 3: The Eastern Islamic World, Eleventh to Eighteenth Centuries (Cam-
bridge, 2010), pp. 539–560.
Aubin, Jean, “Les princes d’Ormuz du xiiie au xve siècle”, Journal Asiatique 241 (1953): 
77–137.
Aubin, Jean, ed., Matériaux pour la biographie de Shah Niʿmatullah Wali Kermani (Teh-
ran, Paris, 1956).
Aubin, Jean, “La fin de l’état Sarbadâr du Khorasan”, Journal Asiatique 262 (1974): 
95–117.
Aubin, Jean, “Le Khanat de Čaġatai et le Khorasan (1334–1380)”, Turcica 8/2 (1976): 
16–60.
Bosworth, Clifford E., “Menhāj-e Serāj”, Encyclopaedia Iranica.
Cahen, Claude, Mouvements populaires et autonomisme urbain dans l’Asie musulmane 
du moyen age (Leiden, 1959).
Drechsler, Andreas, Die Geschichte der Stadt Qom im Mittelalter (650–1350): politische 
und wirtschftliche Aspekte (Berlin, 1999).
Durand-Guédy, David, “Iranians at War under Turkish Domination: The Example of 
Pre-Mongol Isfahan”, Iranian Studies 38/4 (2005): 587–606.
Durand-Guédy, David, Iranian Elites and Turkish Rulers: A history of Iṣfahān in the 
Saljūq period (London, 2010).
Garthwaite, Gene R., The Persians (Oxford, 2005).
Jackson, Peter, The Delhi Sultanate: A Political and Military History (Cambridge, 1999).
Manz, Beatrice F., “The Office of Darugha under Tamerlane”, in Joseph Fletcher, Rich-
ard N. Frye, Yuan-chu Lam, and Omeljan Pritsak, eds., An Anniversary Volume in 
Honor of Francis Woodman Cleaves, Journal of Turkish Studies 9 (1985): 59–69.
Manz, Beatrice F., The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999).
Manz, Beatrice F., “Nomad and Settled in the Timurid Military”, in R. Amitai and M. 
Biran, eds., Mongols, Turks and Others: Eurasian Nomads and the Sedentary World 
(Leiden, 2005), pp. 425–457.
Manz, Beatrice F., “Local Histories of Southern Iran”, in J. Pfeiffer and Sh. A. Quinn, eds., 
History and Historiography of Post-Mongol Central Asia and the Middle East: Studies 
in Honor of John E. Woods (Wiesbaden, 2006), pp. 267–281.
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
Manz282
<UN>
Manz, Beatrice F., Power, Politics and Religion in Timurid Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007).
Manz, Beatrice F., “Nomads and Regional Armies in the Middle East”, in Kurt Franz and 
Wolfgang Holzwarth, eds., Nomad Military Power in Iran and Adjacent Areas in the 
Islamic Period (Wiesbaden, 2015), pp. 1–27.
Melville, Charles, “Sarbadārids”, EI2 (<http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM 
_6630>).
Moin, Mumtaz, “Qāḍī-Minhāj Sirāj al-Jūzjānī”, Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society 
15/3 (1967): 162–174.
Paul, Jürgen, The State and the Military: the Samanid case (Bloomington, 1994).
Paul, Jürgen, Herrscher, Gemeinwesen, Vermittler: Ostiran und Transoxanien in vormon-
golischer Zeit (Beiruter Texte und Studien 59) (Beirut, 1996).
Paul, Jürgen, “L’invasion mongole comme ‘révélateur’ de la societé iranienne”, in 
D. Aigle, ed., l’Iran face à la domination mongole (Bibliothèque Iranienne 45) (Tehran, 
1997), pp. 37–53.
Paul, Jürgen, “Wehrhafte Städter: Belagerungen von Herat, 1448–1468”, Asiatische Stu-
dien/Études Asiatiques 58/1 (2004): 163–193.
Paul, Jürgen, “Where did the dihqāns go?”, Eurasian Studies 11 (2013): 1–34.
Paul, Jürgen, Lokale und imperiale Herrschaft im Iran des 12. Jahrhunderts: Herrschafts-
praxis und Konzepte (Wiesbaden, 2016).
Potter, Lawrence G., “The Kart Dynasty of Herat: Religion and Politics in Medieval Iran” 
(Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1992).
Smith, John Masson, The History of the Sarbadār Dynasty 1336–1381 a.d. and its Sources 
(The Hague, 1970).
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
© john l. meloy, ���� | doi:10.1163/9789004431317_009
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.
<UN>
Chapter 7
The Judges of Mecca and Mamluk Hegemony
John L. Meloy
1 Introduction
In his chronicle of the decades around the turn of the tenth/sixteenth century, 
the Meccan historian ʿIzz al-Dīn Ibn Fahd recorded an anecdote in which two 
judges, the Ḥanbalī and Ḥanafī judges of Mecca, confronted a mamlūk amir, 
the famous Azbak al-Ẓāhirī, who was involved in a legal dispute over property 
in the Holy City.1 The judges accused Azbak of accepting a bribe to protect a 
claimant to the property and rebuked him: “Isn’t it enough that you ruined 
Egypt and so now you come to ruin Mecca also?”2 By this time, in 902 AH/1497, 
the Cairo Sultanate, of course, had had a long history in Mecca, and one would 
think that someone there would have thought, long before this moment, to 
comment on how the Sultanate’s agents had affected the Hijaz. To me, this 
anecdote alludes to the implications of Cairo’s influence in, rather than its di-
rect control over, the Hijaz—an influence that ran deeper than the distant in-
tegration of political and fiscal offices in Mecca and Jedda into the Sultanate. 
After all, Azbak’s reputation rather than the authority of his office was at play 
here. My goal in this chapter is to look beyond the establishment of these of-
fices and what I have called elsewhere the “unruly” relationship between the 
sharifs and the sultan, in an effort to understand how the Cairo Sultanate per-
ceived the problem of control in a periphery that, although physically very re-
mote, was also symbolically very central to the state’s viability.3 Here I will ad-
dress the nature of the Sultanate’s ideological domination and the extent to 
which it was achieved through hegemony—that is, dominance by means of 
the consent of the ruled, rather than by force4—of the Hijaz, and especially of 
Mecca. I will argue that this entailed the centripetal transformation of a dis-
1 On Azbak, see Behrens-Abouseif, Azbakiyya.
2 ʿIzz al-Dīn ibn Fahd, Bulūgh al-Qirā, 2: 981–982; 9 Jumādā ii 902 AH (12 February 1497).
3 Meloy, Imperial Power.
4 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, passim. I have found useful discussions in: 
Bates, “Gramsci and the Idea of Hegemony”, e.g., “political leadership based on the consent of 
the led, a consent which is secured by the diffusion and the popularization of the world view 
of the ruling class” (p. 352); and Williams, “The Concept of ‘Egemonia’”, 586–589.
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tant elite of jurists into stakeholders of the Sultanate, bringing the region more 
firmly into Cairo’s sphere of ideological control.
2 Cairo and Mecca
The sharifs of Mecca and the sultans of Cairo had a relationship that operated 
on a number of occasionally intersecting political dimensions—rhetorical, ad-
ministrative, and economic—that enhanced Cairo’s hegemonic hold over 
Mecca. Because of the mutual dependence of Cairo and Mecca, the relation-
ships were subject to change and negotiation.5 Of course, underlying this inter-
dependence was Mecca’s reliance on Egypt as a source for foodstuffs to main-
tain the populace of the Holy City, the ranks of which were swelled by the 
many pious sojourners who resided there often for long periods of time, and 
the even more numerous pilgrims who visited annually.6
The ideological claims of the Sultanate in Cairo are well known but it may 
be useful to sketch some of these features here since they form the background 
for later developments.7 Mecca became an object of political competition after 
the collapse of the Abbasid Caliphate at the hands of the Mongols in 1258 when 
the sultans of Egypt and Syria competed for influence in Mecca with the Rasu-
lid sultans of Yemen and with the Ilkhans after their conversion. Cairo ulti-
mately prevailed in these contests. The rhetorical claim of the Cairo sultans 
over the Hijaz dates back to the time of the Sultan al-Ẓāhir Baybars (r. 658–76 
AH /1260–76), who claimed to be the protector of the two holy sanctuaries of 
Mecca and Medina, an arrangement formalized in a treaty between Sultan al-
Manṣūr Qalāwūn (r. 678–89 AH /1279–90) and Sharif Muḥammad Abū Nu-
mayy (r. 652–701 AH /1254–1301) of Mecca in 681 AH/1282,8 and continued by 
Baybars’s successors in Cairo until the end of the regime. This claim was ex-
pressed through a number of political rituals in Mecca: the invocation of the 
name of the Cairo sultan at the call to prayer and before the congregational 
sermon in the Ḥarām Mosque in Mecca; the use of the title “Servitor of the Two 
Noble Sanctuaries”,9 which asserted the sultan’s role as preeminent Muslim 
5 Meloy, Imperial Power. See also, for example, Barkey, Empire of Difference.
6 Mortel, “Maṣādir al-Tamwīn”, 193–219. On provisioning Mecca, also helpful is Suraiya Faroqhi, 
Pilgrims and Sultans, 164–166.
7 Jomier, Le Maḥmal; idem, “Aspects politiques et religieux”, 391–401.
8 Ibn ʿAbd al-Ẓāhir, Tashrīf al-Ayyām, 18–19; Ibn al-Furat, Tārīkh Ibn al-Furāt, 7:247–248; see 
also Melville, “Elephant”, 197–214, esp. 198.
9 Combe, ed., Répertoire chronologique d’épigraphie arabe, 12:56–57, no. 4476, in Damascus 
dated 659/1261, and 12:103, no. 4554, in Kara (Qara ?) dated 664/1266.
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ruler; the annual dispatch of the cloth covering for the Kaʿba in Mecca; and the 
annual dispatch of the sultan’s ceremonial palanquin, which represented the 
personage of the sultan.10
Cairo’s dominance was also asserted administratively through the appoint-
ment of the sharifs as amirs in the Sultanate’s administrative apparatus. Thus, 
in principle, the sharifs were subordinate to the sultans; however, this symbolic 
dominance did not necessarily give the Cairo sultans a free hand in the Hijaz. It 
was very much in the interests of the Cairo sultans to rule indirectly through 
the sharifs, whose lineage from the Prophet lent them an unassailable prestige 
and whose sway over local groups was often, but not always, an effective means 
to ensure free passage through the Hijaz for the pilgrimage and commerce. 
Hence the sharifs of Mecca were located at a nexus of local and interregional 
political and economic relationships which enabled them to serve as brokers 
whom the Cairo sultans could not do without. Noteworthy is the one instance, 
in 826 AH/1423, in which the Cairo sultans replaced a ruling sharif, Ḥasan ibn 
ʿAjlān (r. 797–829 AH/1395–1426, with two interruptions), with an officer of the 
Sultanate, Qurqmās—not even ruling alone but appointed jointly with anoth-
er sharif, ʿAlī ibn ʿInān, a cousin of Ḥasan—whose joint appointment ended 
scarcely a year later with Ḥasan’s re-instatement.11 At the same time, the sharifs 
did not have an entirely free hand in the Hijaz since the ruling sharif ’s position 
vis-à-vis local opponents—most often those claiming the sharifal succession—
was enhanced by a political connection to Cairo. The combination of all these 
factors made for a rather contentious political system, most often character-
ized in Cairo as one of fitna.12
The two cities were also bound together as nodes in a network of long- 
distance trade that connected the continents, but their economic relationship 
was concretized fiscally when Sultan al-Ashraf Barsbāy (r. 825–41 AH/1422–38) 
set up a customs collection station in Jedda and established, at least for a time, 
increasingly tighter controls on commerce. Sources composed in Mecca offer 
more nuance to our understanding of these measures and allow us to appreci-
ate that Mamluk political domination was not quite as relentlessly monolithic, 
and certainly not as inflexible, as it often appears to be in the official pro-
nouncements of the Cairo Sultanate and in the narrative sources written in the 
Mamluk metropole.13
10 On the maḥmal, see Jomier, Le Maḥmal; idem, “Le maḥmal du sultan Qansuh al-Ghuri”, 
183–188; and Meloy, “Celebrating the Mahmal”, 404–427.
11 For a detailed account of this episode, see Meloy, Imperial Power, 115–125.
12 Meloy, Imperial Power, 95, 237.
13 Meloy, “Imperial Strategy”, 1–19.
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In my previous work, although cognizant of these various dimensions of 
power, I focused on the dynamic and flexible quality of the Cairo-Mecca rela-
tionship, mainly through the process of brokerage; however, the end product 
was fundamentally an institutional history inasmuch as it explained how the 
Sharifate limited the Sultanate’s power in the Hijaz periphery and how, in turn, 
the Hijazi socio-political order limited the ruling Sharif ’s power. Thus the judg-
es’ admonition is no less unsettling to me, since it is a reminder to consider 
both sides of Hodgson’s aʿyān-amīr system of social power (that is, the condo-
minium of local civilian and military elites who, in the wake of centralized 
imperial power, dominated the Islamic lands in the later Middle Ages) in order 
to appreciate fully that influence may be as powerful as direct control and that 
ideas may rule as effectively as force.14 Consequently, one wonders what other, 
perhaps less visible, transformations were going on. Furthermore, although 
scholarly attention has been given to officials, civilian and otherwise, in the 
Hijaz,15 the judges’ rebuke also serves as a pointed reminder that their story—
not only as representatives, but also situated at the top of the civilian elite in a 
position perhaps parallel to Gramsci’s intellectuals16—has not yet been told. 
In order to attempt to rectify this situation, in this chapter I examine a com-
munity of judges and their role in the extension of Cairo’s hegemony in Mecca, 
an effort that will take us back to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. This 
project provides an essential backdrop for understanding Mamluk state ex-
pansion in the Hijaz in the fifteenth century, and in particular the incorpora-
tion of elite groups in that region into the domain of the Cairo Sultanate, and 
for representing other features of the Mamlukization of the Hijaz—although 
ones that the two judges did not necessarily have in mind when they admon-
ished amir Azbak.
3 Judges in Mecca in the Fourteenth Century
To get immediately to the point, in addition to the dimensions of political en-
gagement briefly outlined above, in the first half of the fourteenth century we 
see another manifestation of the Cairo Sultanate’s hegemony in the Hijaz: the 
cooptation of judicial appointments which occurred during the principal reign 
14 Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, 2: 64–69; Bates, “Gramsci”, 351.
15 Mortel, “Aspects of Mamluk Relations”, 1–13; idem, “The Decline of Mamluk Civil Bureau-
cracy”, 173–188; idem, “Grand Dawadar”, 437–456; idem, “The Mercantile Community”, 
15–35; Wing, “Indian Ocean Trade and Sultanic Authority”, 55–75.
16 Petry, The Civilian Elite of Cairo, 227–228; Williams, “Gramsci’s Concept”, 587.
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of Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad (r. 709–41 AH/1310–41). In short, this was an ef-
fective means by which Cairo could extend its control through elite members 
of the civilian establishment in Mecca. My main source here is the biographi-
cal dictionary of Taqī al-Dīn al-Fāsī (d. 832 AH/1429), scion of a Meccan family 
who served as a Mālikī chief judge in the Holy City, supplemented by the works 
of Najm al-Dīn ibn Fahd (d. 885 AH/1480) and Shams al-Dīn al-Sakhāwī (d. 902 
AH/1497).17 Al-Fāsī compiled biographies of over three thousand individuals, 
about 98 of whom are identified as judges. The biographies that date to the 150 
years or so before his death are quite detailed and we can gather information 
about the ties that bound together the community of judges who served in 
Mecca, at least the Sunni ones, with whom the Cairo Sultanate was concerned. 
Al-Fāsī does not always supply details about appointments, but we can recon-
struct the succession of those who served as the principal judge of Mecca— 
always of the Shāfiʿī madhhab—from the end of the seventh AH/thirteenth 
century until his time. Eight men held the position of chief judge in Mecca 
from 676 AH/1277–78 through to the first decade of the ninth AH/fifteenth 
century, when the judicial hierarchy was modified, a subject to discuss below 
(see Table 7.1, judges #2–#9). A number of points are noteworthy about those 
who served in the fourteenth century.
First, the situation with judges in Mecca was very similar to that in the met-
ropolitan centers of contemporary Egypt and Syria, where particular families 
(like the Bulqīnīs in Cairo and the Banū Jamāʿa in Cairo and Damascus) domi-
nated judicial positions.18 In Mecca also, local families dominated the judi-
ciary. Prior to the mid-seventh AH/thirteenth century, judicial positions were 
dominated by other prominent families, such as the Shaybānī family, who 
subsequently became interrelated with the Ṭabarīs, so that the members often 
used both nisbas (as with ʿAbd al-Karīm ibn Yaḥyā, judge #0 in Table 7.1).19 
After the mid-seventh AH/thirteenth century, judicial positions in Mecca 
were dominated mainly by three families who intermarried. Most of the judg-
es in the fourteenth century were from the al-Ṭabarī and the al-Nuwayrī fami-
lies. In addition, during this time the Ibn Ẓahīra family also filled judicial posi-
tions along with a handful of others. In his study of the chief judges in Egypt, 
Joseph Escovitz designated four factors that played a role in judicial appoint-
ments: merit, patronage, nepotism, and succession through deputyships (nāʾib 
17 Al-Fāsī, al-ʿIqd; Najm al-Dīn ibn Fahd, al-Durr al-Kamīn; idem, Itḥāf al-Warā; al-Sakhāwī, 
al-Ḍawʾ al-Lāmiʿ.
18 On the Bulqīnīs, see Petry, Civilian Elite, 232–240; on the Banū Jamāʿa, see Salibi, “The 
Banū Jamāʿa”, 97–109.
19 Bauden, “Les Tabariyya”, 253–266.
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appointments).20 While he determined that patronage played the largest role 
in appointments, he observed that nepotism and deputy succession were often 
combined and that the two factors together played the largest role. This was 
the situation that obtained in Mecca. Of course, these individuals were learned 
men; in the course of their early careers, they had travelled widely in pursuit of 
their studies: Medina, Cairo, Damascus, and Yemen figure most prominently as 
destinations. Nevertheless, personal connections clearly played a major role in 
their appointments. Of the eight chief judges, mentioned above, four were 
sons or grandsons of judicial predecessors and there were three connections to 
other judges through marriage (see Chart 7.1). Four individuals, at least, had 
served with predecessors as deputies (one of these did so with two predeces-
sors), which parallels the pattern observed by Petry in Cairo,21 and at least four 
had studied with individuals who were judges in Mecca (see Chart 7.2).
20 Escovitz, “Patterns of Appointment”, 147–168.
21 Petry, Civilian Elite, 228–229, 230.
Table 7.1  Chief judges of Mecca from the mid-seventh AH/thirteenth century to the 
beginning of the ninth AH/fifteenth century with Hijri years of service
0. 622–645: ʿAbd al-Karīm ibn Yaḥyā al-Shaybānī al-Ṭabarī, Kamāl al-Dīn 
Abū Muḥammad.
1. 645–673: ʿImrān ibn Thābit ibn Khālid al-Fihrī, Bahāʾ al-Dīn Abū 
Muḥammad.
2. 673–675, 676-ca. 695: Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Ṭabarī, Jamāl 
al-Dīn.
3. ca. 695–730: Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Ṭabarī, Najm al-Dīn Abū 
Ḥāmid.
4. 730–760: Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Ṭabarī, Shihāb al-Dīn Abū 
al-Faḍl.
5. 760–763: Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Ḥarazī, Taqī al-Dīn Abū 
al-Yaman.
6. 763–786: Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Nuwayrī, Kamāl al-Dīn Abū 
al-Faḍl.
7. 786–788: Aḥmad ibn Ẓahīra Ibn Ẓahīra, Shihāb al-Dīn Abū al-ʿAbbās.
8. 788–799: Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Nuwayrī, Muḥibb al-Dīn Abū 
al-Barakāt.
9. 799–806: Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Nuwayrī, ʿIzz al-Dīn Abū 
al-Mafākhir.
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CHART 7.1 Chief judges of Mecca: Kinship
CHART 7.2 Chief judges of Mecca: Student-Teacher relationships (indicated with solid arrow) 
and service as deputy judge (indicated with dashed arrow)
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Second, it is important to note that up until the 730s AH/1330s the Rasulid 
sultans appointed the judges of Mecca. This was in spite of the claims of the 
earliest Cairo sultans to be the servitors of the Holy Cities. The sharif of Mecca, 
at least in one instance to be noted below, appointed a judge as well. There 
were evidently Zaydī judges, appointed by the Zaydī imam in Yemen, but we 
have little information: al-Fāsī mentions briefly one Zaydī judge from Yanbuʿ, 
Aḥmad ibn Rashīd al-Yanbuʿī, who performed the pilgrimage in 819 AH/1416. 
Of course, as one would expect, al-Fāsī was chiefly concerned with Sunni judg-
es; more information on the Zaydī judges would help us round out the picture. 
An interesting case is that of Jamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Ṭabarī (Chart 7.2, 
no. 2), who served as deputy to ʿ Imrān ibn Thābit al-Fihrī (no. 1), and then, after 
being appointed as judge, initiated a string of subsequent generations—either 
direct descendants or descendants through marriage—to hold the position. 
Al-Fāsī tells us that Jamāl al-Dīn voluntarily stepped down from the position (it 
is not explained why) in 675 AH/1276–77, but that he was reappointed the fol-
lowing year by the Rasulid sultan, al-Muẓaffar Yūsuf (r. 647–94 AH/1250–95), 
whereupon the judge duly resumed his responsibilities. However, the water-
shed moment in judicial appointments seems to have occurred with Jamāl al-
Dīn’s grandson, Shihāb al-Dīn Abū al-Faḍl Aḥmad al-Ṭabarī (Chart 7.2, no. 4), 
who held the position from 730–60 AH/1330–60. He was initially appointed by 
the Meccan sharif, ʿUṭayfa ibn Abī Numayy, and the appointment was con-
firmed later in the same year by the Rasulid sultan al-Mujāhid ʿAlī (r. 721–64 
AH/1321–63). Two years later, in 732 AH/1332, Shihāb al-Dīn received yet a third 
appointment as judge from the sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, when the sultan 
performed the pilgrimage.
Given that the biographical and chronicle sources do not provide informa-
tion to explain the policy behind the Cairo Sultanate’s appointments, we can 
only draw some conclusions from the circumstantial evidence of the political 
context. The arrogation of judicial appointments occurred at the height of a 
competition for influence over the holy cities that was being waged between 
al-Nāṣir Muḥammad and his political rivals, the Rasulids in Yemen and the 
Ilkhanids in Iran and Iraq. While the Rasulids had enjoyed considerable influ-
ence in the Hijaz, by the beginning of the fourteenth century they posed little 
military threat to Mecca, and no ideological claim over it, although the Yemeni 
sultans did try to extend their influence, by building institutions there and per-
forming the pilgrimage, as will be noted below. The Ilkhans, however, directed 
a considerable amount of military and political capital toward the holy cities 
during the reigns of Muḥammad Khudābanda Öljeytü (r. 703–16 AH/1304–16) 
and Abū Saʿīd (r. 716–36 AH/1316–35), both converts to Islam. Initially, this 
came about as political opportunity in the succession disputes that arose after 
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the death of Sharif Abū Numayy (d. 701 AH/1301), which eventually led to an 
Ilkhanid military expedition in 716 AH/1316 in alliance with the Sharif Ḥumayḍa 
ibn Abī Numayy. The putative objective of this force, at least according to Sun-
ni readings of the mission, was to exhume the bodies of the Caliphs Abū Bakr 
and ʿUmar from their graves in Medina and banish them from the Prophet’s 
mosque in order to signal Öljeytü’s rejection of their credibility as successors to 
the Prophet.22 However, upon receiving news of the death of Öljeytü (d. 716 
AH/1316), the mission dissolved on its way to the Hijaz. Nevertheless, Sharif 
Ḥumayḍa, together with the remnants of the Ilkhanid expedition, managed to 
enter Mecca after the departure of the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan, expelling 
his brother and rival Sharif Rumaytha ibn Abī Numayy, at the time the ruling 
sharif, from the city. They had the khuṭba given in the name of Öljeytü’s succes-
sor, Abū Saʿīd, in Ṣafar 718 AH/April 1318.23 Ḥumayḍa’s hold on the city was 
short-lived, although the Cairo Sultanate’s interests there were not yet secure.
The Ilkhans continued to pursue their interests in Mecca, although Abū 
Saʿīd adopted an approach less antagonistic than his predecessor’s had been. 
In 723 AH/1323, the two sides established a peace treaty although Abū Saʿīd 
continued to try to boost his influence in Mecca through public works. For the 
pilgrimage of 730 AH/1330, the Ilkhan sought to impress the faithful by sending 
his ceremonial palanquin (maḥmal) on the back of an elephant. It was not a 
success: the poor animal died on the return journey and the one-upmanship 
only served to heighten tensions in Mecca, prompting al-Nāṣir Muḥammad to 
respond immediately with a military expedition in Ṣafar 731 AH/November 
1331. The next year, as mentioned above, he himself performed the pilgrimage 
(his third) during which he also issued the appointment of the Shāfiʿī judge, 
Shihāb al-Dīn Abū al-Faḍl Aḥmad al-Ṭabarī, as mentioned above.
After the appointment of Shihāb al-Dīn, in the Meccan sources, there are no 
more reports of Yemeni judicial appointments, only Egyptian ones. Moreover, 
we also read of instances where the judges of Mecca worked in concert with 
the Cairo sultan. For example, when al-Nāṣir Muḥammad performed the pil-
grimage, the judge Shihāb al-Dīn had the opportunity to ask the sultan about 
the validity of certain orders that were purportedly issued by his chancery. The 
sultan showed the judge a “mark” (amāra) that he could use to distinguish the 
authentic decrees, and Shihāb al-Dīn was consequently able to tear up forty-
some forged documents. Judge Kamāl al-Dīn Abū al-Faḍl Muḥammad al-Ṭabarī 
(Chart 7.2, no. 6), who had been Shihāb al-Dīn’s deputy, prevented a powerful 
merchant, Zakī al-Dīn al-Kharrūbī, from paving the courtyard of the principal 
22 Broadbridge, Kinship and Ideology, 128; Melville, “Elephant”, 200–201.
23 Melville, “Elephant”, 201.
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mosque in Mecca, al-Masjid al-Harām, saying that the only person with the 
authority to undertake this act was the sultan of Egypt.24 Al-Kharrūbī had real 
political clout: he was the commercial agent of the sultan and had clout with 
the Rasulid sultan al-Afḍal al-ʿAbbās (r. 764–78 AH/1363–77) due to his com-
mercial interests in the Kārimī trade in luxury goods from south Asia. Kamāl 
al-Dīn paid dearly for crossing al-Kharrūbī. Kamāl al-Dīn was vulnerable to al-
Kharrūbī’s influential connections since the judge held concurrent appoint-
ments as the Shāfiʿī professor in three prominent madrasas founded by Rasulid 
sultans: the Manṣūriyya (founded 641 AH/1243–44), the Mujāhidiyya (founded 
739 AH/1338–39), and the Afḍaliyya (founded 768 AH/1366–67). Al-Kharrūbī, 
in retaliation for the judge’s rejection of his pious generosity, used his influence 
with the Rasulid sultan to have Kamāl al-Dīn dismissed from all three posi-
tions, by this time perhaps the only remaining domain of Yemeni influence in 
Mecca.25
Further developments occurred in the judicial hierarchy in the fifteenth 
century that show the imprint of Cairo’s hegemony—these will be examined 
in the penultimate section of this chapter. However, in order to focus on the 
nature of Cairo’s hegemonic control over Mecca, it is important to first con-
sider the sectarian disposition of the sharifs in the fourteenth century, which 
will be addressed in the following section. For now, we can conclude that the 
Sunni judges of Mecca were members of a discrete and clearly identifiable lo-
cal social elite who were interrelated by blood and marriage ties and by their 
education and judicial training, and who, although they were born and bred in 
the Hijaz, were well travelled as a result of their cosmopolitan education. 
When al-Nāṣir Muḥammad arrogated to himself the appointment of judges in 
Mecca, he not only absorbed into his state apparatus individuals who held 
prestige and authority and who worked in concert with his interests, but he 
also integrated into his state an entire regional social elite through their mo-
nopoly of Sunni fiqh: in effect, we see here the cooptation of an elite sector of 
society in Mecca. Other positions in the Meccan religious establishment as 
well as in other cities in the Hijaz need to be investigated as well, but it would 
appear to be a safe hypothesis that they were also similarly integrated.
4 The Sharifs and Conversion: Judges as Agents of Hegemony
The ideological claims of the Cairo sultans are often seen in the context of 
Cairo’s competition with other great powers of the Islamic world: from India, 
24 On al-Kharrūbī, see Wiet, “Marchands d’épice”, 114.
25 Al-Fāsī, ʿIqd 1: 300–307, no. 29.
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to Iran, to Yemen and North Africa. However, the sharifs of Mecca themselves, 
who followed Zaydī Shiite Islam, provided potential sectarian competition to 
the Sunni rulers of Egypt and Syria and their judges. The violence that the Cai-
ro sultans inflicted on members of the Zaydī community in the Hijaz indicates 
that they considered this such a serious issue that they effectively expunged 
Zaydism from the local political leadership on Mecca, as Richard Mortel has 
argued.26 As I mentioned earlier, the Banū Ḥasan, who claimed descent from 
the son of ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, ruled as sharifs of Mecca from the middle of the 
fourth/tenth century. They continued to rule in the Hijaz through the Ottoman 
period until the third decade of the twentieth century. However, the Sunni 
character of this lineage was a result of Cairo’s imperial projection in the four-
teenth century. I mentioned at the outset the first sharif of Mecca who had to 
deal with Cairo’s claims on Mecca initiated by sultan al-Ẓāhir Baybars: Sharif 
Muḥammad Abū Numayy. Muḥammad Abū Numayy, like his Banū Ḥasan fore-
bears, was an ardent Zaydī, ensuring the practice of Zaydī rituals in the Great 
Mosque: for example, in the call to prayer, the Shiʿi formula was used and, at 
the congregational prayer on Fridays, the Zaydīs followed their practice of four 
rakʿas of prayer rather than the Sunni tradition of two rakʿas. Sharif Abū Nu-
mayy was highly admired for his political prowess with regard to his ability to 
fend off the ambitions of the sultans of Cairo and the Rasulids despite their 
pretensions to be the protectors of the two sanctuaries. Taqī al-Dīn al-Fāsī later 
wrote glowingly, tinged nevertheless with sectarian disapproval, of Sharif Abū 
Numayy that “were it not for his madhhab, he would have been [a] suitable 
[choice] for the Caliphate; [but] he was a Zaydī, as were his relatives”.27
Mubārak ibn ʿUṭayfa, himself of sharifian lineage, was reported by Ibn Faḍl 
Allāh al-ʿUmarī (d. 749 AH/1349) to have said about the sharifs of Mecca that 
they “profess their obedience for the Imam (the Zaydī imam of Yemen) and 
consider themselves his deputies. They are cautious with the ruler of Egypt out 
of fear and for the iqṭāʿ and with the ruler of Yemen for [the possibility] of by-
passing them so that the Kārim [trade] continues [to come to Mecca] and [to 
obtain its] benefits”.28 Al-Qalqāshandī (d. 821 AH/1418), writing at the turn of 
the fifteenth century, stated categorically in his chancery manual that the Banū 
Ḥasan of Mecca and Yanbuʿ were Zaydīs.29 However, the narrative sources 
would suggest that al-Qalqāshandī’s information, at least about the sharifs of 
Mecca, was outdated—or perhaps there were lingering suspicions in Cairo of 
26 For a detailed overview of the sharifs and religion, see Mortel, “Zaydi Shiʿism”, 455–472. On 
Mecca during this period, see Ota, “The Meccan Sharifate”, 1–20.
27 al-Fāsī, ʿIqd, 1: 467, no. 144; cf. Mortel, “Zaydī Shiʿism”, 461–462.
28 Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-ʿUmarī, al-Taʿrīf, 203.
29 Mortel, “Zaydī Shiʿism”, 467–468.
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the sharifs’ convictions. Over the course of the fourteenth century, the sultan’s 
officers used strong arm tactics and Cairo-appointed judges used aggressive 
moral pressure to drive Zaydism out of Mecca.
The politics of Mecca in the fourteenth century were as unruly as in the fif-
teenth century. In both centuries, the Cairo Sultanate added fuel to the fire of 
Sharifian rivalries. However, while Cairo’s interests in the fifteenth century 
were driven by commercial concerns, in the fourteenth century, its interests 
were driven by competition with other Islamic powers, especially the Ilkhans, 
but also the Rasulids. The political history of the Hijaz in the first four decades 
of the fourteenth century was dominated by the rivalry of the four sons of 
Sharif Muḥammad Abū Numayy, that led, in 714 AH/1315, to the death of his 
son Abū al-Ghayth upon the orders of his brother Ḥumayda, and a few years 
later, in 720 AH/1320, to the murder of Ḥumayda. Sharifs Rumaytha and ʿ Uṭayfa 
continued to struggle over Mecca, and the former emerged as the victor.30 Just 
as they did in the fifteenth century, the Cairo sultans meddled in politics by 
using the force provided by the official pilgrimage caravan, led each year by the 
commander of the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan (amīr al-hajj) and his military 
escort. During his political career, Rumaytha was removed from power and re-
instated on four occasions. We see similar patterns of re-instatement over the 
following century with Rumaytha’s son ʿAjlān, his grandson Ḥasan, and his 
great-grandson, Barakāt.31 The rulers of Cairo found that they had no other 
political options to sustain stability.
The narrative sources give occasional reports about Cairo’s anti-Zaydi activi-
ties, which, taken in sum, may represent a sustained policy to diminish the 
prominence of Zaydism in the Hijaz or, at least, among the region’s political 
elite. Cairo’s pressure on the Zaydīs first occurred in 726 AH/1326 when al-
Nāṣir Muḥammad sent a decree to ʿUṭayfa ibn Abī Numayy, who was ruling 
sharif at the time, to forbid the Zaydī imam from leading prayers in the Masjid 
al-Ḥarām.32 This decree, however, seems not to have been enforced, but the 
agents of the Sultanate subsequently became more aggressive. The next report 
comes twenty years later, in 746 AH/1346, when Rumaytha died, to be succeed-
ed initially by his son ʿAjlān, who occasionally had to compete for the para-
mount position with his brothers, Sanad, Thaqaba, and Mughāmis. The signifi-
cant point here is that at Rumaytha’s funeral the leader of the Zaydī community 
in Mecca, Ibn al-Shuqayf, stepped forward to lead the prayer, but he was pre-
vented from doing so by the Shāfiʿī chief judge, Shihāb al-Dīn al-Ṭabarī (who, as 
30 Mortel, al-Aḥwāl, 65–90.
31 Meloy, Imperial Power, 102–112, 142–162.
32 Al-Fāsī, ʿIqd, 6: 98, no. 2003.
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noted earlier, was appointed by Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad), who went on to 
lead the service.33
Less than a decade later, in 754 AH/1353–54, during the brief reign of al-
Ṣāliḥ Ṣāliḥ (r. 752–5 AH/1351–4), the sultan’s agents took more severe measures 
to prevent the practice of Zaydism in Mecca. The Cairo-based Abbasid Caliph 
al-Muʿtaḍid (r. 753–63 AH/1352–62) and the Shāfiʿī chief judge of Cairo, ʿIzz al-
Dīn ʿAbd al-ʿAziz ibn Jamāʿa, performed the pilgrimage that year along with an 
unusually large number of prominent amirs.34 The goals of this delegation 
were twofold: to establish Sunnism at the expense of Zaydism and to counter 
Yemeni ambitions in Mecca. In 751 AH/1351, the Rasulid al-Mujāhid ʿAlī per-
formed the pilgrimage, evidently at the encouragement of Thaqaba, supported 
by his brothers Sanad and Mughāmis, who hoped that with the Yemeni ruler’s 
assistance they could drive their brother ʿAjlān out of Mecca. The plot failed, 
the conspiring brothers fled to the south, and the Yemeni sultan was captured 
by the agents of Cairo but eventually released.35 While these sharifian intrigues 
were going on, the Egyptian agents continued their persecution of Zaydīs in 
Mecca. The Zaydī imam in Mecca, Abū al-Qāsim Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-
Yamanī, was beaten and imprisoned for refusing to renounce his faith. Until 
this time, Abū al-Qāsim had held a prominent role in the Masjid al-Ḥarām, 
where he led his community in prayer and had a specially designated pulpit. 
He subsequently managed to escape the city; however, his associate, the Zaydī 
muezzin, was not as fortunate since the Egyptian pilgrimage commander had 
him beaten to death.36 ʿIzz al-Dīn ibn Jamāʿa remained in Mecca for some 
months after the pilgrimage and then the following Ramaḍān convened a 
meeting with the leader of the Zaydīs, Ibn al-Shuqayf—this is the man who 
was prevented from leading the prayers at the funeral of Sharif Rumaytha 
about a decade before. Ibn Jamāʿa persuaded him “to renounce, [in writing,] 
before God most high, the creed of the Zaydī, Imamī, and other heretics” 
(iʿtiqād ahl al-bidaʿ al-zaydiyya al-imamiyya wa-ghayrihā). Al-Fāsī noted can-
didly that Ibn al-Shuqayf acquiesced because he was afraid that he would meet 
the same fate the muezzin had met only a few months before.37
33 Al-Fāsī, ʿIqd 3: 161–166, no. 647; 4: 417, no. 1196.
34 Najm al-Dīn Ibn Fahd, Itḥāf al-Warā 3: 261; al-Maqrīzī, Kitāb al-Sulūk, 2: 903; al-Sakhāwī, 
al-Dhayl al-Tāmm, 1: 134; on ibn Jamāʿa, see Salibi, “Banu Jamāʿa”, 101–102.
35 For details and sources on this, see Mortel, al-Aḥwāl, 96–97; De Gaury, The Rulers of Mec-
ca, 101.
36 Ibn Fahd, Itḥāf al-Warā, 3:260–262; Maqrīzī, Kitāb al-Sulūk, 2:904.
37 Al-Fāsī, ʿIqd, 8:89–90, no. 2975; Ibn Fahd, Itḥāf al-Warā 3:265. Note that Mortel says that 
al-Fāsī remarked that Ibn al-Shuqayf agreed upon his own volition (Mortel, “Zaydī 
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Al-Fāsī wrote that when ʿAjlān was on his deathbed in 777 AH/1375 he request-
ed that the Sunni judge of Mecca, Kamāl al-Dīn Abū al-Faḍl Muḥammad al-
Nuwayrī, the maternal grandfather of al-Fāsī (Chart 7.2, no. 6; and Chart 7.3) 
and the judge who was dismissed from professorships in the three Rasulid ma-
drasas, supervise his funeral with the Sunni fuqahāʾ, signifying the sharif ’s last 
assertion of Sunnism.38 However, it is noteworthy that the transition from Za-
ydism to Sunnism among the ruling sharifs may not have been abrupt: even 
ʿAjlān, as a Sunni, did not retain his title as the Cairo sultan’s amir of Mecca. He 
was replaced by his brothers Sanad and Thaqaba, both of whom, we are told by 
al-Fāsī, adhered to their Zaydism. ʿAjlan was subsequently re-appointed in 763 
AH/1362. Thus the Cairo sultans extended their hegemony in the region 
through these parallel approaches: carrying out aggressive anti-Zaydī actions 
and coopting the Sunni judicial community. But their ideological goals were 
also tempered with pragmatism, so their control of the ruling sharif was more 
important to them than the ruling sharif ’s faith. Finally, while the Cairo Sultan-
ate was ultimately successful in their ideological domination of Mecca, by no 
means was Zaydism eradicated from the region. Other members of the Banū 
Ḥasan, like those in Yanbuʿ, continued to avow their Zaydism but they became 
increasingly marginalized.39
Shiʿism”, 466, citing Al-Fāsī, ʿIqd 8:89–90) but the evidence for this conclusion is not clear 
to me.
38 Al-Fāsī, ʿIqd 6: 70, no. 1979.
39 Hurgronje noted that, during his time, “in the environs of Mekka there are still strong re-
mains of that Shi’itism which once contributed to the conquest of western Arabia by the 
Sherifs, and is now for its reward despised by them”. Mekka, 199–200.
CHART 7.3 The first chief judges of Mecca for the four Sunni schools of law
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ʿAjlān seems to have been pragmatic as well, professing Sunnism in order to 
win the support of Cairo.40 Certainly, he was the last of his generation to rule, 
and it would seem that with him and his descendants Sunnism was unques-
tionably established in the Sharifal family. Both ʿAjlān and his son and princi-
pal successor Ḥasan endowed madrasas to teach Shāfiʿī fiqh in Mecca. ʿAjlān’s 
son Ḥasan as well as his sons, Barakāt, ʿAlī, Abū al-Qāsim, and Ibrāhīm, all of 
whom ruled Mecca into the mid-fifteenth century, all studied ḥadīth with Sun-
ni scholars.41 It must be said that the Sunnism of these men did not ensure 
political stability, in spite of their effective consent to Cairo’s hegemony over 
the political leadership of Mecca. Meccan politics continued to be highly con-
tentious due to the political dynamics of tribal society in the Hijaz and, if any-
thing, the contention increased in the first half of the fifteenth century when 
trade is mentioned more often. However, the sharifs’ acceptance of Sunnism 
and their efforts to educate their sons accordingly must have facilitated their 
relations with the Sultanate’s officialdom as well as with the Cairo-appointed 
chief judges of Mecca.
5 Back to the Judges in the Fifteenth Century
In the fifteenth century, we start to see two more developments. First, we see 
the judicial hierarchy and its operation conforming to that of the rest of the 
Cairo Sultanate. Second, we discern connections between judges and sharifs 
that indicate the comfortable cohabitation of these two local elites. During 
the reign of the Sultan Faraj ibn Barqūq (r. 801–808 AH/1399–1405), the num-
ber of chief judges in Mecca increased fourfold since he took the decision to 
appoint chief judges of the Sunni madhhabs in Mecca, an arrangement, of 
course, established by Sultan Baybars in Cairo in the 1260s.42 But the local and 
highly interconnected nature of the Hijazi judicial leadership did not change. 
The first Shāfiʿī appointed in this new system (see Chart 7.3) was Jamāl al-Dīn 
Muḥammad ibn Ẓahīra, who had studied with his immediate predecessor, 
ʿIzz al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Nuwayrī and with Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Ẓahīra, 
his relative, who had preceded ʿIzz al-Dīn as judge.43 In 807 AH/1404–05, the 
40 Hurgronje (ibid.) called the sharifs “opportunists in the question of rite”. This seems an 
unfair judgment on the sharifs in general; however, ʿAjlān’s actions suggest that he may 
well qualify.
41 Najm al-Dīn ibn Fahd, al-Durr al-Kamīn 1:591, no. 514; 1:647, no. 563; 2:1015, no. 992; 2:1329, 
no. 1404; al-Sakhāwī, al-Ḍawʾ al-Lāmiʿ 3:13, no. 50; 3:104, no. 417; 5: 211, no. 709.
42 On this development, see Escovitz, “The Establishment of Four Chief Judgeships”, Jack-
son, “The Primacy of Politics”, 52–65; and Rapoport, “Legal Disunity”, 210–228.
43 Al-Fāsī, ʿIqd, 2: 53–59, no. 213; 1: 371–376, no. 47; 3: 52–53, no. 562.
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first Ḥanafī judge, Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Ṣāghānī, had also served as depu-
ty to ʿIzz al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Nuwayrī.44 The first Mālikī judge, Taqī al-Dīn 
Muḥammad al-Fāsī, the author of our main source for the eighth AH/fourteenth 
century, was the grandson of Kamāl al-Dīn Abū al-Faḍl al-Nuwayrī (Chart 7.2, 
no. 6; and Chart 7.3).45 Two years later, in 809 AH/1406–07, the first Ḥanbalī 
judge was appointed—Sirāj al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Laṭīf ibn Abī Fatḥ Muḥammad al-
Fāsī, a second cousin of Taqī al-Dīn al-Fāsī, his Mālikī colleague.46
Seemingly in parallel to the appointment of chief judges was the establish-
ment, for the first time in Mecca, of a madrasa that taught the four Sunni 
schools of law. The Banjaliyya Madrasa, also known as the Ghiyāthiyya, was 
founded in 813 AH/1410 by Ghiyāth al-Dīn Aʿẓam Shāh (r. 792–813 AH/1390–
1410), the sultan of Bengal. Its four professors of the madhhabs were, at least 
initially, the four chief judges appointed by the sultan in Cairo. It was not un-
usual for judges to hold teaching positions, as was the case with the chief judg-
es’ illustrious predecessor, Kamāl al-Dīn Abū al-Faḍl Muḥammad al-Nuwayrī 
(Chart 7.2, no. 6), noted earlier, who held three positions simultaneously. Noth-
ing had changed in this regard and nothing had changed in terms of the net-
work that facilitated appointments to judicial positions. Of course, what is in-
teresting here is the extension of Indian influence into the mix, which, if 
anything, ended up supporting Cairo’s hegemony; but after all, the Indian re-
gimes often appealed to the Abbasid Caliph in Cairo for recognition.
In addition, just as individuals bought judicial positions in Egypt and Syria, 
so too did judicial aspirants in Mecca, at least in the fifteenth century when we 
have evidence for this in local sources, although this didn’t necessarily pre-
clude the necessity of personal connections that ensured succession in judicial 
appointment. During the time when the Mamluk officer Jānibak al-Ẓāhirī 
dominated Mecca in the 860s AH/1465–64, Muḥibb al-Dīn ibn Ẓahīra was ap-
pointed Shāfiʿī chief judge to succeed his deceased father, after he paid Jānibak 
2,500 dinars, in addition to “some books”. The amount appears to have been 
a bargain compared to the 10,000 dinars for a chief judgeship in Damascus in 
44 Al-Fāsī, ʿIqd, 3: 168–170, no. 650.
45 Al-Fāsī, ʿIqd, 1: 331–363, no. 38.
46 Sakhāwī, al-Ḍawʾ al-Lāmiʿ 3: 333–334, no. 923: he was the second cousin of al-Fāsī: “he was 
the grandson of the paternal uncle of the father of Taqī al-Dīn al-Fāsī”. Among his teach-
ers was Shihāb al-Dīn ibn Ẓahīra. Al-Sakhāwī also says (4: 333): “his father was a Mālikī but 
he changed to the Ḥanbalī madhhab and he was appointed imam of the Ḥanbalīs in Mec-
ca after the death of the son of his paternal uncle al-Nūr ʿAlī ibn ʿAbd al-Laṭīf ibn Aḥmad, 
then to the judgeship in 809 and he was the first Ḥanbalī to be appointed to a judgeship 
of Mecca”.
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
299The Judges of Mecca and Mamluk Hegemony
<UN>
876  AH/1471 (of course, comparison of the figures here is very difficult).47 
Muḥibb al-Dīn was replaced a year later, in 862 AH/1457–8, by his nephew, 
Burhān al-Dīn ibn Ẓahīra; it’s not stated if he paid for the office. However, it is 
reported that Burhān al-Dīn remained in office until his death, in 892 AH/1487, 
when his son Jamāl al-Dīn ibn Ẓahīra, succeeded him. Jamāl al-Dīn paid Sultan 
al-Ashraf Qāytbāy (r. 872–901 AH/1468–1496) 10,000 dinars, 3,000 of which 
were owed by his father and 7,000 for his own appointment.48
We also start to see connections between sharifs and chief judges. Although 
the judges were interrelated through marriage, they seem not to have inter-
married with the sharifs. I have found only one instance of this: Sharif Ḥasan 
ibn ʿAjlān was married to the half-sister of Taqī al-Dīn al-Fāsī. One way, how-
ever, that the sharifs and judges were tied together was through the distribu-
tion of alms. Although there were now four chief judges, the Shāfiʿī chief judge, 
as in Cairo, still held greater prestige and responsibility, which included re-
sponsibility for oversight of the public treasury, pious endowments, and or-
phans.49 One feature of this position in Mecca was in the distribution of alms 
(ṣadaqa) which arrived every year from rulers abroad, ranging from the Otto-
mans in Anatolia, to the Tahirids of Yemen, to the sultans of India.50 The Shāfiʿī 
chief judge supervised the distribution of alms following a customary division 
which granted the ruling sharif of Mecca one third of the sum. One instance, 
dated 20 Shawwāl 888 AH/21 November 1483, is typical:
[On Shawwal 20] the Shāfiʿī judge Burhān al-Dīn [ibn Ẓahīra], may God 
bless him for it, distributed ṣadaqa for Ramaḍān from al-Khaljī [of Mālwa, 
Ghiyāth al-Dīn Shāh ibn Maḥmūd (r. 873–906 AH/1469–1501)], at the 
hand of his messenger Yaḥyā, amounting to four hundred ashrafīs. Sayyid 
Muḥammad ibn Barakāt took one third of it, as customary, according to 
what I heard, and [Burhān al-Dīn] bestowed on the judges five, and the 
preachers four, and the religious officials and the remaining [significant] 
people (al-nās) two, one, two-thirds, one-half and one-third, extending 
[even] to many of the foreigners, which was not customary, but it ap-
peared that he had a reason for that, but God alone knows.51
47 Najm al-Dīn ibn Fahd, Itḥāf al-Warā 4:370–372; for the comparison, see Martel-Thoumian, 
“The Sale of Office”, 75, whose study deals with a later period.
48 Najm al-Dīn ibn Fahd, Itḥāf al-Warā 4: 381; ʿIzz al-Dīn ibn Fahd, Bulūgh al-Qirā 1: 
479–480.
49 Jackson, “Primacy of Domestic Politics”, 53.
50 In fact, this practice may have occurred even earlier; however, we only have evidence for 
the second half of the fifteenth century.
51 ʿIzz al-Dīn ibn Fahd, Bulūgh al-Qirā, 1: 313.
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More often, the author, Najm al-Dīn ibn Fahd, would indicate where he 
stood in this hierarchy of largesse. A number of the gifts were more substantial, 
amounting to thousands or even tens of thousands of dinars which placed the 
Shāfiʿī judge in a key position, in terms of his relationship to the sharif and as 
patron to the religious elite in Mecca.52
Yet one should be cautious in assuming that the relationship between the 
sharif and the Shāfiʿī judge was purely pecuniary and instrumental in nature. 
These men, the judges and the sharifs going back to the time of Ḥasan ibn ʿAjlān, 
were tied together by similar educational backgrounds. Sharif Muḥammad ibn 
Barakāt, like his father and grandfather, Ḥasan, had studied Shāfiʿī fiqh not 
only in Mecca, but also in Cairo and Damascus.53 From 862 AH/1458 until the 
death of Sharif Muḥammad in 903 AH/1497, the Shāfiʿī chief judgeship was 
held by the aforementioned Burhan al-Dīn ibn Ẓahīra and his son Jamāl al-Dīn. 
Both judges enjoyed close friendship with Sharif Muḥammad. Najm al-Dīn ibn 
Fahd observed that the sharif and Burhan al-Dīn had a “firm friendship” and 
that “with his friendship [with Burhan al-Dīn,] the Sayyid obtained abundant 
blessings”.54 ʿIzz al-Dīn Ibn Fahd’s narrative noted frequently that the Sharif 
participated in Ibn Ẓahīra family celebrations for marriages and circumcisions, 
and when Sharif Muḥammad was dying, Jamāl al-Dīn visited his older friend 
to offer his support.55 So these men were tied together through common back-
ground as members of the class of notables with shared interests.
Nevertheless, such a bond between sharif and judge could also work to their 
detriment. About ten years after the death of Sharif Muḥammad and about 
five years after the occurrence of the anecdote I mentioned concerning the 
amir Azbak, shared interests brought together Sharif Aḥmad al-Jāzānī, one of 
the warring sons (yet again) of Sharif Muḥammad and the judge Abū al-Suʿud 
ibn Ẓahīra. At this time, Barakāt ibn Muḥammad had been waging a vicious 
war against his brother Aḥmad al-Jāzānī for control of Mecca as ruling sharif. 
Barakāt found letters from the judge Ibn Ẓahīra revealing his support for the 
cause of Aḥmad. The messages from the judge urged the latter to take over 
Mecca and drive out Barakāt. Barakāt’s men captured the judge, stripped him 
of his possessions, and took him to the island of Qunfidha off the Hijazi coast 
where he was drowned.56 Clearly, a judicial appointment counted for little in 
the context of Meccan politics.
52 For a discussion of these instances, with citations, see Meloy, Imperial Power, 191–197.
53 Najm al-Dīn ibn Fahd, al-Durr al-Kamīn, 1:103–121, no. 70.
54 Najm al-Dīn ibn Fahd, al-Durr al-Kamīn, 1:612, no. 524.
55 ʿIzz al-Dīn ibn Fahd, Bulūgh al-Qirā 2:1019; for a brief discussion of the context, see Meloy, 
Imperial Power, 196.
56 ʿIzz al-Dīn ibn Fahd, Bulūgh al-Qirā, 2:1210; al-Sinjārī, Manāʾiḥ al-Karam, 3:114–127.
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6 Concluding Remarks
Noteworthy is that these families of judges, along with the Banū Ḥasan them-
selves, were coopted by Cairo just as Cairo coopted the power of the pilgrim-
age, the wealth of the trade routes, and the authority of the sharifs. In this 
regard, the Sultanate’s state possessed a kind of “legibility”, that is, an ability 
“to arrange the population in ways that simplified the classic state functions 
of taxation, conscription, and prevention of rebellion”, to quote James Scott, 
in an effort “to shape a people and landscape that will fit their techniques of 
observation”.57 The legibility of the pre-modern state is, I would argue, short-
changed by Scott, who claims that it “knew precious little about its subjects, 
their wealth, their landholdings and yields, their very identity”.58 In response, 
one might at first think of the Cairo Sultanate’s encyclopedic chancery manu-
als or the detailed compilations of cadastral data produced by Ibn Duqmāq 
(ca. 797 AH/1395) and Ibn al-Jīʿān (d. 885 AH/1480). The difference, it would 
appear to me, at least with regard to the Cairo Sultanate is that the modes 
of control were not even relatively simpler, but just simply different. In the 
context of the Hijaz, Cairo read the social landscape with reasonable accuracy 
and used a variety of means to integrate the local Sunni judicial elite into the 
Sultanate’s legal apparatus, which served to overcome, if only partially, the dis-
tance between Cairo and Mecca.
The Sunni judges of Mecca (and presumably also those who worked in the 
other cities of the Hijaz) seem to have been willing to be incorporated into the 
Sultanate’s political structure. At the administrative level, the sharifs of Mecca 
were also willing to be incorporated into the state hierarchy, at least superfi-
cially, using their association with Cairo to their own local political advantage. 
This bureaucratic stratagem, evincing a form of legibility, was both expedient 
and effective as a means of control within the interplay between Cairo and 
Mecca. However, there was quite a different situation at the ideological level 
because the sharifs—as Zaydīs—posed a serious threat to Cairo. The sharifs 
threatened, first, the security of the state as potential allies to the Ilkhans and, 
57 Scott, Seeing Like a State, 2–3 and 82.
58 Scott, Seeing Like a State, 2. One problem is that his concept of legibility is based on the 
historical category of “high modernism”; in this respect, the concept doesn’t work in other 
eras. Another issue is that his definition relies on Foucault’s “governmentality” which as-
sumes the state’s interest in improving members of society (p. 91) or simply the notion 
that states are supposed to serve their citizens. Nevertheless, I think Scott’s notion of how 
states “see” is useful; in the context of the fifteenth century, how and what states “saw” was 
different.
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second, the credibility of the Cairo Sultanate as ideological adversaries to a 
Sunni regime. Here, to achieve hegemony, the Cairo Sultanate used selective 
violence against Zaydī officials and simultaneously exploited sharifian rivalries 
to achieve their political objectives in the Hijaz.
Was Cairo’s control over the Hijaz in the fifteenth century reliant on the ex-
tension of hegemony in the preceding century? It is clear that the Cairo Sultan-
ate’s hegemony over Mecca preceded its political control and may well have 
facilitated it, just as Egypt’s economic hegemony over the Hijaz must have re-
stricted the autonomy of local elites. Egypt’s cultural and social hegemony al-
lowed political domination of the Hijazi elite to function more effectively and, 
one can surmise, at less cost to Cairo. In spite of the ability of the Cairo Sultan-
ate to read the social and political landscape of the Hijaz, the sultans could not 
achieve either direct control or hegemony over the tribal groups that lived 
there, thus they relied on the local political order of the sharifs.
Finally, to return to legibility, when the judges rebuked Azbak—“you’ve ru-
ined Egypt, you want to ruin Mecca too?”—they were evidently blind to the 
fact that Mecca had been Mamlukized long before amir Azbak’s arrival, and 
that they, as part of the local elite, were part and parcel of that process.
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Chapter 8
The Syrian Commercial Elite and Mamluk State-
Building in the Fifteenth Century
Patrick Wing
In Rajab 889/July-August 1484, the Mamluk sultan al-Ashraf Qāytbāy appoint-
ed Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. al-Muzalliq chief Shāfiʿī qāḍī in Damascus.1 
This office was the most distinguished and lucrative post for members of the 
religious elite in late medieval Syria, and the holder of this position enjoyed a 
status as a high-ranking member of the ʿulamāʾ, as well as substantial mate-
rial compensation and power within the ruling hierarchy of the state. Shams 
al-Dīn’s family had been a cornerstone of the economy and social fabric of 
Damascus for most of the 15th century, and provides an illustration of the his-
torical changes that affected the development of the Sultanate more broadly in 
this period. The qāḍī’s grandfather, also known as Shams al-Dīn, Muḥammad b. 
ʿAlī b. al-Muzalliq, was not a judge, but made the family’s fortune in trade with 
India in the late 8th/14th and early 9th/15th centuries. His commercial con-
tacts, in combination with the political alliances he forged during the period of 
civil war in Syria in the first decade of the 9th/15th century, assured his family’s 
position of wealth and influence for generations to come. In this chapter we 
consider what the history of the Banū Muzalliq at Damascus suggests about 
the historical development of the Mamluk Sultanate’s state. Members of the 
family were merchants involved in Indian Ocean and Red Sea trade in the Hi-
jaz, as well as Syria, filled positions in the military and financial administration 
of the Sultanate by the second generation, and occupied roles in the religious 
judiciary by the third. The Muzalliq family aligned their interests locally in Da-
mascus, as well as transregionally, with those of the sultans, beginning in a 
period at the start of the 9th/15th century when Syria had fallen outside of the 
direct control of Cairo, and gradually integrated with the Sultanate’s political 
elite as Syria itself was more firmly re-integrated into the realm. An examina-
tion of the commercial elite of Syria suggests parallels to the broadening of the 
Sultanate’s religious and intellectual elite of the same period, as individuals 
with ties outside the Cairo citadel, and across political boundaries, became 
servants of the state.
1 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ al-Zuhūr, 3: 203.
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The rise of the Banū Muzalliq was closely connected to the political and 
economic challenges facing the Sultanate of Cairo in the early fifteenth centu-
ry. The accession of al-Ẓāhir Barqūq in 784/1382 has traditionally been under-
stood as an important turning point in the history of the ‘Mamluk’ Sultanate. 
Barqūq’s Circassian origins, his reliance on a well-cultivated circle of depen-
dents and supporters, and his dispensing with the acknowledgement of a de-
scendant of Qalāwūn as sultan have all been identified as important features of 
Barqūq’s reign, marking a shift in the political culture of the Sultanate.2 The 
reign of his son and successor, al-Nāṣir Faraj, has typically been viewed as a 
continuation of the Circassian revolution that Barqūq began, and evidence 
that Barqūq sought to establish a new dynastic tradition, based on his own 
lineage. At the same time, however, there are some good reasons for viewing 
Faraj’s reign (801–815/1399–1412) as an important turning point in its own right, 
particularly when considering the place that Syria held in the Sultanate. Syria 
suffered traumatic economic and military setbacks in the first decade of the 
fifteenth century, brought on by a combination of crop failure, inflation, the 
invasion of Tīmūr in 803/1400–1401, and the subsequent civil war among mili-
tary factions. In fact, there is good reason to think of Syria as basically falling 
out of the orbit of the Sultanate in Cairo, if not in the imagination of the politi-
cal elite, then in practical terms. In general, the violent arrival of representa-
tives of Chaghatayid Central Asia in the Nile-to-Oxus region in the late- 
fourteenth and early fifteenth-centuries created great upheaval among the 
representatives of the post-Ilkhanid political order, and to the extent that Syria 
was connected economically and socially to Anatolia, Iraq and northwestern 
Iran, it too felt the impact of these disturbances. Although the Euphrates is 
often considered a significant political boundary, the fact was that for mer-
chants, scholars, and even members of the military elite, Syria and the Ilkha-
nid realm were part of a continuum. Sultan Barqūq was able to maintain con-
trol of his realm to a reasonable degree during most of Tīmūr’s early campaigns 
in Iran. However, after Faraj took the throne, military factions competing for 
influence over the young sultan became more and more powerful.3 Tīmūr’s 
2 The notion that Barqūq’s reign represented a significant change in the history of the Sultan-
ate is evident in the most common scheme of periodization in the field of Mamluk history, 
which has traditionally identified a “Turkish” or “Baḥrī” period from 1250–1382, and a “Circas-
sian” or “Burjī” period from 1382–1517. However, recent scholarship has begun to challenge 
the idea of an abrupt break with the past with Barqūq’s accession, and emphasizes the ways 
in which Barqūq sought to merge his own dynastic ambitions with long-standing institutions 
and rituals. See Van Steenbergen, “Ritual, Politics, and the City in Mamluk Cairo”, p. 265.
3 For a masterful study of the political conflicts among the Mamluk elite in the early 15th cen-
tury, see Onimus, Les Maîtres du Jeu, pp. 223–270.
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invasion of Syria and occupation of Damascus contributed to an already diffi-
cult economic situation, and left Syria open to political fragmentation once 
Tīmūr withdrew.
Accompanying these political challenges facing the Sultanate were two sig-
nificant economic developments. One was the expansion of Venetian com-
mercial influence in Syria in the early fifteenth century.4 A combination of fac-
tors in the last quarter of the fourteenth century had driven Venice out of 
Famagusta on Cyprus by the Genoese in 1373, Cilicia by the Sultanate’s armies 
in 1375, and the northern Black Sea by Tīmūr in the 1390s, thus making the 
Mediterranean ports,5 as well as Damascus and Aleppo, significant points of 
contact between Europe and the eastern silk and spice trade, via Venetian mer-
chants. At the same time, Syro-Egyptian elites turned their attention to taxa-
tion of the transit trade, especially in spices, between the Indian Ocean and 
the Mediterranean in order to increase revenues that had declined from agrar-
ian iqṭāʿs.6 Access to the spice trade required cooperation with other polities 
and merchant networks, including Venice.7 The Venetians thus became the 
main middlemen between the Cairo Sultanate and European markets in the 
fifteenth century.8
The other significant economic development in the early fifteenth century 
was the rise of a new commercial elite operating within the Syro-Egyptian 
realm, seemingly replacing the so-called Kārimī merchants, who had domi-
nated the eastern spice trade in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea from at least the 
Ayyubid period.9 The height of the Kārimīs’ power and influence coincided 
with the reign of Barqūq at the end of the fourteenth century.10 Yet, their 
wealth seems to have vanished along with the general collapse of the Egyptian 
economy at the beginning of the fifteenth century.11 As the influence of the 
Kārimīs declined, the activity of merchants in Syria seems to have increased. 
Trade expanded among both foreigners, mainly Venetians, as well as local mer-
chant notables, often referred to collectively as khawājas, or khawājakiyya, as 
4 Ashtor, Levant Trade, p. 324. Ashtor points out that the Venetians were especially active at 
Hama, Latakia, Tripoli, and Sarmin.
5 Ashtor, A Social and Economic History of the Near East, pp. 325–326.
6 Christ, Trading Conflicts, p. 33.
7 Christ, “Beyond the Network—Connectors of Networks”, p. 28.
8 Arbel, “The Last Decades of Venice’s Trade with the Mamluks”, p. 37.
9 Apellániz Ruiz de Galarreta, Pouvoir et finance en Méditerranée pré-moderne, p. 268; Mor-
tel, “The Mercantile Community of Mecca”, p. 20.
10 Ashtor, “The Kārimī Merchants”, p. 53.
11 Ashtor, “The Kārimī Merchants”, p. 54.
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many of them were identified by this laqab.12 However, there is some ambigu-
ity about what this title actually meant in the context of the commercial econ-
omy. The title “khawāja” is of Persian origin, and has been used with a variety 
of meanings, depending on the period and place. In the case of Egypt and 
Syria, it came to be applied mainly to wealthy merchants working in official 
service to the sultan, who had come from outside his domains.13 It may also be 
a mistake to consider the khawājakiyya as a distinct group operating only after 
about 1400. Sato Tsugitaka has identified the great slave trader Majd al-Dīn al-
Sallāmī (d. 743/1342) who operated between Cairo and Tabriz as a khawāja 
merchant,14 and in fact has emphasized his business in slaves as setting him 
and his like apart from the Kārimīs, who dealt in the spice trade.15 Sato has also 
highlighted the career of the great khawāja slave merchant Fakhr al-Dīn 
ʿUthmān al-Asʿardī (d. 783/1381), renowned for having imported Barqūq to 
Egypt from Circassia. Asʿardī’s qaysariyya, or market complex in Damascus, an-
chored his business in Syria as much as in Egypt.16
Richard Mortel has written on the large percentage of fifteenth century 
khawāja merchants in Mecca whose families hailed from other places.17 As 
Mortel has pointed out, many merchants with the title “khawāja” were born in 
Mecca, but had fathers with nisbas indicating they hailed from other places.18 
During Barsbāy’s reign, these merchants were recruited more directly into the 
service of the Sultanate as Barsbāy attempted to extend his personal control 
more fully over trade at Jedda and Mecca. One of the merchants who received 
the title murshidd of Jedda, an office that served as liaison between the sultan’s 
officials and the merchant community in Jedda, was Shams al-Dīn Dāʿūd b ʿAlī 
al-Kaylānī,19 whose nisba indicated his family’s origins in Gilan in northern 
12 Ashtor, A Social and Economic History of the Near East, p. 321.
13 Sato, “Slave Traders and Kārimī Merchants during the Mamluk Period”, p. 143. The Ency-
clopaedia of Islam points out the variety of meanings that the title “khawāja”, which is 
Persian in origin, has held throughout Islamic history, depending on the period and the 
place. In the Syro-Egyptian case, Qalqashandī’s description of a “khawāja” as an impor-
tant Persian or other foreign merchant was the primary way the title was applied, in con-
trast to the Ottoman case, where it became a designation of members of the ʿulamāʾ. See 
“Khwādja”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, Volume 2 (Leiden: Brill), 4: 907.
14 Sato, “Slave Traders and Kārimī Merchants during the Mamluk Period”, p. 144.
15 Sato, “Slave Traders and Kārimī Merchants during the Mamluk Period”, pp. 152–154. Sato 
contrasts the slave traders with the Kārimīs by pointing out that the Kārimīs were en-
gaged in more religious and cultural activities, while the slave traders came to be regarded 
as state officials, which the Kārimīs never were.
16 Sato, “Slave Traders and Kārimī Merchants during the Mamluk Period”, p. 144.
17 Mortel, “The Mercantile Community of Mecca”, p. 19.
18 Mortel, “The Mercantile Community of Mecca”, p. 24.
19 Mortel, “The Mercantile Community of Mecca”, p. 22.
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Iran. Mortel calculates that significant percentages of the great many mer-
chants in Mecca who were immigrants were from Iran, Syria, and Egypt (with 
smaller numbers from Yemen, Iraq, and Anatolia).20
With the exception of Yemen, all of these places had been shaken by up-
heavals by the Timurids. The turmoil among Timur’s descendants following his 
death in 1405 led to political fragmentation across Iran and Anatolia, as well as 
in Syria, where amirs took advantage of the chaos to compete for control of the 
Sultanate. The fact that the agricultural economy of Egypt was in decline, and 
was leading to the failure of the traditional system of revenue disbursement 
(iqṭāʿ) at the same time that these upheavals in the Timurid realm were taking 
place, meant that merchants with ties to far-flung markets would be valuable 
to the fiscal welfare of the Sultanate. Syria was brought back into the sultan’s 
realm, beginning during al-Muʾayyad Shaykh’s reign (815/1412–824/1421), but 
the Syrian provinces were integrated with Egypt in a new way—the merchant 
elites operating in Syria, with connections to the Timurid realm and the Hijaz, 
became an important point of contact between the Sultanate in Cairo and the 
Levantine cities. This fact not only meant that the Syrian commercial elite 
would play a greater role in the projection of the sultan’s authority, but also 
that its personnel would be shaped by a cosmopolitanism informed by social 
and cultural ties across a wide geographic area, from Cairo to Tabriz, and Alep-
po to Mecca.
Francisco Javier Apellániz Ruiz de Galarreta has illustrated the ways that the 
khawājakiyya were incorporated into the administrative structures of the Sul-
tanate.21 Although they remained private merchants, they acted in concert 
with the interests of the sultan, and received formal recognition for their ser-
vices from Cairo.22 Apellániz Ruiz de Galarreta has argued that the khawāja 
merchants can be considered a privileged merchant guild under the protec-
tion of the Sultanate, comparable to the chartered trade companies of Spain 
and Portugal.23
An example of the wealth and prestige enjoyed by these new commercial 
elites can be found in the case of perhaps the greatest Syrian merchant family 
of the fifteenth century, the afore-mentioned Banū Muzalliq. The Muzalliq 
family had ties to the Hijaz, as well as with Syria, and this made them important 
in the economic and social integration of these regions by the Sultanate. The 
foundations of the family’s wealth, and thus of their entrée into the Sultanate’s 
20 Mortel, “The Mercantile Community of Mecca”, pp. 25, 35.
21 Apellániz Ruiz de Galarreta, Pouvoir et finance en Méditerranée pré-moderne, p. 103.
22 Apellániz Ruiz de Galarreta, Pouvoir et finance en Méditerranée pré-moderne, pp. 104–108.
23 Apellániz Ruiz de Galarreta, Pouvoir et finance en Méditerranée pré-moderne, p. 104.
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elite, was trade in the Indian Ocean. Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad (d. 848/1444) 
made his fortune sailing to India, and was involved in commercial life in the 
Hijaz as well as in Syria.24 His relationship with the amir Shaykh al-Maḥmūdī, 
the future Sultan al-Malik al-Muʾayyad, enabled him to leverage his commer-
cial success in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea trade into a role valuable to 
the economy of the future sultan’s household, and thence into the political 
hierarchy of the Sultanate. Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. al-Muzalliq’s family 
was one of several prominent Syrian merchant families who are designated as 
“khawājas” in the sources, all of which traveled in common social circles in 
Damascus.25 The khawāja merchants were in a position to facilitate the trans-
fer of wealth from trade to amirs competing for supremacy in Syria in the first 
decade of the 9th/15th century. Damascus in particular was a city where con-
flict among amirs played out, largely due to the abundance of pious founda-
tions (waqf) which could be seized to fund military operations.26 The two main 
factions in the civil war during the second reign of al-Nāṣir Faraj (808/1405–
815/1412) were those of the amirs Shaykh al-Maḥmūdī and Nawrūz al-Ḥāfiẓī.27 
In 811/1408, following his defeat of Nawrūz al-Ḥāfiẓī and capture of Damascus, 
Shaykh al-Maḥmūdī relied on Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad to deliver 5,000 di-
nars from the merchant community there.28 Shams al-Dīn’s services paid off, 
as the Banū Muzalliq’s relationship to the most successful amir in the conflict 
in Syria ensured their commercial privileges in Syria, and in the Sultanate writ 
large once Shaykh became sultan. Ibn al-Muzalliq’s privileged status is con-
firmed in a document preserved by Qalqashandī, confirming his exemption 
from taxation in Egypt and Syria.29
For the next three decades, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. al-Muzalliq was 
known as kabīr al-tujjār, head merchant at Damascus. His wealth not only al-
lowed him to lay a foundation for his family’s influence locally and throughout 
the Sultanate (more on this point below), but it also allowed him to reinvest in 
the commercial infrastructure of Syria. He paid for the improvement of roads, 
and built khans, or caravanserais, throughout Syria. According to the fifteenth 
century historian and biographer al-Sakhāwī, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad be-
queathed a third of his wealth upon his death for the completion of a khan 
complex, while dividing the rest among the poor (fuqarāʾ) of Mecca and Me-
dina, Jerusalem, and Damascus. His influence extended well beyond his home 
24 Apellániz Ruiz de Galarreta, Pouvoir et finance en Méditerranée pré-moderne, pp. 79–80.
25 Vallet, L’Arabie Marchande, p. 646.
26 Onimus, Les Maîtres du Jeu, p. 261.
27 Onimus, Les Maîtres du Jeu, p. 250.
28 Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 4: 72.
29 Labib, “Egyptian Commercial Policy in the Middle Ages”, p. 75.
Jo Van Steenbergen - 978-90-04-43131-7
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 10:35:29AM
via free access
Wing312
<UN>
city, and aligned well with the sultans’ interest in maintaining control over 
Syria as well as its trade.30
Despite his wealth and status, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad was still vulnera-
ble to changing political circumstances, illustrated by his imprisonment in 
843/1439 following the accession of Sultan al-Ẓāhir Jaqmaq. Held in confine-
ment in the Damascus citadel, Shams al-Dīn was only released after his son 
paid 5,000 dinars to the treasury, and 10,000 dinars to the dīwān al-khāṣṣ.31 In 
addition to providing a window into the extortionist practices of the central 
government, this incident also sheds light on the extent to which the new sul-
tan looked to the Syrian merchant elite to fund his campaign to take the throne. 
The fact that the Muzalliq family delivered less than Jaqmaq demanded32 also 
suggests that they had some leverage for negotiation with the Sultanate. In any 
case, by the time of his death five years later at the age of more than eighty 
years, Ibn al-Muzalliq had become an essential part of the Sultanate’s state in 
Syria. His importance to the ruling elite is exemplified by reports of the huge 
turnout at his funeral, attended by local elite (aʿyān), including the governor of 
Damascus, the highest ranking official in Syria.33
Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad’s progeny benefited from their father’s prominent 
position in the Sultanate. While one son, ʿ Umar, died before his father from the 
plague in 841/1437–1438,34 another son, Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad (d. 873/1468) be-
came known as a successful merchant in his own right. Although he did not 
hold any government offices,35 Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad did invest in the pious 
institutions of his city, establishing a kitchen (maṭbakh) near the Bāb al-Barīd, 
on the western side of the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus. However, the most 
significant member of the Muzalliq family in the generation after Shams al-Dīn 
Muḥammad was his son Badr al-Dīn Ḥasan. He played a significant role in the 
extension of sultanic authority over trade at Jedda and Mecca during the reign 
of Sultan al-Ashraf Barsbāy (r. 825/1422–841/1438). In 841/1438, Barsbāy appoint-
ed Badr al-Dīn Ḥasan to the position of amir of Jedda, and dispatched him to 
that city along with the nāẓir of Jedda, Saʿd al-Dīn Ibrāhīm b. al-Marra.36 The 
30 Sakhāwī, al-Ḍawʾ al-Lāmiʿ, 8: 174; Sakhāwī, al-Tibr, 243.
31 Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 4: 1157.
32 Maqrīzī writes that the sultan had demanded 30,000 dinars for the treasury. See Maqrīzī, 
Sulūk, 4: 1157.
33 Sakhāwī, al-Ḍawʾ al-Lāmiʿ, 8: 174; Sakhāwī, al-Tibr, 243.
34 Sakhāwī, al-Tibr, 243.
35 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ al-Zuhūr, 3: 17.
36 Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 4: 1028, 1030; Ibn Fahd, Itḥāf al-Wará, 4: 115–116. On the career of Ibn al-
Marra and his role in the extension of Mamluk authority to the Hijaz, see Wing, “Indian 
Ocean Trade and Sultanic Authority”.
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Muzalliq family had thus by this time converted their prominence in Indian 
Ocean-Red Sea trade, as well as their alliance with the Sultanate, into a govern-
ment position at the port of Mecca. This appointment was part of a larger pro-
cess by which the Sultanate was attempting to bring the Hijaz more closely 
under the control of the sultan’s own agents, appointed from Cairo, replacing 
the local dynasty of sharīfs who had served as intermediaries between the Sul-
tanate and the merchants there.37
Badr al-Dīn Ḥasan’s other major appointment was from Sultan al-Ashraf 
Qāytbāy to the position of nāẓir al-jaysh (army comptroller) of Damascus, in 
Dhū al-Qaʿda 872/May-June 1468.38 This position signals the arrival of the Banū 
Muzalliq in the ranks of the Sultanate’s political elite in an official capacity. 
Badr al-Dīn Ḥasan had begun his career at the side of his father as a merchant, 
was brought into the government hierarchy in Jedda by Barsbāy, and raised to 
a high office in the military administration under Qāytbāy.
Badr al-Dīn Ḥasan’s son, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad, represented the third 
generation of the Banū Muzalliq, and a final phase of their incorporation into 
the Sultanate’s ruling elite by the late 15th century. We began this chapter by 
mentioning this Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad, the namesake of his grandfather, 
and his appointment in 889/1484 to the office of Shāfiʿī qāḍī of Damascus. Like 
his father, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad acquired a position in the Sultanate’s gov-
ernment apparatus. However, unlike his father, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad en-
tered the ranks of the ʿulamāʾ, the religious scholars, who ostensibly served to 
ensure Islamic justice in the Sultanate. He continued in this role until he was 
murdered in his home in 902/1497.39
In the second chapter of this volume, Jan Dumolyn and Jo Van Steenbergen 
highlight Michael Chamberlain’s contribution to our understanding of Mar-
shall Hodgson’s “military patronage state”, particularly Chamberlain’s empha-
sis on social relationships, rather than on legalistic bureaucratic offices, as a 
way to best understand the dynamics of politics within the military patronage 
state. In a description of the Seljuk Sultanate that might also be applied to the 
Sultanate of Cairo, Chamberlain described the state as “a collection of power-
ful households kept in check by the head of the most powerful among them”.40 
We might usefully ask where the Banū Muzalliq fit in to such a conception of 
the state? It may be useful to consider this elite merchant family as operating 
in two spheres: on one hand, as representatives of the sultan’s own household, 
37 See Meloy, Imperial Power and Maritime Trade, particularly chapter 4.
38 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ al-Zuhūr, 3: 14.
39 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ al-Zuhūr, 3: 350.
40 Chamberlain, “Military Patronage States”, p. 142.
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and agents of the extension of royal authority over other elite households and 
factions. On the other hand, the Banū Muzalliq, through their service to the 
sultan, also managed to establish an elite household of their own, that survived 
the fall of the Sultanate itself, and continued into the Ottoman period.
The Banū Muzalliq thus illustrate significant features of Syro-Egyptian state 
building in the 9th/15th century. They represent a merging of the political in-
terests of the Sultanate with the commercial networks and wealth that the Syr-
ian merchants could offer. They also represent the ways the family could lever-
age its relationship with the Sultanate to procure offices, property, and power 
within the political elite. Members of the family not only enjoyed privileged 
status as traders, but also acquired access to additional levers of power, all the 
while acting in roles of local patronage and investment in institutions of Is-
lamic learning and devotion, in Damascus as well as in the Hijaz. The Banū 
Muzalliq were a cosmopolitan elite, whose rise within the Sultanate was not 
confined to a barracks or city quarter, but which put them in contact with a 
wider world of Middle Eastern and Mediterranean economic and political 
patterns.
Such a cosmopolitanism among the merchant elite should not surprise us, 
given what scholarship has shown us about networks of intellectuals and men 
of religion in the same period. Already by the middle of the fourteenth cen-
tury there is evidence that the Sultanate was encouraging Ḥanafī legal schol-
ars from outside Egypt and Syria, primarily from Anatolia and Iran, to train in 
the madrasas of Cairo. Leonor Fernandes has shown that the endowment 
documents (waqfiyya) from madrasas founded by prominent amirs in the sec-
ond half of the fourteenth century stipulate “foreign” Ḥanafī students be ap-
pointed to positions in the madrasas.41 The purpose seems to have been to 
train a cadre of religious scholars that would serve as a counterweight to the 
influence of the local Shāfiʿī ʿulamāʾ, who had traditionally enjoyed a privi-
leged status and a good deal of power in the ongoing negotiation of moral 
authority between the military elite and the local population.42 As a result, the 
madrasas and khānqāhs of Syria and Egypt, and particularly Cairo, came to be 
filled by  Turkish- and Persian-speaking individuals who forged ties with others 
41 Fernandes, “Mamluk Politics and Education”, pp. 91–93. Jo Van Steenbergen has shown 
how patronage of Ḥanafī jurists by the amir Yalbughā, who emerged as the main power 
behind the throne in the 1360s, fit into a larger pattern of continuity in the cultural prefer-
ences and roles played by the Qalāwūnid sultans in the fourteenth century. See Van Steen-
bergen, “The Amir Yalbughā al-Khāṣṣakī, the Qalāwūnid Sultanate, and the Cultural Ma-
trix of Mamlūk Society”, pp. 439–441.
42 Fernandes, “Mamluk Politics and Education”, p. 98; Levanoni, “Who were the ‘Salt of the 
Earth’”, pp. 80–82.
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like them, as well as with the ruling elite who underwrote their education 
through the institutions they founded and endowed. The benefits did not 
flow one direction however. While the sultan and amirs provided the eco-
nomic foundation for the ʿulamāʾ, the ʿulamāʾ in turn lent spiritual legitimacy 
to the sultan’s regime.43
The scholars who came to Cairo from Anatolia, Iran, and elsewhere formed 
their own informal networks. In addition to facilitating the exchange of schol-
arship, such networks could also facilitate contact with the sultan and other 
powerful individuals. An example can be seen in the life of Shaykh Badr al-Dīn 
Maḥmūd al-Simavī, best known for leading a rebellion against the Ottomans in 
819/1416. Born and raised in Ottoman Thrace, Shaykh Badr al-Dīn, like so many 
scholars of his age, eventually made his way to Cairo to study logic and philoso-
phy. Here he came into the circle of the well-known physician and master of 
occult sciences Shaykh Ḥusayn Akhlāṭī (d. 799/1397). As İlker Evrim Binbaş has 
shown, Akhlāṭī had a profound influence on Shaykh Badr al-Dīn and helped to 
shape his ideas about mysticism and the occult, which informed his rebellion 
years later in the Ottoman lands.44 Sultan Barqūq himself had an interest in 
Sufism and the occult,45 and members of Akhlāṭī’s circle, many of whom hailed 
from Iran or Anatolia,46 enjoyed the favor of the court. Akhlāṭī himself was a 
close companion of Barqūq, while Shaykh Badr al-Dīn became tutor to Barqūq’s 
son, the future Sultan al-Nāṣir Faraj.47
Thus, by the turn of the fifteenth century, the sultans in Cairo had begun to 
establish a pattern of ties and patronage among intellectuals who would chal-
lenge the orthodoxy of the traditional Egyptian ʿulamāʾ, and would both serve 
and benefit from their relationship with the ruling military elite. It seems that 
a similar development may have been underway with respect to integration of 
merchant networks, which crossed political boundaries in the same way the 
intellectual networks did, at a moment when the sultan and the political elite 
saw their fortunes tied increasingly to the commercial economy and when 
merchants operating across political boundaries and outside the control of the 
sultan’s administrative apparatus, recognized the advantages of working for 
and under the protection of the sultan.
43 Lev, “Symbiotic Relations: Ulama and the Mamluk Sultans”.
44 Binbaş, Intellectual Networks in Timurid Iran, pp. 122–140.
45 Binbaş, Intellectual Networks in Timurid Iran, p. 117.
46 Binbaş, Intellectual Networks in Timurid Iran, pp. 132–135, idem, “The Anatomy of a Regi-
cide Attempt”, pp. 411–412.
47 Binbaş, Intellectual Networks in Timurid Iran, p. 126; Muslu, The Ottomans and the Mam-
luks, p. 74.
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 Conclusion
The Banū Muzalliq were products of the political and economic circumstances 
of the 9th/15th century, and their rise and integration into the Syro-Egyptian 
political elite suggest some realities of state formation in the Sultanate. First, 
the conflicts among amirs in the first decade of the 9th/15th century meant that 
Syria would play a role apart from Egypt, but also central to the factional strug-
gles of the period. In these struggles, and particularly during the last phase of 
civil war between the factions of Shaykh al-Maḥmūdī and Nawrūz al-Ḥāfiẓī, 
wealth from Syria, taken in the form of taxes from local populations, played an 
important role. Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. al-Muzalliq was able to serve the 
immediate local political interests of the amirs (Shaykh in particular), through 
his success in the transregional commercial ventures that connected the Indian 
Ocean, Red Sea, and Mediterranean in this period. Ibn al-Muzalliq thus offered 
a valuable service to the amir, and later Sultan al-Muʾayyad Shaykh, as well as 
his successor, al-Ashraf Barsbāy. Taking over from his father, the kabīr al-tujjār 
of Damascus, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad’s son, Badr al-Dīn Ḥasan, moved into 
administrative roles that signaled both his family’s rise to prominence, as well 
as the Sultanate’s dependence on trade in the Hijaz and Levant for its economic 
prosperity. By the third generation, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Badr al-Dīn 
Ḥasan had solidified the family’s influence over both trade and the levers of le-
gal authority, including over awqāf, as chief qāḍī of Damascus. The Banū Muzal-
liq thus illustrate a path to the political elite that did not begin in the citadel or 
a madrasa. That is, this family of merchants were outsiders, whose connections 
and influence at the peripheries of the Cairo Sultanate made them valuable 
partners in the state’s extension of its authority via loyal agents of the sultan.
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Chapter 9
Settling Accounts with the Sultan: Cortesia, 
Zemechia and Venetian Fiscality in Fifteenth-
Century Alexandria
Georg Christ
On the morning of the tenth of January 1420, four high-ranking Venetian mer-
chants made their way towards the office of the Venetian consul, Biagio Dolfin, 
in the fondaco in Alexandria, Egypt.1 The four, Carlo Contarini, Lorenzo Bem-
bo, Angelo Michiel, and Polo Michiel then proceeded to copy pages 45, 95 and 
111 of the consul’s ledger (‘libro’). Each of them produced their own copy of 
these pages and each of them added a note specifying that they had done this 
on the behest of the consul.2 Such procedure seems unusual. Who were these 
merchants and what had happened? What was contained in the consul’s led-
ger to motivate such solemn proceedings?
1 Introduction
Unlike the consular ledgers, which seem to be lost, these four copies survive. 
They contain excerpts from two accounts settling claims between the sultan 
al-Muʾayyad Shaykh (r. 1412–1421) and the Venetian consul Biagio Dolfin (con-
sul from 1418–1420) as well as between the sultan’s customs inspector (Fakhr 
al-Dīn ibn Sufeir, in office 1415–25) and the Venetian community in Alexandria 
of the years 1418 and 1419.3 These accounts document transactions at the very 
1 Many thanks to Jo Van Steenbergen, Malika Dekkiche and Kristof D’hulster for inviting me to 
the most inspiring international conference “Whither the Early Modern State? Fifteenth-
Century State Formations across Eurasia. Connections, Divergences, and Comparisons” in 
Ghent, 10–12 September 2014, where a first draft of this contribution was presented. Thanks 
also to Natalie Sharpin for thoughtful comments and Angela Marisol Roberts for elegant 
copy-editing.
2 “In Alexandria + mccccxviiii a dì X zener e fo di maitina. Ad istanzia de miser Blaxio Dolfin 
consollo nostro, io Anzollo Michiel asieme con ser Lorenzo Bembo, ser Polo Michiel et ser 
Carlo Contarini fo de miser Iacomo, in la decima, in casa soa, al suo scriver”, account copy 
A. Michiel, see for another version Appendix 1 of this chapter (end).
3 Christ, Trading Conflicts, on Biagio Dolfin pp. 97–110; on Fakhr al-Dīn p. 91 seq., on Venetians 
in Alexandria p. 95 seq. and passim.
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pulse of Veneto-Mamluk relations: the transit trade in spices. What do they tell 
us about Veneto-Mamluk relations and thus about the status of Venetians and 
Venice within the Cairo Sultanate or Mamluk Empire? Jo Van Steenbergen has 
recently discussed the problematic implications of the Mamlukization of late 
medieval Syro-Egyptian history, i.e. the tendency to interpret the multiple 
forms of statehood and power projection but also cultural expression, social 
life etc. of the Cairo Sultanate as ‘Mamluk’.4
Another facet of the ‘Mamlukization’ phenomenon is a tendency to reduce 
the range of the Sultanate’s imperial policies to the centers of Egypt and Syria, 
Cairo and Damascus. While it is acknowledged that the Cairo Sultanate played 
a minor role in the Hijaz and in Nubia, the wider rim of the sultan’s realm, also 
including Latin European powers, is often ignored.5 Veneto-Mamluk relations 
have been studied as bilateral relations between two a priori distinct and equal 
entities. Writing in a time of nation states, great scholars from Wilhelm Heyd to 
Eliyahu Ashtor thus tended to see these relations in a somewhat anachronistic 
way as bilateral agreements or treaties between independent states.6 The more 
recent study of Francisco Apellániz foregrounded fiscal elements and rightly 
interpreted these relations as a symbiosis or even Venetian exploitation rather 
than Mamluk oppression.7 Yet the impression thus remains bilateral and actual 
modes of integration, the peculiar arrangement under which Venetians did 
business in Alexandria not so much as members of a foreign nation state but as 
an integrated and integral part of the sultan’s realm, remains underexplored.8 
4 Van Steenbergen, “‘Mamlukisation’”. I will use the terms Sultanate or Cairo Sultanate (cf. the 
term Soldan del Chairo used in the Venetian accounts transcribed in the appendix) rather 
than ‘Mamluk Empire’ but retain the term ‘Veneto-Mamluk’ relations as a convenient short-
hand and because of its widespread use in the literature. The term is, however, problematic 
as these relations connected the Doge (and to an extent his subjects, the Venetians, even 
somewhat including all Latin Christians) and the sultan rather than state-like entities as the 
term would imply.
5 Ibid., for an exception, see Dekkiche, “State Recognition in the Service of State Formation?” 
and also her thesis currently prepared for publication: Le Caire. Carrefour des Ambassades. 
She is currently in the process of extending her analysis to Mamluk policies with regard to 
European powers. On the Mamluk perception of other powers, see also Drory, “Maqrizi in 
Durar al-ʿUqud with regard to Timur Leng”; Drory also gave a talk on the perception of Euro-
pean rulers in the same treatise at the 2013 CHESFAME in Ghent, which has not been pub-
lished with the proceedings (cf. Vermeulen, D’hulster, and Van Steenbergen, eds., Egypt and 
Syria in the Fatimid, Ayyubid and Mamluk eras viii).
6 Heyd, Histoire du commerce du Levant, p. 49: “traités de commerce”; Ashtor, Levant Trade, 
p. 27: “obtained an agreement”, p. 68: “treaty”.
7 Apellániz Ruiz de Galarreta, Pouvoir et finance en Méditerranée pré-moderne.
8 Cf. Christ, “The Venetian Consul”.
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Veneto-Mamluk relations were, to a great extent, brokered locally and they 
were not understood only as bilateral but also--and importantly--hierarchical 
relations. The day-to-day negotiating occurred in Alexandria as these accounts 
clearly illustrate. The sultanic privileges carefully respected the prerogatives of 
local legal custom. The local negotiations, however, did not unfold in some sort 
of game-theoretical void but within an hierarchical imperial taxonomy. This 
order, although perhaps weak in its enforcement, was still very real in its diplo-
matic and legal consequences. The sultan, at least formally, did not negotiate 
with either the Venetian doge or his ambassadors. The sultan was the patron, 
perhaps mediator and, most importantly, supreme judge. He granted the Vene-
tian privileges and thus protection and status and he spoke out against novel-
ties that would jeopardize the established status quo.9
The Venetians did not interact with the sultan pari passu. Venetian envoys 
instead negotiated with officials of more or less equal rank. The sultan thence 
magnanimously heard the resulting proposal as a supplication and generously 
granted privileges that were expressed in unilateral administrative decrees di-
rected to his subordinates.10 The preserved Veneto-Mamluk instruments are 
thus no treaties but decrees issued by the sultan. There was nevertheless an 
underlying contractual relationship, which formally consisted in the sultan’s 
offer (ῑjāb) of protection (amān) and the Venetian acceptance (qabūl) and sub-
mission to the sultan (ṣulḥ).11 If the doge/the Venetians (in Alexandria) paid 
tribute to the sultan thus accepting the offer and submitting, Venice (concrete-
ly through the Venetians in Alexandria) came under his protection and thus 
became part of the Sultanate. Venice was thus removed from the dār al-ḥarb 
and became as dār al-ṣulḥ part of the Islamic empire and thus the Sultanate. 
The Venetian status was thereby in some respects akin to the status of the Le-
vantine Christian or Jewish communities (dhimma i.e. protected communi-
ties of the so-called people of the books, who [contrary to pagan ‘idolaters’] 
had a defined and relatively protected status within the Islamic Empire). The 
inclusion of the Venetians, ingenuously, was even drafted as the inclusion of 
the entire (Latin?) Christian world by addressing the doge as “doxe glorioso, 
magnifico (…), lo honor de la generation de Yesu Christo, congregador de queli 
che adora la croxe, Doxe de Venetiani (the glorious, magnificent doge (…), the 
9 Christ, “The Sultans and the Sea”, p. 245.
10 Theunissen, “Ottoman Venetian Diplomatics”, pp. 39 seq., 43. For a full list of the privi-
leges, ibid. p. 40 and Pedani, “Gli ultimi accordi”, p. 54 seq.
11 Ṣulḥ (from ṣalaḥa to do the right thing) basically meaning peace and reconciliation (after 
a state of conflict), Khadduri, “Ṣulḥ”, in EI2, pp. 845a–846a (also online s.v.); Theunissen, 
“Ottoman Venetian Diplomatics”, p. 25 seq.
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honour of the generation of Jesus Christ, congregator of those who adore the 
cross, doge of the Venetians)”.12 This bolstered the doge’s status and perhaps 
helped to justify far-reaching privileges. The Venetians (and consequently by 
extension and legal precedence all [Latin] Christian merchants), thus, were 
(or could be) exempted from discriminatory measures technically applying to 
the regular dhimmī communities such as the ban to ride horses, discriminatory 
clothing or the payment of the jizya tax. Instead, the Venetians paid a special 
tribute partially documented by the accounts under investigation.13
Yet trade with the Venetians was not handled in Cairo under the eyes of the 
sultan, who delegated dealings with the Venetians to his representatives in Al-
exandria. There, players of roughly the same level locally brokered the con-
crete rules of the game as evidenced by the accounts.
I suggest an explanatory framework of multi-tiered imperial rule (table 9.1). It 
comprehends the Cairo Sultanate as a hybrid political entity, which partially and 
somewhat akin to a modern unitary authority conflates different tiers of govern-
ment (blue). In the case of the Cairo Sultanate, this means the convergence of 
municipal/district, provincial, royal/regional and imperial/international rule in 
12 Thomas/Predelli, Diplomatarium, p. 306.
13 See appendix.
Table 9.1  The Cairo Sultanate’s system of unitary government and inclusion of Venice
Blue denotes the sultanic, directly ruled realm, while light blue indicates fiscal prerogatives 
and delegation of power, e.g. over Alexandria. Orange indicates tributary relations such as 
those with the Venetian realm
Empire (dār al-islām, mamlaka al-islamiyya)
Kingdom, Nation,‘Country’
(mamlaka)
Province (aʿmal)
Local government
(safaka, barr)
Venetian community in Alexandria
Alexandria Venice as
a tributary 
Venetian community in Damascus
Realm of  Latin 
Christians (Doge as
primus inter pares of
Christian world)
Egypt
Cairo
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the person and the institutions of the sultan. Yet, and this is very different from 
the modern unitary body, the geographical boundaries of the different tiers or 
levels of government were not identical.14 The sultan’s direct authority over the 
local/household and provincial level in many ways did not exceed the citadel 
and parts of Cairo. Royal or regional rule was claimed over parts of Egypt (blue). 
Islamic imperial claims theoretically covered a much wider area: the Islamic 
world and to an extent, with the sultan as an “Alexander of the present times”,15 
even the entire oikumene (oikomene) or civilized world. What historical maps 
show as the Mamluk Sultanate, i.e. Egypt and Greater Syria, would be a de facto 
conglomerate (whereby rule over Syria was delegated) rather than a separate or 
‘official’ tier.
I will thus consider the Cairo Sultanate as a conglomerate of large spaces 
around and relating to the imperial core of Cairo/Egypt.16 I take the sultan’s 
rule to be construed as multi-tiered but with universal aspirations on the im-
perial level. The question is to which extent and how this rule materialized. 
What were the modes of imperial governance including the projection of pow-
er to places beyond the realm of the sultans’ military control? I suggest that 
these spaces were hierarchically arranged and treated differently according to 
their function and their importance for the Sultanate. Rule over lower and 
middle Egypt as the core of the Sultanate had to be relatively direct (blue). 
Rule over areas in the wider realm of the Cairo sultanate including Upper 
Egypt and Syria was delegated (light blue), while rule over peripheral areas 
such as the desert borders, Red Sea, or the Mediterranean was left to tributary 
and more independent actors, such as Bedouin leaders, the sultans of Aden, 
Sharifs of Mecca or, last but not least, the Doges of Venice, who carried a whiff 
of royal rank (as some sort of primus inter pares of (Latin) Christians 
(orange)).
14 These boundaries are in any case blurred: see for the only partial/seasonal domination of 
the Hijaz, Meloy, Imperial Power, p. 234 and passim; for Anatolia: Wing, “Submission, Defi-
ance, and the Rules of Politics”; Adriaenssens and Van Steenbergen, “Mamluk Authorities 
and Anatolian Realities”.
15 Alexandro de questo tempo (“Alexander of this time”), one of the sultan’s titles used in the 
privileges issued to the Venetians (Thomas/Predelli, Diplomatarium, ii, p. 306).
16 “Large space” might evoke Schmitt, Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung, which was writ-
ten in support of German expansionism leading to World War ii. Besides its problem-
atic ideological penchant (re-emerging today in the context of the Ukraine conflict), 
this concept is of but limited use in the Mamluk context as empire and world order are 
programmatically congruent, while Schmitt seems to advocate a multilateral imperial 
order, i.e. a world structured around a few competing empires or Grossräume, cf. Voigt, 
Grossraum-Denken.
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The graduations are, of course, somewhat arbitrary and the transitions are 
fluid: Ruling Cairo meant complex negotiations with many power brokers and 
delegation of much power. Indeed, delegation of power, at least formally, is the 
process of power devolvement that is tying together the various realms. For the 
sultan’s power was fading not only in the imperial peripheries of the Red Sea 
area or the Mediterranean but also in some parts of Cairo. Thus power over a 
province or district near Cairo or over Syria was also delegated but more tightly 
controlled as (military) projection was regular and thus a plausible threat. The 
sultan’s power, however, much less pervaded areas such as the Mediterranean, 
the Hijaz or the southern Red Sea area. He thus ‘ruled’ these areas via less con-
trolled delegation characterized by a higher degree of negotiation. The delega-
tion of power in the southern Red Sea to the Rasulid sultans, for instance, was 
largely a formal construction.17
The sultan, as it were, wore four hats: He was ruler of the faithful but also 
Alexander of his time and thus some sort of universal ruler (empire), ruler 
of (core-)Egypt (kingdom), mayor of Cairo (province) and, finally, head of his 
household and of his personal military units (local government).
Venice would thus be integrated into the sultans’ realm in two ways. Indi-
rectly and bottom-up Venetians were organized as autonomous, protected 
communities e.g. in Damascus and Alexandria. Directly and top-down were 
the tributary relations with the Doge as head of the Venetians.
Needless to say that this sketch (table 9.1) cannot capture accurately or ho-
listically the complexities of the Sultanate’s political structure. It is not a de-
scriptive but an analytical model to analyse Mamluk-Venetian relations.18
After a few words on Venetian trade in Alexandria, I will briefly sketch the 
evolution of the institutional framework of Veneto-Mamluk relations with par-
ticular emphasis on two types of payments: the cortesia paid by Venetians to 
17 Vallet, L’Arabie marchande, p. 516.
18 More layers would arguably have to be defined such as districts, the Sultanate’s core lands 
vs. its Islamic tributaries etc. Also the distinction between dār al-Islam and dār al-ḥarb 
might have to be considered more thoroughly. Then, of course, one would have to pay 
attention to the peculiarity of many pre-modern states (including, to an extent, today’s 
England) which are characterized by the coexistence of different types of state finances, 
only partially to be separated from the ruler’s finances (cf. the Roman fiscus and aerari-
um), which can complicate things considerably. Alexandria’s revenues went to the dīwān 
al-khāṣṣ, i.e. could be considered to be part of the sultan’s demesne but it was not his 
private property (mulk), which typically would be protected against the grasp from future 
sultans/the state by being turned into religious foundations, cf. Ashtor, A Social and Eco-
nomic History of the Near East, p. 318; Daisuke, Land Tenure, pp. 177–204; Loiseau, Recon-
struire la Maison du sultan, p. 188 seq.
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local officials and the zemechia paid by the sultan to the Venetian consul. 
Against this backdrop I will analyze the evidence of the accounts under inves-
tigation and conclude by reviewing the hypotheses raised above.
2 Background: Venetians in Alexandria and Fiscal Inclusion
Alexandria had lost much of its ancient glory but was still the main port of 
Egypt in 1420. The global spice route had shifted south in the wake of the disin-
tegrating Mongol Empire and a great deal of the trade with Indian spices, pre-
cious metal and cloth passed through Alexandria. For that reason, the town 
was teeming with diasporic trading communities of many nations and prove-
nances. Prominent among them were the Venetians. The Venetian republic 
controlled a substantial part of the transcontinental spice trade in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and thus maintained a strong permanent presence with two 
fondachi (caravanserais) under the guidance of a consul assisted by a notary 
and a doctor.19
The Venetian nation in Alexandria had a great deal of discretion as to who 
would classify as Venetian for the purpose of belonging to their community or 
using its services including other Italians or colonial subjects, some of which 
were Jewish but also other Christian merchants. Some of these merchants vis-
ited Alexandria only very briefly for the month-long stay of the galleys but 
some remained for a much longer period and established more intimate com-
mercial ties with their Egyptian counterparts and learned Arabic. As a result, 
ever changing coalitions of merchants, typically involving long-term residents 
in Alexandria (Venetian patricians, cittadini, some non-Venetians), well-heeled 
investors in Venice usually with some first-hand experience of Alexandria, 
merchants sent from Venice with the galleys and lower level intermediaries 
(colonial Venetians, other Italians, Egyptian Jews) operated in Alexandria and 
Cairo.20 The contribution of those coalitions to the Venetian community was 
double-edged. While they crucially bolstered trade by providing mediating 
services and insider knowledge thus facilitating communication between, say, 
customs inspector and the consul, they also undermined joint community ac-
tion because they were in competition with one another. They, for instance, 
19 Cf. Christ, Trading Conflicts; for Alexandria in general, see Labīb, “Iskandariyya”; also (yet 
not replacing Labīb’s excellent survey), Leiser, “Alexandria (early period)” and Christ, 
“Collapse and Continuity: Alexandria”.
20 See for example the coalition in which Angelo Michiel operated (Christ, “Beyond the Net-
work”; idem, “Filippo di Malerbi”, and idem, Trading Conflicts).
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tended to undercut attempts to form a Venetian pepper demand monopoly 
that could set a maximum price. By forming close business ties with Egyptian 
partners, they entered into a relationship based on long-term mutual obliga-
tions, which reduced the Venetian communities’ freedom of action.21
The earliest preserved Venetian privileges for trade in Egypt date from the 
beginning of the thirteenth century.22 The Egyptian sultans regularly renewed 
the privileges upon Venetian request.23 The arrangements for the Venetians as 
emanating from the privileges are so advantageous that one must ask, to which 
extent they reflect a Venetian ideal rather than a reality. In fact, some practices 
like forced sales or taxes entered into the privileges only with a considerable 
lag if ever at all.24 The stipulations in 1415 are not significantly different from 
the earlier or later ones. They focus on full protection by the sultan included 
exemption from the ius naufragiis, exemption from inheritance tax/confisca-
tion of intestate estates, exemption from regular Islamic jurisdiction, and the 
right to directly appeal to the sultan. They also confirmed the Venetian right to 
make use of two fondacos, freedom of movement across the entire empire and 
exemption from discriminatory measures imposed on local Christians.25
What perhaps mattered most to the Venetians were customs duties and 
other expenses. Yet the privileges mention them only marginally. In 1419, the 
officially stipulated tariff was of ten percent (de facto possibly lower), from 
which certain highly desired goods such as pelts or pearls where exempted, 
while gold and silver incurred a reduced tariff.26 The ʿushr, i.e. the tithe of ten 
percent seemed to increasingly have been accepted as an appropriate tax rate 
even for foreigners from the dār al-ḥarb,27 while the customs in the Fatimid 
21 Christ, Trading Conflicts, pp. 224–228; cf. Chap. xiii.
22 Tafel/Thomas, Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig, 
vol. ii, pp. 185–193.
23 Thomas, Diplomatarium veneto levantinum, pars i; Thomas/Predelli, Diplomatarium veneto- 
levantinum, pars ii; Pedani, “Gli ultimi accordi”, p. 54 seq.
24 On the practice of Veneto-Mamluk trade, Ashtor, Levant Trade; on the conservatism of the 
privileges and their programmatic nature, Christ, King of the Two Seas.
25 Thomas/Predelli, Diplomatarium, Nr. 167, pp. 310 seqq. (1415), see also notes above. The 
exemption from being treated as a regular dhimmī would seem to be an advantage as it, 
for instance, meant that the jizya tax had not to be paid. On the other hand, however, the 
customs tariff on dhimmīs would (at least according to the consensus of Islamic lawyers) 
have been only five percent, see Heffening, Das islamische Fremdenrecht, 54 seq.
26 Thomas/Predelli, Diplomatarium, Nr. 167, p. 311: osere=cushr, i.e. a levy of ten percent, 
which was normal in this period (Sopracasa, Venezia e l’Egitto, p. 269); for possibly differ-
ent procedures on the ground (with a provisional levy of only four percent on regular 
merchandise and one percent on gold and silver), see Christ, Trading Conflicts, p. 216.
27 Heffening, Das islamische Fremdenrecht, p. 55 seq. 129; Labīb, Handelsgeschichte, p. 246.
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and Ayyubid periods (909–1260) had been 20 or even 30 percent.28 The privi-
leges of 1238 indeed mention a quartum,29 that is 25 percent, which the Vene-
tians attempted to lower.30 Francesco Balducci Pegolotti (fl. 1310–47), probably 
reflecting conditions in the 1320ies, notes a tariff of 20 percent.31 The privileges, 
however, do no state a percentage but only emphasize the continuity of old 
custom.32 It seems that only in 1344 a Venetian envoy finally succeeded to low-
er the tariff to ten percent.33 Yet as we shall see more money was eventually 
supposed to flow to the Sultanate’s leadership; not only to the sultan’s treasury 
but to various receivers thus reflecting the Sultanate’s system of de facto shared 
rule.
The sultans had always imposed other charges on the Venetians. Agents of 
the sultan, for instance, obtained a share of the pepper entering the Sultanate 
through the Red Sea.34 The Venetians subsequently had to purchase this pep-
per at a fixed price set above the market price. They had to accept it before they 
could buy pepper on the open market. This amounted to an additional de facto 
tax charged to the Venetian community. This practice most likely dates back to 
the late fourteenth century, the reign of Barqūq (r. 1382–89; 1390–99), but was 
28 Labīb equates customs generally with the khums i.e. fifth of twenty percent, Labīb, 
Handelsgeschichte, p. 240 seq. reporting taxes for ḥarbis of up to thirty percent, cf. also 
Cahen, “Douanes et commerce”, p. 243 seq.
29 This interpretation is a conjecture: quartum, at least in the German medieval context, 
would mean a quarter of a set regular tax (for instance a quarter of the tithe to which the 
bishop is entitled), Deutsches Rechtswörterbuch (https://drw-www.adw.uni-heidelberg.de/
drw-cgi/zeige?index=lemmata&term=Quart#Quart-2.0 accessed 05.04.2020), s.v. Quart 
(ii). Yet the present context would suggest that indeed the Arabic-Islamic khums is meant.
30 De hoc quod ipsi petierunt quod omnibus Veneti non abstolletur quartum, secundum quod 
fuit usum et morem. Unde precepimus ut dimittentur et non abstollentur (Mas Latrie, Trai-
tés de paix (1872), Supplément/Appendice, p. 72, II).
31 Pegolotti, La pratica della mercatura, xxi (dating), 72: Di ciò che metti in Allessandria 
all’entrare paga di diritto 20 per centinaio, e all’uscire paga niente.
32 Thomas, Diplomatarium, i, nr. 4, 7 cf. Sopracasa, Venezia e l’Egitto, p. 66.
33 Ibid., 292, nr. 154, cap. 1; also: Mas Latrie, Traités, Supplément/Appendice, p. 89, ix; Sopra-
casa, Venezia e l’Egitto, p. 267 seq.; Ashtor, Levant Trade, p. 67 seq.; cf. Venezia—Senato: 
Deliberazioni miste, vol. 9 registro xxii (1344–1345), §§ 351 seqq.
34 The provenance of the sultan’s pepper cannot be studied in detail here. The pepper was 
probably collected as a customs levy in kind upon transit through the Red Sea ports and/
or Cairo (Ashtor, Levant Trade, p. 283; Heyd, Geschichte des Levantehandels, ii, p. 448; 
Wiet, “Les marchands d’épices”, p. 99), purchased by the sultan’s agents in Jeddah or else-
where or obtained as tribute from the Rasulids (Apellániz, Pouvoir et finance, 
pp. 70–79; Vallet, L’Arabie marchande, pp. 635–649; Vallet, “Du système mercantile à 
l’ordre diplomatique”, [p. 8 of draft on academia.edu]).
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not yet inscribed into the privileges at this time.35 It was rooted in a practice of 
custom’s staple right. This means the obligation to exhibit all imported goods 
in the customs area and to put it to sale on auction. The importer did not have 
to sell his goods to the highest bidder but could “outbid” them. Yet, conse-
quently, he had to pay customs on the so established price.36 This was a sensi-
ble way for the customs administration to establish the price for the merchan-
dise and thus to monetarize customs due by taking ad valorem. Alternatives 
were to levy the due percentage in kind (which entailed logistically compli-
cated unpacking, quality control and weighing/measuring procedures) or fixed 
lists of monetary customs tariffs per unit of merchandise (giving rise to the 
genre of the tariffe manual navigating such procedures).37 In order to record 
these often controversial proceedings to establish the customs due, the Vene-
tians had the right to have their own (Latin) scribe in the customs area.38
More importantly, not only the sultan was entitled to receive payments but 
also local interests although this naturally is not the particular focus of the 
privileges. They only vaguely allude to local custom and established practice. 
They summarily stated that no other payments than those thus prescribed 
were licit. These payments included a multitude of other dues, which could 
not be clearly separated from service charges. Venetian tariffe manuals for Al-
exandria list these charges in detail for each type of merchandise. Among them 
figure two types of payment which archival sources show to be particularly 
contentious: the manzaria (also tome, Arabic ṭuma, i.e. food expenses) and the 
cortesia, lit. “politeness”, as some sort of institutionalized tip. Both of these pay-
ments were not due to the fisc or another institutional treasury but to local 
actors whereby it remains ambiguous to which extent they were ad personam 
or ad officium.39
The merchant selling/importing or acquiring/exporting paid their taxes in-
dividually. The purchase of sultan’s pepper and related cortesia payments, 
however, required communal action and communal funds. The accrual and 
35 Christ, King of the Two Seas; Ashtor, “Le monopole de Barsbay”, p. 553 seq.; Vallet, Arabie 
Marchande, p. 644.
36 Mas Latrie, Traités, Supplément/Appendice, p. 74, ii (1238) cap. 5: mercimoniarum que 
incantantur in doana, quando finitur incantacio, si dominus vult dimittere in doana vel ac-
cipere supra se ad vendenum in civitate, habeat potestatem vendendi, cf. p. 78, iv (1254), 
cap. 10.
37 Alessio Sopracasa shows in his most punctilious and diligently introduced edition that, in 
the late fifteenth century, the evaluation of the merchandise was a procedure separate 
from trading, although the customs administration remained also a market place, Sopra-
casa, Venezia e l’Egitto, pp. 271, 374 seqq.
38 Mas Latrie, Traité, Supplément/Appendice, p. 75, ii (1238), cap. 22.
39 Christ, Trading Conflicts, pp. 150–153; Sopracasa, Venezia e l’Egitto, p. 289 seq.
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management of these funds necessitated a stable and permanent Venetian in-
stitutional presence and a Venetian fiscal system or treasury in Alexandria. 
These funds would also cover other expenses relating to Venetian trade in Al-
exandria, e.g. maintenance and running of the fondacos, the scribe at the cus-
toms, the notary etc.40 The Venetian fiscal system was composed of two differ-
ent funds alimented by different taxes. The cottimo alimented the communal 
fund and the consolazio the consular cash box.41 The extracts under investiga-
tion document the cash-flow in these funds.
The Venetian fiscal system in Alexandria was institutionalized only gradu-
ally. While the privileges from the early thirteenth century seem to indicate 
that the consular office was either not permanent or, more likely, that the 
consuls were not regularly residing in Alexandria for the whole year,42 the Ve-
netian Senate stipulated that the consul should stay for two years in Alexan-
dria in 1271.43 From the year 1284 survive the instructions to such a resident 
consul.44 In 1302, the privileges summarily noted that the Venetian consul 
could officiate according to established legal custom (consuli Veneciarum fiant 
consuetudines).45 Although interrupted by a resurgence of crusading fervour 
from 1309 until 1344 and again, briefly, from 1367 to 1372, the institutionalized 
Venetian presence embodied by the consul essentially became permanent.46
The sultan provided part of the consul’s income. The accounts under inves-
tigation evidence that this payment, the zemechia (clearly meaning  j āmakiyya, 
i.e. a stipend for a mamlūk), was not paid in cash but deduced from the pay-
ments due to the sultan. As such a deduction, the contribution dates back to 
the origins of the permanent consular office in the mid-thirteenth century.47 It 
40 According to the privileges the Mamluk authorities maintained the fondaco, but in prac-
tice this was (at least sometimes) not the case, Christ, Trading Conflicts, p. 72.
41 Christ, Trading Conflicts, pp. 77–88.
42 Mas Latrie, Traités, Supplément/Appendice, p. 74, ii (1238), cap. 8, et si ibi non fuisset con-
sul, cf. p. 78, iv (1254), cap. 14, cf. cap. 20.
43 Jacoby, “Les Italiens en Egypte”, p. 83.
44 Jacoby, “Le consulat vénitien d’Alexandrie”.
45 Thomas, Diplomatarium, nr. 4, p. 6, cap. 7.
46 Ashtor, Levant Trade, p. 551 seq., Christ, “Kreuzzug und Seeherrschaft”; id., “Non ad 
caudam”.
47 Mas Latrie, Traités, Supplément/Appendice, p.79, IV (1254) first as the right to import 
freely (for the value of?) 2000 bezants: Consulem: ipse sit francus de bizanciis mille annua-
tim. Assuming a tariff of twenty percent this would amount to 400 bezants. If we interpret 
it more restrictively as the right to import gold freely it would amount to less as gold was 
paying a lower tariff (at the beginning of the fourteenth c.) of four percent according to a 
decision of the Venetian senate published in Sopracasa, Venezia e l’Egitto, p. 268; cf. Thom-
as, Diplomatarium, i, p. 6 (1302), p. 294 (1345); ii, p. 170 (Damascus 1375: el consolo di Veni-
ciani diebia aver al anno bisanti duxento d’oro, i qual se intenda de le marchadantie che li 
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first appears under the name zemechia in the privileges granted by sultan al-
Muʾayyad Shaykh (r. 1412–1421) shortly before the drafting of our accounts in 
1415.48 This seems to be in line with the trajectory on which the Persian term 
jāmakiyya enters through the Seljuq realm (where it meant remuneration in 
cloth) to the Cairo Sultanate. There it first meant the salary of a mamlūk in a 
clerical function by the beginning of the fourteenth century. By the end of the 
fourteenth century, it meant a monthly, monetary stipend granted by the sul-
tan to his personal mamlūks.49 This money was paid by the ustādār or another 
high official, later even in the presence of the sultan, in the citadel.50 Yet while 
the mamlūks received around 80 dinars a year, the Venetian consul could claim 
first a thousand and later, probably since 1365, still two hundred dinars.51
The Venetian custom system and in particular the zemechia payment reflect 
the close integration of the Venetian community (and by extension Venice) 
into the Sultanate as a very generously privileged dhimma community. The 
consul is thereby quasi conceived as a sultanic official as evidenced by the zem-
echia payment.52 The following section will analyze the accounts documenting 
the financial underpinnings of this arrangement and explore how they shed 
light on the relations between the sultan and the Venetians.
3 Sultan’s and Customs Inspector’s Accounts
Turning to our main source, we note that although the four extracts from the 
consul’s accounts vary considerably in detail, they match as far as the essen-
tials of the transactions (corresponding accounts, actors, and amounts) are 
concerned. They are kept among the papers of the Venetian consul in Alexan-
dria, Biagio Dolfin d. 1420, in the archives of the Procuratori di San Marco, in 
the State Archives of Venice.53 They are all written on the commonly used 
marchadanti porta a, Damasco; zoè al dretto che li paga, et cossì commanda messer lo 
Soldam).
48 Thomas/Predelli, Diplomatarium, ii, p. 313 (1415: che queli habia prouision over zimichia 
dala doana); cf. p. 325 (1422: zemechia da la doana).
49 Monés, “Djāmakiyya”.
50 Ayalon, “The System of Payment”, pp. 50–56.
51 Ibid., p. 55, for the amounts owed to the consul see the account in the appendix.
52 Cf. Christ, “The Venetian Consul”; also in Latin early modern Europe a permanent resi-
dent was perceived as a sign of a close union between the sending and receiving states 
(Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, pp. 95, 154).
53 How did the accounts endup among Biagio Dolfin’s private papers? The copies must have 
been given back to the consular archive by the Venetian officials copying them after the 
aborted mission to the sultan (see below). Lorenzo Dolfin, nephew and heir of Biagio, 
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 imported paper (produced by a mill in the Veneto) of roughly A3 (double-folio) 
format. In some cases, only a half sheet is used. The documents are written 
with ink in a Venetian late-gothic half-cursive or mercantesca, whereby read-
ability and conventions (abbreviations, Latin or Arabic numbers) vary consid-
erably.54 The papers are slightly damaged by damp stains but are readable with 
the help of an ultra-violet Wood lamp. For the purpose of this analysis, I use the 
copy by Polo Michiel as the principal reference and refer to the other copies for 
clarification.55
The account is part of a system of double-entry venture accounting (book-
keeping) evidenced by the regular references to other pages of the ledger con-
taining personal, expense and real accounts.56 The left-hand column lists deb-
its: die dar and the right-hand column credits: die aver. The copies contain 
extracts from three different but corresponding personal accounts: no. 45 of 
the sultan and nos. 96, 111 of the customs inspector in Alexandria.57 The ac-
count extracts run over two pages of the same (double-)folio.
The first account (no.  45 of the consular ledger) starts with the consul debit-
ing himself with the zemechia. On the credit side the sultan’s alleged debt of 
200 bezants, here equivalent to 200 dinars, is matched only by two payments 
by the customs inspector to the consul via the Venetian dragoman Obed of 50 
and 58 dinars respectively. The account is not balanced as it was still an active 
account at the time the copies were drafted.
The next account (extracted from no. 96 of the consular ledger), although 
formally the customs inspector’s account, in fact records transactions with all 
three representatives of the sultan in Alexandria, who were involved in the 
handling of the sultan’s pepper: the so-called chadi nadro della doana, the cus-
toms inspector (nāẓir=inspector), dispatched and controlled by the nāẓir of 
the dīwān al-khāṣṣ (the sultan’s demesne or personal treasury); the amīr (gov-
ernor) of Alexandria reporting arrival of ships and probably also an estimate of 
returned to Venice shortly after his uncle’s untimely death. He must have taken with him 
all papers of his uncle he could put his hands on without being able or willing to separate 
private from official documents. It was all evidence against the many (some rather obvi-
ously fraudulent) claims on Biagio’s estate. Originally, the papers of Biagio Dolfin were 
part of the archive of Lorenzo Dolfin and re-classified as a separate estate/archival entity 
only in the 20th century, cf. Christ, Trading Conflicts, pp. 6–13.
54 The most hastily drawn copy is by Carlo Contarini, see Appendix 1; on the further career 
of Carlo Contarini as vice-consul upon Biagio Dolfin’s departure to and subsequent death 
in Cairo see Christ, Trading Conflicts, pp. 223, 231 seq., 277–279.
55 See Appendix 1, below; variants are indicated in footnotes; see below notes 64 seq. for the 
identity of the four merchants, who produced copies.
56 Lane, “Venture Accounting”; also Melis, Storia della ragioneria, 439 seq.
57 See Appendix 1.
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the cargoes; and the sultan’s merchant delivering the sultan’s pepper.58 In all 
but Carlo Contarini’s copies, this account is struck out and in all four copies the 
balance is drawn and carried forward to the verso, which is the continuation of 
the customs inspector’s account (no. 111 in the consular ledger). As in the case 
of the sultan’s account (no. 45), this also is stylized as a personal account debit-
ing received money and crediting given money (i.e., in this case, incurred fiscal 
obligations). The payments received by the customs inspector are listed on the 
debit side. They include 600 ducats from the consular cash box (chassa de 
conto),59 minor payments by another Venetian merchant and a more substan-
tial payment valuing 680 Bezants by the consul through his nephew (i.e. not 
accredited to the consular cash box but to Lorenzo Dolfin’s personal account). 
The credit side lists the monetary equivalents of the “services” to be rendered 
by the customs inspector. The first entry states rather bluntly: “Chadi nadro [di 
doana] de aver che li fo promesso di darli s’el se portasse ben in [lo fato del] romp-
er di la voxe del piper duc. 600 d’oro (Customs inspector to be credited 600 duc-
ats that were promised to be given to him if he behaved well in the breaking-up 
[concluding] of the pepper voce [auction of the sultan’s pepper])”.60 The ac-
count goes on listing payments to the customs inspector which were all ef-
fected in the context of the forced purchase of sultan’s pepper through an auc-
tion (voze, voxie) whereby it becomes clear that there were two auctions (which 
was unusual).
It is worth noting how these transactions relate to other accounts. The bro-
kers’ fees, which, apparently, were paid via the customs inspector, are debited 
to the brokerage account, apparently a separate fund, which had to be cleared 
by the merchants. A payment to the amīr of Alexandria is classified as cortesia 
(courtesy), i.e. some sort of customary bribe/tax, and thus debited to the cotti-
mo, the Venetian communal fund. A similar cortesia payment to the customs 
inspector in the context of the pepper auctions is also debited to the same 
fund.
The copies of the two accounts extracted from the consular ledger thus 
highlight not only the importance and considerable financial implications of 
absorbing the sultan’s pepper but also how center and periphery were inter-
twined. The sultan has a separate account. Yet the extraction of his account 
together with that of the customs inspector and the dominating theme of 
auctioning the sultan’s pepper clearly connect the two. The Venetians must 
have seen the sultan as ultimately responsible for the actions of the customs 
58 Christ, Trading Conflicts, p. 236, in general Chap. xiii.
59 Usually called conto di cassa (Melis, Storia della ragioneria, p. 439).
60 See Appendix 1.
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inspector. They probably planned to address the sultan as the supreme ruler 
whose foremost task was to “erect justice among mankind”61 to redress the bal-
ance of payments and thus re-establish justice. What had happened to neces-
sitate this? What were the perceived injuries that occurred during the pepper 
auctions?
4 Future Trading, Punitive Pepper Auction and Venetian Appeal to 
the Sultan
It is clear that the accounts relate to the two auctions of sultan’s pepper forced 
onto the Venetian community. The customs inspector obviously played a cru-
cial role in it. Looking for other documents of the same month, we find a delib-
eration taken by the Venetian community’s council, the Council of Twelve, on 
7 January 1420, which is three days before the copies of the two accounts were 
produced. It was decided to send a delegation to Cairo in order to submit a 
formal complaint to the sultan regarding the above-mentioned two pepper 
auctions.62 Some Venetians obviously felt that the customs inspector had 
treated them unfairly and meant to use the excerpts from the consular ledger 
as evidence against him. The four merchants drafting the four copies were the 
highest-ranking members of this council; some sort of executive committee. 
Their names rank first in the list of attendees opening the deliberation, two of 
them (Angelo Michiel and Lorenzo Bembo) appear in other documents as con-
siglieri (councilors), i.e. heads of the council, and Carlo Contarini was the vice-
consul, who had to replace the Venetian consul Biagio Dolfin while he was ab-
sent from Alexandria or in case he died in office.63 Polo Michiel, another 
important merchant and possibly a relative of Angelo Michiel, was together 
with Lorenzo Bembo elected to accompany the consul on his trip to Cairo to 
submit the official complaint to the sultan.64
61 Suscitador de zustixia in la humana generation, acordador e mezador entro queli che a torto 
e raxon, privilege of 1415, Thomas/Predelli, Diplomatarium, ii, p. 306.
62 Decision of the Council of Twelve, about the prices for pepper, Alexandria, 7 January 1420. 
07.01.1420, asve, Procuratori di San Marco, Commissarie miste, b. 180, “Comissaria Biagio 
Dolfin”, fasc. III, f. 4.
63 Ibid. and Christ, Trading Conflicts, pp. 223, 231 seq., 277, 279.
64 Polo Michiel, rather than the naturally predestined councillor Angelo Michiel, was prob-
ably selected because the latter was too heavily involved in the future trading at the heart 
of the problem, which meant a conflict of interest, Decision of the Council of Twelve, 
Alexandria, 7 January 1420, asve, Procuratori di San Marco, Commissarie miste, “Comis-
saria Biagio Dolfin”, b. 180, fasc. iii, f. [4], for A. Michiel’s future trading, see Christ, “Be-
yond the Network”.
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What had happened to trigger two auctions (rather than the usual one auc-
tion) to distribute the imposed sultan’s pepper? What triggered additional pay-
ments to the inspector? Over the summer of 1419, Venetian merchants had en-
gaged in risky future deals regarding the expected amount of Indian pepper 
bound to arrive in Alexandria during the Nile flood in late summer and au-
tumn. One of these deals involved a merchant of the sultan, who was tasked to 
deliver the sultan’s pepper to the Venetians (and perhaps other merchant com-
munities) in Alexandria. At the same time, the consul, buttressed by a solid 
majority of the Council of Twelve and thus, arguably, the Venetian community, 
forbade these speculative practices. He negotiated a very sensible price of 150 
bezants per sporta for the sultan’s pepper (market price: ca. 150–160) with the 
customs inspector, who was responsible for the processing of the respective 
payment to the sultan. This support, however, came at a hefty price as indi-
cated in the accounts. As it turned out, the consul and his supporters were 
right in distrusting the high expectations of the future traders. The latters’ an-
ticipated pepper price of 200 bezants was much higher than the actual prices 
paid when the Venetian galleys arrived in Alexandria in October 1419. When 
the customs inspector learned of the future trades and the anticipated high 
price from the sultan’s merchant (who was involved in the future trade him-
self) he felt cheated. The future price of 157 dinars contrasted sharply with the 
negotiated dumping price and thus undermined his position with respect to 
his superior in Cairo. He consequently raised the price for the sultan’s pepper 
already processed (of the first auction) and imposed a second load of pepper 
at 170 bezants (second auction) to be distributed among the members of the 
Venetian community.65
Although the consul worked out a solution with the customs inspector (and 
a sensible one as the consul argued emphatically in a long letter to the 
Senate),66 some merchants felt hard done by and lobbied the senate in Venice 
as well as the Council of Twelve in Alexandria. Eventually this pressure forced 
the consul into a mission to Cairo in order to redress the locally negotiated 
solution. It is obvious that the customs inspector’s account was essential in the 
planned appeal to the sultan. Why, however, was the sultan’s account includ-
ed? This account, as we have seen, regarded the zemechia, i.e. the regular sti-
pend received by the consul as a nominal member of the Sultanate’s system of 
government. The main reason for the inclusion is that the zemechia had to be 
65 On this episode, ibid., 229–249 (Chap. xiii).
66 Ibid., Chap. xiii, letter in the appendix 317–327.
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paid from the customs levied by the customs inspector.67 It might have insinu-
ated a further accusation; that the customs inspector pocketed the money due 
to the consul.
Furthermore, the zemechia featuring prominently at the head of the docu-
ment reminded the reader of the distinguished rank of the consul; that he was 
part of the Sultanate’s courtly taxonomy. It looks almost like some sort of ID, 
an entrance pass, to facilitate access to the sultan. The key elements connect-
ing the two accounts were courtly payments. That is what cortesia originally 
meant and the zemechia would then appear as some more formalized form of 
a cortesia owed to the consul. Hence, the alleged non-payment of the zemechia 
(by the sultan through the customs inspector) contrasted with an alleged over-
payment of cortesia (to the customs inspector and his men). This formed a 
powerful argument and the way of presentation as meticulously drafted ac-
counts presented it with a captivatingly rational and transcultural touch of fis-
cal sophistication. For accounts were not only a Venetian feature and in line 
with the Serenissima’s corporate identity and the tone of voice of a merchants’ 
republic. They were also part of the administrative and courtly culture, of 
statesmanship, of an Islamic empire.68 The minus of courtesy from the Sultan-
ate’s side further emphasized the surplus of the Venetians, who not only duly 
paid but over-paid their dues.
How the Venetian delegation to Cairo intended to deal with the trickier is-
sue of the obvious Venetian attempt to dump the price of the sultan’s pepper 
and the forward purchases/future speculations, which were at odds with not 
only Venetian regulations but also Islamic law, we probably will never know. 
We do know, however, that the appeal to the sultan, i.e. the attempt to over-
turn local arrangements by appealing to the imperial power, was unsuccessful. 
An epidemic was ravaging Egypt at the very time the delegation took off to 
Cairo, and while the consul died in Cairo, one of his main witnesses died in 
Alexandria.69 The consul’s official successor came late enough to eschew the 
obligation to renew his late predecessor’s efforts. The particular circumstances 
in early 1420 might explain this: less pepper was available in Alexandria and 
thus more expensive due to political problems in Aden and harsh taxation in 
67 This becomes clear from the context of the privileges of 1422, Thomas/Predelli, Diploma-
tarium, ii, p. 325, cap. xiv: i consoli de Dimasco, che quelli habia provision over zemechia da 
la doana, segando la quantitade che ha el consolo d’Alexandria, e de questo si fa testemoni-
anza le tariffe de le doane, et in questo tempo non vien resposo al dicto consolo de la zu-
mechia (sic).
68 Hinz, “Das Rechnungswesen”; cf. Labīb, Handelsgeschichte, p. 235. Vallet, “La comptabilité 
d’État”.
69 Christ, Trading Conflicts, p. 279; Christ, “Filippo di Malerbi”.
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Jeddah,70 while the conflict between Venice and King Sigismund (r. 1387–
1437)71 and war in France reduced demand and thus the urgency of addressing 
the situation in Alexandria.72
Hence Venice and Cairo did not revise the locally brokered solution. The ac-
counts nevertheless document that the regulatory framework of appeal propa-
gated by the privileges was felt to be a possible if difficult option. Recourse to it 
was attempted although it ultimately failed.
5 Conclusions: Imperial Order and Local Arrangements
The Sultan’s zemechia and the Venetian cortesia as two different yet similar 
types of payments are joined in the accounts under investigation to formulate 
a powerful complaint against one of the local Egyptian interlocutors of the 
Venetian community in Alexandria. The complaint is formulated in the dry 
common language of fiscal accounting. It is not arguing for a change of the 
status quo. It is not even accusing. It merely asks the supreme judge to support 
them and to redress the balance; to settle an account and thus to do justice.
The Venetian state’s representative, the consul in Alexandria, was integrated 
into the Sultanate’s taxonomy via nominal inclusion into the court through the 
zemechia. This inclusion is reflected on the diplomatic macro-level (privileges) 
by the diplomatic strategies deployed to include the Venetian doge and state 
into the Cairo Sultanate, including embassies, gift exchange, tribute payments 
and the narrative style of the safe conducts or commercial privileges.73
The embassy, for which these accounts were drawn, did not manage to gain 
access to the sultan. Hence, we can only speculate what the sultan would have 
done. Probably not much, for we do know that a few years earlier, in the case of 
a similar grievance, the sultan made it very clear that he did not want to be di-
rectly involved in the nitty-gritty problems of trade in Alexandria. While he 
emphatically confirmed his basic commitment to protect the Venetians 
(amān), he relegated the resolution of the concrete issue to the governor of 
Alexandria.74 The Venetians, essentially, had to come to terms with the local 
powers: the amīr and the customs inspector. The consul, therefore, received 
70 Vallet, Arabie Marchande, p. 653 seqq.; Christ, “Beyond the Network”, p. 40 (referring to the 
situation in summer 1419).
71 King of Hungary since 1387, king of the Romans 1411.
72 Christ, “Passagers clandestins?”, p. 282; Christ, Trading Conflicts, p. 200.
73 Cf. Christ, “Masked Cooperation with the Infidel?”.
74 Translation of a safe conduct of the Sultan to the Venetians, 9 April 1418, asve, Procuratori 
di San Marco, Commissarie miste, b. 180, fasc. IX, f. [1].
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local officials in the fondaco and administered regular cortesia payments.75 
And, in more or less flagrant violation of sultanal privileges and Venetian regu-
lations alike, some merchants established special relations to Egyptian officers 
both locally and in Cairo. They established and maintained these ties through 
business relations and generous gifts (often of cloth thus perhaps echoing or 
even quoting the sultanic custom of bestowing honorary robes—and to which 
also the zemechia, in its original meaning, referred76).
The resulting image is thus one of Veneto-Mamluk trade relations under a 
hybrid institutional framework, which was negotiated locally but in the shad-
ow of imperial, sultanic privileges. The imperial order, as a system based on the 
delegation of power, recognized and buttressed local arrangements. Locally 
reached consensus, tested over time, could become customary and thus more 
or less explicitly protected by the privileges’ tireless emphasis on established 
custom (e.g. in the 1415 privileges: segondo che se contien in le uzanze e paxe 
antique).77 If such rules, however, were renegotiated and produced new rules, 
there was a window of opportunity during which one could challenge it as 
bidca (novelty; a problem to orthodox Islamic law)78 as the privileges clearly 
state: non i sia innovà vsanza nuova (“there should not be innovated [any] new 
custom [as in: customary law]”).79 The cortesia payments as such were per-
fectly legitimate. They were the necessary lubricant, a catalyzer to facilitate the 
finding of consensual solutions to new problems, to bridge the gap between 
established procedures and unforeseen or unregulated problems. Such solu-
tion could occur ad hoc, on a case-to-case basis, without further consequence. 
Solutions also could slowly become established as standard procedures and 
thus become legal custom. In the grey zone between the two, there was room 
to denounce a new solution and the connected payments as innovation- so in 
this particular case of future trade and the respective punitive action.
The accounts were copied precisely with the intention to explore this am-
biguity and to launch an appeal to the sultan. An unsettled account of mutual 
courtesies was to be brought to the court, to the sultan as the ultimate judge. 
The juridical and perhaps more importantly social (feudal) framework within 
75 Christ, Trading Conflicts, pp. 74, 237 for receiving of officials and appendix for cortesia 
payments.
76 On gifts of cloth to Mamluk officials, see Christ, Trading Conflicts, p. 80: on honorary 
robes: Petry, “Robing Ceremonials in Late Mamluk Egypt”; Mayer, Mamluk Costume, Still-
mann, “Khil’a”; Walker, “Rethinking Mamluk Textiles”; Springberg-Hinsen, Die Khil´a; 
Diem, Ehrendes Kleid und ehrendes Wort.
77 Thomas/Predelli, Diplomatarium, ii, p. 312.
78 At-Turkumānī, ed. Labīb, Kitāb al-Luma; Labīb, “The Problem of the Bidʿa”.
79 Thomas/Predelli, Diplomatarium, ii, p. 310.
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which trade was supposed to unfold was (although essentially localized on the 
 micro-level) cast in and buttressed by the interconnected and complementary 
(sultanic) imperial and (Venetian) state regulations on the macro- and meso-
levels, grounded in the integration of the Venetians, of Venice, into the sultan’s 
and thus Islamic realm. The resulting regulatory framework served as a fall-
back position. The imperial and stately shadow was powerful enough to influ-
ence and delimit arrangements shaped locally.
The accounts seem to illustrate a type, or, rather, phase of statehood, in 
which the government, that is here the sultan’s personal treasury or fisc, vigor-
ously attempted to assert direct control over the financial revenues of Alexan-
dria and, hence, transit trade.80 Such control, however, could only be achieved 
to a very limited extent as the strategy of doing so was based, and could only be 
based, on the principle of divide and rule. The sultan delegated power to and 
thus shared power with his subordinates, including the doge of Venice and the 
Venetian consul in Alexandria. This power sharing arrangement, de facto lead-
ing to a deployment of power to the local/micro-level, was brokered within the 
framework of (sultanic) imperial rule, officially asserting far-reaching imperial 
control, on the macro-level. The inclusion of Venice and the Venetian consul 
into the Sultanate’s imperial order, although first and foremost symbolical, was 
far from being meaningless for the merchants operating on the ground. Ac-
counts, carefully documenting zemechia and cortesia payments, connected the 
financial flows between Venetians and the sultan. They evidence how arrange-
ments responding to the economic logic of supply and demand were brokered 
locally and horizontally between actors of similar status. Yet this happened in 
the shadow of an imperial realm emphasizing the vertical power differential 
and tributary contract between the “Doxe glorioso, magnifico e de gran autorità 
(the glorious, magnificent Doge of great authority)” who submitted to the sul-
tan, the “spada del mondo e de la lè, (…) Alexandro de questo tempo, semenador 
de zustixia e de bontà (the sword of the world and the law, (…) Alexander of this 
time, sower of justice and goodness)”.81
80 This should not be interpreted as a transformation towards some sort of fiscal military 
state. Egypt has been a fiscal military state for a very long time. The only thing that per-
haps changed was a stronger emphasis on customs dues to compensate for declined regu-
lar tax revenue, cf. Christ, King of the Two Seas.
81 Thomas/Predelli, Diplomatarium, ii, p. 306.
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Appendix 1: Document
This is the transcription of accounts settling claims between the Venetian 
community in Alexandria and the Sultan/customs inspector, copied from the 
consul’s ledger by Polo Michiel (P.M.) on the morning of 10 January 1420, asve 
(Archivio di Stato, Venice), Procuratori di San Marco, Commissarie miste, “Com-
missaria Biagio Dolfin”, b. 181, fasc. XXIII, int. n, f. [9]. It is an example of what 
Lane would call Venetian venture accounting.82
The transcription used other copies of the same accounts mainly by Angelo 
Michiel (A.M.), b. 181, fasc. XXIII, int. n, f. [5], without systematically indicating 
minor variants in the other copies.83 Variants are set in square brackets (main-
ly parts omitted by A.M.) or footnotes. The word or abbreviation preceding the 
number indicating the reference account is universally rendered as “c”. for con-
to.84 All Roman numerals are reported in Arabic numerals for convenience, 
although in the originals dates, most amounts in the textual entries, and cross-
references to other accounts are reported in that form, while the sums on the 
right of each column are in Roman numerals.
While the payments are often effected in ducats and sometimes perhaps in 
silver currency, the money of account used is the (ideal) gold bezant, which is 
equal to the ideal or canonical dinar (but different from the real-existing coin 
called bezant minted at the same time in Byzantium), rather than the pound 
(Lira £) and subdivisions used in Venice. This might be inspired by the tradi-
tions of Islamic imperial fiscal accounting converting payments into gold di-
nars.85 The bezant (here abbreviated throughout with bx.) is divided into 24 
carats (k.) and each carat into 6 parvoli (p.). The (ideal) ducat (duc.) was tech-
nically of the same value but real-existing ducats mentioned in the accounts 
are worth slightly less (because of wear and tear but also clipping). Therefore, 
they were valued at a rate slightly lower than the ideal bezant/dinar in these 
accounts, at 22.125 k.
For a reconstruction of the part of the consul’s accountancy covered here 
see, Appendix 2 below; for the diplomatic description of the document see 
above in the main text.
82 Lane, “Venture Accounting”.
83 The copies by Carlo Contarini (C.C.: ibid., b. 181, fasc. XXIII, int. n, f. [10]) and Lorenzo 
Bembo (L.B.: ibid., b. 181, fasc. XXIII, int. n, f. [6]) are more difficult to decipher on account 
of their handwriting and damp stains but clearly converge with P.M.
84 ‘h’ (P.M., L.B.: maybe as in hoc the same [ledger]), ‘lo’ (?) (C.C.), ‘ct’ (?) as in conto? (A.M.).
85 Hinz, “Rechnungswesen”, p. 9.
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Appendix 2: Partial Reconstruction of the Venetian 
Consul’s Accountancy
We can distinguish two types of accounts possibly kept in two different led-
gers, a ledger for personal accounts (debit receiver, credit giver) and real ac-
counts (chassa de conto, normally called conto di cassa) and some sort of ex-
pense account. All amounts in bezants as above.
Personal accounts
Sultan (PA)
Dr [die dar] Cr [die aver]
200
50
58
Customs inspector (PA)
Dr [die dar] Cr [die aver]
568.75
19
14.25
680
568.75
112.5
150
95.6
213.25
208.1
50
240
66.3
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Biagio Dolfin [Venetian consul] (PA)
Dr [die dar] Cr [die aver]
200
Obed [Venetian dragoman] (PA)
Dr [die dar] Cr [die aver]
95.6 95.6
Daniel Capello (PA)
Dr [die dar] Cr [die aver]
19
Polo Michiel (PA)
Dr [die dar] Cr [die aver]
50
Lorenzo Dolfin [nephew of B. Dolfin] (PA)
Dr [die dar] Cr [die aver]
680
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Real account (RA)
Dr=incomes; Cr=expenses
Chassa de conto (RA) c. 81, 36, 101, 96…
Dr [die dar] Cr [die aver]
50
58
95.6
568.75
14.25
‘Nominal’ accounts (NA)
These are not really nominal accounts in the strict English sense of the word 
but rather akin to expenses and income accounts according to the American 
accounting standard.
Pepper auction (NA) c. 81, 92, 97
Dr [expenses] Cr [incomes]
568.75
213.25
240
Here would figure the payments 
from the merchants (booked via 
the cash-box account)
Cottimo (NA) c. 95
Dr [expenses] Cr [income]
150
208
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Cortesia de bari [compulsory (?) tip for some 
sort of petty local officials] (NA) c. 107
Dr [expenses] Cr [income]
66.3
Sanseria [brokerage] (NA) c. 103
Dr [expenses] Cr [income]
112.5
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